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Abstract  
 
There is a growing body of evidence indicating that anxiety, stress and mental ill-health 
are becoming more prevalent in modern Western societies. At the same time, climate 
change and mass extinction have now taken root in a period of the earth’s history that 
has been labelled, ‘the Anthropocene’ and/or ‘Capitalocene’. Some academics have 
related these various issues to a ‘crisis of perception’ and a general nature-culture 
perceptual misalignment. This thesis/play is a deconstruction and (re)construction of 
human-environment conceptions in relation to mental health and wellbeing. More 
precisely, it is an attempt to map ‘the spread mind’ in ‘environ(mental) health’ (Mcphie, 
2014a). (Intra-)Act 1 is an exploration of the performativity of particular Euclidean 
concepts as well as post-Enlightenment environmental and psychotherapeutic 
paradigms, with a particular emphasis on those that purport an innate connection with 
nature. The act also (re)views models that measure mental health as an objectified or 
subjectified essence within an anthropocentrically idealised self. By taking this 
approach, I highlight the distinct move in Western culture from an ontology of 
immanence to one of transcendence. (Intra-)Act 2 invites you to think with a post-
qualitative collaborative action (re)search, using psychogeography and rhizoanalysis to 
map the temporal assemblages of six people-environments (a multiplicity), each with a 
specific diagnosed mental health concern, in order to explore how mental health and 
wellbeing is a distributed process. (Intra-)Act 3 and the assemblages present the 
rhizoanalyses in the form of (re)presentational experimentation including, Brechtian 
vi 
 
playwriting and assemblages of mental health. By thinking with a troika of emerging 
contemporary process-relational ontologies, I propose an alternative post-
psychotherapeutic pathway for how we might conceive of mental health and wellbeing. 
This attempt emphasises the intra-relational co-production of material agency and is 
(re)presented in this study as a process distributed of the environment. This is not a 
conclusion. 
 
Keywords: environ(mental) health, rhizoanalysis, assemblages, ontology of 
immanence, intra-relational. 
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Prologue=Epilogue 
 
‘What I write to you has no beginning: it’s a continuation.’ (Lispector, 2014, p. 41) 
 
Scene one3: The death of the introduction: you have always already entered in 
the middle. 
 
This is no longer even conditioning, it’s anaesthesia. We sleep through our 
lives in a dreamless sleep. But where is our life? Where is our body? Where 
is our space? (Perec, 1973, cited in Highmore, 2002, p. 177). 
 
I have a confession to make — I’m a working class academic (with a trans-classed 
familiarity); a proletariat (it makes a difference). Although forty-five years old and 
property-less, it’s a label I quite like because it affords me a certain type of power, 
namely resistance. And that resistance is quadrupled by the epistemological 
empowerment that a PhD affords. I have managed to avoid oppression to a certain 
degree but there was never really a me to me that was in control of this situation. But 
then neither was I the result of any structural determinism around me. My agency, mind, 
mental health and wellbeing are temporally distributed and co-produced by fluctuating 
intra-acting entanglements of physical matter. Well, that’s what seems to be my opinion 
at the moment anyway. It used to be different and I imagine it’ll change again. How 
could it not? This PhD is that story and you have now entangled yourself in the knot of 
it. It can only get more crowded from here. Welcome to the assemblage. 
 
 ‘…all narratives tell one story in place of another story.’ (Cixous & Calle-
Gruber, 1997, p. 178) 
 
The format of this thesis/play almost follows the traditional PhD format and almost 
‘gives them what they ask for’ (Honan & Bright, 2016, p. 7). It is a tense moment 
                                                          
3 Sous rature, literally meaning ‘under erasure’ is ‘a method that Derrida borrowed 
from Heidegger to denote certain concepts as inadequate, yet necessary’ (Mcphie & 
Clarke, 2015, p. 235); to problematise them. The lines through words and numbers 
remind the reader to pay attention to a variety of illusions and assumptions all of 
which perform in myriad ways. 
2 
 
because you may not agree with me or the style with which I have written (and the many 
others who I have written with but cannot always name4). As you read this, now, on this 
page (or computer screen), you are becoming aware that I am speaking directly to you 
(what does it do when I call out your name?). I apologise if it’s an intrusion as I realise 
the many possibilities of that phenomenon called affect, even when enacted through the 
words on a page/screen, but I also need to emphasise your role in this play/thesis early 
on, as a ‘spect-actor’ (Boal, 1979), something which you may hopefully become more 
aware of as you read. I do this immediately so as to draw your attention to it as another 
practice of placing the thesis/play sous rature. You see the text performs with you and 
so ‘in the artistic sense, I cannot claim responsibility for what it does’:  
 
Please note that ‘performative’ texts are very different from texts that claim 
to represent something literally. As an expression of an aesthetic force the 
text has a life of its own and is out of my control – in the artistic sense, I 
cannot claim responsibility for what it does. My experience with this force 
is that it intends to ‘touch’ each reader differently, in order to bring forward 
something that needs to surface and become visible. In this sense, I invite 
you to observe yourself reading the text and to hold your response before 
you as a gift in your hands (literally) – as something you need to be present 
to. That is the work of the text. (de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016, p. 80) 
 
Whilst following the path that this PhD route has taken me, I have produced a number 
of peer reviewed academic publications in a variety of journals, to wet my whistle. 
During this process I was surprised to encounter such opposing and emotionally charged 
views by the reviewers, in such a way that rendered the supposedly rigorous procedure 
antediluvian (hence my nervous disposition handing over a deeply personal product that 
has become a part of my very identity, an extended self). I’ll give you an example.   
For one publication I submitted to the peer review process, one critic (who we’ll 
call ‘peer reviewer one’) exclaimed,  
 
                                                          
4 Thanks for your insight Deleuze and Guattari, you were right, we were already quite 
a crowd! 
3 
 
What a great piece of scholarship. I thoroughly enjoyed reading/reviewing 
this paper. The author should be commended at the highest level for 
producing a paper that is very polished and feels finished and ready to 
publish. […] convincing and engaging […] It is dense and difficult reading, 
though I say this as a compliment not a criticism.  
 
The editor commented, ‘this is a paper long overdue […] a crucial breakthrough […] 
This paper will challenge our readers. It will get them thinking […] You have indeed 
created an iron fist in a silk glove!’ and so the paper was published with no amendments 
other than a few spelling errors (in fact they added a few).  
However, another peer reviewer (‘peer reviewer two’) from a different journal 
submission decided to exercise their academic pageantry with jibes and advice that 
would apparantly make me ‘sound more sophisticated and grown-up’ and anti-
intellectual discourse such as, ‘they should rewrite the paper in plain English (or 
whatever their mother language happens to be)’ and ‘I was also bothered by his or her 
use of made-up terms and the constant, pseudo-clever fiddling with parentheses and 
hyphenation, as in the following examples: “(psycho)logical,” “DeleuzoGuattarian,” 
“(re)search,” “(re)freshments,” “environ(mental),” “embodied/enminded,” “onto-
epistemethodological,” and “non(method).”’. I wonder what peer reviewer two would 
make of Donna Haraway? But of course Haraway’s ‘pseudo-clever fiddling5’ has 
influenced thousands of people’s lives in a very positive way as attested to by the ever 
increasing citations in anti-enlightenment academic literature, similar to the work of 
Spivak6, Butler, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Ahmed, Derrida and many more whose 
writing I find liberating, refreshing and have done more for social justice than many 
other scholars I can think of. This reviewer began their offensive, ‘As I start writing, a 
glimmer of hope still survives in me that this paper is nothing but a practical joke in the 
glorious tradition of the Sokal hoax.’ This is a reference to the physicist Alan Sokal’s 
hoax submission to the cultural studies journal, Social Text in 1996 as a critique of 
postmodern writing, which he saw as, ‘a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy 
                                                          
5 Isn’t this word itself also psuedo-clever fiddling with its hyphen, silent P and spaces 
in-between the letters? 
6 Although I am also aware of the issues of Bania appropriation that the Dalits of India 
have brought to my attention in works such as Hatred in the Belly by the Ambedkar 
Age Collective (2015) that I cannot simply dismiss. Therefore, I shall focus my 
attention on these issues more intensely post-doctorate.  
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thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities’ (interview with Sokal 
quoted in the magazine Lingua Franca, cited in Scott, 1996, para. 10). Of course, Sokal 
completely misunderstood the ideas of the people he was attempting to parody, perhaps 
due to reading the highly influential, Higher Superstition: The Academic left and Its 
Quarrels with Science by Gross and Levitt (1994) and not having read the appropriate 
literature that he was supposedly critiquing thoroughly enough. The authors of this type 
of journal aren’t trying to deny the existence of reality, ‘they are talking about whether 
meaning can be derived from observation of the real world’ (interview with Professor 
Aronowitz for the New York Times, cited in Scott, 1996, para. 23). 
So, whilst one of my reviewers was left ‘in a darkened hallway, running out of 
air and without a viable roadmap to a viable exit or promising new terrain’, another 
was ‘… swimming, wading and backstroking their way joyfully through the theory!’ 
Peer reviewer two asked, ‘I want the author to provide a much clearer view of where—
other than nihilism—any of this is heading’, whereas peer reviewer one found 
themselves ‘nodding and feeling a sense of an 'opening up' of new assemblages in the 
conceptual work that [they] hadn't brought together before.’ These extreme poles of 
thought and response leave me thinking that if I want to pass this examination process, 
the most important time/part of my PhD is the choice of examiner, for I know that if 
one of the PhD examiners were that second reviewer I would not pass the Viva whereas 
if it were the first, I imagine I would! A toss of the coin and flip of a hat. Little wonder 
I’m uneasy. Whoever you are, reading this, I do hope you’re gentle, with an openness 
to becoming affirmative-critical (Karen Barad’s concept, cited in Kaiser and Thiele, 
2014, p. 166), rather than Sokal-critical. What a strange culture we profess and 
(re)distribute.  
 
Readers will read it differently, selectively and abusively, even. Some will 
be offended by it, some will have something triggered by it, others will 
domesticate it and make it fit whatever it is that they are for or against. Just 
hold your response in front of you and let it be your teacher. There is no use 
asking me what I intended with this text: this text wrote itself into being, so 
my relationship with it is the same as that of a reader – what it did to me 
will be different from what it does to you. (de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016, p. 
80) 
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I will attempt a slightly less territorialised and formal account of my inquiry, one that 
is unsure and nervous about attempting to break free, one that deterritorialises the PhD 
structure of hierarchical ‘set in stone-ness’ that I have been ‘taught’ since being at 
school from the chemistry lab to the art class. This is a minor literature, a story of 
oppression and resistance that travels from observation and transcendence to 
participation and immanence. I do hope we make good travelling companions. 
So, here we go… 
 
The inquiry 
 
This study, a post-qualitative collaborative action (re)search, used 
psychogeography (in a variety of environments) and rhizoanalysis to map the 
assemblages of six people-environments (a multiplicity), each with specific diagnosed 
mental health concerns, in order to explore how mental health and wellbeing is 
distributed in (of) the environment. More precisely, it is an attempt to map the spread 
mind in environ(mental) health; a topological7 cartography of well-becoming. The 
(re)searcher lens8 blended various process-relational ontologies of immanence together 
as a product of (re)viewing relevant9 literature and undertaking preliminary (re)search. 
The practice of psychogeography was used as a practical method of undertaking most 
of the data10 collection. A bricolage of empirical materials were amassed in the form of 
journaling (notes, drawings, mind maps, collage), photography, observation, video 
interviews (individual and group), sociodemographics, and dual video feedback (an 
original11 method), which were then collectively analysed at focus group meetings, 
which were also recorded. The resulting data were then analysed by myself using 
                                                          
7 Topology ‘refers not to surfaces but to ‘relations’ and to the interaction between 
relations […] to go below the surface to study processes of spatial emergence. It 
suggests that any spatial coherence that is achieved (on the surface) serves to disguise 
the relational complexities that lie ‘underneath’ spatial forms.’ (Murdoch, 2006, p. 
12). 
8 A territorialised, positivistic way of saying ‘my’ lens. 
9 I place viewing under erasure due to the occipital hegemonic prevalence in Western 
onto-epistemologies and relevance due to its fallibility as a concept, e.g. why would it 
be more relevant than some other phenomena in a flat ontology? 
10 Data is under erasure and is properly discussed in Act two. 
11 I realise that all things are original where time is concerned but that some things 
appear more original than others depending on their focus of either re-production or 
production. 
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rhizoanalysis in the form of (re)presentational experimentation including, playwriting, 
assemblages, annotated Polaroids, syuzhets and transfers, with an emphasis on the 
(re)search process itself, in order to juxtapose, make explicit and problematise 
normative Occidentalised procedures and paradigms that currently exist in the world of 
mental health and wellbeing. As well as deconstructing normative territorialised 
assemblages, the co-emergent inquiry also sought/seeks to open up new possibilities 
and create novel lines of flight that may be pragmatically beneficial to the co-
participants/co-(re)searchers and wider society-environment. This co-emergent region 
of the inquiry came about as a process of group discussions during the research which 
resulted in a co-participants/co-(re)searchers collectively devised rumination12 
(currently stated as diffractive rumination 2).  
 
Why I am interested in this topic 
 
I began this project as a very different person…literally. Many of my atoms have 
now become something different, perhaps a tea cosy or a murder of crows. My initial 
interest was whether wilderness therapy was possible in a country which has been 
contested as containing no wilderness (the UK for example). This soon changed as I 
realised the inherent problems with the inequitable concept and performance of 
wilderness (not to mention the concept ‘contained’), especially after learning of its 
inevitable consequences regarding the displacement of the Shoshone Sheep Eaters and 
Nez Perce (see Act one, scene three). Next, I imagined a biophilic ‘re-connection to 
nature’, until I realised the naivety in thinking nature was an objective ‘thing’ that we 
could ever possibly be detached from (or even ‘connected’ to) in the first place (see Act 
one, scenes two and three). Edward Wilson’s (and colleagues, such as Roger Ulrich, 
Richard Dawkins and the Kaplan’s) geneticised books soon became lost in my ever 
growing collection of social constructivist accounts of landscape/nature(s) (Urry, 
Cosgrove, Daniels, Cloke, Macnaghton, Schama, etc.) and ‘health and place’ (Curtis, 
                                                          
12 I use the term ‘rumination’ here in place of the more formal ‘question’, not to 
suggest its negative psychological association with obsessive, compulsive thinking, 
but to emphasise the gradual and progressive chewing of the cud explorations that co-
emerged. Instead of a pre-ordained positivist ‘question’ (that requires an ‘answer’) 
that may be achieved by finding ‘the truth’ through normalized ‘humanist concepts’ 
(see St. Pierre (2014, p. 10) for further elaboration), ruminations are fecund in helping 
digest information through the extra empirical materials (saliva) they produce. 
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Gesler, Kearns, etc.), followed by phenomenological paradigms (Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty13, Abram14, Casey, Seamon, Relph, Tuan, Varela, Thompson, Rosch, Fuchs, 
etc.). Yet, these accounts over emphasised the symbolic, the social, the individual, the 
intersubjective and human experience as a central tenet and as such, although a crucial 
and fascinating stage of learning that I am heavily indebted to, I soon became weary of 
the subjective anthropocentricity that these notions seemed to espouse.  
 
The psychoanalystic emphasis on the role of the symbolic—or the 
phallologocentric code in Derrida or the heterosexist matrix in Butler—
posits a master code, or a single central grid that formats and produces the 
subject. This social constructivist grid leaves little room for negotiation and 
instills loss and melancholia at the core of the subject. (Braidotti, 2011, p. 
5) 
 
‘Individualism’, Braidotti (2013, p. 24) intimates, ‘is not an intrinsic part of ‘human 
nature’, as liberal thinkers are prone to believe, but rather a historically and culturally 
specific discursive formation’. Gregory Bateson’s and Tim Ingold’s works were the 
transducers that helped me to free myself from these previous paradigm shifts and 
transported me into a much more interesting and breath-taking realm of thinking. This 
was quickly followed by philosophies of mind that took me out of the human head (Noë, 
Manzotti, Malafouris, Clark, Chalmers, Rowlands, etc.) and distributed me around a-
subjective/post-human (mostly post-structuralist) deconstructions of nature (Haraway, 
Latour, Barad, Morton, Braidotti, Cohen, Bennett, St. Pierre, etc.) and the medicalised 
body (Foucault, Mol, Fox, Duff, etc.), a place I began to settle a lot more 
(un)comfortably into. I have also thought with Deleuze and Guattari quite a lot as is 
evident throughout these pages. Some of their concepts have been particularly helpful 
to ruminate with, such as BwO, striated and smooth space, faciality, topological 
cartography, nomadism, schizoanalysis, immanent ethics, lines of flight, 
territorialisation, rhizomes, assemblages, multiplicities, mapping and tracing, actual and 
                                                          
13 Although Merleau-Ponty’s last works seemed to begin steering away from 
phenomenological accounts of life, especially regarding his concept of ‘flesh of the 
earth’ (1968). 
14 Likewise, David Abram’s later work, Becoming Animal (2011), seems to depart 
from the staunch phenomenological perspective that he took in The Spell of the 
Sensuous (1996).  
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virtual, and perhaps many more that have now become so habitualised in my rhetoric 
that I have forgotten about them, although I’m sure they will appear in the script when 
needed. After a long philosophical struggle, at last I had found a place where I felt I 
truly belonged (until the post-posts come along anyway…a work in progress).  
To cut a very long story short, this thesis/play is-was (one move15) simply an 
unfolding exploration of a journey that caught up with current Western paradigm shifts 
until I reached the ontological turn. I travelled from and through positivism, all the way 
up to the posts and into a most comfortable troika of beautiful philosophies to think 
with. The complimentary play script ‘Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too’ (Act three) is a 
brutal wrestling with these paradigm shifts in thinking. The three narrators are all me(s) 
at different times–places (one move) on my journey. The third narrator, the ecotone, 
may seem arrogant at times, and that is another (non-)quality I have had to wrestle with, 
but it is where I am currently becoming. A sort of diffractive rumination co-emerged 
half way through my inquiry after I had tested the waters with a pre-inquiry (see Mcphie, 
2015a) and had already started exploring various environments with the Walking in 
Circles (WiC) group. The salival material that rumination produces aids digestion. This 
is what co-emerged: 
 
Diffractive ruminations: 
 
1. My ruminations: How is Mental Health and Wellbeing Spread in the 
Environment? (Where and when is environ(mental) health and well-becoming?) 
2. Co-participants/co-(re)searchers ruminations: How can we learn from and use 
the experiences we have to understand ourselves better and enhance our moods? 
 
Of course, the only real research question is, ‘what is produced’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 
2015)? 
 
Scene two: Prologue=epilogue   
 
                                                          
15 Borrowed from Barad’s (2012a) description of ‘intra-actions’ that are ‘entagling-
differentiating (one move) in the making of phenomena’ (pp. 7-8, emphasis added). 
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‘a schizophrenic out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst's 
couch…’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. xvii) 
 
Throughout this PhD I explore, disturb and ruminate how mental health and 
wellbeing is distributed in the environment using a troika of philosophies of immanence. 
By thinking with emerging contemporary process-relational paradigms such as, new 
materialisms (Coole & Frost, 2010), contemporary animism (Harvey, 2013) and a few 
externalist voices from the new science of the mind/situated aesthetics (Manzotti, 
2011a; Rowlands, 2010), I attempt to create an alternative post- (psycho)logical 
pathway for how we might conceive of mental health and wellbeing. 
 
And it is into these back rooms, behind the closed doors of the analyst's 
office, in the wings of the Oedipal theater, that Deleuze and Guattari weave 
their way, exclaiming as does Nietzsche that it smells bad there, and that 
what is needed is “a breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside 
world.” (Seem, 1983, p. xvii).  
 
It is this ‘outside world’ that I attempt to explore throughout this inquiry. This is not the 
naïve ‘outside’ that is proffered by binary bias as the healthful natural world in 
opposition to an artificial sedentary ‘inside’ but an intra-relational outside that is always 
already both inside and outside, natural and artificial, real and conceptual, physical and 
psychological. By this, I mean that psychological phenomena are necessarily physical; 
inside is also outside depending on your contextual and relational situatedness; artificial 
is also always natural; and conceptual is also real, for how on earth could they not be? 
Throughout these pages, I will argue that these differences literally matter and it is 
through this mattering that a (supposedly ethical16) line of flight takes place. One of my 
underlying reasons for this is explained, in part, by Daniel Hutto (2010): 
 
Many, if not all, psychopathological disorders – such as clinical depression, 
borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia and autistic spectrum 
disorder (ASD) – are commonly classified as disorders of the self. […] 
                                                          
16 I say ‘supposedly’ due to the concept’s awkwardness as to whether it is even 
possible to have an immanent ethics as opposed to a transcendent one…I’m still not 
sure. 
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There can be no doubt that such disorders make a difference to one’s ability 
to form and maintain a coherent sense of oneself in various ways. However, 
any theoretically rigorous attempt to show that they relate to underlying 
problems with say, such things as minimal selves or, even, so-called 
narrative selves – where these latter constructions are invoked to do genuine 
explanatory work – would require, inter alia, philosophical clarification of 
what it is that one is precisely committed to talking of such things (if things 
they be). It would also require justification for believing in selves of these 
various kinds. (p. 43) 
 
It is a turn to these ‘selves’ that I spend much time examining throughout the pages of 
this thesis precisely because the dominant belief in what constitutes a ‘self’ seems to 
me to be one of the major stumbling blocks to environ(mental) equity.  
In the preface of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, Foucault encourages the reader to use this book as a ‘guide to everyday 
life’ by developing ‘action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and 
disjunction, and not by subdivision and pyramidal hierarchization’ and to ‘[p]refer what 
is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile 
arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but 
nomadic.’ (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Henceforth, this is a nomadic inquiry17. 
 
Use political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a 
multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action. 
The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to “de-
individualize” by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse 
                                                          
17 ‘Conceptually, nomadic thought stresses the idea of embodiment and the embodied 
material structure of what we commonly call thinking. It is a materialism of the flesh 
that unifies mind and body in a new approach that blurs all boundaries. […] The space 
of nomadic thinking is framed by perceptions, concepts, and imaginings that cannot be 
reduced to human, rational consciousness. In a vitalist materialist way, nomadic 
thought invests all that lives, even inorganic matter, with the power of consciousness 
in the sense of self-affection. Not only does consciousness not coincide with mere 
rationality, but it is not even the prerogative of humans. This emphasis on affect and 
extended consciousness, however, is not the same as the Freudian unconscious. […] 
Thinking is about tracing lines of flight and zigzagging patterns that undo dominant 
representations.’ (Braidotti, 2011, p. 2) 
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combinations. The group must not be the organic bond uniting hierarchized 
individuals, but a constant generator of de-individualization. (Foucault, 
1983, p. xiiii). 
 
I attempt to ‘de-individualise’ the re-presentations of the co-participants/co-
(re)searchers of this inquiry by creating assemblages of mental health that highlight, 
juxtapose, disjoin, proliferate, de-territorialise, re-territorialise, multiply, transgress, 
diffract and…and…and… 
 
Concerning the literature review, methodology and analysis 
 
In qualitative inquiries a literature review often ‘takes place throughout the 
qualitative research process since the process itself is iterative and new questions and 
concepts are arising.’ (Literature reviews, 2015, para. 1). In truth, a literature review is 
never prior or post a methodology and as such would be misleading to place ‘it’ in either 
of these locations, even for sake of (re)presentational comprehension. In a format other 
than rhizomatic, a literature review becomes chopped, boundaried and statisized, a point 
that I continually make throughout this project. Therefore, ‘my’ literature review takes 
place throughout this work, a warp of external influence weaving in and out of a weft 
of empirical data (although I would argue that everything can be perceived as empirical 
data and is of equal empirical depth), for this is how it ‘happened’. 
A literature review can never simply just re-view ‘literature’ in the traditional 
sense. Words on a page (either from books, articles, studies or other PhD’s) are abstract 
phenomena, with supposed symbolic ‘meaning’ that relays information and knowledge 
that exists up to the present point. How I experience this physical phenomena is 
empirical, in the same way that ‘field’ research18 is empirical. A participant’s words 
spoken from their mouths carry sound waves that enter the realm of my (un)conscious 
mind and merge and then co-produce a similar event than that of the letters written on 
a page from a literature review (in fact, transcribed interviews are usually written on a 
                                                          
18 As if ‘field’ research is even possible as we are always already ‘in the field’. By this 
I refer to the (im)possibility of ‘going somewhere else’ to (re)enact a bunch of rules 
that could possibly signify or (re)present some sort of truth that is ‘normally’ 
expressed as an event that would always be ‘the same’ (explored further in the play 
script, Act three).   
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page and so also become abstract ‘data’ in the same format as the literature review 
‘data’). It would be misleading to suggest that one were different—more important for 
a particular purpose—from another in terms of separating them to produce either a 
literature review or a results section.  
 
[T]here is no primary empirical depth we must defer to in post analyses as 
there is in the ontology and empiricism of conventional humanist qualitative 
methodology. That is, in post ontologies it makes no sense to privilege 
language spoken and heard “face-to-face” as if it has some primary 
empirical purity or value, as if it’s the origin of science. (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 
12). 
 
The futile actions of ‘comparing’ one ‘part’ (a literature review) of this process to 
another ‘part’ (a transcribed interview) in order to try to expose either ‘similar findings’ 
or ‘different findings’ would only serve to produce ‘more of the same’ (a sort of 
epistemological tracing). Regurgitating the same ‘reliable’ structure to try to create new 
knowledge certainly ‘works’ to produce new knowledge but only within the bounds of 
constraint regarding what we already know. Do we not need to strive for something 
novel?   
 
As Brian Massumi pointed out in the translator’s foreword to Deleuze and 
Guattari's (2004) ‘A Thousand Plateaus’, ‘The question is not: is it true? 
But: does it work? What new thoughts does it make possible to think? What 
new emotions does it make it possible to feel? What new sensations and 
perceptions does it open in the body?’ (xv-xvi). (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 38) 
 
If I were to ask the Deleuzian inspired question of what does this ‘do’, I would say that 
a more traditional PhD format would perhaps not only ‘structure’ the words on the page 
but would also structure the thoughts of the reader-performer or ‘spect-actor’ (Boal, 
1979), as they (you) ‘intra-act’ (Barad, 2007) with it. I would like very much for you, 
the reader, to taste the ‘actual’ process more readily than the more tried and ‘reliable’ 
positivist/post-positivist format of the traditional PhD. I realise that almost all 
formatting are attempts at re-presentation, hence the obvious digestible school-like 
structures of introduction, methods, results, discussion, conclusions, yet as we will see 
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from the journey that you are about to take with me (and the other authors of this work 
that I have read, thought and written with), this attempt would be quite futile as the 
processes that any (re)searcher travels along have already passed and therefore are 
impossible to re-capture. We can only ever present (not represent) a new creation based 
on a previous event (the ‘field’ research) through association and creative engagement 
with the reader.  
The illusory fabula of experience would perhaps be better understood if the 
syuzhet of a PhD more properly (re)flected this. It would be discourteous to the reader 
to assume that they (you) cannot decipher for themselves which phenomena are gained 
from the participants of a study and which from previous studies, for example. Even so, 
why should we distinguish so readily the literature-results from other people’s studies 
and our own studies? Are they not all so-called ‘empirical data’ of some sort that get 
merged into the meshwork of knowledge generation, evidence to add to the richness of 
the particular exploration that we have embarked upon? Having said this, you, the 
reader-performer, who are involved and imbricated in this endeavor, must also be 
allowed a certain access to this exploration in a way that not only enhances readability 
and allows myself to be examined but also excites current knowledge production and 
challenges you to think differently in a way that you may not have previously. As I 
regard various forms of conceptual art the most analytic and inquirous of explorations, 
I would rather this work be judged as such, an extended poem if you like, in the form 
of a Brechtian play as poetry is ‘designed to contain multiple levels of meaning at once, 
challenge the imagination, and evoke responses that are based on something more than 
scientific consensus and rationale’ (Lidström, 2015, n.p.).  
 
Chickens and eggs 
 
What came first, the chicken or the egg? This is a transcendently grounded 
question that promotes a belief in linear cause and effect trajectories and essentialist 
arborescent19 quiddities20. Of course neither came first as they were never 
transcendently bounded in clock time in the first place. Alternatively, we might ask what 
does it do when we ask a question such as this? In the same way, a literature review, a 
                                                          
19 Tree-like (as in Plato’s logos). 
20 A things ‘whatness’ or an object’s ‘essence’. 
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methodology and an analysis do something different when chunked in this way. 
Similarly, theory informed practice and/or practice informed theory 
become intangible as unidirectional quiddities and so when I first attempted to justify 
which type of inquiry this was, I found it increasingly difficult to separate and order 
them temporally. Firstly, theory is always already practice. Secondly, my reading of 
literature (material semiotic empiricism) happened alongside my reading of data 
(material semiotic empiricism) and so a gradual multidirectional co-production 
emerged. For example, when in Liverpool, I recorded some of the co-participants/co-
(re)searchers comments that I thought seemed to stand out at that time (just as the co-
participants/co-(re)searchers did with other data). The urge to inscribe these particular 
comments were always already informed by literature, embodied memory, etc. In turn, 
the comments inspired an expedition of inquiry that took me along a particular path of 
investigation, also being constantly informed by myriad influences.  
 
[W]e are obliged to acknowledge that data have their ways of making 
themselves intelligible to us. This can be seen, or rather felt, on occasions 
when one becomes especially ‘interested’ in a piece of data – such as a 
sarcastic comment in an interview, or a perplexing incident, or an observed 
event that makes you feel kind of peculiar. Or some point in the pedestrian 
process of ‘writing up’ a piece of research where something not-yet-
articulated seems to take off and take over, effecting a kind of quantum leap 
that moves the writing/writer to somewhere unpredictable. On those 
occasions, agency feels distributed and undecidable, as if we have chosen 
something that has chosen us […] In a previous article, I described that kind 
of encounter in terms of the data beginning to ‘glow’. (MacLure, 2013, pp. 
660-661, glow added) 
 
The initial comments in Liverpool glowed a little, a sort of blush, enough for me to feel 
the need to record them. The focus group meetings (re)enforced the glowing of 
particular data, encouraging them to bloom a little. Looking back at the photos, the 
videos, the journals, my notes, also (re)enforced the blossoming of certain paths and 
events. Discussions in corridors at my university, debates at conferences, exposure to 
particular artworks all merged to inform what I initially thought were ‘my’ choices. All 
the time, I carried on reading, being swept along with whichever direction those 
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particular conglomerations took me. When I think back to how I could possibly justify 
what type of inquiry this was in terms of what influenced what (theory practice) or 
how ‘I’ might have ‘chosen’ a particular route to take the study in, the closest I can get 
to an answer is that it was like listening/participating with jazz. This is how the 
assemblages were written. To be honest, I didn’t have much of a choice in the matter. 
 
Affirmative deconstruction 
 
In order to explore the phenomena of mental health and wellbeing in a way that 
fully justifies the inquiry, I must also explore the epistemology that both produces and 
is produced by the inquiry itself (what does the existence of the question of the chicken 
and the egg do?). A post-structuralist ethic of deconstruction (highlighting the 
contradictions evident in such questions as the chicken and the egg) is useful for this 
matter and I think that an ethic of construction is needed also in order to open up new 
possibilities to support ‘healthy’ communities (human and other-than-human). 
Therefore, I attempt to weave a tapestry of mental health and wellbeing using a warp of 
deconstruction alongside a weft of construction. This is what Derrida called ‘affirmative 
deconstruction’ (enabled through parody to challenge traditional concepts, structures 
and conditions (Oliver, 1995, p. 43)). This is not an easy task as merely attempting to 
re-search anything using a philosophy that illustrates the contradictions of research itself 
is itself a contradiction. I do not wish to simply accept interpretation as a given as if it 
does nothing to the ‘data’ as it does ‘do something’. I believe the only way to escape 
the fallibility of interpretation is to highlight the fact that it is an interpretation. There 
are a number of ways to do this. One way is to simply keep mentioning it throughout 
the text as this would keep it alive in the mind of the reader thereby actively involving 
the reader in the process of deconstructing it (even though the reader may ultimately get 
swept up in the deconstruction and integrate it into yet another contradictory 
story…with no escape). Derrida adopted (and adapted) the method of sous rature from 
Heidegger and this is useful for the same reason. Rather, I have decided to place the 
entire PhD sous rature by structuring it in the skeletal format of a Brechtian play (hence, 
traditional chapters become acts and scenes). There is another play within this play also, 
thus strengthening the process of sous rature itself and making evident Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (2004) poke at the Western disease of interpretosis.  
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[T]he best interpretation, the weightiest and most radical one, is an 
eminently significant silence. It is well known that although psychoanalysts 
have ceased to speak, they interpret even more, or better yet, fuel 
interpretation on the part of the subject, who jumps from one circle of hell 
to the next. In truth, significance and interpretosis are the two diseases of 
the earth or the skin, in other words, humankind’s fundamental neurosis. 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 127, emphasis added) 
 
RigourMortis21     
 
‘Stop! You’re making me tired! Experiment, don’t signify and interpret!’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004, p. 153) 
 
Although not as communicable as Deleuze’s interpretosis, I think RigourMortis has set-
in and happens to be fatal. I came up with this term after a conference I attended where 
a prominent academic retorted, “as long as it’s rigorous” in response to my question 
about whether producing my data analysis as a Brechtian play and a series of 
assemblages would be acceptable to him if he were one of my PhD examiners. After his 
rebuttal, I chose not to tell him that I’d placed rigour sous rature.   
Likewise, Pattie Lather (1993) chose to place ‘validity’ under erasure ‘in order to 
both circulate and break with the signs that code it’ as well as wrestle with ‘all the 
baggage that it carries plus, in a doubled-movement, what it means to rupture validity 
as a regime of truth’ (Lather, 1993, p. 674). In a similar vein, Maggie Maclure (2015) 
problematizes ‘critique in qualitative inquiry’ as 
 
it presupposes a corrective technique authorized by the bifurcation of 
nature. That is, it assumes that the world is demarcated or divided into 
asymmetrically-valued categories: authentic and inauthentic, true and false, 
good and bad, and aspires to negate one side in the interests of a greater 
moral authority, or a smarter take on what’s really going on. (p. 5). 
 
                                                          
21 The term ‘rigor mortis’, in relation to qualitative research, has been previously 
coined by Sandelowski (1993) but is used to highlight how to achieve rigour 
appropriately rather than place it under erasure as I attempt in this thesis. 
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The invented concept ‘rigour’, used to judge the merits, worth and trustworthiness of 
modern research, has a problematic past. What we deem to be more important or 
valuable than something else is always embedded in the historisisation of hierarchical 
knowledge production. It presupposes a strict disciplinary ‘adherence to the truth’ 
(Allende, 2012), a way of perceiving the world that germinated from the Italian 
renaissance and became deeply entrenched in the scientific revolution and 
enlightenment to legislate an ‘ethico-onto-epistemological’ (Barad, 2007) stranglehold 
on the Western world. Apparently, ‘Ostinato Rigore’ (constant rigour) was one of 
Leonardo da Vinci’s favourite mottos as he was dissatisfied ‘with uncertainty, with 
inaccurate answers, with unprecise measurements, with the spread between the plus and 
the minus.’ (Allende, 2012, para. 4). Professor Jorge Allende (2012) exclaims, ‘[r]igor 
is also being methodical commitment to experimental procedure, to the need of 
controlling all parameters that can affect the results of our tests […] it is to disrobe 
ourselves of our prejudices and enthusiasm when we interpret our results’ (paras. 5-6, 
original grammatical layout). However, procedures, inaccuracies, controls, parameters 
and preciseness are already prejudiced due to their Occidental framing that subjugates 
other ways of knowing and being. I propose an inclusion of enthusiasm and an 
exploration of the spread between the plus and the minus as that is where we might find 
other, less dominant, minority paths to escape Cartesian binary bias and monocultural 
hegemony. So, one of the purposes of this thesis is to follow a line of flight away from 
the RigourMortis (rigour as the death of variance) of academic duplication. It is an 
attempt to ‘produce different knowledge and produce knowledge differently’ (Lather, 
2013, p. 653; St. Pierre, 1997, p. 175).  
The concept of academic ‘rigour’ is a couple of paradigms behind. It’s as if the 
ontological turn never happened. It doesn’t seem to have moved out of the stifling 
Enlightenment project as it continues to guide swathes of academics, social scientists 
and PhD wannabes as the one rule that can never be broken. “Creativity is fine”, they 
say, “as long as it's rigorous.” Seemingly set in concrete, it channels epistemological 
currents in one direction only. The signpost reads, ‘DUPLICATION - THIS WAY’. If 
one new well-spring tries to break free from the banks of concrete that the 
epistemological current is channelled by and through, there are the ivory tower elite that 
either try to appropriate or contain the rebel forces with shouts of, “how can we find 
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truth22 if not for rigour” and “we might as well award Jane Austin a PhD for writing 
Pride and Prejudice”23. We might. Is it not ‘original’? Does it not challenge us to think 
diffractively about class and gender divisions (especially when read in different time 
periods)? Is it not empirical enough? Are there degrees of empiricism that are more 
truthful than others? Perhaps not. Yet these beliefs in degrees of empirical evidence 
certainly perform in myriad ways. 
 
We have been criticized for overquoting literary authors. But when one 
writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can 
be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work. […] Literature is an 
assemblage. It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology and 
never has been. […] Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do 
with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come. (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004, pp. 4-5). 
 
I have had this conversation many times now at conferences, in peer reviews and with 
colleagues, all of whom ‘haven't done their reading’ and ‘are paradigms behind’ (Patton, 
2008, cited in St. Pierre, 2014). But it’s hard to keep up with an increasing academic 
workload. And anyway, it’s a political matter with political consequences that some 
academics with good salaries might not be too happy to dislodge in light of upheavals 
and ramifications to the Western onto-epistemological status quo. The same was (and 
still is) said about Deleuze’s Logic of Sense (2014) where he ‘turned to Lewis Carroll 
and Alice’s Adventures for resources to think with’ (MacLure, 2015, p. 18) and 
especially Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) A Thousand Plateaus as it’s not a traditionally 
rigorous academic text. It’s not bound by academic rules and regulations. It makes up 
new language, language that isn’t clear. It’s challenging to read. It uses films as citations 
just as readily as journal studies as it is all taken to be empirical. 
My friend and writing partner, Dave Clarke, has said as much when exploring 
similar concerns: 
                                                          
22 Michel Foucault (2000) implied that ‘truth’ was a game, ‘a set of rules by which 
truth is produced’ (p. 297, emphasis added). What is conceived as true, comes to be 
perceived as true. 
23 Both comments were responses to my critique of rigour when in discussion at a 
conference. 
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So why not look to the full spectrum that is open to us to follow the matters 
of concern, rather than the matters of fact? (Latour, 2004). One of the best 
descriptions of A Thousand Plateaus I have come across for instance was 
on the Deleuze and Guattari facebook group:  
‘The way A Thousand Plateaus is written is very intuitive and kinetic. it's 
very unlike most other philosophy writing: D&G don't really try to explain 
in plain language what they are doing. rather they just keep going round and 
round on this one concept. improvising around a theme. it's like jazz. It's 
supposed to affect you more than tell you things. (Brent Lin, 2016)’ (cited 
in Mcphie & Clarke, under review) 
 
The accessibility of Jazz 
 
I have had many debates about the issue of academic accessibility ranging from 
cries of ‘dumb it down’ to ‘rewrite [it] in plain English’. Gayatri Spivak’s ‘inaccessible’ 
writing (see Eagleton, 1999, p. 3) seems to have received similar contestations but both 
Judith Butler and Terry Eagleton are keen to add that as a pioneer of feminist and post-
colonial studies she has perhaps achieved more political good and changed the thinking 
of thousands of academics and activists around the world (Eagleton, 1999; Butler, 
1999). I’ve heard the same said about Gilles Deleuze and Donna Haraway’s writing. 
 
But the idea that language should be clear is not only deeply embedded in 
our anti-intellectual culture but also in positivism […] It also represents 
positivism’s “search for certainty” (Reichenbach, 1951) echoed in the call 
for clear language. Following Ayer, Maxwell (2010), for example, could 
dismiss Deleuze and Guattari, who introduced new language that might 
enable new realities, and claim they are “simply ‘running their mouths’” (p. 
6), which, of course, one could say about Ayer, Carnap, Reichenbach, 
Husserl, Marx, Einstein, Neils Bohr, Grigori Perelman, and many other 
scholars, including Maxwell, if one were so inclined. (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 
614) 
 
‘The wide-ranging audience for Spivak’s work proves that spoon-feeding is less 
appreciated than forms of activist thinking and writing that challenge us to think the 
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world more radically.’ (Butler, 1999, n.p.). Reading and learning a new language is 
difficult (for some more than others) and takes time as all new skills do. Should we 
make French more accessible by forcing French people to speak English so we may 
‘all’ understand it? Should we destroy that culture too? One language (and therefore 
one culture) every three months is either lost to the world or consumed in the Western 
monoculture (Wiecha, 2013). Is this the future for works of art/philosophy/science such 
as, Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) A Thousand Plateaus, John Cage’s (silent) 4’33”, 
Miles Davis’ remarkable jazz album, Kinda Blue or perhaps we should just burn 
Fahrenheit 451? Yet, there is also a privilege to accessibility that needs ethical attention. 
But this can be dealt with in another way, as I have argued previously (see Mcphie, 
Wingfield-Hayes & Hebbourn, 2015, p. 17). 
 
Concerning significance 
 
An ‘eminently significant silence’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 127) is 
exemplified in John Cage’s 4’33” (composed in 1952), where we (the audience) are 
given the ultimate time and space for signifying and interpreting. ‘Concerts and records 
standardize our responses, but no two people will ever hear 4’33” the same way. It’s 
the ultimate sing-along: the audience (and the world) becomes the performer.’ 
(Gutmann, 1999, para. 8). The playwright Harold Pinter knew as much. Pinteresque 
pauses intensify meaning making. It is a dramatic ploy. This fuelling of ‘interpretation 
on the part of the subject’ is exactly what we (the Walking in Circles (WiC) inquiry 
group) did in our focus group meetings, hence the need to highlight them as a Brechtian 
play ((Intra-)Act 3).  
In Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) description of faciality24, ’the mask does not 
hide the face, it is the face. The priest administers the face of the god’ (p. 127). In a 
similar way, the academic administers the face of research or truth (as do all 
researchers). And in this way, the focus group (and indeed the (re)search itself) is a 
                                                          
24 Deleuze and Guattari (2004) use the metaphor of the face to explain their view of 
signification and subjectification. They describe faciality as the substance of 
expression, the icon proper to the signifying regime, what gives the signifier substance 
fuelling interpretation; ‘look, his expression changed. The signifier is always 
facialized’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p.127). 
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mask (the face of (re)search…the face of interpretation). In this play there is nothing 
but ‘[o]vercoding by the signifier’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 128). The only thing 
left to do in the face of these regimes is to highlight, place under erasure (sous rature), 
juxtapose, problematise, diffract, make obvious, transgress, show it up in all its 
(in)glorious delusion for what it is…a play (in order to take flight). All the world is 
indeed a (participatory and open) stage (without the frame) and we are but (co-
emergent, co-agentic) players.  
These theatrical terms became popular in the 15th and 16th Centuries in Europe 
(perhaps as a (re)emergence of the Greek tragedy), most notably during the Italian 
Renaissance. It is no coincidence that the scientific revolution and enlightenment co-
emerged from these cultural developments. Out of these theatrical-artistic-architectural 
events of the Italian Renaissance (and spread ever westwards by the Spanish crown in 
the 16th century where public parks emerged), Westerners began to both view and see 
the environment as scenery and landscape, a drama-tic backdrop framed as a picture-
sque spectacle, something to be gazed at as an observer but not as a participant. We 
began to imagine we could study the players just as we were fooled into believing we 
could study the scenery as inert properties on the stage as something the players used 
as props (properties), as a re-flection of ourselves. Anthropology emerged from 
studying the players on the stage and science emerged from studying the props, scenery 
and backdrop as objects that merely served the players to support their performances. 
Becoming Brechtian helps us, the observers, to become participants more fully. This 
will take time and we may have to be involved in many such plays before truly realising 
we are always already immersed of the play. I say this because I have been attempting 
to become a (fully aware) participant for some time without success. I realise that I am 
always already immersed of the world (the play) but the ingrained nature of my actions 
suggest and force me to believe that I am not. Such is the nature of cultural 
indoctrination. Put another way, everything is a metaphor (association through 
(un)related similarities). A tree is only ever a metaphor for something else, something 
we can’t quite grasp. James Gibson’s affordance would perhaps be a better metaphor 
than a tree for it attends to what it does (in action) rather than what it is (as a quiddity). 
It’s just that some metaphors are more easily shared in social settings but not necessarily 
more easily understood and their products may become problematic as a result of this 
type of generalising. Signs are still only ever signifiers of other signs (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004).  
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The fact that ‘significance and interpretosis are the two diseases of the earth or 
the skin’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 127) is especially poignant for WiC as I 
struggled to find significance in the tataus (see assemblage two/Mcphie, in press). In 
fact, even by naming them tataus instead of tattoos attaches even more significance to 
them, or to what they might mean! Ever more interpretation leads to ever more 
dramatisation until society becomes nothing more than a spectacle, a parody of itself, a 
tragi-comedy. As I slowly came to realise, things don’t really mean anything but they 
do do something. 
 
Concerning the strand of reasoning throughout the PhD 
 
The narrative thread that I weave (with you) throughout (Intra-)Act 1 is a process 
of deconstruction25 and reconstruction26. It highlights how conceptual apparatus are 
both physical and have physical consequences in/of the world. A short history and 
historisisation of particular events (as knots or tubers in time) that have always already 
taken place (and are still taking place in constant re-imaginings/re-memberings) is 
needed in order to de-frame the dominant hegemonic narratives that transformed (and 
are constantly transforming) these conceptual tools.  
 
Scene three: Summary of the thesis/play 
 
This PhD story is an entanglement that weaves together a philosophical 
endeavour and research process in the (un)making. You may read the acts in the 
deterritorialised order I have presented them here (the syuzhet) or in the usual, 
territorialised order/tracing of a thesis (the fabula), in which case you will need to read 
Acts 1, 2 and 3 (the complimentary play script) before the Assemblages, as the 
assemblages are what an academic might have labelled ‘results’ or ‘findings’ pre post-
qualitative inquiry design. This is the order they appear in: 
                                                          
25 I realise that deconstruction is also a process of construction by its very temporal 
nature and that the prefix ‘de’ merely creates anew. 
26 Again, I realise the temporal futility of the prefix ‘re’ and this shall be considered in 
greater detail in (Intra-)Act 2. 
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Prologue=Epilogue 
Assemblage One 
(Intra-)Act 1 
Assemblage Two 
(Intra-)Act 2 
Assemblage Three 
(Intra-)Act 3 (complimentary play script) 
Assemblage Four 
Epilogue=Prologue 
 
Fabula (story order) and syuzhet (plot order) have their origins in Russian 
Formalism and are used widely in film to aid the portrayal of two different 
characteristics of the timeline of events in a narrative (Torrence, 2014). The syuzhet 
influences the reader’s perception of cause and effect (Torrence, 2014) and disrupts the 
linearity of the illusion of chronology (the fabula). In Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) A 
Thousand Plateaus, the chronological order was ultimately left to the reader but it is 
constructed in this thesis/play as an outcome of forced empathy. Just as Christopher 
Nolan’s (2000) Memento (re)structured the fabula in order for the viewer to empathise 
with Leonard’s narrative, the syuzhet of this thesis/play is structured so that the reader 
empathises with the non-linearity of the actual writing process, my own narrative in the 
story of this PhD process and the WiC group’s discussions as they weaved back and 
forward through time and space. Many of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers narratives 
emphasised the syuzhet of experience as their embodied and extended memories became 
entangled with the ever changing present to constantly (re)construct the story of their 
haecceitical27 mental becomings. Thus, an illusory fabula is constantly being created, 
emerging from the syuzhet that is life.   
 
Intermède28: Memento 
                                                          
27 ‘The concept ‘haecceity’ is taken from the medieval philosopher Duns Scotus to 
mean a “nonpersonal individuation of a body” (Bonta & Protevi, 2004, 94).’ (Mcphie, 
2014a, n.p.) or a things ‘thisness’. 
28 Intermède is an interlude between acts in French theatre. The initial idea for this 
came from Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) use of Intermezzo (a musical interlude), 
following the betweeness (interbeing) of the philosophical positioning of the rhizome, 
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Syuzhet 
The aesthetic and analytic style of this (re)search follows a variety of conceptual 
apparatus from the film Memento (Nolan, 2000), including the addition of 
tattoos/transfers, annotated Polaroids, notes, the non-linear storyline (mixing the fabula 
and syuzhet) and even the fact that it is a film framed by a screen. It is an aid for creating 
new knowledge whilst still acknowledging that it is a play, framed scenery on a 
theatrical screen, a presentation of events that have long since passed and with every 
new viewing, it morphs anew. For example, instead of figures I use ‘Transfers’ 
(representational tattoos) to highlight the dominant, yet limiting, decalcomania29 of 
current practice in modern Western research techniques. I also utilize ‘snippets’ (a 
screenshot utility on Microsoft Word) in place of vignettes to highlight the fallibility of 
chopping…to see what it does. 
 
Fabula 
 
The style I have chosen to present this thesis structure, like the film Memento, 
shuffles the fabula to create a different story (a syuzhet), one that changes and 
challenges the ‘outcomes’. By structuring the thesis/play in this way, it does a number 
of things. It gives you, the spect-actor, a bigger role to play as well as having the option 
of choice as to your preferable narrative. It also challenges linear narratives that have 
dominated more traditional approaches to how theses have been previously conceived. 
For example, there are passages in this thesis that are topologically distributed. In other 
words, you can find them elsewhere, in a different format (perhaps as a published 
journal article or chapter in a book). It’s not essential to the PhD for you to read these 
more distant accumulations but if you so choose, you will find that it highlights/frames 
the role of the spect-actor, true to a Brechtian dramaturgy, as the you-narrative 
assemblage weaves in and out of time and space. You may also choose a different order, 
to see what it does, I’ll leave that to you. And of course you have already embarked 
                                                          
but the term Intermède seems to fit more snuggly in my thesis/play for obvious 
reasons.  
29 Decalcomania is an artistic/decorative process of transfer from prints or engravings 
to pottery or glass. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) used this concept to highlight the 
arborescent tracings of representational thought/practice rather than the cartographic 
mapping of novel lines of flight (what I might call a tatau).  
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upon creating a fourth act by merely reading this far, a phenomena Petersen (2013) also 
mentioned in her ‘ethnographic drama in three acts’: 
 
As a funny twist, due to this specific ethnographic drama’s subject matter 
and its likely audience, any thoughts, sensations, conversations, or emotions 
invoked by performing/reading it will constitute a new round of 
data+analysis and form the beginnings of yet-to-be-written fourth acts.’ (p. 
293) 
 
(Intra-)Act 1 will attempt to disturb the anthropocentric lens of your eyes via the 
process of (dis)entangling concepts such as, Urry’s (1990) ‘Romantic gaze’ from/with 
Foucault’s (2003) ‘Clinical gaze’. By following this particular path, I hope to make 
obvious the distinct move in Western culture from an ontology of immanence to 
transcendence, thereby highlighting the invention of the modern conception of the 
subjective self that observes rather than participates. In so doing, I hope to reveal a little 
more of the Cartesian split that conceptually fractured the mind from the body and the 
body from the environment. In turn, I will argue, this conceptual fracture led to the 
belief that mental health is somehow trapped within a human brain rather than 
distributed of a world much more than human. Scene one, begins with the problematic 
anthropocene before following a particular path that highlights the ontological and 
epistemological journey that proceeds from there. Scene two explores ‘the healing 
power of natures’ due to the concept’s increasing importance and usage within the 
relevant literature on psychological responses to environmental degradation and 
inequities (ecological, social, political, etc.), highlighting some problematic 
assumptions embedded within modern Western psychological paradigms. Scene three 
unpacks some oft used environmental concepts (e.g. Landscape, Nature, Wilderness, 
etc.). Scene four tackles the fallacy of the healthy self and the 
therapeutic/psychoanalytic practices that such thinking has shaped. Scenes five and six 
describe the move to an ontology of becoming, process-(intra)-relational thinking and 
an extended epistemology. Other ways of knowing (animism, externalism and new 
materialisms) are briefly introduced as potential paradigms to think with regarding an 
exploration into mental health and wellbeing.  
(Intra-)Act 2 is a (non-)methodology that elaborates on the idea of a 
transgressive and/or diffractive account of the inquiry process. It is an initial attempt to 
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create an alternative post-qualitative pathway for how we might research and even 
conceive of mental health and wellbeing (or more accurately, how we might co-
produce/research ‘environ(mental) health and well-becoming’). It questions 
philosophical assumptions that underpin contemporary inquiry into mental phenomena, 
such as mental health and the conception of mental representation and introduces 
Elizabeth St. Pierre’s concept of post-qualitative inquiry as a suitable methodology to 
think with and from. Within this transgressive-diffractive post-qualitative model/agenda 
I utilise a variety of methods that I contend work well with this particular (post) 
paradigm. A variety of post-qualitative onto-epistemethodologies30 were/are used that 
combine the onto-epistemological underpinnings of ‘process-relational’ philosophies of 
immanence (Ivakhiv, 2013; Mcphie & Clarke, 2015); the empirical methods of ‘post-
qualitative collaborative action research’ (merging Heron & Reason, 2001 and St. 
Pierre, 2011) and ‘psychogeography’ (Debord, 1955; Coverley, 2010; Richardson, 
2014); and performed as a ‘rhizoanalysis’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). This 
combination maps ‘assemblages’, captures flows and rhythms of the rhizomes and a-
centres the anthropocentric self to fit a more animistic, haecceitical lens. This mode of 
analyses is supported and framed by a number of creative outputs partly inspired by the 
film Memento (Nolan, 2000), that include Brechtian playwriting, annotated Polaroids, 
tataus and Deleuzian assemblages in order to highlight the onto-epistemological 
underpinnings.   
(Intra-)Act 3 is a complimentary Brechtian play within a play and acts as an 
interméde between the Acts and the assemblages. It is a strand of (potentially) ethical 
importance that creates new (bastardised31) voices32 for the usually under-subsumed 
                                                          
30 ‘Onto-epistemethodological’ refers to the notion that theories of existence, 
knowledge generation and the practice of inquiry are tightly bound entanglements that 
cannot be separated. ‘Over the years, it has become abundantly clear to me that 
methodology should never be separated from epistemology and ontology (as if it can 
be) lest it become mechanized and instrumental and reduced to methods, process, and 
technique.’ (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 3). 
31 ‘Bastardised’ only in that they are now presented/translated into a different abstract 
medium, thereby altering their (combined) performativity. It is important to note that I 
am not attempting to deliver individual subjects from some oppressive methodological 
regime, allowing them to have a voice but am instead attempting a prison break as a 
sort of diffracted alternative to interpreting and representing their voices, as if that is 
even possible. 
32 St. Pierre (2014) ‘found qualitative studies that claimed to use poststructural 
theories of the subject but then in the methodology section included descriptions and 
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participants in the inquiry process. It does this by ‘allowing’ their (bastardised) voices 
to be fully contextualised within the WiC focus group analyses unlike the practices of 
thematic analysis and/or even vignettes, for example. It also plays a secondary role in 
exemplifying the illusion of representation in research and a third role of attempting to 
locate when mental health might become. 
The assemblages may be read in any order of preference as they perform 
independently of one another whilst still intra-related to the (topologically33) wider PhD 
assemblage. These assemblages wrestle and ruminate with the empirical materials that 
‘glowed’ (MacLure, 2013) when exposed to the co-emergent process of the me-
literature-participant-computer assemblage. What I mean by this is that I did not 
consciously ‘choose’ the direction of analysis, rather I underwent a process of an 
unconscious stream of thought by letting the abstract presentational material flow 
through me as a co-emergence of a multiplicity of affects (how could I not?). This is 
the capacity to affect and be affected. I have positioned each assemblage between the 
other acts to highlight the inbetweeness and rhizomatic nature of how the analysis, 
methodology and literature review were never linear on this journey. I have also 
repositioned Assemblage Two away from this script (spatially) and placed it in a 
differently published format (see Mcphie, in press) in topological space for you to read 
when/if you so choose. As already mentioned, it is not essential to this PhD but it 
certainly stretches it to include another refrain. It is in the tradition of the cinematic 
syuzhet’s to present life in phenomenal time (and space) rather than clock time (and 
Euclidean space), as exemplified in the film Memento (Nolan, 2000). 
 
The epilogue=prologue sums up the journey but is never a conclusion. 
 
In this inquiry, it is ‘the attempt’ that is the most relevant concept that I bring into 
contention. For in attempting to be transgressive-diffractive I change the flow of 
normative events. I simply cannot be transgressive-diffractive as that would be 
contradictory. Just as many radical ideas have been culturally commodified over time 
                                                          
treatments of people as humanist individuals with unique “voices” waiting to be set 
free by emancipatory researchers.’ (p. 10). Hence, ‘bastardised’ voices. 
33 I say topologically wider rather than holistically larger to disrupt the 
topographically Euclidean suggestions that may be inferred from these concepts, such 
as the Aristotelian reductive and boundaried notion of parts and wholes.  
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to become spectacles or tracings, I can only ever attempt to be transgressive-diffractive 
and in so doing challenge the nature of nature through a process of physical disruptions 
to the status quo. Of course if these disruptions ever became a norm, they would 
inevitably need to be transgressed-diffracted once more due to the staticising nature of 
representational phenomena.  
 
To use those analyses, one must read and wrestle with texts […] that may, 
at first, seem too hard to read and with ideas that may upend one’s world so 
that “thinking is living at a higher degree, at a faster pace, in a 
multidirectionary manner” (Braidotti, 1994, p. 167) that certainly can’t be 
captured in advance of the study in a research proposal or a timeline. If one 
tries to reduce those analyses to recipe, process, and systematicity, the 
magic of inquiry can become what MacLure (2013) called “lumpen 
empiricism.” (St. Pierre, 2014, pp. 10-11). 
 
In this thesis/play, mental health and wellbeing is not conceived as bounded solely 
within a brain or even within a body. ‘It’ is not a thing that can be isolated, categorised 
or essentialised within a subjective self in order to fix, mend or normalise. It is 
introduced in this study as a process distributed of the environment; a trans-cranial34, 
trans-corporeal35, trans-enminded, emic-etic process that weaves through a permeable, 
haecceitic, a-centred self (similar to an ecotone36); hence the need to create a new 
concept, ‘environ(mental) health’ (Mcphie, 2014a). If mental health and wellbeing are 
conceived in this way, it begs the question, where should we look for it? Or indeed 
when? It also has ethical ramifications if we begin to conceive of our mental health as 
immanently placed of our animated environments as opposed to transcendently placed 
from or in static ones. 
And so, to escape lumpen empiricism, I simply wait for the data to glow 
(MacLure, 2013). 
 
                                                          
34 Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) extended mind theory sees cognition as a trans-cranial 
process where certain states of cognition encompass features from the external world. 
35 Stacy Alaimo (2010) states that ‘the human is always inter-meshed with the more-
than-human world’ and trans-corporeality ‘underlines the extent to which the 
substance of the human is ultimately inseparable from “the environment.”’ (p. 2). 
36 An ecotone is the transitional terrain between/joining two biomes. 
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Interméde 
 
As Deleuze and Guattari point out, “A rhizome ceaselessly establishes 
connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and 
circumstances relative to the arts, social sciences, and social struggles” 
(1987, p. 7). This ceaselessness of the connections between rhizomes shifts 
attention away from the construction of a particular reading of any text 
towards a new careful attendance to the multiplicity of linkages that can be 
mapped between any text and other texts, other readings, other assemblages 
of meaning.  Elizabeth Grosz describes rhizomatic texts as “a process of 
scattering thoughts, scrambling terms, concepts and practices, forging 
linkages, becoming a form of action” (1995, p. 126) (Honan, 2005, p. 2) 
 
And so, in rhizomatic fashion, the haecceity that I think of as me is led to co-assemble 
this scene and like so many of the Greek classics, welcomes you to enter in medias 
res… 
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Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage One: Liverpool ONE 
Assemblage 
 
Consisting of: shite – Hitler – the fifth duke of Westminster – Logan’s Run – consumer 
capital – vagrant aesthetics. 
 
Semiocapital is in a crisis of overproduction, but the form of this crisis is 
not only economic, but also psychopathic. […] The mental environment is 
saturated by signs that create a sort of continuous excitation, a permanent 
electrocution, which leads the individual, as well as the collective mind, to 
a state of collapse. (Berardi, 2011, p. 94) 
 
 
Assemblage One: Liverpool ONE mycelium. 
 
There is an ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds […] 
You forget that the eco-mental system called Lake Erie is a part of your 
wider eco-mental system - and that if Lake Erie is driven insane, its insanity 
is incorporated in the larger system of your thought and experience. 
(Bateson, 2000, p. 492) 
 
Liverpool ONE has been driven insane. Its semiocapitalist becomings have 
demonstrated many realisations of mental ill-health (depending on conceptual processes 
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such as consumer capital) and what better way to explore this madness than utilising 
psychogeography. 
 
Psychogeography: a beginner’s guide. Unfold a street map of London, place 
a glass, rim down, anywhere on the map, and draw round its edge. Pick up 
the map, go out into the city, and walk the circle, keeping as close as you 
can to the curve. Record the experience as you go, in whatever medium you 
favour: film, photograph, manuscript, tape. Catch the textual run-off of the 
streets; the graffiti, the branded litter, the snatches of conversation. 
(MacFarlane, 2005, cited in Coverley, 2010, p.9) 
 
So, we (the WiC group) found a map of Liverpool37, put a beer glass on it, drew a circle 
around it and walked as close to the line as we could (we couldn’t very well walk through 
buildings), recording the urban run-off as we went (Transfer 1).  
 
 
Transfer 1: Liverpool Psychogeography Map. (Photo by Jamie). 
 
I’ll give you an example… 
 
                                                          
37 Liverpool was chosen by the WiC group collectively as one of the many 
environments we should visit. 
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Scene one: Liverpool ONE (initial transgressions) 
 
Rather than describing to you, the reader, all the variables (such as, gender, size 
of the minibus we travelled in, what we ate for breakfast, what type of clothing we wore, 
what accents we had, etc.) that were part of this process (as that would be both chunking 
and impossible), I shall simply explain how I followed a line of inquiry that co-emerged 
as I went along. Like the line on the map, the inquiry took me for a walk. 
 
Some (important?) variables of striated space: 
 
Christian influenced Date: 09/09/13   
Clock Time: 12.30pm-3.30pm 
Euclidean Distance walked: 1.5 miles  
Precise weather record: Occasional rain, occasional sun, occasionally overcast, 
occasional blue patches, warm (according to me), not-so-warm (according to Pandora). 
 
We (BBS, Blondie, Bumble, Pandora, Jim, Dolly and I) went to Liverpool, as one 
of many environments, originally to find out ‘how the environment influences our 
mental health and well-being’ and ‘how our perceptions of the environment influence 
our mental health and well-being’.38 After almost entirely circumnavigating the large 
open air shopping mall known as ‘Liverpool ONE’ (Transfer 2), we (the WiC group) 
finally ended up in its heart as BBS asked, ‘who designs this shite?’ (BBS, Annotated 
Polaroid 1). Suddenly, the data began to glow (MacLure, 2013). So I found out who 
designed this shite, bearing in mind another co-participants reaction that it was ‘clean 
and safe’ (Blondie, Annotated Polaroid 2). The glow started to irradiate.   
 
                                                          
38 Later in the (re)search process (as a result of various deliberations with the co-
participants/co-(re)searchers in various environments), these questions merged into 
exploring ‘how our mental health and well-being may be spread in the environment’ 
(as it was not so easy to trace either of the more linear unidirectional pathways that 
the initial questions pre-supposed). 
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Transfer 2: Liverpool ONE. (Photo by Jamie). 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 1: ‘who designs this shite?’ (BBS). (Photo by Jamie). 
 
‘Clean and Safe’- The spatial dimensions of capitalism 
 
‘Evolution is a messy business. Like modern capitalism, evolution is a process of 
creative destruction.’ (Ellison, 2013, p. 19) 
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Annotated Polaroid 2: ‘clean and safe’ (Blondie). (Photo by Jamie). 
 
So, in one form or another, we-all of us, architects, builders, planners, and 
financiers, who have taken part in the construction of the modern 
environment-have participated, willy-nilly, and for the most part with little 
more than mild objection to this robbing of the earth. That is what I mean 
by a mass psychosis. (Alexander, 2002, p. 6) 
 
Oppenheim (2014, para. 3) informs us that ‘[i]n 2008, Liverpool City 
Council renounced all control over the city centre and sold off 170,000 square metres 
of land to a private developer called Grosvenor’. Thirty-five of Liverpool’s historic city-
centre streets were privatised and replaced with one-hundred-and-seventy consumer 
outlets, changing the nature of its local identity (Oppenheim, 2014). Oppenheim (2014) 
continues, ‘the privatisation of public space has been reinforced by private security 
personnel and CCTV cameras which observe the movement of citizens’ who ‘can be 
observed from all angles’ (para. 3). This ‘development’ smarts of Foucault’s (1995) 
description of the ‘panopticon’ where people become an object of information rather 
than a subject in communication or Latour’s (2005) ‘oligopticon’ where ‘they see much 
too little to feed the megalomania of the inspector or the paranoia of the inspected, but 
what they see, they see it well’ (p. 181). Both examples highlight an Orwellian dystopia 
that may be too subtle for many to notice or obvious to some depending on the social, 
material, political, sub-cultural lens that we look through39. For example, there is an 
                                                          
39 As ‘through’ might imply a quiddital self behind the lens, I place it under erasure. 
‘With’ might be more fitting. 
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obvious difference between BBS’s comment about the shite design of this space and 
Blondie’s notions of it being clean and safe. But there is a certain contradiction and 
juxtaposition here that is made evident by Mike Bartlett’s (2015) BBC four radio play, 
A Steal. Through the words of the main character, Hanna, Bartlett (2015) explores a 
particular reaction to the current economic crisis and ‘how it affects the fabric of society 
and community’: 
 
The department store where I work is in this bit of town called Liverpool 
ONE. There was all this controversy. Basically, from what I could tell, the 
council or the mayor or someone sold off this huge bit of the city to a private 
company to build this big shopping thing and now they own it, run it. So, 
it’s not the police on the streets, it’s their security and the roads that were 
like public roads are now like private so you don’t have the right to walk 
down them, it’s up to them. They can do what they want. If they don’t like 
the look of you, they can throw you out; if you’re the wrong type, colour or 
poor, the council or the mayor or whoever it was did it, they took these roads 
that belonged to us and sold them. Still, it looks nice!  
 
Here Hanna reveals the (not so) obvious ethical dilemma introduced by Grosvenor’s 
impositions yet also admits to the culturally received aesthetics of place that she is 
clearly caught up in (with it looking ‘nice’). Both Blondie and BBS are caught up in the 
very same aesthetic contradictions, as are we all.  
 
‘Still, it looks nice!’ 
 
Liverpool ONE’s Chavasse Park also has a ‘nature trail’ (Annotated Polaroid 
3)! Unfortunately we didn’t spot the squirrels, bumblebees or ladybirds as depicted in 
this picture but ‘liverpool-one.com’ (It's all about being green at Liverpool ONE’, 2015) 
states it ‘is home to more than 150 species of insects, birds and animals, transforms 
waste food into water, and diverts 94% of 3,266 tonnes of refuse from landfill’ (para. 2) 
and were awarded the ‘British Standard for environmental management’ (para. 8). 
 
36 
 
  
Annotated Polaroid 3: Liverpool ONE Nature Trail. (Photo by Jamie). 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 4: The view of the nature trail looking from point 2 on the 
‘nature trail’ map (above) to point 11. (Photo by Jamie). 
 
However, there seems to be some disparity, evident in the difference between 
the two pictures (Annotated Polaroid 3 and 4), in terms of what we are sold and what 
we actually experience.  
A global assessment of urbanization, biodiversity and ecosystem services led 
Muller et al. (2013) to conclude that ‘gardens are developed for visual appeal and do 
not increase trophic diversity and often are not self-sustaining’ (p. 136). ‘Unimproved’ 
grasslands tend to be high in species diversity compared to the limited range of species 
in ‘improved’ grasslands, such as ‘recreational swards’ (Price, 2003, p. 24). The grass 
in Chavasse Park is made up of Perennial rye grass and fescue grass—I asked one of 
the landscape gardeners who was busy unrolling the pre-packaged turf (Annotated 
Polaroid 5)—common on golf courses and a significant contributor to hay fever. It had 
a shiny appearance in the sunlight, apparently caused by the high percent of rye-grass. 
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Although lawns in the UK generally contain native species of grass, hegemonic 
aesthetic practices are often exported resulting in ‘a homogenization of lawn flora 
around the globe as a result of globalization’ (Muller et al., 2013, p. 137), increasing 
the occurrence of bio-paucity. 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 5: Pre-packaged turf. (Photo by Jamie). 
 
The company (Grosvenor) are very keen to sell the green credentials of its five 
acre park as part of the larger forty-two acre open air shopping mall. It has a vested 
interest in it. The sales pitch begins, ‘Liverpool ONE’s ‘green crusaders’ have been 
making a huge eco-friendly impact on the city centre complex, a new report has found.’ 
(It's all about being green at Liverpool ONE’, 2015, para. 1, emphasis added). 
Capitalism needs to be alert to current trends in the marketplace and being ‘eco-friendly’ 
is certainly a big sell in the current climate. Yet the ‘reasons’ for the inclusion of bio-
diversity may have trickle-down consequences. There is a trophic cascade40 of ethical 
intensions that may be omitted due to practices such as ‘greenwashing’. Simply 
following an ‘eco-friendly’ agenda based on capitalist economics seems here to omit 
some important strategies for securing various forms of diversity such as; creative, 
economic, political, aesthetic, cultural, social, material, conceptual, perceptual and 
affective diversities.41 Only the ‘bio’-diversity is sold to the consumer as of any 
                                                          
40 ‘American zoologist Robert Paine coined the term trophic cascade in 1980 to 
describe reciprocal changes in food webs caused by experimental manipulations of top 
predators.’ (Carpenter, 2016, para. 1, sous rature added). I place ‘top’ under erasure 
due to the arborescent ontology it infers.  
41 It is important to note here that modern forms of capitalism that homogenise also 
create diversity, yet this ‘version’ of diversity often leads to unhealthy social 
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relevance. But even within this supposedly eco-friendly bio-model it seems to have 
omitted a particular species, the non-consumer. And within the regulations of its 
symmetrical eco-agenda, one particular non-consumer is singled out to be weeded 
before all others, which we will eventually come to in this assemblage.  
Oppenheim (2014) warns that in this space (Liverpool ONE), ‘imposed 
identities have become increasingly prescriptive and fixed. The space for non-consumer 
subjectivities and activities is fast diminishing’ (para. 7) and so we may become 
oblivious (or even apathetic) to the material-cultural terrain; we may become android 
to a particular societal spectacle, one that continues to show signs of a homogenous 
capitalist consumption (homogenous diversity) rather than a more healthy production of 
heterogeneous diversity.  
Oppenheim (2014), complains: 
 
surveillance, behavioural controls and policing strategies are used to 
eradicate visible signs of unrest and deter unwanted visitors from town 
centres and shopping streets […] to discourage non-consuming activities, 
such as busking, skateboarding, political gatherings, musical performances 
or any other ungovernable, impromptu behaviour […]   If you do not have 
a license you can be accused of trespass […] Non-consumers, such as the 
homeless, the unemployed, the poor, the young and the old are branded as 
‘others’ to the hegemonic consumer order. In turn, cities are able to 
demarcate between who is welcome and who is not. (paras. 4-6). 
 
It seems that Liverpool ONE is keen to cover this social paucity with its claims to the 
biodiversity of Chavasse park. They do, however, choose and vet their own buskers and 
artists, yet these have already been appropriated by the corporate machine like permitted 
artistic graffiti over apparantly anti-social (and illegal) tags in other areas of the city 
(see Assemblage Two/Mcphie, in press).  
                                                          
separations such as the rise of nationalism where difference between groups is 
encouraged and protected at the same time as feared. In this model, initially, the 
borders between groups are deterritorialised before reterritorialising them as their 
impervious nature is reinforced and as such gives rise to what Vandana Shiva (1993) 
might call ‘monocultures of the mind’. In this model, other forms of diversity 
(cultural, bio, inorganic, conceptual, etc.) are subsumed, consumed or obliterated 
within its colonising parasitic structure.  
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The Victorians protested (on the streets) to get ‘the streets’ back in to public hands 
and it worked, until recently (as this sort of privatisation has been spreading across the 
UK). This dystopian construct reminds me of literary authors such as, Huxley, Orwell 
and Bradbury, films like Metropolis (Lang, 1927), or Logan’s Run (Anderson, 1975) 
and more recent novels for teenagers such as, The Hunger Games (Collins, 2008). In 
fact, even the architecture of Liverpool ONE was similar to that of the city in Logan’s 
Run, as was discussed by the WiC group when we were there. ‘I think of it as a mass 
psychosis of unprecedented dimension, in which the people of earth-in large numbers 
and in almost all contemporary societies-have created a form of architecture which is 
against life, insane, image-ridden, hollow.’ (Alexander, 2002, p. 6). This is the legacy 
of the open-air shopping mall. Panem (Collins, 2008) has already become a reality. 
 
Anna Minton (2012) imagines:  
 
trying to privatize a piazza. So many genuinely public places in towns and 
cities all over southern and northern Europe, in Italy, Spain, Greece, France, 
Holland, Germany and Scandinavia, are thriving. Families and groups of 
people stroll arm in arm taking the passeggiata, children run around and old 
people sit together on benches. These places do not follow the American 
Clean and Safe agenda of the shopping mall, but they are not dirty and 
dangerous as a result. Far from it, they are healthier and happier. It is no 
coincidence that rates of mental illness in continental Europe are half those 
in Britain and America (p.195-196, emphases added, glow added). 
 
So how does Blondie come to ‘love Liverpool’ and say that Liverpool ONE is ‘clean 
and safe’, especially if, as Minton suggests, the privatisation of space may affect our 
mental health? And is it simply by chance that Minton mentions the very same words 
to describe the American shopping mall agenda that Blondie exclaimed when standing 
in Liverpool ONE, clean and safe? 
Transfer 3 is a screenshot taken directly from Grosnevor’s Office Service 
Charge Brochure (2012). Even the word ‘brochure’ is suggestive of selling the streets 
to customers in order to maintain the illusion of an autonomy of choice under neo-liberal 
capitalist economics. Notice the highlighted words that glowed for me when I first read 
this document. 
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Transfer 3: Grosvenor’s Office Service Charge Brochure (2012, p. 1, glow added) 
 
Hanna’s comment, ‘Still, it looks nice!’ from Bartlett’s (2015) radio play is 
symptomatic of Grosvenor’s consumer aesthetic. Blondie’s comment of Liverpool 
ONE as ‘clean and safe’ seems to have somehow jumped off this brochure and into her 
mind (or the other way round). ‘Capitalism “launches (subjective) models the way the 
automobile industry launches a new line of cars.”’ (Guattari, 1977, p. 95, cited in 
Lazzarato, 2014, p. 8). In this way, subjectivity is produced through the articulation of 
‘economic, technological and social flows’, where ‘political economy is identical with 
“subjective economy.”’ (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 8) as ‘everyday life is becoming 
increasingly consumerized’ (Žižek, 2011, cited in Bridger, 2015, p. 228) under its 
General; ‘privatisation’. 
Guattari’s and Lazzarato’s comments here are typical examples of what is 
explored and often revealed through the practice of psychogeography (especially 
contemporary psychogeographic practices, such as Richardson’s Schizocartography 
(2014, 2015), Rose’s Anarcho-Flâneuse (2015) or the antipsychological 
psychogeographical practice of Bridger (2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015)). For example, 
Richardson’s Schizocartography takes Guattari’s molecular revolutions (1984), 
schizoanalysis (1998) and schizoanalytic cartographies (2013) and re-weaves them in 
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order to produce a practice that reveals a (capitalist) subject’s behaviour who takes 
consumption to be the norm and/or pervading form of consciousness. 
 
For Guattari, ‘capitalist subjectivity’ (2013, 44) is a worldview that not only 
pervades the daily lives of people but also orients them according to a 
singular form of desire that predominantly involves the attainment of mass-
produced consumer goods. While it might appear that capitalism is simply 
an economic system, even if we do choose to accept that it can influence 
our consciousness, what has capital got to do with the way the city is 
manifest; the way it is formed out of buildings, routes and spaces; and the 
effect it has on individuals who move about it? (Richardson, 2015, p. 184) 
 
Just as I was about to investigate this interesting conundrum (flow of material) further 
(that I imagined may have revealed Blondie’s ties to Liverpool ONE’s privatised 
spaces), I decided to read the second page of the brochure (as a diffractive act of 
changing direction before I began to interpret and make meaning out of Blondie’s 
words) which began to reveal some very worrying language (Transfer 4).  
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Transfer 4: Grosvenor’s Office Service Charge Brochure (2012, p. 2, glow added) 
 
Note that the striated Platonic/Cartesian/Newtonian concept/language of anti-
social ‘elements’ comes directly from Euclidean geometry and Mendeleev’s chemistry. 
I wonder which element they are as I’ve searched the periodic table and cannot find 
them (Transfer 5)? I do not mean this metaphorically or even as a joke. I mean it literally. 
My objection to the use of the word ‘element’ here is not merely semantics as words 
literally perform and matter in their mattering (after Butler and Barad). These words 
(and use of words) create an opinion that forms in our shared cultural-mental space. It 
then gets dispersed through our media and our altered behaviour soon follows. A sort 
of non-linear trophic cascade is enacted. 
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Transfer 5: ‘the elimination of anti-social elements such as vagrants and beggars’ 
(Grosvenor’s Office Service Charge Brochure, 2012). (Periodic Table created by 
Sandbh, 2015). 
 
As this ‘data’ (or rather rhizomatic ‘line’) seems key, from an ethical perspective, 
I decided to follow it, believing it to be a glowing example of empirical importance as 
to how the environment (in this case the topological environment of the internet as well 
as the physical architectural space of Liverpool ONE) influences our mental health and 
wellbeing (one of my initial questions) and may, therefore, provide further material to 
tease out what the shite designs of Liverpool ONE’s clean and safe environment does.  
 
Scene two: The elimination of people 
 
‘Elimination’, ‘anti-social’, ‘elements’! This language is not idle. It comes from 
somewhere and it does something. For example, referring to people as ‘elements’ is 
reductionist and dangerous. By association, this type of language infers that 
(consumerist) normative society, as a superior and separate group of living organisms, 
are different from vagrants and beggars who have been reduced to more static and 
essential elements on an invented periodic table. They’ve been chunked! Through the 
use and abuse of conceptual apparatus (such as scientised words), it essentialises and 
fixes certain groups of people into material properties that may now be judged and 
deemed unworthy of normative consumer ‘life’ and therefore must be ‘eliminated’ (in 
the very subtle way that Western societies eliminate, mostly by creating regulations or 
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media campaigns designed to remove unwanted problems…such as vagrants and 
beggars). Sometimes however, this language goes further. For example, in 1963 a 
Brazilian rubber company massacred a tribe. It was named the massacre of the 11th 
parallel: 
 
The head of the company, Antonio Mascarenhas Junqueira, planned the 
massacre, deeming the Cinta Larga Indians to be in the way of his 
commercial activities. ‘These Indians are parasites, they are shameful. It’s 
time to finish them off, it’s time to eliminate these pests. Let’s liquidate 
these vagabonds.’ He hired a small plane, from which sticks of dynamite 
were hurled into a Cinta Larga village below. Later, some of the killers 
returned on foot to finish off the survivors – finding a woman breastfeeding 
her child, they shot the baby’s head off, and then hung her upside down and 
sliced her in half […] In 1975 one of the perpetrators, José Duarte de Prado, 
was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, but was pardoned later that year. 
He declared during the trial, ‘It’s good to kill Indians – they are lazy and 
treacherous.’ (Survival International, n.d., n.p., emphasis added) 
 
This type of behaviour is associated with the language we inherit from our culture. 
Again we see words such as ‘eliminate’, ‘pests’ and ‘vagabonds’. The indigenous 
population were seen as lazy parasites perhaps because they were not deemed to be 
useful to their version/vision of a civilised capitalist society, preventing progress, 
similar to vagrants and beggars. In Middle English the words vagabond and vagrant 
were related to a person without a settled home but became synonymous with idleness, 
disreputability and criminality (Harper, 2016a). After the Napoleonic wars resulted in 
many homeless people in the United Kingdom, the vagrant act of 1824 made it an 
offence to sleep rough or beg (Transfer 6): 
45 
 
 
Transfer 6: Vagrant Act of 1824 (n.a.) 
 
This act is still in use today. In 1988, 573 people were prosecuted and convicted 
in England and Wales under the act (Hargreaves, 1991, column 863). In 2014, three men 
were arrested for ‘stealing’ discarded food (cheese, mushrooms, tomatoes and cakes) 
found in a skip outside the store ‘Iceland’ in London and were charged under the vagrant 
act of 1824, although the case was later dropped (Iceland food bin theft case dropped 
by CPS, 2014). 
In an article for the online forum ‘Open Democracy’ entitled, The modern return 
of Vagrancy Law, Hermer (2014) reports:  
 
In a jigsaw of related criminal justice amendments, the government has 
revitalized the ‘rough sleeping’ (s, 4) and ‘begging’ (s, 3) offences of the 
Vagrancy Act and crafted them into everyday tools to move on and arrest 
visibly poor people. To make matters even more worrisome, the 
empowerment of the 1824 Act has occurred in tandem with an increasing 
array of powers given to civilian police Community Safety Officers (CSOs) 
to fight anti-social behaviour. Currently, CSOs can move on or detain people 
who are begging or rough sleeping for delivery to the police. […] These 
ramped up powers, practically non-existent a decade ago, suggest that the 
vagrancy Act has become a major tool once again to police visibly poor 
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people, using the raison d’etre of vagrancy law – the crime of being 
suspicious. (paras. 9-10) 
 
It is no accident that the words vagrant and vagabond are also linked to the word vague 
as they originated from the terms wandering, strolling, unsteady and undecided (Harper, 
2016a). In pre-enlightenment Europe, someone who wandered from place to place was 
most certainly not of aristocratic social standing (as they would be carried either by 
horse, carriage or even other humans). It was only during the Picturesque and Romantic 
periods that wandering began to be seen as something that a gentleman could do (the 
urban version being termed a flâneur). These class-based notions of wandering and 
vagrancy have been distributed since the agricultural revolution (often referred to as the 
birthplace of capitalism42) to form a palimpsest of judgement in the modern mind. 
Therefore, many indigenous people, often associated with a more primitive form of 
wandering—nomadism—are not ‘civilised’ and may be seen as ‘other’, such as pests, 
vagrants and vagabonds to be reduced to elements and eventually eliminated.  
In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault (1995) claimed that 
to the capitalist establishment, ‘the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a 
productive body and a subjected body’ (p. 26).  Reducing a human to this sort of 
description and labelling (elements, pests, vagrants, vagabonds, beggars) may not only 
render certain ‘unproductive’ bodies as unwanted but also change our conceptions and 
perceptions about that (or that group of) human(s).  
The concept ‘elements’ also stems from a reductionist positivist epistemology 
that does not ‘fit’ with certain ethical considerations when discussing ‘real lives’ 
(whatever they may be argued to be). Then of course there is the rather more blatant 
language of ‘elimination’ and ‘anti-social’ (which often just means ‘social’ but is ‘sold’ 
                                                          
42 Following the work of Marx and Engels, ‘[i]n his history of the development of 
social classes, Martin Empson (2014) informs us that as agriculture became centred on 
permanent settlements, society became divided into distinct classes (40). As 
agricultural surplus grew, certain individuals and their family groups began to form a 
social class which controlled a part of society's wealth (Empson, 2014).’ (Mcphie, 
2014a, para. 14). ‘Consequently, 'with the rise of class society, there is a 
corresponding development of the state' which is 'made up of institutions and 
organisations that exist to protect the interests of the ruling class' (Empson, 2014, 41). 
This undoubtedly brings with it the exploitation of one class by another, even if those 
ruling class interests are subtly hidden away from a public consciousness within those 
institutions.’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 15). 
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as the opposite43). What else does this language ‘do’? How does it enact in the mind of 
our environments (if we are of our environments)? With a little more following of lines, 
I found a shining historical (and historicised) example of how this type of language 
manifests itself physically within the mental health of our environments: 
 
The psychological importance of a planned campaign against the nuisance 
of begging should not be underestimated. Beggars often force their poverty 
upon people in the most repulsive way for their own selfish purposes. If this 
sight disappears from the view of foreigners as well, the result will be a 
definite feeling of relief and liberation. People will feel that things are 
becoming more stable again, and that the economy is improving once more 
[…] Once the land has been freed of the nuisance of beggars, we can 
justifiably appeal to the propertied classes to give all the more generously 
for the Winter Aid Programme now being set in motion by the State and the 
party. (Reich Ministry of Propaganda guidelines, cited in Ayass, 1988, n. p.) 
 
Yes, I’ve used the Hitler Trump card (pun intended)! Wolfgang Ayass’ (1988) Vagrants 
and Beggars in Hitler’s Reich highlights the rise of the German Nazi’s where vagrants 
and beggars were rounded up and sent to workhouse prisons. ‘Beggars registered as 
inhabitants of other towns must be ruthlessly removed by the police for a lengthy period 
into a concentration camp as far away as possible from Hamburg.’ (cited in Ayass, 1988, 
n. p.). Foucault’s (1995) notion of consumers within a capitalist society as ‘docile 
bodies’ means that those in power can manipulate consumers more easily.  
I’m sure you (the readers of this) have already formed opinions regarding these 
comparisons between Liverpool ONE’s brochure and the Reich Ministry of 
Propaganda guidelines; made links and created concepts which will all be very different 
depending on your socio-demographics, etc. For me, it leads to this: ‘lnstead of 
destroying poverty, it was considered cheaper and more efficient to destroy the poor.’ 
(Ayass, 1988, n. p.). This is the ‘elimination of unwanted elements’. Selfridges in 
Manchester has recently installed metal spikes outside one of its stores (Transfer 7) to 
                                                          
43 For example, I have been told (by a German student) that in Germany ‘anti-social’ 
is more akin to spending time alone whereas in the UK it is advertised perhaps as a 
gang of lads smoking and jeering outside a local store. Yet, for the members of that 
group, this behaviour perhaps would be a highly social act. 
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‘reduce litter and smoking […] following customer complaints’ (Andreou, 2015). This 
is called ‘defensive’ or ‘disciplinary’ architecture. 
 
 
Transfer 7: ‘Spikes installed outside Selfridges in Manchester’ (Andreou, 2015). 
(Photo by Christopher Thomond (2015) for the Guardian44) 
 
Nick Beake (from BBC London) gathered the reactions from various residents of 
a Southwark block of flats where this defensive architecture had recently been 
introduced: 
 
‘The first time I saw someone lying here, a homeless couple actually, I 
didn’t like it because I didn’t like having to walk by them. That sounds very 
selfish. So when I saw those studs I thought good idea.’ 
‘I think it’s a perfectly reasonable thing to do to be honest and you know, 
we all pay a fair, decent amount of money to live in this block of flats and 
it’s not great when you get people coming down and asking you for change 
in the morning.’ (Beake, 2014, n.p.) 
 
In a channel 4 news interview, when asked if they thought the spikes were a good idea, 
one of the residents of the £800,000 apartments answered:  
 
                                                          
44 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
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‘I think it’s a good idea, I think that, I mean it completely affects the way 
that the building seems, the appearance and it’s just not very nice’ (Metal 
spikes – treating homeless people like pigeons?, 2014). 
 
So, according to some, it seems that homeless people are an inconvenient and unwanted 
fashion accessory for the very rich. Similar to sweeping dust under a carpet, London’s 
homeless are moved on without focusing on how the dust got there or why some people 
choose to sweep it under the carpet with little to no empathy. This is a particularly 
unempathetic aesthetics of place, a place=people aesthetics. 
 
It is the discretion of the anti-homeless paving in Southwark that chills me. 
The spikes tone carefully with the architecture. They are almost tasteful. 
[…] The number of rough sleepers in London has doubled since Boris 
Johnson became Mayor. Meanwhile, the Government has criminalised 
squatting, removed safety nets for the unemployed and cut mental health 
spending. (Godwin, 2014, n.p., emphasis added) 
 
‘Katharine Sacks-Jones from Crisis said: “For the last three years in London we've seen 
a 75% increase in rough sleeping because of a lack of affordable housing and cuts to 
benefits”’ (cited in Beake, 2014, n.p.). 
There is a section in Don Mitchell’s (2003) book, The Right To The City entitled, 
‘The Annihilation of People’ (pp. 170-173) in which he explains how there is a ‘desire 
to regulate the homeless out of existence’ (p. 173). He quotes segments of an essay by 
a legal scholar named Jeremy Waldron (1991) who described the predicament of 
homeless people as having ‘no place governed by a private property rule where he is 
allowed to be’ (p. 229) and explains that ‘in a “libertarian paradise” where all property 
is privately held, a homeless person simply could not be’ (cited in Mitchell, 2003, p. 
170). What prevents this dystopian elimination is ‘only by virtue of the fact that some 
of [society’s] territory is held as collective property and made available for common 
use. The homeless are allowed to be – provided they are on the streets, in the parks, or 
under bridges’ (Waldron, 1991, p. 300, cited in Mitchell, 2003, p. 170). However, with 
the privatisation of space for hyper-consumption, as in Liverpool ONE, comes the 
elimination of a certain type of person. Perhaps this is partly down to the way we 
conceive of space or place in of itself. For example, if we continue to think of space as 
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empty or place as property, what does this do if, as I have contested, we are also of the 
environment? Jeremy Waldron (1991) illuminates: 
 
What is emerging-and it is not just a matter of fantasy-is a state of affairs in 
which a million or more citizens have no place to perform elementary 
human activities like urinating, washing, sleeping, cooking, eating, and 
standing around. Legislators voted for by people who own private places in 
which they can do all these things are increasingly deciding to make public 
places available only for activities other than these primal human tasks. […] 
If I am right about this, it is one of the most callous and tyrannical exercises 
of power in modem times by a (comparatively) rich and complacent 
majority against a minority of their less fortunate fellow human beings (pp. 
301-302). 
 
Godwin’s mention of cutting mental health spending seems almost trivial if we don’t 
even have the right to exist. Mitchell (2003) protests that ‘we are creating a world in 
which a whole class of people cannot be – simply because they have no place to be’ (p. 
171, emphasis added), unlike the ‘150 species of insects, birds and animals’ (It's all 
about being green at Liverpool ONE, 2015, para. 2) in Chavasse Park that are most 
welcome, as long as they continue to promote the product. But how does this behaviour 
manifest itself in the mental realm of our environments? If the realm of the ‘mental’ is 
indeed a physical process then it must be in relation with our buildings, the concrete, 
the pavements, the perceived space between the buildings, the conceived regulated 
space of parks and shopping malls, the aesthetics of a juxtaposition of place and space 
(‘the spikes tone carefully with the architecture’ (Godwin, 2014)), the politics of space 
and the spectacle of modern Western society.  
Gregory Bateson suggested ‘that the primary problem is epistemological, a 
systemic false consciousness of our relation to nature, that is itself now a part of our 
ecological condition’ (Goodbun, n.d., p. 43). 
 
Epistemological error is all right, it’s fine, up to the point at which you 
create around yourself a universe in which that error becomes immanent in 
monstrous changes of the universe that you have created and now try to live 
in. (Bateson, 2000, p. 493). 
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So, in this assemblage we move from the propaganda of ‘clean and safe’ to the ruthless 
removal of beggars in Nazi Germany (or is it the other way around?) simply by 
following a line of concepts (which you, the reader, are implicated and imbricated in). 
But what does this mean? ‘I meant nothing by The Lighthouse’ (Virginia Woolf, 
cited in Ellmann, 2000, xvi). Or is it more important to find out what this does? ‘The 
symbol is not in the poem. The symbol is the poem’ (Boland, 2000, p. xv). And is it 
really the ‘structure’ (whether political, topographical, cultural, etc.) of the space in 
Liverpool ONE that determines our ‘reactions’, behaviour, mental health? Through this 
inquiry, I’m beginning to think that it’s a little more complex and co-created than that. 
After all, ‘towns and cities are assemblages of individuals’ as well as ‘social networks, 
organisations, and various forms of infrastructure’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 
6). For example, if we continue with our line of inquiry from Grosvenor, we come to 
the 6th Duke of Westminster45 who owns the company and was the third richest person 
in Britain in 2014.  
 
The ‘propertied classes’ 
 
In 1998 the duke was worth an estimated one-point-seven billion pounds. In an 
interview with Anne Treneman (1998) of the Independent newspaper, he wouldn’t be 
drawn on whether the figure was accurate: 
 
“I cannot discuss it. It's not something I dwell on,” he said. “We are rich in 
terms of property and the quality of property. It is not something that 
concerns me. Never has. Not interested in material things. Honestly. It 
would drive me bonkers if I thought too deeply about it.” […] one Christmas 
(he) took his two eldest daughters to visit the poor drug-addicts of 
Liverpool. “There is a whole different world out there and I want to open 
their eyes to it,” he said […] he remains a paternalistic (some say feudal) 
landlord who is not above controlling his tenants and who is adamantly 
                                                          
45 Unfortunately, Gerald Cavendish Grosvenor has since died of a heart attack and has 
passed his fortune on to his only son, Hugh Grosvenor, over his three sisters. 
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opposed to the right to roam. “Private” signs pepper his estates. (Treneman, 
1998, n.p., emphasis added) 
 
Obeying the laws of parody by referring to himself as ‘we’, at least he realises he is a 
multiplicity. Deleuze would be proud!  
According to Forbes (2015) rich list, the philanthropist is now worth over eight 
billion pounds. The Duke is what the Reich Ministry of Propaganda would call one of 
the ‘propertied classes’ who, in a neoliberal Western society, would be expected to give 
generously to the poor in the trickle-down structure of a capitalist democracy. If so, 
what does this process of events do? For example, by privatising large amounts of land 
(space) it poses certain restrictions on the organisms that dwell there. In most cases 
these restrictions are controlled by the propertied classes who hold certain traits that 
influence the governing of their actions and therefore the organisms within the 
boundaries of their control. This may have the effect of reducing, diminishing or 
extinguishing any sort of freedom or even life that the organisms hold within their own 
permeable boundaries. For example, the reduction of space may influence the growth 
of an individual, emotionally or even in mass due to stress, as with certain fish when 
imprisoned within glass bowls (Ranta & Pirhonan, 2006). It could also lead to 
overcrowding, lack of resources, environmental fatigue, which in turn can lead to stress, 
anxiety and many other mental illnesses (if we wish to label them as such).   
But it’s not the Duke’s fault as he is also enmeshed in a culture that frames and 
borders everything. It doesn’t ‘start’ or ‘end’ with him. Do his views of privatisation, 
property rights and land laws stem from a long line of Norman invaders46 (as part of 
this ever increasing assemblage)? If so, how might they relate to Grosvenor’s brochure 
which seems to have co-developed a narrative of its own (rather like an ‘It narrative’)? 
Bateson (2000) noted that ‘Socrates as a bioenergetics individual is dead. But 
much of him still lives as a component in the contemporary ecology of ideas’ (p. 467). 
So then does the Duke of Westminster’s upbringing determine and structure Blondie’s 
                                                          
46 The Normans certainly introduced a more obvious class based language to England. 
Words such as peasant, duke, noble, authority, obedience, servant, serf, labourer 
(Mastin, 2011) were added to the English vocabulary as French became the language 
of aristocracy and English became a lower class vulgar tongue. This class-based 
linguistic invasion has germinated and is now evident in many perceptions and 
treatments of people with ‘common’ accents, specifically strong colloquial ones such 
as Scouse, Geordie or Brummy. 
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mental health (as in the determinist/structuralist assumptions) through the words and 
actions of Grosvenor or does she determine and structure her own (as in the 
possibilist/humanist assumptions)? At first (or second) glance, there seems to be some 
influence in both directions. Maybe there are no linear ‘directions’ at all, maybe the 
chaotic and complex co-emergence that gives rise to (or ‘is’) Blondie’s mental health is 
directionless and dimensionless or multidirectional and multidimentional (or both)!  
 
[T]he processual character of assemblages undermines any conception of a 
determining social structure that shapes bodies or subjectivities. Both the 
exercise of power or control and the capacity to resist such power and 
control must be explored as socially and spatiotemporally specific 
occurrences within continual and continuous flows of affect in assemblages 
(Buchanan, 2008, pp. 16–17). (Fox & Alldred, 2014, p. 4) 
 
Although there may be no unidirectional determining social structure that shapes 
Blondie’s mental health and wellbeing, it seems that the assemblages produced from 
the politics of a neo-liberal capitalist democracy play a rather large role when trying to 
locate where and when mental health and wellbeing might become. However, it would 
be hard to pinpoint a clear or definite linear path of cause and effect from capitalism to 
our mental health (due to the impossibility of chopping matter into variables), although 
we might ‘know’ this instinctively. But if the ‘spaces’ themselves are highlighted as 
territorialised, as I have exampled here through the space of Liverpool ONE, perhaps 
these spaces could be conceived as contracting and showing symptoms of a type of 
madness, an insanity all of their own that touches those haecceities that come into 
contact with it. If the human biome becomes ill, then so do many of what we think of 
as the other organisms inside us, such as the mycelium, viruses or bacteria (although 
some may thrive and revel in the madness for a while or even be the cause of the 
madness itself). Were we always already zombie-ants?47 But our boundaries do not 
simply stop at our skin. If humans are conceived as having a mental realm where there 
is a possibility of relative madness when compared to an invented norm among the same 
                                                          
47 A parasite causing Toxoplasmosis has been found to control a mammal’s or bird’s 
behaviour in order to complete its life cycle (and is found in many people diagnosed 
with schizophrenia) just as a parasitic fungus controls ‘zombie-ants’ (and has its own 
‘fungal stalker’ in turn) (Barford, 2013; Harmon, 2012).  
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species (another invented concept), why not extend this conception to a wider 
environment? After all, ‘assemblages have material dimensions or components (e.g., 
spaces, objects, technologies, bodies), and expressive ones (e.g., identities, signs, 
affects, desires).’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 6). 
 
The framework of Western biology and its concepts of function, structure, 
and performance are believed to order and constrain abilities located in or 
derived from the human body. Acceptance of what are assumed to be 
invariant and fundamental givens within the biological paradigm has 
created a cultural blindness, which can be the source of errors in [social 
scientific] analyses. (Manning & Fabrega, 1973, p. 256) 
 
The Western biomedical model of health and more specifically mental health is 
straightjacketed by the very terms of its existence. If we were to challenge 
(through deconstruction and (re)construction) those assumptions, what riches may 
emerge?  
 
Scene three: Inorganic life 
 
In her description of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of inorganic life, Leslie 
Dema (2007) states, ‘It is not so much that organisms are not alive, but that life can be 
articulated in all things.’ (para. 1).  
 
This streaming, spiralling, zigzagging, snaking, feverish line of variation 
liberates a power of life that human beings had rectified and organisms had 
confined, and which matter now expresses as the trait, flow or impulse 
traversing it. If everything is alive, it is not because everything is organic or 
organized, but, on the contrary, because the organism is a diversion of life. 
In short the life in question is inorganic, germinal, and intensive, a powerful 
life without organs, a body that is all the more alive for having no organs, 
everything that passes between organisms. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 
550) 
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This chimes with Gregory Bateson’s (2000) example in Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 
where ‘the eco-mental system called Lake Erie is a part of your wider eco-mental 
system’ (p. 492). This conception of a mind extended in the environment has also been 
apparent for many animistic societies for countless years, obvious in Joseph Masty’s 
(an elder of the Whapmagoostui Cree Nation in northern Quebec) statement that ‘if the 
land is not healthy, how can we be’ (Adelson, 2000, p. 3). This animistic, relational 
notion of environ(mental) health (Mcphie, 2014a) was conveyed to Naomi Adelson 
(2000) by Masty as he highlighted that, ‘health and, more specifically, health ideals are 
rooted in cultural norms and values that permeate and define – yet extend beyond – the 
state of the physical body’ (p. 9, emphasis added) and that health ‘is political’ as it ‘takes 
on a particular, and particularly charged, meaning when understood within its historical, 
cultural, and social context’ (p. 9).  
 
Indeed, among the Whapmagoostui Cree the concept of health – 
miyupimaatisiiun – ultimately transcends the individual, and as part of the 
realm of ‘being Cree’ is linked to a larger strategy of cultural assertion and 
resistance in a dynamic balancing of power between the state, the 
disenfranchised group, and the individual. (Adelson, 2000, p. 9) 
 
This extension of health beyond the state of the physical body doesn’t just incorporate 
other organisms (if we were to follow Kohn’s (2013) biocentric rationale in his 
‘anthropology beyond the human’), it also incorporates any relational material process 
at any time, including the concept of Liverpool ONE. This fully material inclusion into 
the mind, agency or mental health is properly ecocentric (unlike the deep ecology and 
biocentrism of Arne Naess, for example). Perhaps a better way of verbalising this idea 
of an extended agency or mind would be to accept that the physical body itself is the 
thing that is extended into the environment (or that the environment is extended into the 
self).  
Kathleen Wilson’s (2003) study of Anishinabek (a first nations collective of 
Ojibwa and Odawa people living in Northern Ontario) found that the immanent 
philosophies of animist peoples can redirect our current perspectives in health and place 
research: 
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Geographic research has shaped our understandings of the ways in which 
places, monuments, and landscape features imbue identity at national, 
regional and local levels. Gillis (1994) draws a link between social memory, 
monuments and the development of national identities. Places are argued to 
shape identity or as Gesler states (1991, p. 8) ‘‘places inﬂuence personal 
identity’’ (emphasis added). As such, there is a sense that identity and place 
are separable from one another. However, […] the relationship Anishinabek 
have with the land cannot be captured by the simpliﬁed notion of being 
‘close to nature’. The land is not just seen as shaping or inﬂuencing identity, 
but being an actual part of it. (Wilson, 2003, p. 88) 
 
Thus, the category mistake/invented concept of nature being something we may ‘be 
close to’ or can ‘re-connect to’ is made obvious but also emphasises a crucial way 
forward for mental health psychology/geography. 
Bateson describes totemism as humans in society taking metaphoric clues from 
the ‘natural’ world around them to apply them to the society in which they live, 
empathising with nature ‘as a guide for his own social organisation and his own theories 
of his own psychology’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 492). This view shares similarities with deep 
ecology, ecopsychology and ecotherapy literature (i.e. Aldo Leopold’s thinking ‘like’ a 
mountain). He goes on to describe animism as the ‘next step’ historically as it reversed 
this totemic process to ‘take clues from himself and apply these to the natural world 
around him […] extending the notion of personality or mind to mountains, rivers, 
forests, and such things’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 492). Thus, we think ‘with’ the mountain 
(or the mountain thinks ‘with’ us). This view is sympathetic to a flatter, more immanent 
ecology/ontology, such as Miranda Green’s (1997) description of the Celtic Taranis, 
who was not the god of thunder but was thunder itself, thus marking the difference 
between immanent and transcendent thought (Mcphie, 2015b; Mcphie & Clarke, 2015). 
Bateson’s liking for animism then is in sharp contrast to his description of the ‘next 
step’ historically as Occidentalists separated ‘the notion of mind from the natural world’ 
which led to ‘the notion of gods’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 493). The fundamental error in this, 
Bateson argues, is that ‘when you separate mind from the structure in which it is 
immanent, such as human relationship, the human society, or the ecosystem […] in the 
end [it] will surely hurt you’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 493). 
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Mind is a necessary, an inevitable function of the appropriate complexity, 
wherever that complexity occurs. But that complexity occurs in a great 
many other places besides the inside of my head and yours […] a redwood 
forest or a coral reef with its aggregate of organisms interlocking in their 
relationships has the necessary general structure. The energy for the 
responses of every organism is supplied from its metabolism, and the total 
system acts self-correctively in various ways. A human society is like this 
with closed loops of causation. Every human organization shows both the 
self-corrective characteristic and has the potentiality for runaway. (Bateson, 
2000, pp. 490-491)  
 
Seen in this way, the metropolis of Liverpool ONE is a mental/physical ecosystem and 
if ‘it’ is mentally/physically ill then so are we who participate and intertwine with it, 
some more than others (depending on the amount of consumer capital one has been 
afforded). Yet, eventually, we all consume and are consumed by physical space, as we 
are it.  
 
I wonder whether the kind of knowledge that a theoretical account of the 
metropolis would produce - knowledge that would surely be shaped by our 
complex metabolic relations to nature to an extent not appreciated by 
Lefebvre - might take the name of ecology? I do not of course refer here to 
the semi-dismal bourgeois form of ecology, but rather the aesthetically re-
conceived ecology proposed by Bateson. (Goodbun, n.d., p. 44) 
 
Bateson ‘considered that ecosystems had to be considered to be communicating and 
informational systems, and even as mental systems, as minds, not just as material and 
energetic systems’ and ‘emphasised that to properly understand ecosystems, we need to 
find ways to think ecologically, recognising ourselves as a part of the system being 
observed or interacted with.’ (Goodbun, n.d., p. 41). If we convert or translate what we 
know of ‘natural’ ecosystems, such as forests, to the human made environment (which 
I contend is also ‘natural’) and convert the relational processes to the realms of agency 
and the mind, a sort of extended agency, how might it look?  
 
OCD, CCTV, GBT, CSAS, SS, VIP: Steps to a mental ecology of privatised space 
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Mature ecosystems (e.g. Appalachian forests) display high organisation (i.e. 
minimal entropy) because they are more diverse than immature ecosystems. 
They have more species and more niches are filled, and they are able to 
capture more matter and slow down energy dissipation. (Pepper, 1984, p.p. 
103-104) 
 
Liverpool ONE is an extremely immature ecosystem and as such dissipates energy 
quickly, poorly and inefficiently. I don’t simply mean this because it is an urban 
environment lacking flora and fauna as I believe many urban environments are very 
diverse (not simply ‘bio’-diverse) and many (mono-cultural) rural environments are 
homogenised. It is the spatial dimensions of the capitalist agenda of Liverpool ONE 
specifically that sets about subduing and subjugating the mind to a form of mass 
hypnosis that I refer. This giant open air shopping mall fits the description Marc Augé 
(2009) would label as a ‘non-place’, along with supermarkets, airport lounges, hotels, 
motorways or even the endless topological space of a computer. Many of Augé’s ‘non-
places’ could even be described as ‘an air-conditioned purgatory where there’s nothing 
to do except shop’ (Rose, 2015, para. 4). Indeed, the Ojibwa leader Winona LaDuke 
(2014) described herself as such a hyper-consumer before learning how to farm (after 
advice from her father) with the comment, ‘We’re all really smart and we shop but we 
don’t know how to do anything’ (emphasis added). The homogenisation and mono-
cultural practice of Liverpool ONE’s space assemblages (concrete-glass-docile 
consumer-symmetrical tree-CCTV camera-shawn grass-logos) displays a maximal 
entropy due to its poor intra-relational capacities for energy efficiency. Capitalism, far 
from creating a healthy difference out of competitiveness, seems to create a homogenous 
difference and sterility as an ultimate (yet entirely ‘natural’) distortion of ecological 
space. Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) seems to have enveloped Liverpool 
ONE, partly co-produced through a specific (Western) practice of privatisation. ‘People 
with OCD may also be preoccupied with order and symmetry’ (National Institute of 
Mental Health, n.d., para. 4). As a collective, highly organised mass of consumers, 
concrete, trees in concrete, glass, plastic, metal, one inch grass and CCTV cameras, 
Liverpool ONE is certainly preoccupied with an aesthetics of order, neatness, symmetry 
and cleanliness. The trees and posts appear evenly distanced from one another, ordered 
in symmetrical lines in relation to the vertical and horizontal lines of the architecture 
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(of the buildings and spaces between the buildings). Numeracy is the mediating signifier 
that predicates the appearance of perfect spatial homogeneity. The grass is cut to 
promote little resistance for walkers and is of a certain colour green that has been 
historically conceived (and promoted) as visibly pleasing and picturesque. There is no 
mud, mess, weeds, scruffiness, anarchic buddleia (unlike the backstreets we 
encountered outside of Liverpool ONE), out-of-place people, untidy litter, cracks in the 
pavement, free-floating plastic bags and the grass and concrete know exactly where they 
are supposed to be…separate from one another (Annotated Polaroids 6-11).  
 
    
    
Annotated Polaroids 6-11: ‘Clean and Safe’ Liverpool ONE. (Photos by Jamie) 
 
Even moss and lichen are not allowed to blemish the polished stone. It’s clean 
and safe…and so are our thoughts. Aesthetically, this space is what Deleuze may have 
called ‘striated’. 
 
POPS 
 
Of course this behaviour is not solely restricted to Liverpool ONE. In the UK, a 
growing trend of Privately Owned Public Spaces (‘POPS’) means that ‘the rights of the 
citizens using them are severely hemmed in’ (Garrett, 2015, n.p.). Bradley Garrett 
continues, ‘[a]lthough this issue might be academic while we’re eating our lunch on a 
private park bench, the consequences of multiplying and expanding Pops affects 
everything from our personal psyche to our ability to protest.’ (2015, n.p.). In POPS we 
may even be conned into a form of self-policing, one in which we become the principle 
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of our own subjection (Foucault, 1995, p. 203) as it ‘may make you wary and cause you 
to confine your behaviour to a narrow range so as to avoid confrontation.’ (Garrett, 
2015, n.p.). 
 
[W]hen space is controlled, and especially when the public is unclear about 
what the legal or acceptable boundaries of activity are, we tend to police 
ourselves, to monitor our behaviour and to limit our interactions, especially 
after embarrassing confrontations with security. (Garrett, 2015, n.p.) 
 
Originally conceived by the actress Joanna Lumley, the Garden Bridge Trust (GBT) in 
London has proposed the development of a £175,000,000 green space that will stretch 
along the Thames consisting of 270 trees and thousands of plants to be enjoyed by 
consumers visiting that area (Walker, 2015). The project will be funded by £40,000,000 
of public money (£30,000,000 given by George Osborne from Treasury funds and 
£10,000,000 from Transport for London (TfL)) even though the GBT ‘hoped to 
“maximise the opportunity provided by the status of the bridge as private land” by 
imposing rules to “establish expectations for behaviour and conduct”.’ (Walker, 2015, 
p. 5). The GBT have proposed a set of thirty rules that include the prohibition of ‘any 
exercise other than jogging, playing a musical instrument, taking part in a “gathering of 
any kind”, giving a speech or address, scattering ashes, releasing a balloon or flying a 
kite.’ (Walker, 2015, p. 5). Walker (2015, p. 5) reports that as well as the placement of 
‘enhanced’ CCTV cameras to capture anyone not obeying the rules, visitors ‘will be 
tracked by their mobile phone signals’ and the rules will be enforced by ‘visitor hosts’ 
who will be given powers under the government’s Community Safety Accreditation 
Scheme (CSAS) to impose fixed penalties, take personal details of transgressors and 
seize and dispose of any property that is deemed anti-social in relation to this park (such 
as kites, balloons or musical instruments). ‘Bag searches or “wand” scans of people’s 
clothes could be used but only, for example, if a VIP were visiting the bridge.’ (Walker, 
2015, p. 5). Under the CSAS, ‘police can grant powers to civilians involved in crowd 
control’ (Walker, 2015, p. 5) in order to prevent demonstrations or protests and keep the 
garden neat, quiet and tidy, a sort of garden protective echelon (in German this would 
be called ‘schutzstaffel’ or SS for short). Liberal Democrat Caroline Pidgeon ‘said she 
feared the bridge was following “a worrying trend of the privatisation of public places 
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where the rights of private owners trump those of ordinary people”.’ (Walker, 2015, p. 
5).  
On a Channel 4 news programme, psychogeographer Will Self (2016) asked the 
developers of POPS to widen their aesthetic lenses rather than monetise the spaces. As 
seen in the OCD of Liverpool ONE, this weeded, essentialised and reduced form of 
nature (a more ‘picturesque’ and controlled version of ‘Nature 1’ in (Intra-)Act 1) is a 
rather limited and limiting perspective of the world, one which aids and abets the 
capitalist production of subjectivity by co-creating a desire inherent in the consumer 
spectacle itself (from the architecture of the buildings to the construction of the elite 
aesthetic derived from the Enlightenment production of Euclidean space). These 
supposedly picturesque aesthetised spaces are being afforded the same protective 
powers as certain people. But the people are always already caught up in the spaces 
themselves. We are of the integrated ecological co-emergence of these physical 
realisations (Liverpool ONE, the new King’s Cross development at Granary Square, 
Garden Bridge and so on) born out of capitalist conceptions (privatised spaces for public 
consumption). As such, capitalism also produces a particular type of subjectivity.  
 
The production of subjectivity  
 
Apart from the visual ecological aesthetics that capitalist economics produce, 
there is a ‘ubiquity of entrepreneurial subjectivation’ that attempts to ‘transform every 
individual into a business’: 
 
The autonomy, initiative, and subjective commitment demanded of each of 
us constitute new norms of employability and, therefore, strictly speaking, 
a heteronomy. At the same time, the injunction imposed on the individual 
to act, take the initiative, and undertake risks has led to widespread 
depression, a maladie du siècle, the refusal to accept homogenization, and, 
finally, the impoverishment of existence brought on by the individual 
“success” of the entrepreneurial model. (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 9) 
 
The capitalist production of subjectivity leads many of us to believe we act alone and 
are individually responsible for our compulsions but as Jane Bennett reminds us, ‘the 
locus of political responsibility is a human-nonhuman assemblage’ (2010, p. 36) which 
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‘presents individuals as simply incapable of bearing full responsibility for their effects’ 
(p. 37) and so ‘the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s 
response to the assemblage in which one finds oneself participating’ (p. 37). The 
fashion, in the West, is to think of OCD as an individual psychological dis-order that is 
reserved solely for the right of humans to suffer. In order to ‘fix’ it, we must look to the 
idea of the autonomous genetic and/or socially constructed individual, not the collective 
concept of a city centre that is the production of capitalist economics built upon a 
palimpsest of historicised ethico-onto-epistemological (rhizomatic) growth. But if we 
think with assemblages and extended mind theory, for example, the Liverpool ONE 
assemblage does have the capacity to have OCD and it comes at a price. OCD is often 
‘accompanied by severe distress, high levels of disability, and disruption of the person’s 
social and occupational functioning (Crino et al., 2005 and Veale & Roberts, 2014)’ and 
has ‘been linked with more severe and persistent OCD symptoms, more incapacitating 
feelings of hopelessness and/or helplessness, and the experience of suicidal thoughts 
and behaviors (Angst et al., 2004, Levy et al., 2013, Marcks et al., 2011, Torres et al., 
2013 and Veale and Roberts, 2014).’ (cited in Angelakisa, Goodingb, Tarrierc & 
Panagiotia, 2015, p. 2). These behaviours are now becoming ever more evident in a 
world of mass suicide and Hikikomori48 (Berardi, 2015). So then does a clean and safe 
capitalism lead to depression or suicide? Feelings of ‘hopelessness and/or helplessness’ 
may certainly arise if the right to protest is confiscated. ‘Vagrants and beggars’ don’t 
even have the right to shit anymore if they are ‘eliminated’ and eradicated for fear of 
smudging the shiny new (eco) furniture and so suicidal thoughts may become 
commonplace. 
Cleanliness and sanitisation, taken in this sense, tend to reduce differentiations of 
diversity (‘bio’ and ‘cultural’). Volcanic action and desertification also tend to do this, 
sometimes resulting in mass extinctions. The physical realms of mental health and 
wellbeing are not of a different nature to this. They are not of some mystical non-
physical, other earthly space hauntingly residing in the pineal gland within a human 
brain. Nor are they solely skin-bound within the confines of a subjective individual, 
either genetically or mentally. The physical processes that enable a relatively healthy 
mental state are bound to the intra-relational capacities and affordances of (ecological) 
                                                          
48 Hikikomori is a growing trend in Japan that involves a social withdrawal from 
modern society into the rooms of the isolated individuals who often retreat there for 
months or even years without coming out.  
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concepts such as capitalism and privatisation. In his re-reading of Lefebvre’s Right to 
the City, David Harvey points out: 
 
The city has to be viewed as a metabolic and ecological system in its own 
right and therefore as a vibrant and increasingly dominant part of the natural 
world we inhabit. While there is, in my view, nothing unnatural about New 
York City, the qualities of the urban environments we create are a major 
concern and those qualities are not confined to what humans need but also 
to preserving the whole life-system upon which we ultimately depend. 
(cited in Goodbun, n.d., p. 44) 
 
Scene four: The depression of Liverpool ONE 
 
So, the (inorganic) organism that is a city or a rural space (another ‘natural’ 
anthropocentrically managed/co-produced environment) or whatever/wherever we 
draw our boundaries around, may become mentally ill depending on its territorialising 
intensions. Extend this boundary even wider and we can see an illness on a much larger 
scale, that of the sixth mass extinction. We have now entered the mental assemblage of 
the ‘Capitalocene’ (Moore, 2014).  
 
Bateson argued that it was necessary to transform not just ecological 
knowledge, but the very basis of science in general, with an aesthetic 
dimension, a recognition that ecological patterns are minds, and that this 
was the only way to grasp the interconnectedness of environmental entities 
and relations. (Goodbun, n.d., p. 44) 
 
In order to explore how a mental disorder of a clean and safe capitalism may lead to 
suicidal impetus, I’d like to return to the quote from the start of this assemblage: ‘Like 
modern capitalism, evolution is a process of creative destruction.’ (Ellison, 2013, p. 19). 
The creative destruction of Liverpool city centre may well afford opportunities for 
change, thereby opening up new growth for some people to flourish (one of the tenets 
of capitalism) but we also have to examine the ‘type’ of creative destruction and 
(re)construction as it is not necessarily always productive for the ‘long-term’ or for the 
minoritarian. There’s a certain heterogeneity in (re)construction born out of cycles of 
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destruction yet initial rapid growth of this kind doesn’t always imply creativity and 
diversity for long term sustainability, especially regarding the mental health of many of 
the (invented conceptual) organisms that attempt to dwell within that newly developed 
space (buddleia, vagrants, buskers, nay-sayers). In this way, capitalism is a form of 
anthropogenic eutrophication.  
After the algal blooms of branded retail outlets flourish in Liverpool ONE, we see 
overly competitive behaviours, eventually leading to hyper-consumer hypoxia. This 
leads to OCD and all the problems that develop from the addictive run-off. After 
homogenisation and blandification, the environment becomes worn out and the 
buddleia move in to start a different process of creative destruction and (re)construction, 
one that may be slightly more supportive of diversity (but not simply because it is 
‘natural’ or ‘organic’). Although capitalism is indeed a natural process, it acts similarly 
to mass volcanic action in that it is highly unsustainable (for short term organic 
existence) and ultimately (and arguably) may bring/has brought about another mass 
extinction. On the way to this extinction, the mental health of assemblages of organisms, 
biomes, places, spaces, countries and ecosystems may well/have become severely 
jeopardised. Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi (2015) has already begun to explore the modern (post 
1977) effects of capitalism on mental health:  
 
Suicide is no longer a marginal phenomenon of isolated psychopathology, 
but is becoming a major agent of the political history of our time, and also 
the marker of an anthropological shift that planetary culture is unable to 
elaborate. Suicide offers, in my view, a crucial perspective on the history of 
the present. (p. 158).   
 
The rapid colonisation of capitalist space (and clock time) doesn’t seem to allow enough 
time for evolutionary adaptation and so (once vibrant) places (and therefore mental 
health) begin to wilt, homogenise and transform into ‘non-places’ (Augé, 2009). 
Consciousness may be too slow to keep up with processing information from a ‘world 
in acceleration (info-technology multiplied by semiocapitalist exploitation)’ as ‘we are 
unable to translate the world into a cosmos, mental order, syntony and sympathy.’ 
(Barardi, 2015, p. 221). The monoculture and OCD of Liverpool ONE will undoubtedly 
lead to its eutrophication and depression (including many of the multiplicities that make 
up its temporal co-productions). 
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Throughout this PhD process, my own understanding of mental ill-health has 
changed a few times but my present understanding is that it is a physical process that 
extends beyond the modernised (and medicalised) conception of the human biome 
to/from (one move) the wider topological environment. Therefore, it makes complete 
sense to me that a certain area can become mentally ill, through homogenisation, 
privatisation, hierarchies of power and control, etc. (as exampled with Americanised 
shopping malls like Liverpool ONE or elitist dystopian gardens like London’s ‘Garden 
Bridge’). However, these environments are not mentally ill to those haecceities 
who/that fit snuggly in to these environments, such as desulfitobacterium to certain 
types of pollution or propertied classes, docile bodies and hyper-consumers to Liverpool 
ONE. For example, if you have a certain amount of consumer capital (unlike ‘vagrants 
and beggars’), retail therapy may indeed have a beneficial influence on your mental 
health, wellbeing and happiness, at least in the short term. Yet again, it’s temporal, 
relational and contextual. ‘There is no question that the context and parameters of health 
shift with time and place.’ (Adelson, 2000, p. 9). 
But I don’t want to focus too much on interpretations or finding conclusions to 
this last line of inquiry as if there were some inarguable truth to be found in the data. 
Other than my bringing to the reader’s attention some of the obvious ethical issues that 
have co-emerged from this particular assemblage creation by ruminating (rather than 
finding conclusions), I’m also interested in what’s omitted and what’s created and 
produced from the omissions being omitted! Martin and Kamberelis, (2013, pp. 670-
671) encourage us to ask, what are ‘the dominant discursive and material forces at 
play…’? What are the ‘…forces that have been elided, marginalized or ignored 
altogether…’? What are the ‘…forces that might have the power to transform or 
reconﬁgure reality in various ways...’?  
The assemblage that is Liverpool ONE, is never the same as it ever was. A better 
description would be Liverpool ONEing as it always becomes something different with 
every reading/viewing/conceiving! Therefore, in Assemblage Two (Mcphie, in press), 
I veer away from the topic in this assemblage as 
 
staying on topic is impossible, because the assemblage is not a topic, totality 
or essence (DeLanda, 2006). It is a network of shifting, infinite relations 
among heterogeneous components. One cannot ‘stay on’ something that 
shifts and changes – becomes – as its very definition, or determine in 
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advance what ‘staying on topic’ means. Second, this imperative to stay on 
topic is also unnecessary because privileging stasis over movement or 
isolated objects over networks does not have to be the way that inquiry 
proceeds, despite being the norm. Finally, ‘staying on topic’ is undesirable 
within a Deleuzian frame because it stops thought, or presupposes what can 
happen by requiring the process to behave like a topic, at all: something that 
we, together, can ‘stay on’ where ‘staying on’ is established by attending 
only to language in use. (Airton, 2014, p. 83) 
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(Intra-)Act 1: From Participation to Observation  
 
‘In the participatory universe, to be a full member of it, you must participate fully; the 
more fully the better. We are sitting at the feast of life. Its name is participation.’ 
(Skolimowski, 1994, p. 157). 
 
(Intra-)Act 1 tracks historicised ontological and epistemological changes in the 
perceptions and conceptions of human-environment relations regarding how these 
changes have influenced perceptions and conceptions of mental health and wellbeing. 
 
Scene one: ‘We're all really smart and we shop but we don't know how to do 
anything.’ (LaDuke, 2014, emphasis added) 
 
Although not about climate change and mass extinction specifically, these 
potentially catastrophic concepts are implicated in the nature of this PhD due to the 
novel approach I take by suggesting that mental health is distributed in the environment 
and not bound within the confines of a human skull. The planet’s health is ultimately 
our health and as such we may need to displace our current understanding of human-
environment relations. And as this act/story needs to start somewhere, what better place 
to begin, regarding a mental account of the earth, than ‘the Anthropocene49’. 
 
A Problem 
 
There seems to be ‘a problem’. The world is being driven insane. Something has 
happened in the last 263 years that has led geoscientists to call this era of the planet’s 
                                                          
49 ‘The Anthropocene’ was originally labelled by Paul Crutzen. Although I realise the 
obvious anthropocentricity issue in the name of this concept, I agree with Morton 
(2014) when he states, ‘Anthropocene ends the concept nature: a stable, nonhuman 
background to (human) history. Should this not be welcome for scholars rightly wary 
of setting artiﬁcial boundaries around history’s reach? (p. 1). However, I also disagree 
with Morton’s (2014) insistence that the sixth mass extinction event is ‘caused by 
humans-not jellyfish, not dolphins, not coral’ (p. 2) in that humans are not a 
transcendent or biologically bounded entity (or ‘object’ as he might now put it) 
distinct from the intra-actions of other life processes. This would lead to a 
‘fetishisation of difference that tends to erase other differences’ (Colebrook, 2014, 
seminar). In this sense, the term Anthropocene may herald problematic performative 
consequences but for the purposes of this scene, I will use it under erasure.   
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physical history, the age of Humans (Steffen, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2007, cited in Clarke 
& Mcphie, 2014). The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007, 2013) 
suggest that the effect of humanity over this time period has been significant (Clarke & 
Mcphie, 2014, p. 212). The ability for the Earth to self-regulate in a way that supports 
many/most biological species is now under threat…again. According to the Living 
Planet Report 2014 and the Living Blue Planet report 2015, population sizes of 
vertebrate species have dropped by half since 1970 (WWF, 2014; WWF, 2015), in the 
time that I have been alive. ‘We need 1.5 Earths to regenerate the natural resources we 
currently use; we cut trees faster than they mature, harvest more fish than oceans 
replenish, and emit more carbon into the atmosphere than forests and oceans can 
absorb.’ (WWF, 2014, para. 3). This has led many academics to adopt a change of name 
for the current geological period in Earth’s history: 
 
We no longer live in the Holocene […] but in the Anthropocene. Chemical, 
physical and biological changes are dramatic and sometimes frankly 
alarming: atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations are now at levels last 
seen more than two million years ago and rising fast; invasive species have 
been introduced to every continent and a sixth great mass extinction event 
may be with us in mere centuries; landscapes are transformed. 
(Zalasiewics, 2013, p. 9, emphasis added) 
 
Landscapes have transformed rapidly since the industrial revolution, along with the 
biosphere, hydrosphere, lithosphere and troposphere (if you want to label them this 
way). Yet the industrial revolution wasn’t a predetermined or sporadic evolutionary 
event. It was born out of ideas and conceptual apparatus that had been layering over 
time like a palimpsest (see Mcphie, 2015b, pp. 224-225). 
At an Under Western Skies conference that I attended in Calgary, Canada in 2014, 
keynote speaker and First Nations spokeswoman Winona LaDuke stated, ‘We're all 
really smart and we shop but we don't know how to do anything.’50 She was referring 
to the ‘enlightened’ Western consumer culture and capitalist production of subjectivity 
                                                          
50 As a result of her father scolding her for her lack of practical experience growing food 
from the earth, Winona LaDuke tended the land as a farmer for a substantial period of 
time until she truly understood how to ‘do’ something that gave her a more embodied 
and embedded tacit understanding of ecological relatedness (LaDuke, 2014). 
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that is becoming increasingly reliant on homogenised monoculture practices 
(agricultural and epistemological). Bruno Latour (1993) suggests that this Western 
worldview accelerated in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall: 
 
The liberal West can hardly contain itself for joy. lt has won the Cold War. 
But the triumph is short-lived. […] The repressed returns, and with a 
vengeance: the multitudes that were supposed to be saved from death fall 
back into poverty by the hundreds of millions; nature, over which we were 
supposed to gain absolute mastery, dominates us in an equally global 
fashion, and threatens us all. It is a strange dialectic that turns the slave into 
man’s owner and master, and that suddenly informs us that we have 
invented ecocides as well as large-scale famine. (p. 8) 
 
This homogenised way of thinking that eco-theorists have been so critical of since the 
nineteen seventies has become an increasingly dominant paradigm, spreading outwards 
from Europe to cover all parts of the globe. It affects thinking which in turn affects 
behaviour (as thinking is a physical ecological process). Fritjof Capra (1996) has 
previously described this problem as a ‘crisis of perception’. ‘Within this view, 
fragmentation and instrumental rationality are prioritized over other modes of 
participating in the world, directly resulting in anthropogenic environmental 
catastrophe’ (Abram, 1996, 2011; Bohm, 1980; Capra, 1996; Hamilton, 2002; Harding, 
2009; Ingold, 2011; Merchant, 1994; Orr, 1992, 2004; Plumwood, 2002; Sterling, 2004; 
cited in Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, p. 201). ‘Anthropogenic environmental catastrophe’, 
put another way, is simply catastrophe. If we take an immanent view of the world, 
environment is everything and humans (including mental health and wellbeing) are of 
that everything and so cannot be divorced from any physical processes/environmental 
changes that are occurring at present. This also problematises the very possibility of an 
idea such as an Anthropocene due to its evident anthropocentric dissociate. 
 
Ecocidal51 immanence 
                                                          
51 Ecocide is ‘the extensive destruction, damage to or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given 
territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful 
enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been severely diminished.’ (Higgins, 
2010, p. 63) 
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In their address to the Critical Climate Change series of books, editors Cohen and 
Colebrook (2014) posit: 
 
The possibility of extinction has always been a latent figure in textual 
production and archives; but the current sense of depletion, decay, mutation 
and exhaustion calls for new modes of address, new styles of publishing and 
authoring, and new formats and speeds of distribution. As the pressures and 
realignments of this re-arrangement occur, so must the critical languages 
and conceptual templates, political premises and definitions of ‘life.’ There 
is a particular need to publish in timely fashion experimental monographs 
that redefine the boundaries of disciplinary fields, rhetorical invasions, the 
interface of conceptual and scientific languages, and geomorphic and 
geopolitical interventions. Critical Climate Change is oriented, in this 
general manner, toward the epistemo-political mutations that correspond to 
the temporalities of terrestrial mutation. (n.p., emphasis added) 
 
What Cohen and Colebrook are asking for is nothing less than an ‘ethico-onto-
epistemological’52 (Barad, 2007) overhaul, one that acknowledges human’s role in 
terrestrial mutation yet with the adage that what we might think of as human is 
problematic in the first place. This terrestrial mutation, then, is not the same as an 
anthropocene. The human is not so easily identifiable, as we shall see. If we are to 
‘redefine the boundaries of disciplinary fields’ (as I will attempt to highlight with my 
‘transcranial’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) and ‘trans-corporeal’ (Alaimo, 2010) notion of 
environ(mental) health) and include an ethics of immanence in our deliberations, we 
must explore how phenomena are intra-related (an ecological investigation). For 
                                                          
52 ‘Onto-ethico-epistemology in its hyphenated sense captures something important 
about new materialism, and that is that what is in the world (ontology), what we know 
what is in the world (epistemology) cannot be separated as two separate things that do 
not affect one another (van der Tuin 166). That is, things emerge in the world and they 
are both shaped by what we know and material simultaneously, and even more we 
cannot think of them as separate. Finally, for both van der Tuin and Barad, embedded 
within this concept is that everything that emerges is embedded in politics, and while 
there is no inherent way of being ethical, there are choices that people make in 
specific special temporal consequences by which they had a role to play and should 
take partial responsibility.’ (van der Tuin & Dolphijn, n. d., para. 1). 
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example, Empson (2014) observes, ‘[t]he existence of classes within human society has 
had profound impacts upon our ecological relationships as well as our responses to 
changing environmental circumstances’ (p. 40, cited in Mcphie, 2014a, para. 11). Or 
perhaps it’s the other way round, or a mutual co-existence of both. Regardless of 
directions, it is becoming ever more obvious that ecocide is a bedfellow of inequity.  
 
The perfect symmetry between the dismantling of the wall of shame and the 
end of limitless Nature is invisible only to the rich Western democracies. 
The various manifestations of socialism destroyed both their peoples and 
their ecosystems, whereas the powers of the North and the West have been 
able to save their peoples and some of their countrysides by destroying the 
rest of the world and reducing its peoples to abject poverty. […] The West 
thinks it is the sole possessor of the clever trick that will allow it to keep on 
winning indefinitely, whereas it has perhaps already lost everything. 
(Latour, 1993, p. 9) 
 
We are implicated and imbricated in a process of ecocide. If ecocide is on the current 
agenda within this terrestrial mutation, it is almost certainly under the rubric of mental 
health and wellbeing, for ‘if the land is not healthy then how can we be?’ (Mr Joseph 
Masty, Sr, cited in Adelson, 2000, p. 3). Or put another way, if we are not healthy, how 
can the land be? Ecocide, therefore, is a mental health issue that involves the wider 
mental human-environment assemblage, a kind of ecocidal immanence. But if this is 
the case, where should we begin our exploration of this wider mental health issue? Polly 
Higgins (2010) explains:  
 
Ecocide is like the virulent Japanese Knotweed – it spreads out of control, 
sucking the life out of all that comes in its way, strangling the life out of the 
very air we breathe. To stop it, it has to be eliminated literally at its roots. 
(p. xi) 
 
So, is the crisis of perception the root we might explore? In Vital Signs: Psychological 
Responses to Ecological Crisis (Rust & Totton, 2012), the 23 authors focus on 
humanity’s ‘psychological predicament’, believing it to be distinct from humanity’s 
‘physical predicament’ and attempt to find ‘the answers’. Many of the authors purport 
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to reject Cartesian dualisms, anthropocentricity or positivist positions and yet they 
themselves fall into the positivist/Cartesian trap by the very words they use. The title of 
the book is also suggestive of this problem (i.e. a physical unidirectional cause with a 
non-physical yet linear effect). Anthropocentric anxiety about a changing climate (eco-
anxiety) is perhaps more complex and non-linear than is suggested in much psychology 
literature. The idea that climate change, as a thing happening ‘out there’, may be 
affecting our psyche, as a thing happening ‘in here’ (our heads), seems rather uni-
directional, deterministic and dualistic in its approach. Rather than focusing on climate 
change per se as some separate phenomena that may negatively affect a human psyche 
bound within a skull, maybe a redefinition of mental health and wellbeing is needed, 
one that merges conceptual boundaries and regards ‘the climate’ as of a wider mental 
assemblage so that mental health and wellbeing become an ecological or even 
geological discipline, for example.  
 
As Naomi Oreskes and Eric Conway (2014) have argued, one of the 
contributing factors in the ongoing failure to act on climate change has been 
a conception of science as an isolated activity not bound up with systems of 
political action and social dynamics. What is required, Latour argues, is a 
sense of ourselves as earthbound – not as observers of matter, but as 
oriented towards matters of concern in which our own being depends upon 
a world (a speciﬁc world, not an open universe). (Colebrook, n.d. pp. 1-2, 
emphasis added) 
 
According to Colebrook (n.d.), Latour seems to be suggesting a conceptual paradigm 
shift from observation to participation is needed. Although often mistranslated into 
spiritually holistic principles, James Lovelock’s ‘Gaia theory’ (1972, 1979, 1988, 2006) 
goes someway to tackle this issue, as for him, ‘planet Earth is understood as a self-
sustaining whole, each aspect working in a manner (without forethought or intention) 
that maintains the continuity of Gaia’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, p. 200) and humans are 
just another part of that wider ecological process.  
It seems that our perceptions, conceptions and affections may be well worth 
unpacking if we are to attempt to map the spread mind in environ(mental) health. But 
in order to unpack mental ill-health or environmental degradation, we must first begin 
to understand why we (in the West) have come to separate these two concepts in the 
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first place. For example, why would we believe mental ill-health to be of a different 
nature to environmental ill-health? If it is as simple as a category mistake, what might 
this mistake ‘do’ (as well as the categorising itself)? 
 
The ghost in the machine 
 
The ‘ghost in the machine’ was coined by Gilbert Ryle in his 1949 book 
‘The Concept of Mind’, which refers to Rene Descartes’ mind-body 
dualism. Descartes believed that our pineal gland, in our brains, held our 
mind (or immortal soul); a non-material, non-physical, non-spatial entity 
separate from our ‘body’ (which he believed to be spatial but not conscious). 
(Mcphie, 2015b, p. 227) 
 
Out of this Cartesian dualism sprang the rejuvenated Greek and Latin concepts ‘psyche’, 
‘mind’ and ‘mental’ as they seemed to imply a non-physical realm (spirit or soul) that 
gave agency to a physical human body (rather like a ghost operating a machine). These 
concepts took root within the head and even now are related to the brain, within the 
confines of the (human) skull. Type in the words ‘psychology’, ‘mind’ or ‘mental’ to 
any computer search engine and you’ll receive thousands of pictures of brains. So, 
mental health has become associated with human brains (or more likely the other way 
around). Now, on the same computer search engine, type in the word ‘environment’. 
Deciduous green trees (in the summer); green grass shawn by sheep (or lawnmowers); 
and undulating, aesthetically framed landscapes are the dominant pictures that appear. 
Simply adding the word ‘health’ on to environmental or mental doesn’t really change 
the pictures much. One concept is to do with human brains and the other is to do with 
romanticised and idealised framing of the world. Both are to do with framing subjective 
identities (at different scales). Within the conceptual framework of the modern Western 
paradigm there are inherent separations of mind-brain-body-environment.  
In a Guardian newspaper review of the British scientist Stephen Emmot’s book 
Ten Billion, John Gray warned that ‘The planet does not care about the stories that 
humans tell themselves; it responds to what humans do, and is changing irreversibly as 
a result’ (2013, p. 6, cited in Zylinska, 2014, p.11). However, there is an over-assertion 
here when Gray says that the planet does not care about the stories. It does, as is testified 
to by the many humans (and quite possibly other-than-humans such as bacteria or 
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volcanoes) who are currently trying to (re)form the dominating story (monoculture) that 
is subjugating the world to environmental inequity in this supposed Anthropocene 
period. It cares because we care. And we are of the world. To say otherwise is 
conceptually separationist, pointillist and ontologically transcendent in nature. 
Furthermore, Zylinska (2014) contends that ‘stories have a performative nature: they 
can enact and not just describe things—even if there are of course limits to what they 
are capable of enacting’ (p. 11). This is a philosophy of immanence. As Donna Haraway 
(2013) revealed in a Sawyer Seminar at UC Davis, ‘It matters what thoughts think 
thoughts. It matters what knowledges know knowledges. It matters what relations relate 
relations. It matters what worlds world worlds. It matters what stories tell stories.’ This 
is not an anthropocentrically isolated story but rather a multiple narrative of 
amalgamated events.  
What has this to do with mental health and wellbeing as it is currently 
understood? As previously asserted, a growing number of psychologists (mostly 
ecopsychologists) believe there is a connection between certain current mental health 
issues and planetary ill-health (see Rust & Totton, 2012). Throughout the 1970’s 
psychologists began to explore the importance of ecological-psychological connections 
as there seemed to be a pattern developing in society that reflected the belief that a 
psychological disconnection from nature could be hazardous to mental health (Roszak, 
1992). Much of this belief is due to a growing body of evidence indicating that anxiety, 
stress and mental ill-health are becoming more prevalent in modern Western societies, 
despite the increase in material wealth, life expectancy, GDP, political stability, 
technology, healthcare and apparent quality of life (WHO, 2001; Halliwell, 2005; 
Spedding, 2006; Summerfield & Gill, 2005). The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
estimates that depression and depression-related illness will become the greatest source 
of ill-health by 2020 (WHO, 2001; Spedding, 2006). ‘Mental illness is the single largest 
cause of disability in the United Kingdom’ (WHO 2008, cited in Gilburt, Edwards & 
Murray, 2014, p. 7) and ‘it is estimated that in any one year, at least one in four people 
will experience a ‘significant’ mental health problem’ (ONS, 2009; Mental Health 
Foundation, 2013, cited in Bragg & Atkins, 2016, n.p.) with depression and anxiety 
disorders being the most common (Gilburt, Edwards & Murray, 2014).  
It is important to note here that some mental illnesses are twice as common in 
deprived areas than non-deprived areas (People’s Inquiry into London’s NHS 2014, 
cited in Gilburt, Edwards & Murray, 2014, p. 7) as this inequity may have profound 
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consequences for how many people perceive and conceive of certain environments and 
selves due to the intra-related nature of various associations. There also seems to be a 
political discrepancy between support for mental ill-health compared to what is 
commonly perceived of as physical ill-health as well as minority communities 
compared to majority communities. The King’s Fund found that in London:  
 
it is estimated that only a quarter of people with depression or anxiety are 
receiving treatment, compared with the vast majority of those with physical 
conditions such as diabetes and hypertension (Centre for Economic 
Performance Mental Health Group 2012). Furthermore, many people have 
to request psychological therapies rather than being offered them, and after 
being assessed, as many as 10 per cent are not offered any treatment (Mind 
2013). The Mind survey also identified limited access to choice of therapy 
and poor rates of access for particular at-risk groups such as people from 
black and minority ethnic (BME) communities, older people and children.  
(Gilburt, Edwards & Murray, 2014, p. 18). 
 
Regardless of these inequitable differences in treatment, there still seems to be some 
debate over the cause of many modern mental health conditions. 
 
A symptom of planetary ill-health? 
 
We want the world, which is complex, dynamic and plural to fit the pre-
defined scripts we have in our heads for interpreting reality. We firmly 
believe we can think our way out of the problems that our thinking itself has 
created. No wonder there is so much anxiety, depression and conflict if our 
thinking has severed our sense of connection with the world, in its attempt 
to over-determine it. (de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016, p. 82) 
 
It has been suggested that this decline in mental health is due to a number of factors 
including: environmental degradation; sedentary and indoor lifestyles; greater social 
exclusion; a lack of collective agreement on fundamental moral principles; the move 
from rural to urban landscapes; an increase in negative comparisons in lifestyles; and a 
breakdown in modern Westernised social structures (CDC, 1996; DCMS, 2002; DoH, 
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2004; Pretty, Peacock, Sellens & Griffin, 2005; Layard, 2005). Gass, Gillis and Russell 
(2012) believe that ‘our growing separation from the natural world in which people 
have evolved can cause a variety of psychological symptoms that include depression, 
anxiety and stress’ (p. 95, emphasis added). Yet again we see the influence of 
enlightenment rationality combined with genetic romanticism embedded in the 
conceptual apparatus used to describe the issues (separation and natural world – 
Cartesian duality; cause – Newtonian linearity; people have evolved – genetic 
romanticism). Partly due to many of these (Cartesian) deep ecological beliefs regarding 
separation (as opposed to de Oliveira Andreotti’s (2016) ‘sense of connection’), many 
people suffering from mental ill-health now prefer alternative, non-drug based forms of 
therapy. ‘With the prescription of anti-depressants at record levels and a huge demand 
for Cognitive Behaviour Therapy and other psychological therapies, health and social 
care commissioners are examining and commissioning different options for cost 
effective services for mental health’ (Bragg & Atkins, 2016, n.p.). 
 
Alternative ‘outdoor’ treatments 
 
Alternatives to medication and psychotherapy, such as exercise and outdoor 
therapies (including ‘green’ exercise programmes such as, ‘walking for health’ or ‘green 
gyms’), became more common by the end of the last century, particularly in treating 
clinical depression (Bandoroff, 2003; Russell & Farnum, 2004; Pryor, Carpenter & 
Townsend, 2005; Halliwell, 2005), following the view in medicine that ‘nature’, as well 
as physical health is essential to mental wellbeing (Ulrich & Parsons, 1992; Warner, 
1987; Greenway, 1995). Gass, Gillis and Russell (2012) state that ‘[b]y spending time 
in the natural world and reconnecting with its processes, people are in essence also 
reconnecting to themselves and each other’ (p. 95). The current assumptions about the 
restorative benefits of nature by many outdoor therapy practitioners and participants 
seem to be consistent with this established ‘belief’. Many researchers began to explore 
the empirical basis behind that belief in the 1970’s, 1980’s and 1990’s (Russell & 
Farnum, 2004) continuing up to the present day. Natural England recently produced a 
review of nature-based interventions for mental health care (NECR204) due to the 
‘increasing recognition of the importance of nature and place as a determinant of 
individuals’ mental health’ and posit that ‘[t]hese nature-based interventions (also called 
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green care and ecotherapy) could be part of a new solution for mental health care’ 
(Bragg & Atkins, 2016, n.p.). 
The evidence base for this rapidly growing trend is now oft cited and meta-
studies, reviews and reports are published every year with increasing fervency for 
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCT’s), yet more meta-analyses and obsessive green 
(or blue) nature compulsions. For example, there has been a great deal of research on a 
variety of mental health benefits that may be gained from viewing (or being in) green 
spaces in ‘urban environments’, ‘countryside’ and ‘wilderness’ (Moore, 1981; Balling 
& Falk, 1982; Ulrich, 1984; West, 1985; Verderber, 1986; Ulrich & Simons, 1986; 
Orians, 1986; Hartig, Mang & Evans, 1991; de Vries, Verheij, Groenewegen & 
Spreeuwenberg, 2003; Grahn & Stigsdotter, 2003; Russell & Farnum, 2004; Pretty, 
Hine & Peacock, 2006; Pretty, Peacock, Sellens & Griffin, 2005; Pretty et al., 2007). 
For a rather impressive continuation of this list by Natural England see Bragg and 
Atkins (2016, pp. 10-11). 
It is important to note here that their definition of ‘natural settings’ are: ‘from 
the open countryside, fields and forests, remote wilderness, parks and open spaces, to 
street trees, urban greenspaces, allotments and gardens.’ (Bragg & Atkins, 2016, p. 10). 
I scrutinised most of the studies that Bragg and Atkins cite in their work for Natural 
England (and many more) during the first few years of my PhD and found that all of 
them confine what they think of as ‘nature’ to a very narrow, romantically idealised 
conception. Over the next few scenes, I will argue that this perception (that I started this 
PhD journey with), is a naïve and potentially catastrophic interpretation of nature and 
the world. Although not at first obvious to the uncritical eye (it took me six years of 
study to (re)cognise this inherent contradictory dualism), these definitions are 
problematic in that they unwittingly support oppressive regimes that have potentially 
dire consequences for certain environments (including the people of those 
environments). This romanticised perception taken from a humanist paradigm doesn’t 
seem to be able to climb out of the Cartesian trap. The very idea of ‘humanity’s 
relationship to nature’ is an epistemology inscribed in transcendent ontology. We are 
always already of nature, therefore we simply cannot have a relationship to nature. This 
is not merely semantics as words—concepts—are performative. For example, if there is 
a generalised assumption that nature is essential to mental wellbeing, then what does 
this mean for those who do not have various forms of access (e.g. economic, 
geographical, social, epistemological, etc.) to these particular versions of nature (such 
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as a heavily romanticised ‘green’ nature)? Also, if there is an assumption that the 
concept nature is a ‘real thing’, and that thing is green rolling hills, deciduous forests, 
sublime mountainous terrain, Disneyfied tweety birds or even ‘wild’ dangerous felines 
(another romanticised ‘red in tooth and claw’ perspective), etc., what does this 
conception produce? These are the topics for the next scenes.  
 
Scene two: The Healing Power of Nature(s) 
 
A far back as Hippocrates, the belief that (some version of) ‘nature’ cures (rather 
than the physician, assuming the physician to be ‘other’ than nature) has influenced 
various health interventions of Western culture. Public baths, bathing in healing rivers 
and Egyptian, Persian and Chinese urban gardens have long, cultural traditions 
(Hongxun, 1982; Shepard, 1967; Ulrich, 1993). In Europe, from the 12th Century 
onwards, the belief that visual contact with plants and other biota have psychologically 
beneficial health effects, have influenced the provision of gardens for patients in 
healthcare institutions (Ulrich & Parsons, 1992; Warner, 1987). In other Western 
societies, these beliefs have provided part of the justification for influencing urban 
parks, architecture and other so called ‘natural spaces’ in cities (Parsons, 1991; Ulrich, 
1993). 
Before the 1800’s, a ‘Friends Hospital’ opened in Philadelphia, USA, where part 
of the treatment was based on the idea that the ‘natural environment’ is healing for the 
mentally ill (Davis-Berman & Berman, 1994).  
Peaking after the 1800’s, the English romantics, such as Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, encouraged a socially desirable view of the English countryside, suggesting 
that a walk through these landscapes could achieve a sense of spiritual awareness or 
renewal.  
One of the earliest outdoor based interventions of the modern era, in 1901, was 
‘tent therapy’ which began on the hospital grounds of Manhattan State Hospital East, 
USA, as an intervention to stop TB from spreading from patient to patient (Davis-
Berman & Berman, 1994). Eventually, the patients residing in the tents seemed to 
recover at a faster rate than the patients left in their hospital beds indoors. This was one 
of the first evidence based studies that favoured the outdoors as a place of healing and 
is oft cited as proof of the healing effects of ‘nature’ and the ‘outdoors’, yet the reasons 
for this faster rate of recovery were/are unclear.  
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In the Peak District National Park, the Monsal Head Viaduct opened in 1863 to 
widespread criticism from those (including John Ruskin) who felt it destroyed the 
beauty of the Wye valley but is now listed as a site of architectural and historical interest 
within a Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI)! During the inter-war period, many 
within the middle classes believed that mountains and moorland specifically was better 
for people than other kinds of countryside (Clark, Darrall, Grove-White, Macnaghten 
& Urry, 1994). These examples invoke the question, ‘are these perceptions, and 
therefore healing responses, malleable’?  
 
The death of nature 
 
There still lingers a popular idea that truth can be extracted from a world 
separate from ourselves if we follow a set of instructions, ones that Patti Lather and 
Elizabeth St. Pierre (2013, p. 631) remind us ‘we made up’! For example, by reducing 
the variables in data collection we (pre)suppose that we can see a truth more clearly, as 
it really is without all the messy nature stuff around it. In other words, we must carve 
nature at its joints, a Platonic tradition that still holds strong in Western onto-
epistemologies, such as, ‘the notion of nature as merely the inert scenery against which 
the humanist adventures of culture are played out’ (MacLure, 2013, p. 659). In relation 
to the theme of this paper (environ(mental) health), much environmental 
psychology/ecopsychology research that supports genetic and innate notions of the 
healing power of ‘nature’ does just this and has become increasingly popular since the 
nineteen-eighties. 
The healing power of ‘nature’ now appears dominant in a range of 
interdisciplinary fields including, ecopsychology (Greenway, 1995; Kahn & Hasbach, 
2012; Roszak, 1992), environmental psychology (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982, 1989), 
evolutionary psychology (Wilson, 1984), therapeutic landscapes (Gesler, 1992, 2005; 
Gesler & Kearns, 2002), health geography (Curtis, 2010), architecture (Kellert & 
Calabrese, 2015), nature therapy (Burns, 1998), ecotherapy (Buzzell & Chalquist, 2009; 
Clinebell, 1996; Jordan, 2014; Jordan & Hinds, 2016), adventure therapy (Bandoroff & 
Newes, 2004; Gass, Gillis & Russell, 2012; Norton, Carpenter & Pryor, 2015), 
wilderness therapy (Davis-Berman & Berman, 1994), and horticultural therapy (Simson 
& Straus, 1998). Several researchers (Bacon, 1983; Gibson, 1979; Greenway, 1995; 
Johnson & Frederickson, 2000; Kimball, 1983) even go as far as to say that it is ‘nature’ 
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that is the dominant therapeutic component in outdoor interventions, such as adventure 
therapy, and the leader/councillor does nothing more than ‘supplement’ its healing 
power (Gass, Gillis & Russell, 2012).  
One of the most commonly cited studies undertaken on the health benefits of 
nature is Roger Ulrich’s (1984) ‘View Through a Window May Influence Recovery 
from Surgery’, in which 23 surgical patients who were assigned to rooms with windows 
that over-looked a ‘scene of nature’ had shorter postoperative hospital stays, received 
fewer negative evaluative comments in nurses’ notes, and took fewer potent analgesics 
than 23 matched patients in similar rooms with windows facing a brick wall. One of the 
reasons for its popularity is its publication in the famous journal, ‘Science’ and has been 
cited over 3000 times. However, Helman’s (2001) ‘Context Effects’ (referring to 
‘unconscious’ beliefs as well as conscious ones) and more specifically his 
‘macrocontext’, suggest that the ‘script’ of a person’s perception of, for example, the 
hospital ward or nature garden, is derived from culture itself and tells them how to 
behave, how to experience the event and what to expect from it which, in turn, helps 
validate the healer/practitioner and their methods of healing (Helman, 2001; Vallance, 
2006). Also, when attending a little more closely to what a ‘scene of nature’ actually is, 
it becomes evident that both of these invented Occidental concepts are highly 
problematic in numerous ways (explored more thoroughly in (Intra-)Act 1, scene three). 
More recent examples of evidence for nature based outdoor therapies are 
supported by colourful therapeutic concepts such as, ‘green gyms’ (Pretty, Peacock, 
Sellens & Griffin, 2005) or ‘blue gyms’ (White et al., 2010) to find the ‘best dose of 
nature’ to improve mental health (Barton & Pretty, 2010). These green and blue gym 
research examples (Transfers 8 and 9) purport to measure various positive effects of 
‘nature’ on our mental and physical health (note the Cartesian divide) by showing 
‘virtual representations’ (such as photographs or ‘sounds of the sea’ played through a 
speaker) of ‘nature’, whilst on a treadmill in an indoor gym (comprehensively reviewed 
by Curtis, 2010, pp. 35-63). 
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Transfer 8: Green Exercise. Reducing the variables in data collection! (Photo 
retrieved from Pretty, et al., 2005) 
 
Transfer 9: Blue Gym. Reducing the variables in data collection! (Photo retrieved 
from White, et al., 2010) 
 
I respect the commendable ethical intentions for this type of research but I have 
noticed various problematic assumptions embedded within it that seem typical of how 
many of us in the West see the world. These range from the fallacy of measuring it by 
chopping it into variables and data and then transporting/transferring these 
disembodied parts into a more static, workable environment…a laboratory-gym (which 
is also nature…to think otherwise must be anthropocentric, dualistic and essentialist) to 
subjective Westernised romantic conceptions of an objective ‘nature’ (evident in 
recently popularised notions such as, ‘get out into nature’ or ‘re-connect to nature’). 
There now exists a ‘Connectedness to Nature Scale’ (CNS) (Mayer & Frantz, 2004), a 
‘Nature Relatedness Scale’ and a ‘Connectivity to Nature Scale’ (Selhub & Logan, 
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2012, p. 228) for researchers to objectively measure both wellbeing and nature in order 
to disseminate the results at academic conferences such as, ‘Nature Connections…an 
interdisciplinary conference to examine routes to nature connectedness’ (Nature 
Connections, 2015).  
Although I have critiqued these problematic concepts (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014, 
2015; Mcphie, 2012, 2013, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b; Mcphie & Clarke, 2015) it is also 
worth mentioning that the types of colourful inquiry that support these romanticized 
conceptions (i.e. green and blue gym research) are still very useful in many ways. For 
example, they can reveal a great many conceptions of the world such as, a method to 
show how to evidence the placebic healing effects of a two-dimensional picture that 
may be perceived as a romanticized Western idyllic landscape. In other words, rather 
than re-presenting the effects/experiences of these outdoor environments, this type of 
research could suggest that a ‘picture’ of a person’s ‘perception’ of what they ‘think’ 
‘nature’ is, may have an influence on their mental health and wellbeing, indicating that 
the perception itself (including conceptions and beliefs) may be enough to trigger a 
positive response, rather like an embodied placebo response (Mcphie, 2012, 2015a). If 
this were so, it would have powerful implications regarding the potential healing power 
of concepts themselves (such as a romanticized version of ‘nature’) rather than 
objectified percepts of empirical materials. 
Psychological conceptions of a romanticized objective nature evident in 
environmental psychology, evolutionary psychology and ecopsychology have in turn 
led to alternative outdoor therapies such as, ecotherapy, wilderness therapy, adventure 
therapy, horticultural therapy, green therapy and nature therapy. Whilst I acknowledge 
that each of these psychologies/therapies may have proven beneficial for many people 
since their invention, surely we could also explore what stories are omitted or narratives 
repressed by their very existence as a matter of ethical responsibility. For example, what 
does the creation of new power relations that have emerged and been generated from 
these psychological concepts do (socially, environmentally, materially, politically, 
conceptually, affectively, etc.)? Also, we could look to their underpinning theoretical 
conceptual origins in order to highlight any possible assumptions. For example, these 
conceptions are partly founded on innate, genetic assumptions about a generalized 
fundamental human preference for certain romanticized landscapes over others, evident 
in theories such as, Ulrich’s (1979, 1983, 1991) ‘Psycho-Evolutionary Stress Reduction 
Theory’; Kellert and Wilson’s (1993) ‘Biophilia Hypothesis’; Kaplan and Kaplan’s 
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(1982, 1989) ‘Attention Restoration Theory’ (ART); Orians’ (1980, 1986) ‘Savannah 
Hypothesis’; and Appleton’s (1975) ‘Prospect-Refuge Theory’ (themselves 
descendants and palimpsests of post Socratic Greek conceptions of the healing power 
of ‘nature’). However, if we examine these genetic theories more closely it becomes 
apparent that there is no evidence of any specific genes identified that would evidence 
their inventor’s claims making many of their assertions highly improbable.  
 
The death of Biophilia 
 
Biophilia combines two Greek words, life and love, to form the literal translation 
of ‘the love of life’. Edward Wilson (1984, p.1) defined Biophilia as the ‘innate 
tendency to focus on life and life-like processes.’ He proclaims a genetically based 
human dependence on nature that developed throughout evolution and a partly genetic 
basis for humans’ positive responsiveness to ‘nature’, particularly to Earth’s living biota 
(Wilson, 1984). Kahn (1997) reviewed several critiques of the Biophilia Hypothesis 
purporting that:  
 
there are severe limitations to an interpretation which relies on such 
deterministic socio-biology, since people are not entirely driven by 
genetically encoded, primitive instincts, but also influenced by their own 
lifetime experiences and environment and by contemporary social 
influences of their social group. (cited in Curtis, 2010, pp. 39-40). 
 
There has been some supposed evidence for the genetic heritage of ‘biophobia’ in the 
form of arachnophobia and Ophidiophobia when compared with handguns and frayed 
electrical wire (Cook, Hodes & Lang, 1986; Hugdahl & Karker, 1981; Ulrich, 1993) or 
biologically prepared learning through repeated exposure to slides of fear-relevant, fear-
irrelevant or neutral stimuli (Ohman, 1979; Ohman, Eriksson & Olofsson, 1975; 
Ohman, Dimberg & Ost, 1985). Both Wilson (1984) and Ulrich (1993) argue that such 
evidence of biophobia promotes the proof of the existence of biophilia. However, 
inadvertently, many of these studies support a very different hypothesis; that we learn 
our biophobias from each other rather than genetically inherit them. For example, many 
studies have shown that merely observing another person’s fearful or aversive reaction 
to a thing or receiving information regarding the possibility of an aversive consequence 
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is enough to trigger a biophobic response (Cook & Mineka, 1989, 1990; Hugdahl, 1978; 
Hygge & Ohman, 1978; Mineka, Davidson, Cook & Keir, 1984; Ulrich, 1993). Also, 
Koole and van den Berg (2005) showed how many people have biophobic reactions to 
(conceptually) ‘natural’ landscapes, associating ‘wilderness’ with death, for example. 
Orians’ (1980; 1986) savannah theory states that the first humans lived in the 
African savannah where they evolved and developed an innate attraction to savannah-
like trees and landscape in general. However, many paleoanthropologists now believe 
that these earlier humans were not optimally adapted to any environment in particular 
(Chamberlain, 2000) and as such would not necessarily have developed a genetic 
aesthetics for any one singular environment. 
As always, there are philosophical, social, political and ethical issues related to 
these reductionist accounts of life. There are also more erudite explorations of some 
unquestioned assumptions evident within these theories’ paradigmatic underpinnings, 
such as important discussions around the polyvalent concept of ‘nature’ within 
ecotheory (comprehensively examined by Braidotti, 2013; Cohen, 2013; de Vega, n.d.a; 
Iovino & Oppermann, 2014; Morton, 2007, 2010; and Zizek, 2008, for example).  
 
The death of psychology 
 
The Anglo-American phenomenon, evolutionary psychology, ‘claims to explain 
all aspects of human behaviour, and thence culture and society, on the basis of universal 
features of human nature that found their final evolutionary form during the infancy of 
our species some 100-600,000 years ago’ (Rose & Rose, 2001, p. 1). Evolutionary 
psychologists describe this fixed state as the ‘architecture of the mind’ (Rose & Rose, 
2001, p. 1) which includes ‘everything from children’s alleged dislike of spinach to our 
supposed universal preferences for scenery featuring grassland and water’ that has 
derived ‘from this mythic human origin in the African savannah’ (ibid. p. 2) and a few 
of these claims even go as far as to ‘legitimise men’s ‘philandering’ and women’s 
‘coyness’’ (ibid. p. 2). Of course, there is always the argument with any concept that it 
is not the gun that kills someone even though the gun is imbricated in the co-production 
of events. Rose and Rose (2001) counter the evolutionary psychological claims that, 
‘living organisms must be understood not as reducible to their genes but as following a 
lifeline trajectory, simultaneously product and process, being and becoming’ (p. 12). 
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Environmental psychology, the psychology behind the green and blue gym 
studies (and subsequently the charity Mind’s claims), follows a similar path to the 
evolutionary claims. Kaplan and Kaplan’s (1982, 1989) ‘Attention Restoration Theory’ 
(ART) is a key hypothesis that supports many restorative claims (such as Louv’s (2006) 
Nature Deficit Disorder). Yet, Joye and van den Berg (2011) found ‘that neither current 
empirical evidence nor conceptual arguments provide any strong support for the 
hypothesis of restorative responses to nature as an ancient evolved adaptive trait’ (p. 
261). Milligan and Bingley (2007) also found that whilst some participants found 
woodland restorative, others felt fearful or even repelled by it. 
Even ecopsychology and its pragmatic partner ecotherapy, although allegedly 
bio/ecocentrically focused, still fall into a genetic and Cartesian trap. Ecopsychology 
partly takes its theoretical underpinning from the genetic theories evident in 
evolutionary and environmental psychologies and partly from the ontological claims of 
Arne Naess’s (1973) ‘deep ecology’ that we must re-connect to nature. I would agree 
with the claim that the ‘psyche’ when considered in isolation from the environment is 
indeed a major problem within traditional psychology. However, following the rhetoric 
of deep ecology (and therefore, ecopsychology and ecotherapy), to believe there is a 
natural environment that is transcendent and separate from an unnatural environment 
(or to believe that an unnatural environment even exists), is a romanticized, Cartesian 
and anthropocentric assumption. In The Posthuman, Rosi Braidotti (2013) uses the case 
of Arne Naess’s deep ecology (which proposes ‘a return to holism and to the notion of 
the whole earth as a single, sacred organism’), in order to explain that although ‘[t]his 
holistic approach is rich in perspectives’, it is ‘also quite problematic for a vitalist, 
materialist posthuman thinker’ as it is ‘based on a social constructivist dualistic method’ 
(p. 84). She suggests that ‘its technophobic aspect is not particularly helpful […] 
considering the world we are living in’ as well as paradoxically reinstating ‘the very 
categorical divide between the natural and the manufactured which it is attempting to 
overcome’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 85).  
 
The problem with this position is that, in flagrant contradiction with its 
explicitly stated aims, it promotes full-scale humanization of the 
environment. This strikes me as a regressive move, reminiscent of the 
sentimentality of the Romantic phases of European culture. I concur 
therefore with Val Plumwood’s (1993, 2003) assessment that deep ecology 
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misreads the earth-cosmos nexus and merely expands the structures of 
possessive egoism and self-interests to include non-human agents. 
(Braidotti, 2013, p. 85). 
 
Various conceptions of ecotherapy (such as the promotion of a healthy re-connection to 
an idealized nature) may also actively promote social and cultural inequity in certain 
contexts (perhaps a case of the gun not being the main culprit) if performed as a white, 
middle-class Euro/Amero-centric hegemonic concept, that partly arose through the 
romantic era in Europe. For example, a romantically conceived nature, rather like the 
term wilderness, may indeed be healthy for a privileged few but certainly not all, 
especially if your social capital is inhibited53 or if you happen to be a persecuted culture 
that has been forcibly removed from your home environment to support a national park 
meant for all and yet sold as, ‘untrammelled by man’ for a privileged aesthetic and semi-
spiritual benefit (see Callicott, 2000 for an in-depth discussion of wilderness as an 
androcentric, colonial, racist and genocidal concept). It is highly contextual. It is also 
highly political and, as previously mentioned, if not kept under close scrutiny may 
become culturally bias, dualistic, essentialist and quite possibly promote social inequity 
for some through socio-cultural and epistemological inaccessibility (not unlike 
academe).  
Similar to humanist/modernist conceptions of mental health and wellbeing, 
these environmental/ecological approaches to psychotherapeutic design typically view 
health as a ‘natural fact’ of a ‘normal’ body (Mol, 2002) which is ‘largely treated as a 
product of social, biological and individual factors’ and is ‘presented as the inevitable 
outcome of a propitious environment, supportive public policy or a favourable genetic 
endowment’ (Duff, 2014, p. 5)54.  
 
The death of place 
 
                                                          
53   This point is becoming increasingly evident within my own research (Mcphie, 
2014b) where I am finding that the conception of a green nature as beneficial to 
mental health is highly contextual and dependant on many complex phenomena, one 
of them being ‘social capital’ (see Bourdieu, 1986). 
54 This conception of mental health is problematic for a number of reasons and is 
discussed further in (Intra-)Act 1, Scene four.  
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There are a number of alternatives to the environmental/ecological approaches 
to psychotherapeutic design from the world of health geography that explore how and 
why ‘social and physical environments’ impact on a person’s psychological wellbeing 
including, Topophilia (Tuan, 1990), Therapeutic Landscapes (Gesler, 1992, 2005; 
Gesler & Kearns, 2002) and various conceptions in/of Space, Place and Mental Health 
(Curtis, 2010). For example, Gesler’s (1993, p. 171) therapeutic landscapes are places 
with ‘an enduring reputation for achieving physical, mental, and spiritual healing’ and 
merge cultural geography, sense of place and symbolic landscapes, in order to research 
the symbolic systems within ‘locations of healing’. These various conceptions of mental 
wellbeing in relation to our environments add a richness to our understanding of how 
the environment may influence our own mental health, especially when understood in 
terms of relational complexity (see Cummins, Curtis, Diez-Roux & Macintyre, 2007 for 
a review) with an ‘increasing emphasis on exploring the interactions between individual 
people and the context in which they live their lives’ (Curtis, 2010, p. 11). 
However, from my own reading and reviewing of these geographical inquiries, 
it seems that most of them still take much of their theoretical underpinning from the 
same genetic, innate sources as evolutionary and environmental psychology (mostly 
from Wilson, Ulrich and the Kaplans) as well as/or relying on generalised 
anthropocentric symbolic mental representations and meaning making to explain a 
variety of outcomes (Mcphie, 2015a).  
For many of these reported therapeutic encounters, notions of place might 
characteristically provide a backdrop, yet the ‘speciﬁc restorative qualities of enabling 
places are typically neglected in favour of the analysis of “healing experiences” (Gesler, 
2005), “place preferences” (Korpela, Klemettila & Hietanen, 2002) or “meaning and 
value” (Williams, 1998)’ (Duff, 2011, p. 151).  
Most of these endeavours mentioned smart of anthropocentric interpretosis and 
take serious the invention of psychology as somehow separate from a physical world, a 
world other than merely human.  
 
In the absence of coherent theoretical accounts of the characteristic features 
of enabling places, much less the means of their production, existing 
approaches risk reifying the therapeutic effects of ‘natural’ environments 
without properly attending to the potentially enabling qualities of built 
environments. (Duff, 2011, p. 151) 
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Alternatively, instead of reifying the traditional healing spaces of clinical settings, 
following Lefebvre’s work, Law (2009) explored how a mental health group preferred 
a ‘transgressive landscape of counterculture and deviance, of vagrants, graffiti artists 
and a host of skateboarders’ (p. 1828), to promote recovery by reclaiming these spaces 
rather than the ‘misjudged aesthetic of comfort’ of traditional therapeutic landscapes 
that seem to further alienate the injured (p. 1832).  
 
Maybe Law is right, and we should invest more research into exploring 
alternative spaces that would allow people to develop both an active 
position and their own understanding of place. Perhaps then, these people 
will be better able to regain control of their lives in order to build up a 
different and hopefully healthier position. (von Peter, 2013, p. 324) 
 
How these spaces are conceived and perceived is perhaps, then, of paramount 
importance if we are to reconnoitre whether reclamations of space into place is even 
possible for many people.  Or perhaps we need an epistemological shift ‘from places to 
paths’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 2015), in order to exemplify a process-(intra)-relational world 
becoming rather than an illusory space or static place of being. 
 
Intermède: Mechanos 
 
‘Theos’ and ‘Mechanos’ were terms used by Henryk Skolimowski (1994) 
to describe the last two stages out of four (the first two being ‘Mythos’ and 
‘Logos’) of the history of the Western mind. Theos describes the period of 
Christianity that emerged from the Dark Ages and Mechanos describes the 
scientific revolution and later enlightenment that eventually led to treating 
the universe as an objective clockwork mechanism to be measured to find 
‘truth’. (Mcphie, 2015b, p. 226) 
 
In this next scene I shall illuminate how this Enlightenment ontology, Mechanos, has 
dominated the architecture of the Western mind and furthered the conceptual 
entrenchment of becoming observers of our own participation of the world. I will 
attempt to expose the conceptual paradigm shift that took place during the early stages 
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of this period and explore what that shift has done to the performance of discourse and 
behaviour akin to our current understanding of human-environment relations. I believe 
this is important to uncover how our current indulgence of a mental health trapped in 
an independent, subjective self (the quiddity of the human form), dominates our 
understanding and treatment of ‘patients’ and ‘environments’ as separate entities, 
something akin to Alfred North Whitehead’s (1919) notion of the bifurcation of 
nature55.  
Reading recent literature from what have been called the ontological, affective, 
empirical and material turns (Clough, 2007; Coole & Frost, 2010; Ivakhiv, 2013; St. 
Pierre, 2014), it is clear that concepts (as stories), such as ethics, aesthetics, nature, 
culture, environment, psyche, mental health, etc. are performative56 and therefore must 
be duly considered for issues of mental health and wellbeing, especially (re)search into 
mental health and wellbeing. Foucault (1972) knew this well: 
 
discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these 
signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the 
language (langue) and to speech. It is this “more” that we must reveal and 
describe. (p. 54) 
 
Donna Haraway (2004, p. 70) suggests that it is more important to map where the effects 
of difference appear rather than where differences appear. Concepts perform in all sorts 
of ways with varying intensities, rhythms and forces, depending on their wielder or 
(perhaps more accurately) co-animator/co-producer. It is the effects of these co-
                                                          
55 According to Bruno Latour (2002), Whitehead’s bifurcation of nature is ‘the strange 
and fully modernist divide between primary and secondary qualities’ (p. 2), ‘what 
happens whenever we think the world is divided into two sets of things’ (p. 3).  
56 In How To Do Things with Words, Austin objected to ‘the logical positivists’ focus 
on the verifiability of statements’ and so ‘introduced the performative as a new 
category of utterance that has no truth value since it does not describe the world, but 
acts upon it—a way of “doing things with words.”’ (Hall, 2000, p. 184). For example, 
Butler’s (1990) notion of ‘performativity’ attends to the capacity of communication 
and speech to perform and even define identity as there is no prediscursive identity. 
‘[E]ven our understanding of biological sex is discursively produced. This perspective 
puts more weight on the speech event itself, requiring us to examine how speakers 
manipulate ideologies of feminine and masculine speech in the ongoing production of 
gendered selves.’ (Hall, 2000, p. 186).  
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produced concepts that perform to reveal a shared agency rather than a concept in itself, 
as that can do nothing without a partner (or assemblage). But rather than just following 
the post-linguistic turn’s human relations alone (i.e. Foucault and Butler’s work), what 
is also needed is a ‘posthumanist performative account of the material-discursive 
practices of mattering (including those that get labelled “scientific” and those that get 
labelled “social”)’ (Barad, 2007, p. 146), as 
 
for both Butler and Foucault, agency belongs only to the human domain, 
and neither address the nature of technoscientific practices and their 
profoundly productive effects on human bodies, as well as the ways in 
which these practices are deeply implicated in what constitutes the human, 
and more generally the workings of power. (pp. 145-146). 
 
And it is important where we draw our lines. Plato suggested we carve nature at its 
joints but Gregory Bateson (2000) warns that by doing so, we may miss or lose 
important information. The same is true of (supposed) representational phenomena that 
attempt to define concepts by labelling and then bounding them in disciplinary concrete, 
such as words: 
 
Indeed, there is a host of material-discursive forces— including ones that 
get labeled “social,” “cultural,” “psychic,” “economic,” “natural,” 
“physical,” “biological,” “geopolitical,” and “geological”—that may be 
important to particular (entangled) processes of materialization. If we 
follow disciplinary habits of tracing disciplinary-defined causes through to 
the corresponding disciplinary-defined effects, we will miss all the crucial 
intra-actions among these forces that fly in the face of any specific set of 
disciplinary concerns. (Barad, 2003, p. 810) 
 
In other words, ‘‘[t]hings matter’ and theory never is a purely epistemological 
undertaking. Which cuts are made, to speak with Barad, will make a difference – and 
necessarily so because these cuts constitute (‘are’) the very plane from-with which 
everything emerges.’ (Thiele, 2014, p. 204). For example, psychological concepts, such 
as anxiety, stress, depression and mental ill-health in Western societies are usually 
attributed to humans (and more specifically to human brains) and at a push, certain 
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animals. Yet mental ill-health is evident in humans and the environment if viewed 
through a particular lens, one that doesn’t choose to isolate mental from physical 
processes or culture from nature (or humans from environments for that matter). This 
is an immanent lens (rather than a holistic one). But before attempting to explore these 
concepts more thoroughly throughout this PhD, it is perhaps prudent to first unpack 
current (Western) onto-epistemological perceptions of environmental concepts (scene 
three) and mental health and wellbeing (scene four), before the move to process-
relational paradigms (scene five), as I believe these concepts are key to considering how 
mental health and wellbeing are distributed in the environment and have recently 
become more evident in much of the literature on this topic, from ecopschology to 
therapeutic landscapes.   
Scene three uncovers some of the most commonly used definitions, descriptions 
and deconstructions of historicized topographical concepts in order to expose some of 
the more relevant aspects of how we perceive and conceive ‘the environment’ and our 
potential therapeutic attachments to it. This is especially relevant for how we in the 
West have come to view and frame the world in a particular way, one that erects borders 
around everything including mental health and wellbeing. For once we expose and 
deconstruct these assumptions, we may then begin a process of creative production from 
the mosaic that is left behind. 
As ‘the environment’ is a crucial concept to understanding how mental health 
and wellbeing is distributed, it is fundamental to first explore what we mean when we 
say (or think) ‘environment’ for ‘once we begin to be suspicious of the everyday 
language we take for granted – “our mother tongue” or our “language with a history” 
(Spivak, 1993, p. 69) – the world becomes shaky indeed’ (St. Pierre, 1997, p. 175).  
 
Scene three: The Aesthetics of a Teletubby Landscape: A Short History of a 
Romantic Gaze  
 
The title of this scene was born out of reasoning during research I conducted 
between the periods of June to July, 2012, that explored how volunteers experienced 
and interpreted specific outdoor environments (urban parks) within two restorative 
outdoor health intervention groups (see Mcphie, 2015a). In this research, there were 
some especially interesting comments regarding all the participants’ aesthetic 
perceptions of ‘wild’ nature, ‘managed’ nature and the ‘right sort’ of nature when I 
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interviewed them. In fact, one participant went as far as to suggest that the shape of a 
particular part of the landscape was ‘a bit like Teletubbies’, meaning it seemed a little 
too manicured. In fact, one of the reasons that the participants from one initiative took 
me to their ‘nature trail’ was due to their belief that it was slightly ‘more natural’ than 
much of the rest of the place, including the Teletubbies area. One such comment came 
from the Green Man (self-chosen pseudonym) saying that they “try to keep part of it 
natural for this nature walk, you know, so it’s not too manicured” (Mcphie, 2015a, p. 
564).  
It is also topological and metaphorical: topological, because of the relational 
value it bears on the historisized, aesthetized and highly politicized (to name a few) 
cultural hegemony of the white upper-middle classes and how it’s filtered through the 
media; metaphorical, because the Teletubby landscape is the idea of paradise found, 
Eden or if you like, England (or at least a new England). 
The aesthetics of this ‘Teletubbies Landscape’ (Transfer 10) is of special 
significance for a number of reasons. The relation it bears to the themes that emerged 
from both the study mentioned above and a review of the literature suggest that the 
perception of nature is heavily influenced by historical and linguistic irrevocability and 
engaged via embodied associations rather than through genetic or evolutionary 
influence (as proposed by Edward Wilson, Roger Ulrich and Jay Appleton) and, as 
Oelschlaeger (1991) reaffirms, not as a product of human cognition in social context (as 
advocated by Lee (1972), Cosgrove and Daniels (1988)). 
Of course this type of landscape propaganda that is sold to children is also 
similar to other televised notions of idealised places of community living. In 1937 
Tolkien described Hobbiton as it is now pictured in the recent film Lord of the Rings 
(Transfer 11) but these places have not simply been cognitively or magically invented 
out of a tabula rasa of a subject’s imagination. They have been embodied through both 
indirect, historically influenced, cultural-natural phenomena and embodied memory 
and association from direct experience. This type of underground, grass covered 
housing already exists in the world (Transfer 12) and many authors, composers, artists 
and poets had envisioned this type of undulating landscape throughout history and 
physical manifestations of it can be seen in such idealised and highly managed/produced 
settings as the Lake District (Transfer 13) or parts of New Zealand (Transfer 14). 
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Transfer 10: Teletubbies Landscape (Teletubbies Wiki, 201657) 
 
  
Transfer 11: The Shire (Darkchylde, 201658) 
 
  
Transfer 12: Suomenlinna, Finland (WikiNed, 201459) 
                                                          
57 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
58 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
59 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
94 
 
        
Transfer 13: Lake District, England (Photo by David Iliff, 200960) 
 
 
Transfer 14: Matamata, New Zealand (Photo by Daniel Peckham, 201261) 
 
Of course these green landscapes were initially produced by grazing animals but 
have since become associated with an assortment of notions ranging from fertile 
farming resource to picturesque or romantic scenery, most of which are viewed 
favourably (at least by white, middle class Westerners). It may also be used as a medical 
resource for outdoor therapy practices, although a more romantically conceived wild 
landscape is often preferred. 
The Teletubby landscape appeal is exemplified in William Blake’s poem Milton 
(1804), later appropriated in 1916 into a popular song Jerusalem by Sir Hubert Parry to 
rally British troops (although briefly adopted by the suffragette movement), now sold 
as the unofficial national anthem for England (Cox, 2012). Referring to an ancient 
legend that Jesus once walked England’s ‘green and pleasant land’, Blake wrote: 
 
                                                          
60 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
61 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
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And did those feet in ancient time/Walk upon England's mountains 
green?/And was the holy Lamb of God/On England's pleasant pastures 
seen? […] I will not cease from mental fight,/Nor shall my sword sleep in 
my hand,/Till we have built Jerusalem/In England's green and pleasant land. 
(cited in Cox, 2012, n.p.). 
 
Of course there would be an issue of biodiverse sustainability if Jerusalem really were 
built in England, just as there is a problem in Australia, America, Africa, etc., places 
where England’s green and pleasant land was (re)built in place of the native 
environments.   
 
The traditional British countryside is an invented concept designed (not 
necessarily intentionally) to impose dominant power relations within 
societal and environmental structures in this country and export it to other 
countries whilst also instilling a sense of place for those people who would 
protect it, fight for it and transform other places ‘into’ it (e.g. Australia, 
America, etc.)! Vandana Shiva (1993) put it nicely stating, ‘Emerging from 
a dominating and colonising culture, modern knowledge systems are 
themselves colonising’ (p. 2). (Mcphie, 2014b, n.p.) 
 
Hence, this article in the Daily Mail newspaper with the headline, ‘From wartime hell 
of Afghanistan to rolling green hills of England: Soldier's best friend Treo the […] 
sniffer dog enjoys peaceful retirement after saving soldiers' lives’ (Reilly, 2012, n.p.). 
This title is highly suggestive, implanting an idea of Afghanistan as ‘Hell’ compared to 
a garden of Eden that is England (perhaps an embodied manifestation of Apollonian 
and Dionysian artistic presentations of landscapes such as, Bosch’s Garden of Earthly 
Delights and Lorenzetti’s allegory of good government). This is what we are fighting 
for, all that is good in the world. Hobbiton is England (now transported to New Zealand, 
a new England) and Mordor is Afghanistan, Iraq or Iran. Of course, there are also 
implications of race, religion and general cultural biases (including xenophobia) within 
these concepts. It is not simply a matter of dark versus light (or dark skin versus light 
skin/Islam versus Christianity), it is also a matter of dark versus green! Of course after 
the Romantic movement, the Lake District became extremely popular as a tourist 
destination and influenced a further wilderness ideology that was to prove fatal to 
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certain indigenous people around the world. This perhaps shows that our cultural 
landscape perceptions can indeed change over time and provides hope for the political 
refugees of the enforcement of the Teletubby landscape ideology. 
We attach associations to landscapes. Hence, certain urban and rural 
environments may be perceived as welcoming due to the wealth associated with their 
aesthetic appeal. For example, a English garden with a freshly mown lawn and a 
Monkey Puzzle tree in it may seem relaxing compared to a rundown estate with ‘weeds’ 
in the pavement cracks, supermarket trolleys lying on their sides, broken windows and 
graffiti tags decorating the buildings. This is not because the Monkey Puzzle tree holds 
more aesthetic appeal objectively but probably because it sits in the garden of a large 
and wealthy house as a remnant from the Victorian age of exploration when the upper 
classes travelled to distant lands (Chile in this case) and brought back exotic flora to 
adorn their showcase gardens. Sometimes this association to social capital is felt 
unconsciously and passed on through each generation as a palimpsest of ever bulging 
embodied memory. 
The definitions of the various topographical concepts themselves are worth 
exploring for they are both a reflection and actant of perceptual and behavioural 
topographical zeitgeists. In other words, the words themselves are both performative 
and reflective of the various historical and geographical ontological and epistemological 
trends. Their conceptual meanings change according to major philosophical shifts and 
patterns in thought. In turn, their usage alters the perceptions and behaviours of the 
cultures that act out the new conceptual status of the terms. For example, in 1642 James 
Howell thought the Alps were ‘uncouth, huge, monstrous Excrescences of Nature, 
bearing nothing but craggy stones’ (Thompson, 2010, p. 20). ‘In 1657 a dictionary still 
describes ‘forest’ as ‘awful’, ‘gloomy’, ‘desolate’, ‘inhospitable’ (Lemaire, 1988, p. 
62).’ (cited in Egmond, 2007, pp. 15-16). These views changed not long after that time 
as more picturesque constructions of landscapes began to multiply among the 
upper/middle classes. Picturesque, sublime and romanticised perceptions were also 
heavily influenced by the 1681 book A Sacred Theory of the Earth (1681 in Latin, 1684 
in English), by Thomas Burnet (MacFarlane, 2003; Nicolson, 1997; Schama, 2004) as 
it altered perceptions of mountainous terrain from excrescences to agreeable 
excrescences. Seven years later, John Dennis described the Alps as a ‘Delightful 
Horrour’ and ‘Terrible Joy’ and by 1705 Joseph Addison described the Alps as an 
‘Agreeable kind of Horrour’ (Nicolson, 1997; Schama, 2004; Thompson, 2010). The 
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book was read by Addison, Dennis, Steele, Wharton, Young, Wordsworth, Coleridge 
and many others (Nicolson, 1997). A century after Burnet’s book was written, the 
mountains had transformed once more from agreeable excrescences to a new found 
sublime birthplace for hegemonic cultural constructs to appropriate. ‘Moreover, the 
wilderness, in particular the wild forest, became associated for many Romanticists with 
the experience of God’s Creation and as such turned out to be the centre of spiritual and 
religious regeneration.’ (Egmond, 2007, p. 16).  
 
Landscape and Scenery  
 
The concept Landscape (literally meaning shape of the land) may signify a 
‘visible’ picture or painting that supposedly represents the topography; ‘a picture 
representing inland scenery’ (Little, Fowler, Coulson & Onion, 1957, p. 1104). Often 
regarded as a human-made feature of the land, or its organisation, landscape may be 
defined as ‘the land transformed’ (Dean & Millar, 2005, p. 13) or perhaps merely a 
pretty backdrop for the purpose of human activities (Brown 1995; Ellison, 2013). 
Antrop (2013, p. 13) claims that landscape ‘can be described and analyzed using 
objective scientific methods’, but ‘also refers to subjective observation and experience 
and thus has a perceptive, aesthetic, artistic and existential meaning (Lowenthal 1975; 
Cosgrove and Daniels 1988)’. These conceptions of landscape as either objective or 
subjective are common in the literature and expose its many delineations, including the 
change of perceptions of landscape from ‘within’ (emic) to ‘without’ (etic): 
 
landscab encompassed a view of people being within […] But by the 17th 
century, Dutch painters were referring to landscape as landtskip, which 
represents natural scenery that people view from without (OED 2011). 
(Ellison, 2013, p. 7, emphasis added) 
 
According to Denis Cosgrove, the term ‘Landscape’ as a scenic backdrop originated in 
15th century Italy (Cosgrove, 1985; Cosgrove & Daniels, 1988). This understanding of 
the term arose ‘with the invention of new perspectival techniques for representing space 
and depth on the canvas’ (Wylie, 2007, p. 8), mostly for the purposes of architecture 
and art but was also heavily influenced by Italian theatre designs and the concept of 
‘scenery’.   
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The term ‘scenery’ is also a product of the Italian Renaissance62 and began life 
as the backdrop to a ‘scene’ in a staged play (the equivalent of this page you are reading 
right now, whether on a computer screen (pixel scenery) or a tree derivative (paper 
scenery), that may be styled ‘portrait’ or ‘landscape’). This particular style of theatrical 
scenery developed from the linear perspectives of Filippo Brunelleschi (1377- 1446), 
Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472), Pellegrino da San Daniele (1467-1547) and 
Sebastiano Serlio (1475-1554) who published the highly influential work ‘Architetura’ 
which detailed a court theatre (Brockett, 1977; Macgowan & Melnitz, 1955; Wild, 
2006).  
These changes in Occidental perception seem to mark one of the major 
epistemological and ontological paradigm shifts from immanence to transcendence63. It 
is not merely coincidence that Alberti and Brunelleschi’s linear perspectives preceded 
the birth of Nicholas Copernicus in 1473, René Descartes in 1596 and Isaac Newton in 
1642 to begin what is known as the scientific revolution (and later Enlightenment). 
According to Manzotti (2010), the Italian developments in linear perspective led to an 
illusory perception that an ‘image is all we need to see reality as it really is’ (n.p.). 
‘When Alberti and Brunelleschi introduced the technique of perspective implicitly they 
suggested a theory of perception according to which we do not perceive the world as it 
is but rather an image of it.’ (Manzotti, 2010, n.p.). This led Kepler (1571-1630) to 
conclude that there was a ‘retinal internal image’ inside the eye that was projected from 
an ‘external image of the object getting inside the eye’ (Manzotti, 2010, n.p.). Manzotti 
(2010) jokes that ‘if, to see a flower, I need an image of that flower, then […] in order 
to see that image I would need an image of that image of that image of that flower and 
so on and on ad infinitum’ (n.p.). However, there is no evidence of any images or 
pictures along the visual perceptual chain, only physical phenomena (Manzotti, 2010), 
                                                          
62 Although according to Antrop (2013), landscape’s meaning as scenery ‘comes with 
Dutch painting from the seventeenth century, international renown introduced the 
word into English but with an emphasis on ‘scenery’ instead of territory’ (p. 12). 
63 I say ‘one’ due to the evidence of other shifts of this kind (both epistemological and 
ontological) in European history. For example, one could argue that shifts from 
immanent to transcendent thought occurred in the agricultural revolution, post-
Socratic Greek states, Romano-Christian developments, the Norman invasion of 
Britain, the scientific revolution and the industrial revolution (Mcphie, 2014a, 2015b). 
However, there has always been an underlying state of immanent thought within 
pockets of animist traditions throughout the world as well as within more radical 
philosophies. 
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suggesting that we experience life directly rather than any so-called representation of 
it. For Meinig (1979), ‘Landscape is defined by our vision and interpreted by our 
minds.’ (p. 2) and yet, as I argue in (Intra-)Act 2, the mind is not for interpretation or 
representation of any kind as it perceives directly. In other words, landscape is a directly 
embodied sensory process (influenced by natural-cultural material zeitgeists) and as 
such implies a physical process of change when we think with it.  
So, it seems the perception of landscape has undergone a heavy conceptual 
change, from participating in the landscape to being an observer of it64. From landscape 
as a sort of partner and way of seeing (Ellison, 2013; Taylor, 2008) to setting detached 
spectators at a desistance from it (Williams, 1985; Wylie, 2007), the morphogenesis is 
radical and life changing. It is no less than a change from an immanent perspective to a 
transcendent one.  
Thompson, Howard and Waterton (2013) state that landscape is something 
which is ‘mental as well as physical, subjective as well as objective.’ (p. 1). Although a 
shared linguistic understanding is easier for comprehension, what might these deliberate 
anthropocentric representational65 binaries produce? ‘Representationalism is so deeply 
entrenched within Western culture that it has taken on a commonsense appeal. It seems 
inescapable, if not downright natural. But representationalism (like “nature itself,” not 
merely our representations of it!) has a history.’ (Barad, 2003, p. 806). 
 
The Romantic Gaze 
 
Urry’s ‘Romantic gaze’ mainly refers to an upper-middle class form of tourist 
consumption, an elitist, solitary and semi-spiritual appreciation of magnificent ‘natural’ 
scenery which requires substantial cultural capital (Egmond, 2007; Urry, 1990; 
Wessendorf, 2004; Wang, 2000), whereas ‘the collective gaze is clearly identified with 
the working-class tourist.’ (Wessendorf, 2004, p. 86). ‘And this gaze [the tourist gaze] 
                                                          
64 ‘A First Nation elder, that I befriended at a conference in Canada […] whispered to 
me after hearing the anthropologist, Tim Ingold speak. ‘That Ingold fella’, he said, 
‘we would give an ‘A’ for anthropology but an ‘F’ for participation; for he is an 
observer, not a participant’.’ (Mcphie, 2015b, p. 229) 
65 ‘[R]epresentationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between 
representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular, that which is 
represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing. That is, there are 
assumed to be two distinct and independent kinds of entities—representations and 
entities to be represented.’ (Barad, 2003, p. 804) 
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is as socially organized and systematized as the gaze of the medic’ (Urry, 1990, p. 1). 
These gazes are like looking at the world through a Claude Glass, a heavily tinted and 
framed screen that, from a very young age, turns us into conceptual observers rather 
than participants of the world. Yet, unlike the Claude Glass of the eighteenth century, 
it is now embedded in our optic nerve, always already as a lens that we cannot remove 
(no matter how hard we try). 
 
Haraway (1988) reminds us [of] the vanity of a rational, masculinist 
objective look that fixes that which is looked at. The portrayal as captured 
then becomes part of a privileged and legitimate knowledge. For example 
the ‘natural’ landscape captured in a Claude glass is portrayed as natural, as 
a picturesque that should be preserved and not used or abused. (Nettleton, 
2015, p. 774) 
 
For example, the poet William Wordsworth opposed the train reaching Ambleside in 
the Lake District (as it had Windermere) to protect its ‘natural beauty’ from the hordes 
of ‘working classes’! Wordsworth explained that ‘members of the working class would 
not have the capacity to appreciate the “beauty” and “character of seclusion and 
retirement” that the Lakes District had to offer.’ (Schwartz, n.d., para. 5). His letter to 
the Morning Post on December 9, 1844, stated, ‘it can be produced only by a slow and 
gradual process of culture’ (Wordsworth, cited in Schwartz, n.d., para.7). 
So, what we’re talking about is an elite epistemological accessibility to certain 
landscapes, an accessibility to an elitist construction of knowledge. Hawkins (in 
Howard, Thompson & Waterton, 2013) explains that the paintings of ‘peaceful rural 
scenes, such as The Haywain’ by the Romantic artist John Constable, ‘were used to 
promote a timeless ideal of beauty and social order which belied exploitative labour 
relations, rural poverty and the political unrest that was sweeping the English 
countryside at the time they were painted.’ (pp. 3-4). But this Romantic gaze has not 
simply been confined to England’s green and pleasant land, as mentioned earlier, it has 
been distributed both topographically and topologically, sometimes under a 
pseudonym. 
 
Wilderness  
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The World Bank estimates that between 1986 and 1996, about 3 million people 
were forced to move from forests, tribal land and other areas as a result of both 
development and conservation schemes (Vidal, 2001, cited in Mcphie, 2014b). This 
includes national parks, such as Yosemite and Yellowstone in the United States and 
Tsavo in Kenya. Corry (2011) suggests that such conservation schemes are ‘involved 
the destruction of the resident indigenous peoples, and the problem is now growing 
more acute as conservationists press harder for governments to set aside ‘natural’ areas, 
which in reality have been lived on for generations’ (p. 211). 
 
By defining wilderness areas as human exclusion zones from permanent 
habitation or culture, then the only way to keep wilderness ‘and’ human 
culture would be to separate them (Gomez-Pampa & Kaus, 1992; 
Washington, 2007). Vidal (2001) states that this ‘wilderness concept’ is an 
elite European/American construction, which separates us from nature and 
defies evolutionary science. But many peoples do not even have a word for 
nature and do not see themselves in any way separate from the whole 
environment in which they live (Vidal, 2001). (Mcphie, 2014b). 
 
Of course we all understand the concept slightly differently depending on our culture, 
historical affiliations or life experiences. The problems are inherent and become 
apparent as concepts become enacted into reality. The idea of wilderness, as I have 
previously discussed (Mcphie & Clarke, 2015), holds connotations of genocide, racism, 
colonialism, etc. (Callicott, 2000, p. 24). Occidental notions of indigenous peoples as 
‘wild’ savages still exists (e.g. the 1963 massacre of the 11th parallel) alongside notions 
of them as ‘noble’ savages (from the romantic writings of Rousseau). The persecution 
of many indigenous peoples is still enacted whether the concept ‘wild’ is negatively 
imbued and embodied within ‘the tribal human’ or positively imbued and embodied 
within ‘the landscape’.  
 
Nature  
 
Nature is perhaps the most stubborn and problematic concept regarding our 
perceptions of the world (although Levi Bryant identifies ‘culture’ as the culprit, not 
nature). 
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The world of nature, it is often said, is what lies ‘out there’. […] Application 
of this logic forces an insistent dualism, between object and subject, the 
material and the ideal, operational and cognized, ‘etic’ and ‘emic’. (Ingold, 
2000, p. 191) 
 
Nature has many faces. It ‘can refer to stable substrata of brute matter’, can signal 
‘generativity, fecundity, Isis or Aphrodite’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 117). It is infused with 
bias and informed by propaganda. It can open doors to health or restrict access to 
livelihoods depending on a variety of cultural (in)equities. 
 
Opportunities to engage with forests, moorlands and woodlands are 
constrained by gender and ‘race’ (Travlou 2006, 24) and humans respond 
differently to them, with pleasure, fear, awe or indifference (Milligan and 
Bingley 2007). In some cultures, nature is perceived as important and in 
others as of little signiﬁcance (Travlou 2006). (Quinn, 2013, p. 740) 
 
We must have an idea of what nature ‘is’ if ecospychologists, deep ecologists and 
ecotherapists are to ask people to ‘re-connect’ to ‘it’. So, what is this ‘it’? Macnaghten 
and Urry (1998) claim that there is no singular ‘nature’, only a diversity of contested 
natures and each such nature is represented through a variety of socio-cultural processes 
from which such natures cannot be separated. ‘What we perceive and experience is 
never a direct reflection of environmental conditions but must be understood as a 
specific reading of these conditions’ (Willig, 2013, p. 7), as all of us have different ways 
of ‘seeing nature’. 
 
8 Natures 
 
The following list of natures is not meant to state that there are only eight such 
versions of nature, I’m sure there are many, many more and they can never be simplified 
to a bounded number. It is merely a ploy to highlight the shortcomings of reducing the 
concept ‘nature’ to just one definition, one thing, when it is clearly many things to many 
people (or nothing to some). Of course I realise the contradiction inherent in numbering 
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them as such, and so for the record I would like to place all of these numbered natures 
under erasure (surprise!). 
 
Nature 1: Scary, useless or dangerous, inhabited only by wild animals, as in the 
wildēornes of the saga Beowulf. 
 
Nature 2: An ordered, neat, picturesque, specifically designed (perhaps by Gilpin or 
Capability Brown) formal nature, framed with a hint of human culture in the scene (a 
typical Teletubbies landscape). 
 
Nature 3: Type in the word ‘nature’ into any search engine images and you will see a 
plethora of Disneyfied landscapes. This is a romantically idealised nature: Green rolling 
hills, wild (but never too wild), ‘particular’ mammals, ‘particular’ flowers, a lake in 
front of some mountains, green leaved trees (usually deciduous, pictured in the 
summer), a rainbow, a waterfall, blue sky with white clouds, etc. Yes, that’s nature. 
Along with fresh air, bird song, stars and sweet smelling nectar, this is the sort of nature 
that people who say ‘we must re-connect to nature’ generally seem to mean.  
 
Green analysis often focuses on the destabilizing encroachment of 
industrialized society into wild spaces, the restorative and even ecstatic 
powers of unblemished landscapes, and the companionless dignity of 
nonhuman creatures. Woodlands, serene waterscapes, sublime vistas, and 
charismatic megafauna feature prominently. (Cohen, 2013, pp. xix-xx) 
 
With Nature 3 there is a ‘utopian emphasis on homeostasis, order, and the implicit 
benevolence of an unexamined force labelled nature.’ (Cohen, 2013, p. xxii). Morton 
(2010) suggests that this ‘bright green’ view peddles nature as ‘affirmative, extraverted 
and masculine […] sunny, straightforward, ableist, holistic, hearty, and ‘healthy.’’ (p. 
16) or as Cohen (2013) posits, ‘a purified place to which one travels rather than dwells 
always within: separate from the human, empty, foundationally pure’ (p. xxi). This is 
the nature of deep ecology, for example. Ellison (2013) indicates that since the late 19th 
Century ecology has been dominated by a romantically harmonious notion of landscape 
which is the wrong sort of nature for an ecologist to study. 
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Nature 4: Dog shit, slime mould, adrenal cancer, earthquakes, strychnine poison, 
sulphur dioxide, methane, piss, tsunamis, scorpions, rotting cabbage, snot, bile, viruses, 
the Black Death, phlegm, malaria, weeds, sharks, breast cancer, floods, a flower that 
smells of rotting meat, puke, forest fires, etc. They're all nature too. This nature is 
perhaps more reminiscent of nature 1, conceptually conditioned by history and socio-
economic status. They are generally labelled as ‘natural’ or ‘nature’ but aren’t usually 
thought of when picturing scenic landscapes and cuddly mammals. Do you still wish to 
re-connect to nature, re-connect to shit and cancer? 
 
Nature 5: A James Bond watch, pickled onion flavour Monster Munch, an iPhone, false 
teeth, a plastic lawn, a tube of toothpaste, books, computers, stilettos, scissors, electric 
wire, cars, a guitar, a knife, a plastic flower, etc. They're nature too, only many people 
in the West, perhaps especially ecotherapists and deep ecologists (and myself, as I 
travelled through that paradigmatic phase before escaping its romantically despotic 
clutch), think not, mostly because these things (what might be labelled as ‘artificial’) 
are the produce of humans, even though those same people might argue that humans 
are nature too. Somewhere along their thought patterns, somehow human produce has 
become separated from the existing universe. A form of transcendence has invaded the 
earth.  
 
Nature 6: A tear, a frown, blindness, a whisper, a tender touch, an annoying cough, the 
word ‘cunt’, a wink, speech, an uncanny atmosphere, the rush of a blush, the force of 
an erotic encounter, emotional elation, etc. These are nature too but are harder to define 
or capture as they are an affective nature, one examined under the lens of the Affective 
Turn perhaps (see Gregg & Seigworth, 2010).  
 
Nature 7: Free speech, 56, fascism, yellow, the alphabet, China, nature, culture, etc. 
These are nature too. They exist in the world, a world of (re)cycled materials, forces 
and energies. When 56 is written on a page it is perhaps ink (that is a material of the 
world) on paper (from a tree, even the romantic idealists may call this one nature!). If it 
is uttered from a mouth, that is breathe (full of CO2, etc.). They are percepts as they are 
things that we can touch or see or hear, for example, but they are not the idea of 56, 
nature or yellow. Alfred North Whitehead (1919) suggested that ‘[n]ature is that which 
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we observe in perception through the senses’ (p. 1) but ‘[t]hought about nature is 
different from the sense-perception of nature.’ (p. 2). Yet thought is itself a sense, as we 
can feel it, just a different kind of sense. What Whitehead is referring to here is what I 
would call the difference between nature as a concept (still a kind of percept, although 
less intense) and nature as a percept. The concept can influence the percept (and vice 
versa). The affect may also influence and be influenced by the other two in turn. When 
56 is thought but not articulated it is a concept and yet still a percept. We might say it’s 
not really real (virtual?), yet still real enough to enact a physical presence of some sort 
(in the actual?). 
 
Nature 8: A unicorn, pixies, an Orc, fairies, God, Bambi, Shiva, ghosts, ray guns, the 
USS Enterprise, etc. They're all nature too! As ideas, these ones are abstract concepts, 
like the thought of 56 from Nature 7 (the not really real), only more difficult to prove. 
For example, we can witness the effects of 56 when applied to atomic physics66. Now 
it gets tricky as they are still percepts. A picture of a unicorn is a percept because it is 
empirical yet can we touch the unicorn itself? Unicorns are concepts, thoughts, and 
thoughts themselves are physical relational processes of the world of material, force and 
energy. They are not outside it. They are empirical in some way. Therefore, the thought 
of them exists as a percept in the world (a subtle real, a conceptual percept) but not the 
actual unicorn. However, it has the potential to exist as an actual percept rather than a 
conceptual percept. But this is similar to 56 because they all start life as conceptual 
percepts. With the example of 56, we can see its impact in the world, its impression. 
But then the abstract concept God has perhaps made even more of an inscription in the 
fabric of the world due to its performativity.  
                                                          
66 Bodies represented by numbers: I suppose what numbers tell us is that there is never 
a whole, never a 1. It's always a 1.1, 0.9563 or 1.246, etc. If we pretend that numbers 
represent phenomena, events or processes, then we must also remember this: they can 
always divide and be divided, add and be added to, multiply and be multiplied, 
subtract and be subtracted. If they are ever 1 at some point, they are never 1 for very 
long, a minuscule event that soon changes to a 4.71. The validity and reliability of 
significance in data forgets time. Yet time has always already changed it. So, like the 
term nature, 1 is a concept and as such makes a mark in the world but can always be 
deterritorialised. For example, the atomic bomb had a devastating physical 
consequence, but it came from a concept, a bunch of numbers. This is how nature 
works. Although a representational invention, it has physical consequences. But it can 
be deterritorialised and occupied! 
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There are degrees of actuality and actualising (or virtuality and virtualising if 
you prefer) rather than the binary actual-virtual as ‘[p]urely actual objects do not exist’ 
(Deleuze, cited in Deleuze & Parnet, 2002, p. 112). Their boundaries are topologically 
fluid and permeable as they flow and stretch interchangeably. This makes more sense 
to me due to the allowance of grey bits, dark matter that is perhaps more abundant than 
what is perceived. An affective realm may be actualised more fully and coherently if 
we look for ecotones rather than definite boundaries between virtual and actual planes. 
The unicorn is also actual in this sense and not merely virtual. It’s just not as actual as 
a horse or Narwhal which is much more obviously empirical and open to many more 
sensory apparatus than the felt presence of a unicorn depending on the particular 
assemblage (as I knew someone who interaced explicitly with an imaginary ‘My Little 
Pony’—see, hear and talk to it as one might do a dog—whereas I only ever perceive the 
abstract little pink pony conceptually). Don’t forget, it’s the ‘effects’ of conception that 
‘matter’ in the world. So, for me, I’ve never actualised a god, it’s always been more 
towards the virtual end of the scale (not that there’s an end…or a scale) whereas for my 
auntie, a born again Christian, God has been actualised rather explicitly and has 
achieved a material status in its actual affects in/on/of the world.  
All of the Natures presented here are also concepts and as such they ‘do’ things, 
they perform. They are all ecological processes and can indeed perform as they are 
enacted in the world. This leads to perceptions that force us to assume that either certain 
ecologically destructive actions won’t affect ‘us’ too much or that we can discard the 
non-romanticised nature, like pollution, in favour of a pristine wilderness 
‘untrammelled by man’! But what does this perception ‘do’?  
The different types of nature do different things. They work in different ways. 
Nature 1 destroyed the wolves and bears and created the urban. Nature 2 aesthetised 
(and anesthetised) productive landscapes (from food production to aesthetic 
production). This one civilised the land. Nature 3 idealised a romantic, wild nature. This 
is the one that has performed feats of racism, genocide, androcentrism, colonialism, etc. 
Nature 4 is an ill thought of nature and is often discarded, feared, killed, eradicated or 
‘weeded’ out (often in response to nature 2). Nature 5 is not thought of as nature to 
many people, as already mentioned it is of human produce. But humans are nature too 
and anything we produce is of nature (the material, force and energy of the 
world/universe) so at what point does it become ‘not nature’? In our heads? 
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Some scholars (Morton, Zizek) disapprove of the term nature altogether and 
wish to eliminate it. Some scholars (Bryant) think it’s the concept ‘culture’ we must 
abolish rather than nature. Some (Latour, Haraway) wish to merge it to form 
‘natureculture’. Cohen (2013) attributes nature with an ‘inorganic agency’ (p. xxii) 
where ‘[s]hadow itself is ecological’ (p. xix). He suggests that if nature was ‘refracted 
through the geological […] our ethical connectedness to the nonhuman would become 
more tangible.’ (Cohen, 2015, p. 12). 
Each of these suggestions do something different, perform in diverse ways. 
Thinking from a flatter, immanent ontology, some scholars (Bryant, de Vega, Deleuze, 
Cohen, Mcphie & Clarke) wish to revolutionise it as the concept has its uses. But we 
must be wary of how we attempt to (re)present it. For how can we justify using a concept 
that has the potential to perform atrocities? And even if we do excuse the terms of 
possible oppression, how can we use them as a counter measure to revive or free-up 
alternate, less problematic meanings? ‘How then to write about young people engaging 
in just such ‘sacred spaces’, like woods and moorlands, without resorting to reiﬁed 
notions of nature?’ (Quinn, 2013, p. 738). Quinn (2013) has ‘considered coining the 
term ‘open nature’, which could be helpful in conveying a sense of forests and 
moorlands, but negatively would serve to sub-divide nature in a binary way’ and so 
decides to leave it to other scholars: ‘Ultimately, ﬁnding a solution to this philosophical 
problem of naming is not within the scope of this article’ (p. 739).  
 
Environment  
 
The term ‘environment’ has become a noun out of the verb ‘environ’ + ment. The 
Oxford International Dictionary of the English Language (Little, et al., 1957, p. 619) 
provides one definition of ‘environ’ as ‘to surround’, ‘envelop’ or ‘enclose’. But to 
surround or envelop what (and indeed when)? This definition is undeniably 
separationist if we assume that it is we or other organisms who are surrounded. The 
1647 definition, ‘to go round in a circle’ (Little, et al., 1957, p. 619, emphasis added) 
is perhaps more appropriate to the condition of a thing (and is one that best applies to 
Ingold’s (2000, 2007, 2011) lines of living in the world, hence part of the reason for my 
choice in naming my cooperative action research ‘Walking in Circles’). For example, 
‘to go round’ implies movement along rather than an emic-etic split (an in and an out). 
Ingold (2011, p. 148) states that ‘we tend to identify traces of the circumambulatory 
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movements that bring a place into being as boundaries that demarcate the place from its 
surrounding space,’ as ‘the pathways or trails along which movement proceeds are 
perceived as limits within which it is contained […] turning the ‘way through’ of the 
trail into the containment of the place-in-space.’ 
 
[H]uman existence is not fundamentally place-bound, as Christopher Tilley 
(2004: 25) maintains, but place-binding. It unfolds not in places but along 
paths. Proceeding along a path, every inhabitant lays a trail. Where 
inhabitants meet, trails are entwined, as the life of each becomes bound up 
with the other. Every entwining is a knot, and the more that lifelines are 
entwined, the greater the density of the knot. (Ingold, 2011, p. 148) 
 
In this way, and developing Ingold’s reasoning further, I would say that we are not in 
spaces or places, nor on or along paths, rather, we are the paths themselves in their 
continual environing. Therefore, the 1603 definition of ‘environment’ possibly serves 
my own purposes best when attempting to find a suitable term that describes what it is 
that we are in and/or of: ‘The action of environing’ (Little, et al., 1957, p. 619). Hence, 
environment is an action, something we do and are of rather than something we are 
encased in. Environment is something that is continually becoming and we are of that 
process. One might say, then, that we are living lines of environing. The 1827 version, 
‘That which environs; esp. the conditions or influences under which any person or thing 
lives or is developed’ (Little, et al., 1957, p. 619) is also useful due to its emphasis on 
movement and development as opposed to stasis and separation.  
Perhaps we must look to non-anthropocentric, flatter ontologies for our 
conceptual approaches to the nature of our environments. Perhaps this bifurcation of 
nature is the result of transcendent ontologies. How, then, might it look from an 
immanent perspective and do these perspectives still exist in the West? 
 
Landscaping  
 
‘the landscape thinks itself in me . . . and I am its consciousness.’ (Cezanne, cited in 
Wylie, 2007, p. 2)  
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So, Landscape is not fixed scene to be ‘gazed upon’ by an image capturing spectator 
(through a lens) that catches and then frames a representation of it. In recent literature 
they have started to become more mobile once again. 
 
For Wylie in particular, this shift to ‘landscaping’, […] turns the word from 
a noun into a more rhythmic and mobile action verb […] Body and 
landscape thus become recursively intertwined, both constitutive and 
constituting, and always in a process of (re)formation. Indeed, they become, 
to borrow from Thrift and Dewsbury (2000: 415), extensions of the body 
and mind, and vice versa. (Waterton, 2013, p. 70) 
 
Rather like Andy Goldsworthy’s Taking a Wall for a Walk or Paul Klee’s Taking a Line 
for a Walk, Cumbrian poet Norman Nicholson’s (1977) poem Wall emphasises the 
animacy of what are normally considered inanimate objects in the landscape, 
illuminating how ‘[a] wall walks slowly’ and ‘[i]s always on the move.’ Nicholson had 
a keen eye for movement and saw the Cumbrian landscape in ways that the Romantic 
poets, such as Wordsworth and Coleridge seemed to omit. For Nicholson’s artistic 
working class gaze, the landscape of the Lake District wasn’t merely a romanticised 
scenic nature for an elite clientele: ‘It is futile to assess such country in terms of views. 
[…] it measures the landscape from the borders of an imaginary picture-frame; it 
reduces like to a post-card’, as for him ‘it is also the man-made screes beside the 
quarries; and whitewash on the Copper Mines Hostel, a stone playing ducks & drakes 
on Levers-Water, making the black tarn throw up waves like a magicians’ steel rings’ 
(Nicholson, 1977, pp. 33-34). We might call this more mobile landscape, landsceppan 
(Ingold, 2011), landscaping (Wylie, 2007), environing or just life. 
 
Shelley’s Romantic (re)visions  
 
In the book Romantic Revisions (Brinkley & Hanley, 1992), Brinkley (1992) 
examined the Romantic poet Shelley’s notebook where he drafted a copy of his poem 
Mont Blanc. Rather than explain the meaning of the finished and polished poem, 
Brinkley explored the spaces between the words, the omissions and the words placed 
under erasure by Shelley himself, the words that Shelley changed his mind about 
including in the finished product. The poem, Brinkley (1992) writes, seemed ‘to be 
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structured by the breaks in composition’ as ‘much of ‘Mont Blanc’ was inspired as it 
was composed – by intervals of thwarted writing’ (p. 243). In this poem, Shelley 
originally wrote ‘In daylight thoughts, bright or obscure / In day – the stream of various 
thoughts [eternal] universe of things / Flows thro the mind reflecting rolls & rolls its 
rapid waves’ later changing it to, ‘In day – the [eternal] universe of things / Flows thro 
the mind & rolls its rapid waves.’ (Brinkley, 1992, p. 247). These reworkings, Brinkley 
writes, ‘articulate a radical epistemology in which things – and not their representations 
– are said to flow through the mind.’ (1992, p. 247, emphasis added). This is a non-
representational philosophy, a philosophy of immanence and vital materiality. It is a 
radical onto-epistemology which rejects the Freudian tripartite psyche, the Cartesian 
soul which operates a mechanical body from within the confines of the human pineal 
gland or the Kantian subject as a reflective self.  
As Spirn (1998) clearly points out, ‘[h]umans are not the sole authors of 
landscape’ (p. 17). The volcanic processes (flows of material, force and energy) that 
metamorphose rock from one state into another are similar processes to those that 
metamorphose a mountain into a shopping centre. ‘Intention’, ‘agency’ or ‘will to act’ 
follow the same complex co-emergences as the rest of the material fluxes that 
continually transform the planet. And so, for the purposes of this PhD I shall use the 
concept ‘environment’ due to the fact that we can place ourselves more easily within 
its permeable borders. Henceforth, environment and mental health are merged together 
at the same time as denoting temporal haecceitcal intradependence to become 
‘environ(mental) health.’  
 
Scene four: The Accidental Death of Mr. Happy and the Medical Gaze: The 
Fallacy of the Healthy Self  
 
I can’t seem to find a me to me! Where would I locate it? ‘Inside’ me? In my 
heart (as this is the first organ to develop in the womb)? In my head (as Descartes 
suggested)? Or is it ‘all’ of me? Where is that? What is that? When is that? If I were to 
peel off my skin, is that still me? Or am I simply a vessel for bacteria? If my memory 
is also me, am I in my address book, iPhone or computer? Am I a complex knot of 
matter-energy-force like all other processes that ebb and flow throughout the universe?  
Am I a ‘quiddity’ (‘whatness’) or a ‘haecceity’ (‘thisness’)? As my friend Dave has 
queried regarding a murmuration of Starlings, ‘Where is the murmuration? Thickening 
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dark densities give way to sparse thin amalgamations in the shifting transience of a 
murmuration.’ (Clarke, 2016, n.p.). Is it better to imagine ourselves as a murmuration 
then? These ontological questions, including how we perceive ourselves, are important 
as they influence the understanding and treatment of mental health and wellbeing, 
whatever, wherever and whenever that may be. So it is perhaps worth unpacking what 
the existence of the concept mental health and wellbeing does in relation to whatever 
we think we are. 
 
Health and Wellbeing 
 
Szolosi (2012) suggests that due to the subjective nature of how we define and 
perceive health, it has led to the conceptualisation of health into four formal models; 
‘the medical model, the World Health Organisation (WHO) model, the wellness model, 
and the environmental model’ (p. 139). The predominant view of health, the medical 
model, may be defined as the absence of disease or disability (Larson, 1999) and as 
such focuses on objective measures that lead to diagnosis and treatment of ailments 
(Szolosi, 2012). Many conceptions of health and wellbeing tend to focus on material 
wealth and neglect perhaps more salient issues of illbeing, including stress, depression, 
loneliness, accelerationism and environmentally destructive behaviour (Beradi, 2012a; 
Hämäläinen, 2013; Hirvilammi & Helne, 2014). The wellness model defines health as 
a subjective feeling or experience (Marvin & Crown, 1976) which can ‘affect even the 
simplest of physical processes’ and focuses on ‘perceptions such as happiness and other 
personal feelings’ (Szolosi, 2012, p. 139). The World Health Organisation (WHO, 
2014) defines health as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’ 
(para. 2). Finally, ‘the environmental model asserts that health exists to the extent that 
an organism can grow, thrive, and function within its environment’ (Abanobi, 1986, 
cited in Szolosi, 2012, p. 139). Let us take each of Szolosi’s points in turn.  
 
1. The medical model: The Clinical Gaze 
 
David Armstrong’s (1993) From Clinical Gaze to Regime of Total Health, traces 
the perception of bodily illness in the late eighteenth century, a period that ‘gave birth 
to the modern system of clinical pathological medicine’ and left us ‘with the clear image 
of the triumph of truth as medical scientists uncovered the diseases previously hidden 
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within the human body.’ (p. 55). Due to developments in clinical technique and the 
dissection of the corpse, ‘specific anatomical lesions were identified inside the body’ 
that ‘seemed to account for the outward appearances of illness’, a ‘clinico-pathological 
correlation’ (Armstrong, 1993, p. 55). Following this, the hospital became a place where 
‘bodies could be examined with proper rigour, the post-mortem as the event in which 
the true nature of disease was finally revealed, and the many facets of clinical method 
which still underpin medical practice today’ (Armstrong, 1993, p. 55).  
In The Birth of the Clinic, Michael Foucault argued that this ‘fabrication of the 
body by means of the “anatomical atlas”’ directed the anatomy student’s attention to 
particular structures and not others, thereby forming ‘a set of rules for reading the body’ 
so that the body’s reality ‘is only established by the observing eye that reads it’ (cited 
in Armstrong, 1993, p. 56). ‘In effect, what the student sees is not the atlas as a 
representation of the body but the body as a representation of the atlas’ (Armstrong, 
1993, p. 56). Foucault posits that the modern patient, as the object of clinical practice, 
is a product of this eighteenth century clinical gaze: 
 
The clinical gaze, encompassing all the techniques, languages and 
assumptions of modern medicine, establishes by its authority and 
penetration an observable and analysable space in which is crystallised that 
apparantly solid figure of the discrete human body. (Armstrong, 1993, p. 
56, emphasis added). 
 
[This solid figure, a discrete human body is starting to look decidedly inhuman, 
decidedly constructed.]  
 
Every time medicine had cause to deploy its new techniques and treat an 
illness, it drew the anatomical outline of a docile body. At first the procedure 
was unsure and the outline hazy but with time and with refinement the shape 
became more clear. (Armstrong, 1993, p. 57, emphasis added). 
 
[A more recognisable shape is now starting to emerge, with a round, yellow, easily 
definable face.]  
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This became what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) might call the ‘body with organs’. ‘As 
the nineteenth century progressed each and every consultation of the new pathological 
medicine functioned to imprint, by its sheer repetition, the reality of a specific anatomy.’ 
(Armstrong, 1993, p. 57). By the late nineteenth century the ‘autopoietic character of 
the body-as-organism’ had become the perfect model of what a body is: 
 
Because the body-as-organism is defined autopoietically as open to energy 
but informationally closed to the environment, thus engendering its own 
boundary conditions, Luciana Parisi and Tiziana Terranova have argued 
that the body-as-organism befits the disciplinary society of late nineteenth 
century industrial capitalism, “where the fluids which were circulating 
outside and between bodies…are folded onto themselves in order to be 
channelled within the solid walls of the organism/self/subject” (2000, 4). 
The body-as-organism is organized for “reproduction within a 
thermodynamic cycle of accumulation and expenditure; and trained to 
work” (5). (Clough, 2010, p. 207) 
 
This was not the birth of the clinic, it was the birth of the quiddital Mr. Happy 67. 
But what does this product of happiness do? 
 
 
Note 1: ‘Why be happy when you can be normal?’ (Bumble). (Jamie’s Duddon Valley 
notes). 
                                                          
67 The quiddital birth of Mr. Happy (Hargreaves, 1971), that just so coincides with the 
year I was born, is a children’s literary character that I have previously (Mcphie, 
2014a) contrasted with another character, Mr. Messy (Hargreaves, 1972) who I 
perceive to be a more obvious example of how a haecceity might be conceived. 
(Picture taken from the ‘Mr. Men Wiki website’ (2016a): Creative Commons 
Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA)). 
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‘Why be happy when you can be normal?’ (Bumble). This statement from a 
member of the Walking in Circles (WiC) assemblage, Bumble, came from a book she 
was reading at the time by Jeanette Winterson (2012). Bumble was referring to our 
yearlong exploration into mental health and wellbeing in various environments 
regarding the second part of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers inquiry rumination, 
‘How can we learn from/use the experiences we have to understand ourselves better and 
enhance our moods?’ Bumble was suggesting that perhaps too much focus was being 
forced on the ideal/concept of happiness. When something like happiness is sold to a 
population, it may present new challenges that produce the opposite of the desired 
effects.  
 
2. The wellness model: The death of Mr. Happy 
 
The ‘U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ definition of mental health 
includes, ‘emotional, psychological, and social well-being’ that ‘affects how we think, 
feel, and act.’ (MentalHealth.gov, 2016, n. p.). Their examples of signs to look out for 
to reduce the onset of mental ill-health include, ‘Yelling or fighting with family and 
friends’ and ‘believing things that are not true’ (MentalHealth.gov, 2016, n. p.). This 
normative healthy citizen certainly seems to be quite well behaved and evidently has a 
particular belief system to adhere to. The same model promotes a more ‘positive’ vision 
of wellness that apparently allows people to ‘Realize their full potential, Cope with the 
stresses of life, Work productively, Make meaningful contributions to their 
communities’ and in order to maintain this ideal of a positive utopian model citizen they 
must practice ‘Connecting with others, Staying positive, Getting physically active, 
Helping others, Developing coping skills’ (MentalHealth.gov, 2016, n. p.). Mr. Happy 
is certainly well defined, perhaps more like a Stepford Mister. 
 
Staying positive and connecting to nature 
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Snippet 1: Positive Psychology 
 
Many scientific theories (from objective and subjective paradigms) regarding 
wellbeing and happiness (for example, see Haidt, 2006 and Eid & Larsen, 2008 for 
overviews), stemming from disciplines such as positive psychology, purport the 
‘science’ of the effects of place and nature on wellbeing and health and are still 
prominent in popular academic literature on the subject as well as therapeutic practice. 
For example, Healing Spaces: The Science of Place and Well-Being by Sternberg 
(2009); and Your Brain on Nature: The Science of Nature’s Influence on Your Health, 
Happiness, and Vitality by Selhub and Logan (2012), imply anthropocentric objective 
or subjective properties or truths that can in some way (whether quantitatively or 
qualitatively) be isolated, measured or chunked, a Platonic tradition that still holds 
strong in Western psychotherapeutic research and practice. Similarly, the 
(re)emergence of ‘alternative therapies’ in the 1970’s accentuated altered attitudes 
towards mental health and ‘the body’, resonating with popular consciousness. Rosalind 
Coward (1993) postulates that  
 
[a]ttending to health and well-being has become a major cultural obsession 
and alternative therapies satisfy something of the sense that we should be 
‘committed’ to our bodies and our health; they cater for the sense that even 
‘the worried well’ should be doing something definite for their health. (p. 
95) 
 
In place of a hedonic approach to wellbeing (pleasure seeking, pain avoidance), deep 
ecological (Naess, 1973, 1995), Zen Buddhist (Fromm, 1960) and phenomenological 
(Fuchs, Sattel & Henningsen, 2010; Owen & Hardland, 2001; Varela, Thompson & 
Rosch, 1993) approaches to wellbeing share a more eudaimonic view, that we attain 
self-realisation to achieve joy, our fully functioning potentials and give meaning to our 
lives (see Ryan & Deci, 2001, for a comprehensive review). Even though these 
approaches ‘see wellbeing as an aspiration and a process of self-actualization that could 
more aptly be called well-becoming’ (Hirvilammi & Helne, 2014, n.p.), somatic and 
mental realms seem to be purposefully split in these paradigms, whilst claiming to 
dissolve the Cartesian binaries of the normative clinical models (through experiencing 
‘oneness’, for example), thereby enforcing a problematic contradiction.  
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This focus on personal control over a subjective self is perhaps more easily 
attained (in the West) if you are of a certain social class, a class that has easier access 
to various forms of romanticised epistemologies and a consciousness that gives way to 
new moralities concerning self-care of the mindful body. In the Ladybird Books for 
Grown-Ups Series, Hazeley and Morris (2015) deliver a parody of the modern Western 
practice of positive psychology and Mindfulness that emphasises this class inequity 
regarding the realities of life for many impoverished and/or working class people by 
focusing on a number of different characters: 
 
 
Snippet 2. Mindfulness enclassed. 
 
This does not mean that mindfulness does not ‘work’, as I’m sure it does, for 
many people who practice it or who may be undergoing mindful approaches to therapy. 
But examining what it ‘does’ (at least when practiced in Western cultures) seems to 
highlight certain socio-economic inequities as well as Cartesian divisions. From a more 
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academic, yet no less empirical viewpoint, Barbara Ehrenreich (2009) challenges 
various domains of positive psychology with a deconstruction of happiness which she 
purports:  
 
is generally measured as reported satisfaction with one's life – a state of 
mind perhaps more accessible to those who are affluent, who conform to 
social norms, who suppress judgement in the service of faith, and who are 
not overly bothered by societal injustice (p. 169, emphasis added). 
 
Coward (1993) sees an obvious issue with this ‘quest for natural health’: 
 
With the emphasis on changing consciousness have come all the fantasies 
and projections associated with religious morality, fantasies of wholeness, 
of integration and of the individual as origin of everything good or bad in 
their life. And with these fantasies there has mushroomed the industry of 
‘humanistic psychotherapies’ emphasizing the role of the individual will-
power in making changes (p. 96) 
 
Ehrenreich (2009) notes that one psychiatrist at a cancer centre in New York began to 
realise that ‘the failure to think positively can weigh on a cancer patient like a second 
disease’ (p. 43) as they experienced ‘a kind of victim blaming’:  
 
It began to be clear to me about ten years ago that society was placing 
another undue and inappropriate burden on patients that seemed to come 
out of the popular beliefs about the mind-body connection. I would find 
patients coming in with stories of being told by well-meaning friends, “I’ve 
read all about this-if you get cancer, you must have wanted it…” Even more 
distressing was the person who said, “I know I have to be positive all the 
time and that is the only way to cope with cancer-but it’s so hard to do. I 
know that if I get sad, or scared or upset, I am making my tumor grow faster 
and I will have shortened my life” (from Holland’s ‘The Tyranny of Positive 
Thinking’, cited in Ehrenreich, 2009, p. 43). 
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As well as the obvious mind-body dualisms inherent in much humanistic and alternative 
psychology literature, there lies a binary bias that has also seemingly emerged out of 
the renaissance-scientific revolution-enlightenment-romantic movement assemblage. 
That is the culture-nature binary that I contend has a profound impact on events ranging 
from mental health to climate change. Coward (1993) suggests that the oppositions of 
modern society and nature stem directly from Christian views of morality, such as good 
versus evil: ‘To pursue a natural life style and diet is to find yourself on the side of the 
‘whole’, the integrated, balanced and healing forces of nature’ (Coward, 1993, p. 96). 
This is the romanticised face of ecopsychology and ecotherapy, the facade that narrows 
its field of vision to what I have previously called ‘nature 3’ ((Intra-)Act 1, scene three). 
For if this veil was lifted, it may reveal some unwanted and so-called ‘unnatural’ guests, 
as Coward so aptly (and sarcastically) demonstrates.  
 
To ignore natural laws is to side with the fragmented, the inharmonious, 
with modern ‘mass’ society, with junk, technology and destruction. 
Ultimately it is an alliance with disease. The individual must choose 
between these forces, between the life-giving forces of nature and the 
destructive forces of the modern world. And the sign of the choice we make 
is ‘health’. (Coward, 1993, pp. 96-97) 
 
Yet, as I have insisted throughout these acts, nature must also be Dionysian and not just 
Apollonian. And so must health be. This is especially true for mental health as it has 
been waylaid and hidden away from the reaches of environmental forces such as 
politics, society, climate and materiality itself.  
 
Becoming healthy has become synonymous with finding ‘nature’ and ‘a 
natural life style’ and this is to be the route by which advanced industrial 
society will be resisted. […] The alternative health movement has become 
a place where the individual can play out, in a highly personal way, a sense 
of the corruptions of modernity and the struggle against these corruptions 
[…] The solutions to these are rarely political. They are individual. It is up 
to individuals to transform themselves, to deal with the pain and suffering 
imposed by modern life.’ (Coward, 1993, p. 99) 
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In other words, through the illusion of escape from the industrial machine, certain 
elements of the alternative health movement seem to fall straight back into the same 
modernist trap that the clinical model is entrenched in. Ehrenreich (2009) asks, ‘would 
happiness stop being an appealing goal if it turned out to be associated with illness and 
failure?’, alternatively asking us to ‘imagine being gloriously contented with a life spent 
indulging unhealthy habits, like the proverbially happy “pigs in shit”?’ (p. 159). In a 
similar vein, Sarah Ahmed (2010a) sees happiness as a possible tool for justifying 
oppression ‘by privileging hegemonic groups who have access to what makes us believe 
we are happy’ (p. 2). For example, Ahmed (2010b, p. 30) articulates ‘how the family 
sustains its place as a “happy object” by identifying those who do nor reproduce its line 
as the cause of unhappiness.’ She calls such others, ‘affect aliens’, who include 
‘feminist kill-joys, unhappy queers, and melancholic migrants.’ (Ahmed, 2010b, p. 30). 
This forced production of happiness may even lead to what Franco Berardi (2009) has 
called a ‘mass production of unhappiness’ (p. 168).  
 
In general, unhappiness functions as a stimulus to consume: buying is a 
suspension of anxiety, an antidote to loneliness, but only up to a certain 
point. Beyond this certain point, suffering becomes a demotivating factor 
for purchasing. There is therefore an elaboration of conflicting strategies. 
(Berardi, 2012a, p. 83) 
 
Just think of all the ‘natural’ health products for the resilient spiritualised self to be 
consumed by. These products also have corresponding bases of ‘evidence’ to support 
them, in contrast to the ‘clinical’ evidence, until eventually the consumer of happiness 
becomes thoroughly confused with which supporting evidence to believe. Then, a 
certain point is reached where the health retail therapy stops working and anxiety or 
apathy sets in. 
Rosalind Coward’s (1993) critique of alternative therapy’s ‘polarization 
between the generalizations of ‘the modern’ on the one hand and ‘nature’ on the other’ 
(pp. 98-99) suggests this turn to nostalgia fails to ‘join up with a more thoroughgoing 
challenge to the structures of a capitalist society’ (p. 99). However, Franco Berardi 
certainly does when discussing the effects of the acceleration of capitalism on mental 
health which ‘opens a pathological gap and mental illness spreads as testified by the 
statistics and above all our everyday experience’ (Berardi, 2012a, p. 82). Berardi 
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(2012a) reports that ‘[i]t concerns a growing mass of existential misery that is tending 
more and more to explode in the center of the social system itself’ (p. 82) because 
‘[t]oday capital needs mental energies, psychic energies. And these are exactly the 
capacities that are fucking up. It is because of this that psychopathology is exploding in 
the center of the social scene’ (p. 83). 
For a truly alternative version of how happiness may be realised outside of the 
reductionist model of the medicalised body, the film Two Years at Sea (Rivers, 2011) 
demonstrates beautifully Jake Williams’ escape from normative society into the middle 
of a forest in Scotland, where he makes good use of the junk lying all around (like a 
Womble), including a caravan up a tree! With no ‘standardised’ model of happiness to 
compare to, no romanticised green and pleasant nature to be psycho-seduced by, Jake’s 
own version is re-invented and co-produced with the environment (including the junk) 
he has become of.   
 
In the alternative health movement, nature is none of the following things: 
it is not technological, scientific, rationalist; not industrial; it is not 
fragmented, arbitrary and without meaning; it knows nothing of bad 
posture, bad parenting, bad diet; above all, it knows nothing of disease. 
Clearly the critique of modern society is a very limited one. (Coward, 1993, 
p. 99) 
 
So, the message is this (must be spoken with a ‘spectacular’ smile); choose health, 
happiness and wellbeing, choose life! 
 
3. The WHO model 
 
The World Health Organisation’s (WHO, 2014) definition of health as ‘a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well-being’ (para. 2) implies that ‘mental’ 
phenomena are not the same as ‘physical’ or ‘social’ phenomena. But if mental (or 
social) phenomena are not physical, what are they and what does this separation of 
percepts into concepts do? Also, the WHO’s definition of health has been criticized as 
embodying a ‘utopian view of health that is near impossible for anyone to truly realize, 
attain, or even measure’ (Larson, 1999, in Szolosi, 2012, p. 139), not that it is 
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measurable anyway. Their holistic and yet thoroughly bound version of mental health 
fares no better regarding inaccessibility. For example: 
 
In April 2016, the World Bank Group and the World Health Organization 
will co-host a high-level meeting on global mental health, with a focus on 
depression and anxiety, to coincide with the 2016 Spring Meetings of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. (WHO, 2016a, 
para. 3, emphasis added) 
 
By merely suggesting it as a ‘high level’ meeting (with the WBG and IMF no less), it 
places the concept of mental health out of reach for many, if not most people in the 
world. Who are these people who decide it is ‘high level’?  For example, voting power 
within the World Bank Group (WBG) is weighted so that the US receives 16.21% of 
total votes out of 188 countries (WBG, 2015)68 but that’s not surprising given that the 
dominating ‘founding father’ of the WBG and IMF, Harry Dexter White, was a 
privileged white male from the US. Although the work that the WBG and IMF do is 
arguably beneficial to many people in many countries, it seems to me that they are 
dominated by a particular idealistic perception of the world, one that is ruled by a 
hegemonic elite and frames the world in the very same way that the WHO do under the 
umbrella of the enlightenment paradigm. This is an inaccessible version of mental 
health for many.  
According to WHO (2016b), mental disorders ‘are generally characterized by a 
combination of abnormal thoughts, perceptions, emotions, behaviour and relationships 
with others’ (para. 1, emphasis added). So, is it simply a matter of comparison to a 
standard model of what ‘normal’ might be? If so, who defines this normative standard, 
at what evolutionary stage in history, judged by which cultures ethico-onto-
epistemological conceptions? Put another way, at what stage in what culture’s history 
should we take for the normative descriptions of what the treatment of a ‘dis’order 
might entail? I imagine it performs differently with varied zeitgeists. For example, the 
                                                          
68 Voting shares are largely determined by a country’s economic weight and although 
there have been recent reforms to the WBG, the Bretton Woods Project, show that 
‘high-income countries will cling onto almost 61 per cent of the vote, with middle-
income countries getting under 35 per cent, and low-income countries on just 4.46 per 
cent.’ (The Bretton Woods Project, 2016). 
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historical oppression of numerous women under the banner of ‘hysteria’ (see Tasca, 
Rapetti, Carta & Fadda, 2012) is a direct result of a particular type of medicalised (and 
masculinised) lens, not too dissimilar (from an onto-epistemological perspective) to 
current conceptions of various mental disorders. 
 
4. The environmental model 
 
I will now argue for the case that health and wellbeing, from the perspective of 
what Szolosi (2012) calls the ‘wellness model’ and the ‘environmental model’ (and the 
resultant perception of happiness), is neither solely situated within the self as a 
subjective, cognitive construction (‘in here’), nor is it solely objectively situated in a 
realist paradigm (‘out there’) but as ‘spread’ or ‘distributed’ along a process of 
becoming (unlike the eudaimonic model of deep ecology, Zen Buddhism and embodied 
phenomenology).  
Nick Totton (2012), suggests that ‘individuality is both crucial and illusory’ (p. 
260) and that the ‘idea of an overarching self is in effect the idea of an outside, a place 
to stand which is not itself part of the complex whole, but allows us to understand and 
control it.’ (p. 262). I disagree, as does (‘the portable’69) Rosi Braidotti (2011):  
 
The notion of the individual is enlarged to enclose a structural sense of 
interconnection between the singular self and the environment or totality in 
which it is embodied and embedded […] The inward-looking individual 
fails to see the interconnection as part and parcel of his/her nature and is 
thus inhibited by an inadequate understanding of him/herself. The truth of 
self lies in its interrelations to others in a rhizomic manner that defies 
dualistic modes of opposition. Reaching out for an adequate representation 
of oneself includes the process of clearing up the confusion concerning 
one’s true nature as an affective, interconnected entity. Ultimately, this 
implies understanding the bodily structure of the self. Because of this bodily 
                                                          
69 ‘”The Portable” refers to the title Rosi Braidotti (2011) gives herself in her book 
“Nomadic Theory” and is a notion of a “subjectivity as one in flux”, “always in the 
process of becoming”.’ (Mcphie, 2014a, n.p.) 
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nature, the process of self-consciousness is forever ongoing and therefore 
incomplete or partial. (pp. 310-311). 
 
Alva Noë (2009) proposes that consciousness is not just neurological connections that 
happen inside us but rather it is something we do, make or achieve; ‘consciousness is 
more like dancing than it is like digestion’ (p. xii) as ‘the locus of consciousness is the 
dynamic life of the whole, environmentally plugged-in person or animal’ (p. xiii). 
However, to understand concepts of cognition in neural terms may actually help us 
perceive the mind as spread if we think of the neural activity extending outside of the 
brain. There is neural activity in our stomachs and around our hearts (Gregg & 
Seigworth, 2010) and neurological decisions may equally be thought of as being made 
from those locations (such as ‘eat now!’), not just our brains. But we can extend this 
neural activity even further if we don’t simply think of consciousness or the workings 
of the mind as stemming from biological cells or neurons alone. ‘You can no more 
explain mind in terms of the cell than you can explain dance in terms of the muscle’ 
(Noë, 2009, p. 48). Similarly, music would be difficult to explain through the notes 
alone. An anecdote goes that Schumann had once played ‘a very difficult étude and one 
of his students asked if he could explain it. “Yes,” said Schumann, and he played it 
again.’ (Steiner, 2016, n.p.). 
Cognitive action is distributed (although unevenly) around our environments 
and is not bounded by dermatological barriers. Or put more eloquently;  
 
Human experience is a dance that unfolds in the world and with others. You 
are not your brain. We are not locked up in a prison of our own ideas and 
sensations. The phenomenon of consciousness, like that of life itself, is a 
world-involving dynamic process. We are already at home in the 
environment. We are out of our heads. (Noë, 2009, p. xiii) 
 
If cognition and consciousness are processes that cross the divide of our skins, (our) 
mental health and wellbeing must also be distributed in environments. Noë (2009) 
suggests that perceptions of illnesses such as depression that are seen as a brain disease 
are comparable to the outdated reductionism of identifying consciousness only with 
events in the nervous system (p. xii). He goes on to state that due to neural signatures 
of depression, drug therapy can influence it but to understand why people get depressed 
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in neural terms alone is impossible as depression happens against the background of 
people’s individual histories as well as ‘the phylogenetic history of the species’ (Noë, 
2009, p. xii).  
Deleuze and Guattari (1983) suggested that it is ‘the capacities and limits of 
what a body can do that determines whether it is ‘healthy’ or ‘sick’.’ (Fox, 2016, n.p., 
emphasis added). This is the ‘capacity of a body to form new relations’ (Fox, 2016, 
n.p.). Therefore, conceptions of health such as depression, anxiety or schizophrenia may 
be better off treated as contextualised environmental phenomena as opposed to a disease 
bounded within ‘the self’.70 If we think of mental health and wellbeing from this more 
radical perspective it follows that we must also include environmental conditions (both 
Euclidean and topological) in our explorations of ‘the healthy self’.  
Regarding certain definitions of psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia, 
emotional disorders, etc., Curtis (2010) argues that ‘from perspectives in health 
geography or sociology of health one might take a more ‘relative’ view of such 
diagnostic criteria, considering them not as fixed, undisputed definitions, but more as 
the constructions of a particular, influential social group (certain psychiatrists in western 
countries)’ (p. 28). Of course there are other, cross cultural differences in socially 
constructed ideas of mental health and wellbeing (Curtis, 2010). Curtis (2004) and Prior 
(1993) suggest that understandings of mental health are socially and culturally 
constructed, are based on value judgements and are the result of products of thought 
and social practices. This implies that ‘the idea of mental health is not fixed but variable 
between societies, cultural and social groups or individual people, creating potential for 
geographical variation in perceived mental health between spatially separate 
communities’ (Curtis, 2004, p. 193, emphasis added).  
Curtis (2010, pp. 32-33) provides a discussion of a variety of different ’quality 
of life’ measures, concluding that there are cultural differences in understanding of 
wellbeing, which may contribute to international differences in wellbeing of people as 
measured on these scales. For example, for the Matsigenka (a Peruvian Amazonian 
tribe), notions of health and wellbeing are linked to ideals about happiness, productivity 
and goodness, ‘as well as’ to biomedical health (Izquierdo, 2004). For the Matsigenka, 
increases in acculturation and permanent settlement result in a decrease in their health 
                                                          
70 However, there may only be a limited range/window of tolerable ideas about mental 
health conceptions that the public will find acceptable (I believe this is commonly 
called the Overton window). 
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and wellbeing (Izquierdo, 2004).  Izquierdo (2004) found that although biomedical 
indicators of the Matsigenka’s physical health had significantly improved over the past 
20-30 years, they ‘perceived’ their health and wellbeing to have severely declined 
during this period. This indicates fundamental problems with definitions such as 
‘health’ and ‘well-being’, including issues with the hyphen. The International Journal 
of Wellbeing (2011) states:  
 
The decision to close the hyphenated gap between ‘well’ and ‘being’ is 
intentionally forward looking. […] A cursory glance over journals from 
other disciplines demonstrates that many of them are already making the 
transition to dropping the hyphen. […] ‘Wellbeing’ should to refer to the 
topic of what makes a life go well for someone and ‘well-being’ should refer 
to the more specific concept – the opposite of ill-being. 
 
I always shiver when the word ‘should’ is imposed (especially when I do it 
unconsciously). Perhaps for a more erudite understanding of wellbeing we may have to 
look outside of our Western culture. For example, Adelson (2000) informs us that there 
is no direct translation of mental health and wellbeing for the animist Cree. The closest 
description is, ‘being alive well’, a concept ‘less determined by bodily functions’ but 
rather spread out among political, social and ecological relationships (Adelson, 2000, 
p. 3). Should we use this?  
 
The death of the ‘true self’ 
 
‘Parambolic as I am. I can’t sum myself up because you can’t add a chair and two 
apples. I am a chair and two apples. And I cannot be added up.’ (Lispector, 2014, p. 
67). 
 
Of course, all of these definitions of mental health and wellbeing are (and must 
be) diffracted when the subject or object under scrutiny is placed sous rature. Carol 
Taylor (2013a) explains, 
 
in Deleuze’s view, the individual does not possess a ‘self’ which exists as a 
separable entity with a stable ego, people are not divisible into interior and 
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exterior components, and neither do they possess internal will or agency to 
motivate external action. To think so is an illusion derived from 
Enlightenment rationality. Instead, Deleuze proposes, subjectivities are 
multiplicities, subjects are characterised by flows of forces, intensities and 
desires, and individuals are continually being formed through a process of 
‘dynamic individuatiuon’ (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 93) from which the 
changing ‘self’ as an assemblage, a connective multiplicity, emerges. 
Deleuze uses the term ‘becoming’ to refer to this process of dynamic 
individuation. For him, becoming is first and foremost a material, sensible, 
intensive and embodied process, enabling us to experience life as a radically 
immanent fleshed existence motivated by desires and flows (Braidotti, 
2002). Deleuze sees becoming as immanent to all of life, human and 
nonhuman, and becoming, difference, change and variation as the hallmarks 
of life. (pp. 46-47) 
 
In this sense, concepts such as, mental health and wellbeing become something different 
when we consider our selves as multiplicities or haecceities. Many objective and 
subjective measurements of certain concepts such as, happiness, wellbeing, nature and 
mental health seem to treat these concepts as isolated quiddities that supposedly reveal 
to the transcendent researcher a knowable truth. Yet Karen Barad (2007) asserts, ‘We 
do not obtain knowledge by standing outside the world; we know because “we” are of 
the world. We are part of the world in its differential becoming.’ (p. 185). As mentioned 
previously, Gregory Bateson (2000) saw the problems inherent in the Platonic ‘nature 
carving’ frenzy and posited that by doing so, we may omit important information as ‘the 
mental world - the mind - the world of information processing - is not limited by the 
skin’ (p. 460). 
Walther and Carey (2009) point out that modernist thought in traditional 
psychiatric, psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic practice, postulates the notion of a 
‘true self’, implying that beneath our experiences lie a core set of structures that drive 
our sense of self. Yet, the mental world cannot be separated from the environment that 
it is ultimately of (not a part of). Therefore, we could conceive of our mental health as 
our environment’s (mental) health (not just a part of it).  
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It means, you see, that I now localize something which I am calling “Mind” 
immanent in the large biological system-the ecosystem. Or, if I draw the 
system boundaries at a different level, then mind is immanent in the total 
evolutionary structure. (Bateson, 2000, p. 466) 
 
If, as I am advancing, mental health is indeed a transcranial/transcorporeal process, 
rather than a bounded objective or subjective phenomena that we can measure 
(objectively) in an isolated vacuum (for example, as a malformation or malfunction 
within an individually insulated self), what does this understanding mean, or rather do, 
for mental health research that in turn informs various therapeutic practices? 
 
The death of therapy? 
 
The therapy world has also more recently been preoccupied with 
reproducing itself and with the intensiﬁcation of what get referred to as 
‘‘professional standards’’ and with restraining new developments in the 
name of ‘‘evidence-based’’ orthodoxies in the therapeutic professions. 
(Winslade, 2009, p. 333) 
 
If evidence for psychological/psychiatric treatment (in the form of a variety of therapies 
from cognitive behavioural therapy to humanistic therapy) is repeatedly taken from 
research that is underpinned by modernist onto-epistemological conceptions of the 
world, what might this practice do in terms of Being Alive Well (Adelson, 2000, p. 3)? 
Could it create various forms of oppression and binary bias?  
With reference to government policy documents, Hui and Stickley (2007) 
explain that ‘If service users are at all perceived as partners within these documents, 
they seem to be a very silent partner.’ (p. 422). Fisher and Freshwater (2013) emphasize, 
‘people with mental health problems are invariably referred to as ‘patients’, ‘service 
users’, ‘users’, but rarely as ‘people’’ (p. 3). I have previously (and provocatively) 
mentioned that this imbalance is usually dealt with by submitting to an economic 
structure that always subjugates certain social and cultural groups to create a binary bias 
of oppression (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 40), especially regarding involuntary psychiatric 
‘treatment’. ‘Brown and Tucker (2010) point out that medical power (enmeshed in 
economic and political power), in the guise of the professional psychiatrist, may be 
128 
 
exercised with oppressive consequences’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 42). They argue that 
when certain medical ‘conditions’ are diagnosed (such as schizophrenia), the ‘patient’s’ 
legal and moral rights are overruled and as a consequence, the ‘service user’ is 
marginalised and ‘excluded from full participation in mainstream society and subject to 
the ultimate sanction of being deprived of [their] liberty on the say-so of [their] 
psychiatrist’ (Brown & Tucker, 2010, p. 230). ‘Rather than affirming what a body can 
do, the meeting seeks to render the service user as a passive collection of dysfunctional 
affects that stand in need of careful management’ (Brown & Tucker, 2010, p. 243). 
These meetings may also enhance the belief that this management can only be properly 
deciphered and completed by the mental health ‘professional’, even though it is the 
psychiatric patient who ‘knows’ their own body best (Brown & Tucker, 2010).  
Following Fraser (1989), Fisher and Freshwater (2013) point out that if 
‘individuals are simply ‘docile bodies’ constituted through the effects of power, this 
leaves no room for resistance to power’ (pp. 3-4) or, put another way, ‘Once you have 
been conned into becoming Mr. Happy, the cruelty really begins’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 
52). Freshwater (2006) proposes that ‘definitions of mental illness […] are spoken into 
existence according to the values and beliefs that shape the discourse about what is 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’, or ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’’ (p. 56) and as such ‘the labels 
that define people as mentally ill arguably have no reality independent of the discourse 
of the society in which they occur’ (Fisher & Freshwater, 2013, p. 8).  The ontologies 
of these definitions are co-produced through practice. Viewed this way, therapy 
becomes part of a performance that generates illusions of normativity as a standardised 
model by which to measure mental health and identity, one that has the potential to 
exclude, dominate or oppress certain people (and indeed other environments). For 
example, Tilsen and Nylund (2010) assert that ‘[p]eople who perform fluid identities 
that are relationally constituted – identities that some people would call queer – are not 
accounted for by modernist notions of the essential self’ (p. 66). In light of these 
pathology-orientated perspectives, Adelson (2000) urges us to ‘rethink – rather than be 
constrained by – the framework of Western biology’ (p. 6). I would also include 
rethinking Western psychotherapy as in my mind it is no less biological. 
 
I do not propose that we abandon the study of subjectivity, but would like 
to argue for a concept of subjectivity that is based on relationality with 
others and with things. That means paying attention to feelings as well as 
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ideas, and viewing feelings, not as properties of the self, but as produced 
through the interaction between self and world. And it means seeing that 
interaction, not as the coming together of two separate entities, but as a 
process of entanglement in which boundaries do not hold. (Labanyi, 2010, 
p. 223) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari conceived of the ‘Body without Organs’ (BwO) not in opposition 
to organs but as a resistance ‘to the organization of the organs insofar as it composes 
an organism’ (2004, p. 34). ‘It is the organism that imposes form, that provides 
hierarchized organization, and that sediments and signifies a subject.’ (Mazzei, 2016, 
p. 153). And so we may want a change of scenery, from the suppression of Mr. Happy 
to the entanglements of Mr. Messy. The mycologist, Alan Rayner (1997) suggested ‘the 
whole of biology would be different if it had taken the mycelium as the prototypical 
exemplar of the living organism’ as ‘it could not, then, have been built upon the 
presumption that life is contained within the absolute bounds of fixed forms’ (cited in 
Ingold, 2011, p. 86). ‘Instead of thinking of organisms as entangled in relations, we 
should regard every living thing as itself an entanglement’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 87). The 
artist Ryan Alexander (2010) demonstrates this mycelium well, available by following 
this link:  
http://www.creativeapplications.net/processing/mycelium-processing/. ‘Personally, I 
prefer the concept of the children's character Mr. Messy as I identify more strongly with 
him...and if you Google Mr. Messy, there he is, you don’t even have to use your 
imagination!’ (Mcphie, 2014a, para. 28). 
 
Agency, materiality and mental illness 
 
‘To be is to be related’ (Mol, 2006, p. 54) points to the fact that the condition 
of any human is predicated on its embedding social and material relations. 
A therapeutic culture that values only self-governance, autonomy and 
rationality when it comes to explaining agency might therefore overlook the 
potentials for change that exist in our material environment. (von Peter, 
2013, p. 322) 
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Walther and Carey (2009) insist that Foucault's operation of modern power shows how 
dominant discourses and normative expectations gain a truth status by which people 
measure themselves (and others), which privileges the interests of those whose lives fit 
in with their own narrow confines, yet marginalise those who live their lives differently 
(Mcphie, 2014a, para. 21). This leads to an illusion of a certain kind of agency that can 
be especially problematic in the world of psychotherapy as ‘the various ‘psysciences’ 
have been especially inclined to using and disseminating this notion of agency (Illouz, 
2008).’ (von Peter, 2013, p. 318). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (2004) opposed the 
authoritarian role of the psychoanalyst’s relationship to their patient (or Sigmund 
Freud’s Oedipus Complex as a symbolistic analytical account/method) as ‘it bases its 
own dictatorial power upon a dictatorial conception of the unconscious’ (p. 19). 
Schizoanalysis, (‘the study of bodies politic from a materialist, anti-Oedipal 
perspective’), ‘on the other hand, treats the unconscious as an acentred system, in other 
words, as a machinic network of finite automata (a rhizome), and thus arrives at an 
entirely different state of the unconscious’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 19). This a-
centred version of the unconscious body, may now include the materiality of the world 
rather than distance it. So, it is to the intra-relational, rhizomatic haecceity that we must 
turn. 
 
Scene five: The Birth of Mr Messy: Becoming a (re)search assemblage 
 
remember the sense of fusion 
of liquefying into  
an infinite melt of oneness 
(feel it when your flesh crosses the  
skin to entangle with another’s) 
 
(de Oliveira Andreotti, 2016, p. 87) 
 
Interméde: A topological Syuzhet 
 
‘I don’t like points’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 161) 
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I initially wrote about ‘relational ontologies’ in 2012-2013 for the MPhil/PhD 
transfer process and elements of it were later merged into a published paper that I co-
authored with my friend Dave Clarke (Clarke & Mcphie, 2014). Please read this 
(faraway?) paper if you’d like to discover how I travelled from ‘points’ to ‘lines’ as it 
will add another flavour to this scene. 
 
Becoming Ecological Entanglements  
 
After reading Thoreau’s work, Jane Bennett (2004) asks if sensitivity to a focus 
on materiality, which she terms ‘thing-power’, can induce a stronger ecological sense 
(p. 348). Her notion of an ‘onto-story’ is a depiction of ‘the nonhumanity that flows 
around but also through humans…it emphasises those occasions in ordinary life when 
the us and the it slipslide into each other’ (p. 349). She sees her work as a continuous 
journey to try to untangle our relations to/in a world of materiality and describes her 
methods for enhancing her receptivity to thing-power (‘the agential powers of natural 
and artifactual things’) by writing about it as ‘an account of the thingness of things’ so 
that she is able to ‘feel it more intensely’ and gain a ‘greater awareness of the dense 
web of their connections with each other’ (Bennett, 2004, p. 349). A research focus on 
the ‘thingness of things’ is enticing and may certainly be fruitful.  
As an example of how this might play out in contemporary research practice, 
Carol Taylor (2013b) explored how ‘materialities of classrooms do crucial but often 
unnoticed performative work in enacting gendered power’ (p. 688) and ‘reveals 
educational practices to be a constellation of human–nonhuman agencies, forces and 
events’ (p. 689). Observing a chair-teacher assemblage in a typical classroom, Taylor 
(2013b) noticed the chair as ‘an object with thing-power’ which ‘took its place as a 
material-discursive agency within a classroom space saturated with gendered meanings’ 
as the ‘chair and his body formed a human–nonhuman assemblage which freed him up 
to glide, slide, spin, twirl, tilt, lean, roll and spring.’ (p. 693), unlike the (crucially) 
stationary chairs that the students were immobilised with. In Taylor’s (2013b, p. 694) 
notes, she observes that the ‘power clearly resides with him. He is totally relaxed and 
expansive in his body language, leaning back in his chair and controlling the space at a 
distance.’ Yet the ‘control’, I imagine, was partly produced and enacted by the chair 
itself as a crucial co-star in the entanglement of agential distribution. The design and 
mobility of the chair itself could indeed be said to co-create the power that Taylor 
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noticed emanating from the assemblage, not as a Gibsonian affordance, but as a worldly 
material emergence in-of-itself. I’m not even sure that ‘control’ was ever present within 
the teacher in the first place (what do you think?). 
The possibility of an increased intensity and awareness of the lines of becoming 
within this meshwork, may help researchers and practitioners understand how the 
processes involved in the production of perception may influence mental health and 
wellbeing by focusing on the temporal fluidity of the lines themselves. It may also 
encourage participants’ awareness of their own web-like relations with the 
environments they are ultimately of, potentially helping them to become (re-)embodied 
if (for example) there is an issue of disembodiment or hyperembodiment. 
 
Steps to an Ontology of Lines  
 
Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) quest to find ‘the consciousness or 
thought of the matter-flow’ (p. 454), Ingold (2007, 2011, 2012) suggests we think 
‘from’ materials rather than ‘about’ them. He reflects that we ‘should no longer speak 
of relations between people and things, because people are things too’ (Ingold, 2012, 
pp. 437-438). Merleau-Ponty suggested that ‘since the living body is primordially and 
irrevocably stitched into the fabric of the world, our perception of the world is no more, 
and no less, than the world’s perception of itself – in and through us’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 
12). 
So, in order to understand the material composition of inhabited environments, 
Ingold (2011) proposes that we engage ‘directly with the stuff we hope to understand’ 
(p. 20). This includes ‘its tensions and elasticities, lines of flow and resistances […] 
guided by intuition in action’ (Ingold, 2012, p. 433) and to study the entangled lines of 
this meshwork, ‘is to adumbrate an ecology of materials’ (p. 435). It is this ‘ecology of 
materials’ that I wish to grow and develop as an ‘ontology of lines’ (see Ingold, 2007, 
2015) in order to further explore how we leak and spill into our environments (and vice 
versa). And as our perceptions are the result of this flow of materials, it will hopefully 
lead to a better insight into how mental health and wellbeing is distributed in the 
environment. 
Alfred-North Whitehead’s process metaphysics is a suitable introduction to the 
next section as it is 
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entirely about process and transformation; it values becoming over being, 
relation over substance, and continual novelty over the perpetuation of the 
same. It rejects the “bifurcation of nature” (Whitehead 1920/2004, 30-31), 
or the separation of reality from appearance (1929/1978, 72). It holds that 
there is nothing besides “the experiences of subjects” (167); and it grants to 
all subjects-including inhuman and nonsentient ones-and to all their 
experiences-conscious or not-the same ontological status. (Shaviro, 2012, 
p. 99) 
 
A Troika of ontologies of immanence 
 
Interméde: A topological Syuzhet 
 
This next section is a conversation with a paper I published in 2015, entitled, ‘A 
Walk in the Park’ (Mcphie & Clarke, 2015), for which I have cited the relevant pages 
under the title Syuzhet as it follows the non-linear path of this topologically distributed 
play. My added critical responses to these pubished sections are labelled here as Fabula. 
The pages from my joint paper with Dave that I emphasise here highlight most of the 
new literature from contemporary animism, new materialisms and new science of the 
mind that I have come to recognise as particularly salient to my PhD inquiry.  
 
Syuzhet 
 
Please read Mcphie and Clarke (2015, pp. 231-233) for an overview of 
contemporary animism and its relevance to environ(mental) thinking, a worldview that 
runs counter to the majority of current unsustainable conceptual processes and practices 
that stem from the Western mind/worldview (Ingold, 2011).  
 
Fabula 
 
An issue with contemporary animist writing is that it is still ‘mostly’ written by 
Western anthropologists and/or ethnographers: this is a matter of appropriation, just as 
Dalit writing is suppressed through appropriation by Brahmin scholars. Similar to the 
protestations of Foucault and Deleuze regarding the historisisation of certain 
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hegemonies, Ambedkar stressed, ‘one finds so little that is original in the field of 
historical research by Brahmin scholars unless it be a matter of fixing dates or tracing 
genealogies’ (cited in Ambedkar Age Collective, p. 8). ‘We must shape our course 
ourselves and by ourselves’ (Babasaheb Ambedkar, 1930, cited in Ambedkar Age 
Collective, p. ix).  
Where a person positions oneself has an effect. It is impossible to remove the 
ingrained lens that we look at the world through, no matter how reflexive we might have 
become. I believe this is also true of the modern Western paradigm. In fact, I now find 
myself on the verge of appropriating Ambedkar’s words. But I don’t. I diffract instead. 
I do this by highlighting where this appropriation may take place and interrogate it. 
Patrick, a Cree elder, once told me that I must look to my own cultural heritage to 
become a participant, so as not to become merely an observer of the world. In this way, 
I appropriate from my past. I become an archaeologist rather than an anthropologist.  
 
Syuzhet 
 
Please read Mcphie and Clarke (2015, pp. 233-234) for an overview of process-
relational thought, externalist philosophy and the new science of the mind. 
 
Fabula 
 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) landmark paper, ‘The Extended Mind’ used the story 
of Inga and Otto to exemplify their point: 
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Snippet 3: Inga and Otto. 
 
As ever, there are critiques of externalism (see Rupert, 2004, 2009), the most 
vocal voices coming from Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2008, 2010) who claim that the 
extended mind has not provided a ‘plausible theory of what distinguishes the cognitive 
from the non‐cognitive’ (2010, p. 78). Eva Perez de Vega retorts: 
 
In light of the terms provided by assemblage theory, it seems that A&A 
believe that cognition is a state, describable through relations of interiority, 
or, what is the same, they conceive of cognition as a whole with properties 
that can be reduced to the properties of its parts. Furthermore they assume 
that the way these parts function sometimes, determines how they function 
all of the time, thus committing a fallacy themselves. A&A work within a 
world of fixed and definite categories, which is hardly consistent with the 
complexity of cognition. (n.d.b, p. 12). 
 
Syuzhet 
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By 2015, I had already developed a reasonable understanding of both 
contemporary animism and new science of the mind. Please read Mcphie and Clarke 
(2015, p. 234) for the link that introduces where I first started to aquire a new materialist 
comprehension of the world that in many cases takes an intra over an inter 
understanding of reality (hence, my light bulb moment of linking the three philosophies 
of immanence together). The next Fabula takes this understanding further to explore its 
rich labyrinths.  
 
Fabula 
 
‘Matter is agentive and intra-active […] Bodies do not simply take their place in 
the world. They are not simply situated in, or located in particular environments. Rather 
‘environments’ and ‘bodies’ are intra-actively constituted.’ (Barad, 2007, p. 170). With 
this comment, Barad ‘shows that space is not simply a physical container; objects and 
things are not inert, fixed or passive matter awaiting ‘use’ by human intervention; nor 
is the body a mere corporeal vehicle to be moved by the mind.’ (Taylor, 2013b, p. 688). 
Barad (2007) coined the term ‘agential realism’ to denote her ‘posthumanist 
performative account of material bodies (both human and nonhuman)’ (p. 139) as it 
‘allows matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing 
intra-activity.’(p. 136).  
 
Agential realism is an account of technoscientific and other practices that 
takes feminist, antiracist, poststructuralist, queer, Marxist, science studies, 
and scientific insights seriously, building specifically on important insights 
from Niels Bohr, Judith Butler, Michel Foucault, Donna Haraway, Vicki 
Kirby, Joseph Rouse, and others […] This entails a reworking of the 
familiar notions of discursive practices, materialization, agency, and 
causality, among others. (Barad, 2003, pp. 810-811).  
 
As Iovino (2012) points out, ‘the true dimension of matter is not that of astatic being, 
but of a generative becoming’ (p. 53). Discourses of ‘agential realism bring matter and 
the nonhuman to the centre of the discussion’ (Quinn, 2013, p. 742) where ‘matter and 
meaning are not separate entities’ (Barad, 2007, p. 3). Barad’s agential realist accounts 
of life have now become a central tenet of the growing new materialisms movement.   
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“New materialism” as a term was coined by Manuel DeLanda and Rosi 
Braidotti in the second half of the 1990’s. New materialism shows how the 
mind is always already material (the mind is an idea of the body), how 
matter is necessarily something of the mind (the mind has the body as its 
object), and how nature and culture are always already “naturecultures” 
(Donna Haraway’s term). (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, p. 48) 
 
Post-structuralism71 regards meanings of texts as not in the texts but rather emerges and 
is produced ‘as the reader interacts with the texts’ (Grenz, 1996; Sarup, 1993; 
Tarragona, 2008). However, if we were to add new materialist theories to the post-
structuralist paradigm, the previous sentence could read, ‘co-emerges and is co-
produced as the reader intra-acts with the texts’. ‘If language really does construct 
meaning (as opposed to revealing an objective meaning already present in the world), 
then the work of the scholar is to take apart (“deconstruct”) this meaning constructing 
process.’ (Grenz, 1996, p. 43, cited in Tarragona, 2008, p. 170) in order to reconstruct 
more healthy futures (from an ‘ecological’ perspective, if that is indeed possible 
considering its (logocentric) Platonic Occidental origins of hegemonic control that can 
create colonialist assumptions of intellectual power, binary bias and hierarchy). Yet 
language itself doesn’t construct meaning, it is a co-producer of meaning. 
The material turn sides with Donna Haraway’s introduction of the concept 
‘naturecultures’ (Haraway, 2003) to ‘breach the categorical schism between nature and 
culture’ (Oppermann, 2013, p. 60) as well as Bruno Latour’s ‘nature-culture’ (Latour, 
1993, p. 7), both heavily influenced by Deleuze and Guattari’s writing: 
   
                                                          
71 Maggie MacLure (2013) defines poststructuralism as ‘an opposition to the 
rationalist, humanist worldview that is the (continuing) legacy of the seventeenth-
century ‘Enlightenment’ […] asserting that truths are always partial, and knowledge 
always ‘situated’ – in other words, produced by and for particular interests, in 
particular circumstances, at particular times.’ (p. 167). ‘Poststructuralism is also 
associated with the ‘crisis of representation’, in which language is no longer held to 
represent or reflect a pre-existing reality, but is inextricably implicated in the 
fabrication of realities. Finally, poststructuralism decentres and dis-assembles the 
humanist subject – the thinking, self-aware, truth-seeking individual (‘man’), who is 
able to master both ‘his’ own internal passions, and the physical world around him, 
through the exercise of reason.’ (MacLure, 2013, p. 167). 
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We make no distinction between man and nature: the human essence of 
nature and the natural essence of man become one within nature in the form 
of production of industry, just as they do within the life of man as a species 
... man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting one another 
... rather, they are one and the same essential reality, the producer-product. 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, pp. 4-5). 
 
After reviewing thirty recent empirical new materialist social inquiries, Fox and Alldred 
(2014) point out that a Deleuzo-Guattarian ontology has played a signiﬁcant role in the 
emergence of new materialism,  
 
because of its empirical focus on processes and interactions (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1984, p. 3), its nomadic politics and ethics of becoming rather than 
being (Braidotti, 2006, p. 14; Conley, 1990), and its methodological 
capacity to move beyond structure/agency and culture/nature dualisms 
(DeLanda, 2006; van der Tuin & Dolphijn, 2010, p. 154). (Fox & Alldred, 
2014, P.3) 
 
‘[T]o become animate and mobile, for Deleuze and Guattari it is clear that materiality 
needs no animating accessory. It is figured as itself the “active principle.”’ (Bennett, 
2010, p. 61). In the wake of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) ‘transcendental empiricism’, 
Latour’s (2005) ‘Actor Network Theory’ and Barad’s (2007) ‘agential realism’, Jane 
Bennett’s (2010) ‘vital materialism’ explores ‘the vitality of matter and the lively 
powers of material formations’ (p. vii) in which she relates Baruch Spinoza’s natura 
naturans ‘to the so-called élan vital or creative force described in the later work of Henri 
Bergson’ (Hale, 2015, p. 174) without the mysticism this often evokes nor the 
mechanism of the opposing views. 
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The material turn (including OOO72, material ecocriticism73 and feminist new 
materialisms74) has attempted to forge a path between the confines of scientific 
naturalism (‘the aggregation of ever smaller bits’) and social relativism (‘constructions 
of human behaviour and society’) (Bogost, 2012, p. 6) in order to seek those ever elusive 
lines of flight away from hierarchical binary logics, humanistic cultural constructions 
and oppressive essentialisms of enlightenment rationality. Maggie MacLure (2015) 
reveals: 
 
                                                          
72 ‘Object Oriented Ontology’ (OOO) was born on the back of Bogost, Harman, 
Bryant, Meillassoux and Morton. The worry I have for OOO is that by not examining 
the multiple lenses that one examines the world with, the unexamined assumptions 
that slip through the net have the potential to enact inequitable effects.  
73 Following Iovino and Oppermann’s recent work, ‘Material ecocriticism is the study 
of the expressive dynamics of nature’s constituents, or narrative agencies of storied 
matter at every scale of being in their mutual entanglements. It seeks to explore the 
narrative dimension of the material world in terms of the stories embodied in material 
formations.’ (Oppermann, 2013, p. 57). Material ecocriticism is interested in the 
narrative potentiality of matter through significance and innate meaning making and 
in this sense deviates from feminist new materialisms and OOO, for example. The 
impact of omitting the matter of concepts in the cogitations of material ecocriticism 
leaves open the performance of the neglected cogitations themselves (i.e. what do they 
do?). 
74 Feminist new materialisms focuses on ‘how the forces of matter and the processes 
of organic life contribute to the play of power or provide elements or modes of 
resistance to it.’ (Frost, 2011, p. 70). It is neither anti-biological nor does it turn to 
biology as the master plan, dismissive of other onto-epistemologies (Ahmed 2008; 
Hinton & van der Tuin, 2014; Sullivan 2012). Taylor and Ivinson (2013) point out that 
‘‘new’ material feminisms displace the human as the principal ground for knowledge 
[…] and accepts that matter is alive.’ (p. 666). There is a ‘priority given to difference, 
entanglement and undecidability’ as it challenges ‘the distance, separation and 
categorical assurance that shores up the self-mastery of the oedipal (male) subject of 
humanism. (Maclure, 2015, p. 5). The similarities between all three modes of thought 
have immense potential for (re)configuring life whilst at the same time have their own 
sets of issues within their distinct trajectories. The most important differences, for 
myself, are the conceptual, ethical and political implications that feminist new 
materialisms engage with compared to the other two. For example, Graham Harman 
has yet to choose a political ‘side’ (almost deeming himself to be objectively 
politically neutral, which in my mind is an impossibility) as well as being a bit of a 
‘boys club’ and Iovino and Oppermann seem to omit conceptual matter in their 
theoretical musings. Iovino (2012) states, ‘matter is everything but a conceptual 
abstraction.’ (p. 51). Yet matter is indeed a conceptual abstraction. Even this question 
matters. 
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Materially-informed work is going on under a variety of names: material 
feminism, new materialism, new empiricism, posthuman studies, actor 
network theory, affect theory, process philosophy, the ontological turn. It 
has been mobilised by theorists such as Karen Barad (2007), Gilles Deleuze 
(2004), Patricia Clough (2009), Donna Haraway (2007), Myra Hird (2009), 
Brian Massumi (2002), Rosi Braidotti (2013), Vicki Kirby (2011), Bruno 
Latour (2004), Jane Bennett (2010) and Isabelle Stengers (2011). All of 
these scholars, in their different ways, insist on the significance of matter in 
social and cultural practices. There are also connections with indigenous 
philosophies, which are vitally attuned to matter. In such philosophies, ways 
of knowing and being rest on a fundamental acknowledgement of the 
agency of place and land, and relationality across human and non-human 
entities (Jones & Hoskins, 2013; Turk, 2014). (pp. 3-4). 
 
Likewise, language performs because it is physical and alive. As such, the scholarship 
that follows it ‘is ‘material-semiotic’ or ‘material-discursive’ (Haraway 1988, Barad 
2007).’ (New Materialism, 2016, n.p.). Language isn’t inert matter controlled by human 
agency, it enacts through the intra-relational capacities of extended bodies. Whereas a 
‘framework of representation […] treats research topics from the outside, […] new 
materialism demonstrates how scholars (from all disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
fields) are in fact part of the phenomena that they study’ (New Materialism, 2016, n.p.) 
because ‘the agencies of observation are inseparable from that which is observed’ 
(Barad, 2012a, p. 6). Steering clear of Kantian representationalism and Cartesian 
thinking, new materialist researchers frame themselves as part of the ethical 
entanglement of how matter comes to matter (Barad, 2007), creating ‘a more ethical 
research practice’ (Quinn, 2013, p. 740). 
 
 
Snippet 4: Intra-actions of you-snippet. 
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If we employ an ‘externalist’ view of cognition and mind (both ‘embodied’ and 
‘extended’), one that is an ‘extracranial’ and a ‘transcranial process’ (see Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998; Malafouris, 2013, pp. 57-58; Manzotti, 2011a, pp. 15-36; and 
Rowlands, 2010, pp. 51-84, for overviews); a New Materialist view that ‘decentres the 
human and emphasises the co-constitutive power of matter’ (Taylor & Ivinson, 2013, 
p. 666) and how the mind is material and embodied (see Coole & Frost, 2010, pp. 1-43; 
and Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012, pp. 13-16, for overviews); and a contemporary 
animist view of ‘bringing things back to life’ (Ingold, 2013a, p. 225), where animated 
relations come to life in a world much more than human (see Harvey, 2013, for an 
overview), it must change our understanding and practice regarding mental health and 
wellbeing (for example, see Adelson (2000) for a unique description of the ‘Health and 
Politics of Cree Well-Being’). It also becomes a very pressing ethical issue as it 
implicates and imbricates physical processes outside of our own head (or organic skin) 
regarding our personal mental health. These processes are spread topologically75 to 
include political decisions, architecture, land management, societal consumption, noise, 
institutional parity, monoculture practices, mobile phones, etc. I use this troika of 
philosophies of immanence to ‘think with’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012), as a sort of 
contact lens to explore the empirical materials. However, as I am limited in space to 
explain these philosophies in more detail, I hope their influence seeps through this 
thesis’ pours as I think and write with them and attempt to wrestle with the bricolage 
that co-emerges. 
So, I look to (and think with) philosophies of immanence as an attempt to break 
free from the Cartesian trap of self-other or nature-culture dichotomies that reify 
transcendent and static modes of thought and practice regarding notions of self, agency 
and mental health, ontologies that conceive of agency as distributed rather than bound 
within a subjective, isolated and essentialised self for a superego to determine his76 own 
destiny.  
 
                                                          
75 ‘Topology focuses on the […] inherent connectivity of objects while ignoring their 
detailed form. Because of this abstraction from the detailed form, it is possible to 
define the “objects” of topology as “topological spaces”.’ (Braungardt, 2016, para. 3) 
76 I say ‘his’ on purpose due to the ‘humanistic arrogance of continuing to place Man 
at the centre of world history’ (Braidotti, 2013, p. 23) 
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What is needed is a robust account of the materialization of all bodies—
“human” and “nonhuman”—and the material-discursive practices by which 
their differential constitutions are marked. This will require an 
understanding of the nature of the relationship between discursive practices 
and material phenomena, an accounting of “nonhuman” as well as “human” 
forms of agency, and an understanding of the precise causal nature of 
productive practices that takes account of the fullness of matter’s 
implication in its ongoing historicity. (Barad, 2003, p. 810) 
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Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Two: Embodied walls and 
extended skins  
 
Interméde: A topological Syuzhet 
 
This distant assemblage follows the non-linear path of this topologically 
distributed play and appears as a chapter in the forthcoming book Street Art of 
Resistance, edited by Sarah Awad and Brady Wagoner (Mcphie, in press). It explores 
tataus77 and graffiti as they came up in conversation quite a few times within the 
‘Walking in Circles’ (WiC)  research group and two tattoos in particular caught my 
attention as they were spoken about by the owners of them with more emotional elation 
than conversations surrounding them. So I chose to follow this line of affect. It is an 
important assemblage in that it helped me to formulate a deeper understanding of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) notion of the ‘Body without Organs’ (BwO) as a move 
away from Merleau-Ponty’s ‘flesh’: 
 
We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the body in the world 
and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the seer 
as in a box. Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, 
since the world is flesh? Where in the body are we to put the seer, since 
evidently there is in the body only “shadows stuffed with organs,” that is, 
more of the visible? (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 138) 
 
I’ve included this quote due to the insight Merleau-Ponty gleaned with his concept 
‘flesh of the earth’ but swiftly depart from it as he believed this extended flesh to be 
non-material. I believe it is material. At this point, I jump on board with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (2004) notion of the ‘body without organs’ (BwO). ‘The BwO is an 
assemblage of forces, desires, and intensities that attempts to conceive the relations 
between subjectivity, society and environment differently, to see what the forces acting 
through life do rather than describe what life is’ (Goodchild, 1996, cited in Mazzei, 
2016, p. 153).  
                                                          
77 Tattoo comes from ‘tatau’, a Samoan/Tahitian word for mark. 
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This particular assemblage also helped me conceive ‘Inorganic skin’ and an 
‘Extended Body Hypothesis’ (EBH). A snippet taken directly from this 
chapter/assemblage briefly explains these ideas and hopefully teases you, the spect-
actor, to read the rest of this topological refrain away from the more static production 
of the thesis that you are currently engaging with.   
 
 
 
Snippet 5: Inorganic Skin (Mcphie, in press). 
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(Intra-)Act 2: The birth of rhizoanalytic post-qualitative co-operative 
action (re)search 
 
It was like living in a time warp as we responded to those who were 
“paradigms behind” (Patton, 2008, p. 269), those who had missed all the 
turns—e.g., the social turn, the cultural turn, the linguistic turn, the 
postmodern turn, and so on. (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 2). 
 
The dominant paradigms that have forced their hand in the world of academia need an 
overhaul to find better stories than the current one being traced repeatedly, on a tape 
loop, as we attempt to ‘produce different knowledge and produce knowledge 
differently.’ (St. Pierre, 1997, p. 175). This becomes an ethical imperative of what we 
can do. 
This act describes a non-methodology. It intra-acts with some of the posts and 
(dis)re-gards most of the re’s, as it weaves in and out of the underpinning ontology of 
immanence that I have chosen to think with (or has chosen to think with me). It explains 
how I chanced upon (and merged) post-qualitative co-operative action (re)search to 
inquire with, along with the analytical devices of ‘rhizoanalysis’ and ‘environ(mental) 
health assemblages’78.  It also gives a little background to ‘psychogeography’ as a useful 
political-psychological tool to walk/explore with. 
 
When we speak about “presentation” or “presenting,” one has to consider 
that presenting itself is a performance (Denzin, 1997), a new construction, 
a way of “framing reality” (Denzin, 1997, pp. 224-225) and not a pure 
representation of an outside reality. […] Just like in the speaking, in the 
writing we give birth to our selves and the selves of others (also those of 
our participants!). (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 15) 
 
Scene one: Diffractive productions 
 
                                                          
78 The reasoning for the production of the Brechtian play assemblage, Liverpool ONE-
Liverpool Too’ is explained in the ‘programme’ as a complimentary play script to 
accompany this PhD thesis/play. 
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‘Art does not reproduce the visible but makes visible.’ (Klee, 1961, 
p. 76) 
 
The ‘places’ we inhabit or visit also become our embodied and/or extended 
selves as we experience them and our (un)consciousness’ integrate and merge with their 
unique spatio-temporal characteristics to form unique rhizomes, events, assemblages or 
becomings (after Deleuze and Guattari). For many animists the ‘land is not just seen as 
shaping or inﬂuencing identity, but being an actual part of it’ (Wilson, 2003, p. 88) and 
as it is constantly morphing into something new, research into environ(mental) health 
and well-becoming may have to be contextualised with each new presentation.  
Inquiries that are supported by an ontology of immanence, such as Deleuze’s 
‘transcendental empiricism’79, communicate the need to experiment with life not as a 
subject, but as a haecceity (Colebrook, 2002; Waterhouse, 2011). Therefore, the 
corresponding epistemology is very different from positivist (or post-positivist) 
paradigms of empiricism which place the thinking subject as the basis of experience 
(Waterhouse, 2011). Transcendental empiricism is ‘a creative endeavour that focuses 
on the thoughts and ideas that may be produced by experiences, by an event’ 
(Waterhouse, 2011, p. 125). It is a diffractive endeavour (after Haraway and Barad).  
 
A diffractive methodology, then, encourages new ways of thinking about 
and relating to data and meaning-making. It offers a critical practice of 
interference which pays attention to what we don’t normally see, to what is 
excluded (Taylor, 2013b, p. 692) 
 
So how does this diffractive ontology of immanence influence my own research 
epistemology? In agreement with Alvermann (2000), St. Pierre (2004, 2011), Masny 
(2006) and Waterhouse (2011), I have experienced an almost complete breakdown of 
the structure of conventional interpretative qualitative inquiry within my own research 
journey as I have tried to overcome ‘the pervasiveness of received understandings of 
                                                          
79 Transcendental empiricism is not ‘an abstract, supplementary framework into which 
immanence can be fitted; it is not ‘the transcendent’ (Deleuze 2001a: 26)’ (Coleman 
& Ringrose, 2013, p. 10). Instead, Deleuze (2001) describes it as ‘a haecceity no 
longer of individuation but of singularisation: a life of pure immanence’ (p. 29), 
allowing for the possibility of an ethics of immanence regarding the construction of a 
self. 
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key research terms: method, data, analysis, reporting of findings, knowledge’ 
(Waterhouse, 2011, pp. 125-126), variables, coding, categorising, participants, etc. The 
belief in re-presentational empirical phenomena as ways of finding the truth for best 
practice are engrained in our culture. 
 
Scene two: The birth of post-qualitative inquiry 
 
Qualitative inquiry was born out of a positivistic paradigm, and as such has 
failed to escape it at the ontological level. For example, both validity and credibility are 
judged against a set of rules and voices that came into use in England during the 1550’s 
for validity—from middle French validité (Harper, 2016c)—and during the 1590’s for 
credibility—from the medieval Latin credibilitas (Harper, 2016d). By assuming that 
research is credible, we are also assuming that the ideals of the institutional paradigm 
we are measuring that credibility by are set or fixed and true. When this credibility is 
challenged, perhaps by a different culture, it often performs with oppressive 
consequences, as recorded in the annals of anthropological imperialism.  
Post-qualitative inquiry (see St. Pierre, 2011, 2014 and Lather & St. Pierre, 2013 
for a full description) seeks to destabilise this oppressive representational trend of 
knowledge re-production. These emerging novel methodologies challenge the 
researcher to produce knowledge differently by ‘refusing a closed system for fixed 
meaning’ in order to ‘keep meaning on the move’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. i). These 
problematic fixed meanings could involve ‘mechanistic coding’, which St. Pierre (2011, 
p. 622) infers ‘is a positivist social science of the 1920’s and 1930’s’), or ‘reducing data 
to themes’, which Jackson and Mazzei (2012) suggest ‘do little to critique the 
complexities of social life’ as ‘such simplistic approaches preclude dense and multi-
layered treatment of data’ (p. i). ‘But to convert what we owe to the world into ‘data’ 
that we have extracted from it is to expunge knowing from being.’ (Ingold, 2013b, p. 
5). 
Even Norman Denzin (of Denzin and Lincoln fame) has jumped on the post-
qualitative bandwagon by performing a critique of the concept ‘data’ in his paper 
entitled, The Death of Data? (2013): ‘Data are Dead. Data died a long time ago, but few 
noticed.’ (p. 353). The ‘reader is asked to imagine a world without data, a world without 
method, a world without a hegemonic politics of evidence’ (Denzin, 2013, p. 353). He 
suggests that data have agency, are not passive and concludes that ‘the word data should 
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be outlawed; replaced by William James term empirical materials’ (Denzin, 2013, p. 
355), even though that term is ‘almost’ as problematic if taken to mean the ‘empirical’ 
of the enlightenment project. ‘If a word is data, isn’t a code (a word) data as well? Do 
we code codes?’ (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 622). 
Lather and St. Pierre (2013) endorse post-qualitative research pointing out that 
‘we have become so attached to our invention - qualitative research - that we have come 
to think it is real’, asking, ‘have we forgotten that we made it up?’ (Lather & St. Pierre, 
2013, p. 631). ‘The argument is basically that a new form of research is needed to 
engage meaningfully with the world philosophized as an assemblage or a mangle.’ 
(Greene, 2013, p. 755). Honan (2014) and MacLure (2013) advocate moving beyond a 
focus on language towards a materially engaged discourse that is ‘non-representational, 
non-interpretive, a-signifying [and] a-subjective’ (MacLure, 2013, p. 663). A growing 
number of discontented researchers do provide alternative non-, post- or anti-
representational methodologies that could potentially be nominated to fit under the post-
qualitative umbrella (for example, see Davies et al., 2013; Dewsbury, 2003; Doel & 
Clarke, 2007; Honan, 2014; Jackson, 2013; Latham, 2003; Law, 2004: Lefebvre, 2004; 
Lenz Taguchi, 2013; Lorimer, 2008; Martin & Kamberelis, 2013; Patchet, 2010; 
Pickering, 1993; Thrift, 2008; Whatmore, 2006). Additionally, following this unruly 
trend, Laws (forthcoming) calls for a ‘magical realist human geography’ as a disruptive 
tool, to enchant research with mental health users and as a (re)action to her scepticism 
of ‘evidence based’ discourse (e.g. what makes ‘best evidence’ best?). 
Post-qualitative inquiry is now gaining ground in qualitative research handbooks 
and journals (see Honan & Bright, 2016; Jackson & Mazzei, 2012; St. Pierre, 2011; St. 
Pierre & Lather, 2013; St. Pierre, Jackson & Mazzei, 2016). However, critiquing post-
qualitative inquiry, Jennifer Greene ‘expresses concerns: ﬁrst, about whether post-
qualitative research can still be considered research; second, where it is going; and third, 
what is being lost in the new inquiry’ (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, p. 632). Greene (2013) 
imagines post-qualitative inquiry ‘as a kind of retreat into the mind’ (p. 753, emphasis 
added). I think the Cartesian ghost still haunts Greene’s (2013) onto-epistemological 
position as she perceives post-qualitative inquiries as challenging her mind, but not 
engaging her body (p. 754). But thinking with extended minds or new materialisms, for 
example, flips this understanding around to encompass a mental wideware of the 
environment (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), highlighting Spinoza’s point of the mind as an 
idea of the body (Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012). Therefore, I would counter Greene’s 
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stance with an affirmation that post-qualitative inquiries are more like a transgressive, 
diffractive and ethico-political advance out of the non-physical mind and into a physical 
world other than merely human. This physical world involves intra-acting with other 
materials. ‘Different sensor modalities have different sizes. Furthermore, due to the use 
of devices and tools, we can artificially modify the size of our conscious experience’ 
(Manzotti, 2008, n. p.). Therefore, the devices and tools of the research process itself 
become our extended selves.  
 
If the measurement intra-action plays a constitutive role in what is 
measured, then it matters how something is explored. In fact, this is born 
out empirically in experiments with matter (and energy): when electrons (or 
light) are measured using one kind of apparatus, they are waves; if they are 
measured in a complementary way, they are particles. Notice that what 
we’re talking about here is not simply some object reacting differently to 
different probings but being differently. What is at issue is the very nature 
of nature. (Barad, 2012a, pp. 6-7) 
 
For me, good research would involve attending to that imperceptible point that we can’t 
quite focus on; we know it’s there because we can see it momentarily, fleetingly, 
peripherally out of the corner of our vision but when we move to view it full on, fovially, 
it disappears and we soon forget about it. As soon as we try to put it into words, it 
changes its physicality and morphs into something new, something mythological. 
 
If we cease to privilege knowing over being; if we refuse positivist and 
phenomenological assumptions about the nature of lived experience and the 
world; if we give up representational and binary logics; if we see language, 
the human, and the material not as separate entities mixed together but as 
completely imbricated “on the surface”– if we do all that and the “more” it 
will open up – will qualitative inquiry as we know it be possible? Perhaps 
not. (Lather & St. Pierre, 2013, pp. 629-630) 
 
Scene three: The death of the author  
 
150 
 
‘Nomads are always in the middle . . . Nomads have no history, they only have 
geography.’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. 31) 
 
For the reader, appearances can be deceptive, for the author ‘appears’ without a history, 
yet history has written ‘through’ the author. The agent does not write the document 
alone. Nor does a structure (societal, psychological, political, etc.) determine the 
agential intent alone. But moving forward from Deleuze’s (1995) comment that we 
always write ‘with someone else you can’t always name’ (p. 141), I will assert that 
writing is an act (act one) that is co-produced by many 
‘things’/events/phenomena/materials/processes; the writer, other people, events, the 
pen, the paper, the temperature of the room (at the time of writing as well as at the time 
that the writer was (re)membering), the computer, the keyboard, the walls, the 
background noises, the flow of blood around the writers body, the flow (or lack of) of 
air in the environment at the time of writing (and at the time of (re)membering), the 
chair, the toothache, the indigestion, the elation of a certain memory, the odour of 
perfume, the feel of plastic, plastic, and even the reader. In a similar way, reading is 
also an act (act two) that is co-produced by many ‘things’.  
William Faulkner’s (1936) American civil war novel, Absalom, Absalom, 
highlighted and played with the idea of multiple viewpoints/narratives that are 
constantly revised through time and are not necessarily sequential so that one truthful 
historical objective account is thus rendered irrecoverable. The implication here is that 
although re-constructions of the past are irretrievable and inventive as ‘no one 
individual can look at truth’, Faulkner suggests there is ‘a’ truth and a reader can 
ultimately know it (Hobson, 2003, p. 290). Thus, in one sense the author dies and the 
reader is born (although the author is still alive in another sense as they (literally) merge 
with the reader). For me, this novel speaks volumes regarding a critique of almost all 
research paradigms. Thus, ‘the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the 
Author’ (Barthes, 1977, pp. 147-148). 
 
Scene four: The birth of post-qualitative co-operative action (re)search  
 
Looking back now, I know that I read Deleuze so early in my doctoral 
program that the ontology of humanist qualitative methodology could never 
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make sense. For me and others like me, that methodology was ruined from 
the start, though we didn’t quite know it at the time. (St. Pierre, 2014, p. 3) 
 
Although I came to co-operative action research before I stumbled upon post-qualitative 
inquiry (non)methods, I found that they merged together rather well, once I decided to 
throw the methodological, cyclical and reflective co-operative action research rule book 
out of the window and began to work a little more intuitively, diffractively and 
rhizomatically.  
The original aims of the co-operative action research inquiry were to gain insight 
into how perceptions of environments may influence health and well-being and to 
explore an alternative to mainstream approaches to understanding therapeutic landscape 
research and practice. The intention was to inform health professionals on the nature of 
effective interventions in a variety of environments and to help co-participants gain a 
deeper insight into how the concept of health and wellbeing is understood when it is 
thought of as ‘distributed’ in the environment. I realised that ‘the researcher’ could 
never position themselves outside of the research and so becoming a co-participant 
seemed like the obvious choice to make, just as the volunteers became co-(re)searchers. 
I began: “This is an intersubjective/interobjective inquiry, within and of 
organisms-environments in order to explore how perceptions of environments influence 
health and well-being (well-becoming)!” I needed a method that suited the 
intersubjective/interobjective nature and emergent process of exploratory experiential 
investigation. I also wanted it to be transformative to help inform participants of the 
most suitable actions to take (for themselves) considering their engagements with 
environments (whether assumed to be ‘restorative’ or not). The most obvious direction 
to take at the time was the Action Turn. 
Reason and Torbert (2001) state that the purpose of the Action Turn in action 
research is, ‘to forge a more direct link between intellectual knowledge and moment-
to-moment personal and social action, so that inquiry contributes directly to the 
flourishing of human persons, their communities, and the ecosystems of which they are 
part’ (p. 4-5). This model cycles between action and reflection (Transfer 15).   
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Transfer 15: Simple Action Research Model (Retrieved from: MacIsaac, 1995) 
 
Heron and Reason (2001) took action research down a more participatory path 
with their ‘co-operative inquiry’ (see p. 180 for a detailed description), that is conducted 
with rather than on or for other people. This ethic seemed to sit better with me than Kurt 
Lewin’s (1946) original action research structure, even though there were/are still 
evident issues of facilitative power relations between academic researchers and non-
academic co-researchers (discussed later). This approach was also more fitting with 
relation to complexity theory (Reason & Goodwin, 1999), which appears throughout 
more recent and relevant work regarding Deleuzian inspired psychoanalytic research 
(for example, see Dodds, 2011) as well as therapeutic landscapes research with a 
relational focus on place and complexity (for example, see Cummins, Curtis, Diez-
Roux & Macintyre, 2007, for an overview of this literature). 
 
Initial transgressions 
 
I initially intended to follow the inquiry skills and validity guidelines as suggested 
in Heron and Reason’s (2001) The Practice of Co-Operative Inquiry (p.184) in order to 
ensure authenticity during the research. I applied a Dionysian and informative inquiry 
structure to my co-operative action research and asked ‘critical friends’ to help with 
managing divergence and convergence within and between cycles, balancing reflection 
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and action, challenging uncritical subjectivity and intersubjectivity, managing unaware 
projections (and displaced anxiety), maintaining/making clear my different roles (as 
researcher and facilitator) and resolving any conflicts that might arise between them 
(Heron & Reason, 2001). I attempted not to ‘set up’ the inquiry but to ‘facilitate its 
emergence’ (Reason & Goodwin, 1999). However, I found this to be increasingly 
problematic as I progressed. There were a few reasons for this. The first was the obvious 
inaccessible language I was tracing from this template. In the first meeting (02-05-13), 
I witnessed stunned faces as I reeled off the methodological instructions. I think this put 
a few people off. The only reason I imagine many of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers 
stayed with the project was due to this quote from Heron and Reason (2001) owing to 
its inspiring and empowering co-operative approach: 
 
We believe that good research is research conducted with people rather than 
on people. We believe that ordinary people are quite capable of developing 
their own ideas and can work together in a co-operative inquiry group to see 
if these ideas make sense of their world and work in practice. (p. 179) 
 
Of course it’s never entirely with people. There are issues of facilitative power that 
cannot simply be ignored or placed under erasure (as in the ‘bracketing’ method of 
phenomenology or IPA80). Although collaborative action research attempts to disrupt 
this power imbalance by sharing the research, it may still subject the co-participants/co-
(re)searchers to the ‘us-and-them’ binary in a multitude of ways. For example, in my 
research I held power through material legitimacy (minibus, cameras, laptop) and social 
hierarchy through my words (at first, the academic inaccessibility of the language of 
co-operative action research that I spoke to them and secondly by the fact that it is ‘me’ 
writing it up as academic journal articles, ‘me’ who gets the funding to go to 
epistemologically inaccessible conferences and by the very fact that it was I who 
introduced the research to them). This does not mean that they did not hold power over 
                                                          
80 Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) was the method I had originally used 
in my practice inquiry (see Mcphie, 2015a). This was useful as I learned a great deal 
about the futility of attempting to be objective in research and naively imagining that 
the meanings I had gathered through my coded interpretations were perhaps more 
trustworthy or rigorous that ignoring the rules of chopping and hierarchizing and just 
‘going with the flow’. 
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me also. However, it is a different form of power, one that may not repress me in the 
same way that repression exists for some of the co-participants.  
In critiquing Foucault and Deleuze, Spivak writes that Foucault’s followers 
follow him, ‘[b]ecause of the power of the word ‘power’…’ (Spivak, 1988, p. 69), 
something which she accuses him of not attending to (even though the same could easily 
be said about Spivak, especially regarding her appropriation of the plight of the Dalit 
caste in India). Members of the WiC group may have no access to the cultural 
imperialism of much of modern English society. But by saying a words name (Spivak’s 
‘subaltern’, Foucault’s ‘power’ or Freire’s ‘oppressed’), it gives it power and with that 
power, to misquote Spiderman (or even Winston Churchill), comes great responsibility! 
By placing a person in such a group, by calling them subaltern, oppressed, 
disempowered, it can suppress or increase their power, yet in very different ways. For 
example, I initially attempted to explain and interpret Blondie’s tattoo but found her 
voice missing from the interpretation (see assemblage 2). So my story is weighed down 
by my historiography and as such may well rob Blondie’s own voice and treat her as 
dispossessed. Fortunately, due to the nature of the co-operative method of inquiry (I 
constantly reinforced my assumptions by discussing them with the co-participants/co-
(re)searchers) as well as highlighting this power (and not bracketing it), it helped me to 
notice when I slipped into this role more easily. It helped me to be reflexive with my 
own academic performance, but I needed to become much more diffractive if I was to 
attempt transgression. 
 
Transgressive diffractions 
 
A representational issue with the action-reflection model (Transfer 15) is the 
fallacy of the ‘intermediate entity’ (Manzotti, 2010) within the ‘distinct person’ that we 
imagine we experience life through as opposed to experiencing life directly (as a 
haecceity). Haraway (1997) problematized reflexivity in a similar fashion: 
 
Reflexivity has been recommended as a critical practice, but my suspicion 
is that reflexivity, like reflection, only displaces the same elsewhere, setting 
up worries about copy and original and the search for the authentic and 
really real (p. 16). 
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Haraway clarifies that reflexivity ‘reproduces a situation that automatically seeks one 
dominant perspective’ and ‘this reflection or displacement of the same hides the 
interests and position of the viewer behind a veil of objectivity’ (Busch, 2015, n.p.). As 
suitable alternatives, Donna Haraway (1997, 2000) suggests ‘diffraction’ and 
‘interference’ rather than reflection or reflexivity: 
 
Diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, 
reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not 
about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions do not displace the same 
elsewhere […] Rather, diffraction can be a metaphor for another kind of 
critical consciousness, […] one committed to making a difference and not 
to repeating the Sacred Image of Same. (Haraway, 1997, p. 273). 
 
Although both are accepted as optical phenomena, Karen Barad (2007) also prefers 
diffraction over reflection as it is ‘marked by patterns of difference’ rather than 
reflecting ‘the themes of mirroring and sameness’ and it attends and responds to ‘the 
details and specificities of relations of difference and how they matter’ (p. 71). Both 
Haraway (1997, 2000) and Barad (2007) point out that thinking with a diffraction 
pattern is not an attempt to map the appearance of differences but rather the effects of 
where differences appear.  
I prefer the concept ‘transgression’81! Similar to diffraction, this practice 
disturbs historicity rather than follows history, inscribes mapping rather than traces 
copies, produces rather than represents, generates variance rather than shadows 
replication and creates rather than interprets. ‘We push the edges of academic 
acceptability not because we want to be accepted within the academy but in order to 
transform it.’ (Brown & Strega, 2005, p. 2). I accept Foucault and Deleuze’s critique of 
the ‘transgressive subject’ as holding the potential to be reactive rather than creative 
(MacCormack, 2009, p. 138) but the difference (that makes a difference) is how 
transgression works for ‘me’ (differently). I conceive transgression as providing more 
                                                          
81 Transgression is an act that disrupts traditional codes of conduct and overlaps 
boundaries uncomformably. St. Pierre (1997) has previously used ‘transgressive data’ 
(emotional, dream, sensual and response data) to ‘shift the epistemologies that define 
the possibilities of qualitative research’ (St. Pierre, 1997, p. 175) and Eagleton (1981) 
highlighted its radical potential to counter, criticise, disrupt and denaturalise the 
existing social order (cited in O’Neill & Seal, 2012). 
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of an anarchic political push on the road to ‘becoming an anti-oppressive researcher’ 
(Potts & Brown, 2005, pp. 255- 286) than the more erudite diffraction. So, perhaps a 
continuous attempt to think with them both may produce affirmative rather than reactive 
disruptions. Either way, I’ll continue to let it stew and see what happens whilst keeping 
a close eye on what it might do. 
Thinking with diffractive methodologies (see van der Tuin, 2014) and 
transgressive (post-structural) methodologies (see Brown & Strega, 2005; Strega, 2005; 
St. Pierre, 1997), my inquiry attempts to disruptively map ‘the relationship between 
discursive practices and the material world’ (Barad, 2007, p. 94). Barad’s agential 
realism, Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, Bennett’s vital materiality, Thrift’s non-
representational theory all support diffractive or transgressive analytical techniques and 
have all influenced my thinking to some extent during this inquiry process82. 
I also diverted from the recommended practice of co-operative inquiry due to 
the ill-fitting concepts of validity, authenticity, cyclical reflections, interpretations, 
analysis and theming/categorizing of the data within the project. None of this language 
seemed to ‘fit’. Whenever I started to use any of these concepts, I became increasingly 
uncomfortable with their implications concerning what they did to the inquiry itself: 
tracing well-worn Occidental traditions in research, chopping, chunking, hierarchizing, 
giving them ‘what they ask for’ (Honan & Bright, 2016, p. 7) and sucking up to the 
esteemed concept of rigour that Leonardo imagined would find a truth that surpassed 
other truths.  
 
Letting go of the ‘I’ 
 
Eventually, I found myself letting go of that academic tension. I relaxed, 
limbered up, threw away my parachute and (in the tradition of psychogeography) let the 
empirical materials take me for a walk. 
 
 ‘In short, we will all begin to create stories’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 153). 
 
                                                          
82 Although Barad’s and Deleuze’s ontologies have been criticised as being 
incompatible and incommensurable due to fundamental differences between 
Deleuze’s immanent and Barad’s transcendent thinking (see Hein, 2015), I find them 
both extremely useful in their performativity.  
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St. Pierre (2011) tells us that even the post-structuralists would find it difficult to take 
the ‘I’ out of the research. But in post-structural accounts, ‘the participants are not an 
“epistemological dead-end” (Sommer, 1994, p. 532)—an object of knowledge—but 
rather a line of flight that takes us elsewhere-participants as provocateurs’ (St. Pierre, 
2011, p. 620). In this type of (re)search, each (re)searcher will undoubteldly create their 
own ‘remix, mash-up, assemblage, a becoming of inquiry that is not a priori, inevitable, 
necessary, stable, or repeatable but is, rather, created spontaneously in the middle of the 
task at hand, which is always already and, and, and….’ (St. Pierre, 2011, p. 620). 
Elizabeth St. Pierre (2011) believes that ‘this has always been the case but that 
researchers have been trained to believe in and thus are constrained by the pre-given 
concepts/categories of the invented but normalized structure of “qualitative 
methodology”, its “designs” and “methods”, that are as positivist as they are 
interpretive, often more so’ (p. 620). This is how I came to rhizoanalysis…created 
spontaneously in the middle of my research! I hadn’t ‘planned’ it beforehand; I hadn’t 
prepared it so that the research would take this path. I simply couldn’t find a suitable 
method of ‘analysis’ until ‘it’ came to me as I came to it simultaneously. This was a 
reciprocal affair. 
 
Interméde: A Snippit from Monica Waterhouse’s PhD 
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Snippit 6: Affect and Intuition 
 
Scene five: Rhizoanalysis: A (non)method83 for analysing the empirical materials 
 
Interméde: A topological Syuzhet 
 
Rhizoanalysis is explained in my published paper written with my friend Dave 
Clarke and as such I will only introduce it briefly here. However, I politely urge you to 
read the description (see Clarke & Mcphie, 2015, pp. 11-13) as an extended inorganic 
limb to this more intense thesis body that you are currently reading.  
                                                          
83 ‘I use the term ― (non)method because method could suggest a set of fixed 
procedures while the rhizome, on the contrary, is ―open and connectable in all its 
dimensions; … susceptible to constant modification (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, 
p. 12).’ (Waterhouse, 2011, p. 128) 
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Fabula 
  
As I became more interested in the nomadic tentacles of rhizomatic inquiry (in 
2013), I found other scholars who had also attempted similar transgressions away from 
re-search. ‘[W]e form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather our viruses cause us to form 
a rhizome with other animals.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 11). It is now a growing 
trend: 
 
What is rhizoanalysis? Rhizoanalysis is not a method; in other words, there 
is no one way to do rhizoanalysis. There are a number of approaches to 
rhizoanalysis in the literature (Clarke & McPhie, 2015; Cole, 2013; 
Dufresne, 2002; Fox & Alldred, 2015; Olsson, 2009; Sellers, 2013; 
Waterhouse, 2011). However, while there may be different approaches to 
rhizoanalysis, the ontology remains the same: subject decentered, 
immanence, and difference. (Masny, 2016, p. 4) 
 
Putting it more succinctly (although I recognise the dangers in doing that), and drawing 
from Deleuze and Guattari (2004), Waterhouse (2011) asks researchers to: 
 
• Produce knowledge as a creation rather than discover knowledge as an endpoint 
• Pose questions rather than make claims 
• Produce thinking rather than knowledge 
• Palpate rather than understand 
• Map (narrations) rather than trace (reality) 
• Create rather than represent or interpret 
 
A researcher could use vignettes, or in my case, ‘Snippets’, rather than categories 
so that the data are contextualised as opposed to coded and chunked84 through a process 
of indoctrinated interpretation. Also, the analysis is ‘post-humanist’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 
2012) in that it doesn’t privilege the humanist self of the enlightenment project and as 
                                                          
84 Although vignettes and snippets are still guilty of chunking yet they perform in a 
very different way, especially if placed sous rature.   
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such we must acknowledge that we, as inquirers, are implicated and imbricated in the 
assemblage of the research itself, just as you are now. 
 
The map does not reproduce […] it constructs […] it fosters connections 
[…] The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is 
detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. […] It can be 
drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political 
action, or as meditation. […] A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to 
the tracing, which always comes back “to the same”. (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2004, pp. 13-14) 
 
Thinking rhizomatically about action research 
 
‘If you know exactly what you are going to do, what is the point in doing it? (Picasso, 
undated)’ (cited in Amorim & Ryan, 2005, p. 589) 
 
In their pedagogical study, Deleuze, Action Research and Rhizomatic Growth, Amorim 
and Ryan (2005) disrupted the field of traditional action research, ‘imagining a new 
epistemology (in which the concepts work rather than represent) and how the rhizome 
demands experimental forms of writing ourselves in action research’ (p. 588). They 
(2005) concentrated on a teacher, ‘Lucy, an allegedly weak evaluator, identifying the 
growth in the children in a range of ways, more rhizomatic than linear’ (p. 591) to reveal 
‘[a] new cartography for action research, a new way of constructing space […] that is 
nomadic in quality, unlike the striated space of action research cycles that is ‘coded, 
defined, bounded and limited.’ (p. 588).  
In contrast to the control and power that was co-created within the masculinised 
chair-teacher assemblage in Taylor’s (2013b) observations, Amorim and Ryan (2005) 
found that through a ‘process of interactions, between teacher, birds, pupils, materials’, 
Lucy was ‘skilled in the cultivation of rhizomes’, who charted ‘lines of flight’ and 
allowed escape ‘for all involved’ (p. 591).  
 
While she accepted the striated judgements of the academy, Lucy had also 
devised for herself and her pupils a better way, by occupying smooth space, 
charting her own territories, identifying her own lines of flight, in her 
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actions and her writing. In this way, she offers up similar possibilities for 
her pupils, for us as learners and, for the communities of action research: a 
richer possibility; a future growing at the edges; a richer way to view action 
research […] it is possible to resist forces and create the smooth space. 
(Amorim & Ryan, 2005, p. 591) 
 
Ken Gale (2014) also engaged with a Deleuzian pedagogy in his ‘reworking of the 
theory and practice of action research’ that challenged ‘antecedent positions’ and helped 
generate ‘a more plural, reflexive and methodologically relevant pedagogy/research 
praxis.’ (Gale, 2014, p. 667). In these examples, Deleuzian rhizomes and assemblages 
were employed to think with and possess powers of deterritorialisation (Amorim & 
Ryan, 2005). 
 
Thinking rhizomatically about co-operative action research 
 
How does an inquirer think rhizomatically about co-operative action research? 
This was a challenge, when it came to me, because of all the inequities already inherent 
in the academic research machine. Co-operative action research was always inherently 
striated due to the oppressive forces of academia, evident in epistemological and socio-
economic access issues I came across ranging from conferences to publications. During 
the inquiry process, I always had in the back of my mind, the ghostly echo of ‘research 
with, rather than on, people’. How could they possibly be an equal partner in this 
hierarchical process? I put this to the WiC group and the resounding response was, ‘you 
get what you want from this and we get what we want’ (Dolly). Okay, this made sense, 
to a certain degree85, but how could I reveal ‘their’ voices without subjecting them to 
my own interpretations and supposed representations? How could I present the point 
that this was not the truth, a re-presentation or even re-search without contracting 
interpretosis or RigourMortis? My way out was to place the entire PhD under erasure, 
not by placing a line through it, as that would make it a little too difficult to consume, 
but by constructing the skeletal structure of it as a play (hence acts and scenes) and 
adding another play within that play. This reasoning is fully discussed in the 
                                                          
85 I say ‘to a certain degree’ because, as Berlant points out, ‘[e]ven when you get what 
you want, you can’t have what you want’ (Berlant, 2011, p. 266, emphasis added). 
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‘Programme’ for the play, Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too: A Therapeutic Tale of Two 
Cities, which is provided for you as a complimentary play script alongside this PhD. ‘A 
rhizome can take the most diverse forms: from splitting and spreading in all directions 
on the surface to the form of bulbs and tubers.’ (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p.6). 
The Brechtian play, is such a tuber. It is one of many assemblages, albeit an extravagant 
one. 
 
Scene six: Rhizomatic assemblages86 
 
What is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity which is made up of many 
heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations between 
them, across ages, sexes and reigns‐different natures. Thus, the 
assemblage’s only unity is that of co‐functioning (Deleuze & Parnet, 2002, 
p. 69) 
 
Assemblages are ‘a temporary grouping of relations’, lines of becoming that are ‘always 
in process, changing, moving’ (Coleman & Ringrose, 2013, p. 9) and underscore 
emergence, multiplicity, indeterminacy, heterogeneity (Anderson & Mcfarlane, 2011) 
and immanence. Assemblages blur spatio-temporal binary divisions of structure-
agency, organic-inorganic, artificial-natural, social-material, human-nonhuman, in-out 
and near-far (Anderson & Mcfarlane, 2011; DeLanda 2006). Anderson and Mcfarlane 
(2011) state ‘we could understand the contemporary enthusiasm for assemblage theory 
as a response to ambivalence toward the a priori reduction of social-spatial relations and 
processes to any ﬁxed form or set of ﬁxed forms’ (p. 124), including a move from the 
linguistic turn. 
 
There are also important non‐linguistic practices that make up society, as 
well as of course non‐human elements that also shape society (viruses, 
bacteria, weeds or non‐organic energy and material flows like wind and 
                                                          
86 ‘‘Assemblage’ is a somewhat uncomfortable translation of the original French 
agencement, which has the sense of ‘fitting out’ (Phillips 2006: 108) or of creating a 
collage of different elements.  Both these aspects of agencement emphasise the act of 
making connections between disparate components.’ (Fox, 2011, p. 374) 
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ocean currents). In this model language itself becomes just another 
component part of a much larger system. (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 13) 
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage is ‘an intensive network or rhizome 
displaying ‘consistancy’ or emergent effects by tapping into the ability of the self-
ordering forces of heterogeneous material to mesh together (‘entrainment’ in 
complexity theory terms), as in the ‘man-horse-bow assemblage of the nomads’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987 [1980], p. 404, cited in Bonta & Protevi, 2004, p. 54). This 
man-horse-bow assemblage has many similarities with Gregory Bateson’s (2000) 
example of the blind man-stick-street87 (assemblage), as well as externalist examples 
such as, Malafouris’ (2008) potter-clay-wheel (assemblage) or Manzotti’s (2011c, p. 
28) pencil-paper-mathematician (assemblage) and also animist examples such as, the 
Koyukon of Alaska’s name for the boreal owl, ‘perches in the lower part of spruce trees’ 
(Ingold, 2011, p. 169), which is an assemblage of (verbal) action-plus-environment—
what Deleuze might call a haecceity of singularisation—rather than a static noun as 
subjective essentialised individuation. Before discussing these multiple assemblages in 
more depth, it is perhaps wise to explain what they are not. 
 
Assemblages are not ‘parts’ or ‘wholes’. 
 
A rhizome is an underground root system, a dynamic, open, decentralized 
network that branches out to all sides unpredictably and horizontally. A 
view of the whole is therefore impossible. […] With the principle of 
multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the existence of a multiplicity 
that does not get reduced to a whole on subject or object level but rather 
only consists of definitions or dimensions. (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 
2008, p. 6) 
 
Assemblages reconceptualise the Aristotelian whole-part relation. ‘No individual level 
of instance of the assemblage, whether individual, group, network, region, space, or 
                                                          
87 ‘If what you are trying to explain is a given piece of behavior, such as the 
locomotion of the blind man, then for this purpose, you will need the street, the stick, 
the man, the street, the stick, and so on, round and round.’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 459). 
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organisational entity, can be reduced to the sum of its parts’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 
2015, p. 6). 
 
[A]ssemblages should not be understood as a composite of forces that may 
somehow be disassembled to reveal each constituent element. On the 
contrary, assemblages are “intensive multiplicities” whereby each 
assembled element is transformed in its relations with other elements such 
that it no longer makes sense to speak of constituent parts (Deleuze & 
Parnet, 1987, p. 132). (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, pp. 4-5) 
 
Assemblages are the mutually constitutive becoming of intra-relations. They are never 
parts or wholes as that would still imply ‘carving nature at its joints’. Instead, we focus 
on the intra-relations between the joints (joints which are more like conjoining, flowing 
tributaries than fixed points). Although DeLanda’s (2006) assemblage theory indicates 
that entities are ‘wholes whose properties emerge from the interactions between parts’ 
(p. 5), the focus of assemblages is not on notions of stabilised wholes or parts (as points 
or nodes) but on the interactions themselves (even though this word is problematic due 
to the obvious dissection that ‘inter’ infers, hence Barad’s preference for ‘intra’). These 
intra-actions are more like lines than points and as such are irreducible to each other.  
For example, exploring Law and Hetherington’s (2000) point that ‘knowledge is 
a relational effect’ (p. 38, original emphasis), Camilla Hald’s (2011) study of criminal 
investigation in the Danish police used a theory of assemblages to conclude that 
epistemic webs do not emerge from a ‘weaver’, rather knowledge in this sense 
‘becomes’ and is co-produced (and not simply ‘by’ humans). ‘Thus ‘actors’ are treated 
in the sense of ‘assemblages’’ (Hald, 2011, p. 25). In A Voice without Organs: 
Interviewing in Posthumanist Research, Mazzei (2013) explains: 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, that kind of human being is an assemblage, an 
entanglement, a knot of forces and intensities that operate on a plane of 
immanence and that produce a voice that does not emanate from a singular 
subject but is produced […] in an enactment among researcher-data-
participants-theory-analysis. (p. 733) 
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As a consequence, ‘individuals may be regarded as assemblages of sub-personal 
components’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 5). Doolin, Lamprou, Mitev and 
McLeod (2014) propose that assemblages help ‘to conceptualize the contingent 
interactions of different components […] in a more continually dynamic perspective’ 
where the ‘constant dynamic interaction continuously shapes and re-shapes the […] 
structure’ and ‘allows for the possibility of open configuration, continuous connections, 
not in an inextricable combination of interrelated parts…’ (p. 97, emphasis added, sous 
rature added). And so assemblages are not ‘parts’ or ‘wholes’, they are the conjunctions 
between. They are intra-relations. In this way, the parts are conceived as fluid and intra-
relational rather than static and circumscribed. Assemblages also include materiality in 
their forces of encounter. They emphasise the interplay and importance of what Jane 
Bennett calls the thinginess of things. Therefore, working with assemblages in research 
processes (and with an emphasis on the research assemblage itself) ‘may allow for new 
ways of approaching unresolved problems in psychological inquiry, such as the realism-
constructivism impasse’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 3). Masny (2013, p. 341) 
states: 
 
An assemblage can be constituted by teachers, classmates, researcher, 
computers, classrooms, and more [sic]. The subject is in the assemblage no 
more, no less important than the other elements in the assemblage. The 
elements in the assemblage construct relationships to each other once they 
come together in the actual. There is no a priori or pre-given relationship 
among elements in the assemblage.  
 
‘Masny’s (2013) description of a rhizomatic map as an assemblage make the 
practicalities of engaging in rhizoanalysis more apparent’ as ‘any elements can be 
brought together’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 2015, p. 13). Anything and everything becomes 
empirical. Following Strom (2013), immanence is central to this approach and as such 
there is nothing in the data to be ‘found.’ Instead, ‘ﬁndings are produced through a 
mapping activity – drawing lines that connect the multiple acts, actions, activities, 
events, and artifacts that constitute the data-set’ (Martin & Kamberelis, 2013, p. 676, 
emphasis added). This way of working with the empirical materials ‘opens the 
researcher up to risk, embraces uncertainty, expresses something of the fragility of 
composition’ (Anderson & McFarlane, 2011, p. 126). ‘The assemblage thus articulates 
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the real in new ways, it tells a story in the manner after Ingold (2011), crossing the 
boundaries that classiﬁcation and categorisation create.’ (Clarke & Mcphie, 2015, p. 
13). What is produced are ‘new assemblages of desire, of machines, and of statements, 
that insert themselves into the old assemblages and break with them’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1986, p. 83, cited in Anderson & McFarlane, 2011, p. 126). What is described-
created (one move) is a story. 
So, what do these multiple assemblages look like and how might they be 
constructed? 
 
Assemblage/Externalism 
 
‘the mind as an assemblage means that relations between components of the mind are 
only contingent, not constitutive.’ (de Vega, n.d.b p. 11). Eva Perez de Vega (n.d.b) 
makes the link between assemblages and Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) Extended Mind 
Hypothesis (EMH) by asserting that: 
 
what they are claiming is consistent with the idea of a coupled system being 
an assemblage not a totality: it is a new emergent whole which cannot be 
reduced to the sum of its parts. In the same way that brain‐bound cognition 
cannot be reduced to the sum of all the different neural connections, the 
properties of the coupled system Otto+notebook cannot be reduced to the 
addition of the properties of the notebook and the properties of Otto. (pp. 
11-12).  
 
de Vega (n.d.b) believes the ‘mind‐as‐an‐assemblage model’, fits perfectly with Clark 
and Chalmers’ (1998) EMH as it ‘provides a way of understanding the complexity of 
the whole mind without reducing it to its micro‐level parts’ (p. 12). ‘Under this view 
cognition is a capacity, and as such is relational: it can affect and be affected by 
something external to itself.’ (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 12). de Vega (n.d.b) compared 
assemblage theory with connectionism and neural network theory88 to ‘conclude that 
what is important in a new conception of the mind is the connections between the parts, 
                                                          
88 ‘The central principle of connectionism is that mental phenomena can be described 
as emergent processes of interconnected networks made up of simple units. Neural 
networks are the most common model used to illustrate this.’ (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 16) 
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not the parts themselves.’ (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 16, emphasis added). Although the parts 
themselves are always already connections between. 
  
The new model of cognition as an assemblage is consistent with the 
extended mind  hypothesis […] In this model, the mind emerges from 
components characterized by relations of exteriority; where the whole is 
emergent and as such cannot be explained by looking at its component parts. 
(de Vega, n.d.b, p. 16) 
 
Assemblage/Animism 
 
Tim Ingold’s (1993) research into the Lapland Reindeer herders takes a similar 
divergence away from independent entities (parts) as objects or subjects that ‘interact’ 
and places the Reindeers within the same assemblage as the herder’s. In effect, they 
become ‘an’ assemblage of (at least) Reindeer-herders or herder-Reindeers. However, 
in his later work, Ingold (2013a) introduced the toggle as also playing an equal role in 
this assemblage. This ‘dance of animacy89’ is more ‘correspondance’ than ‘interaction’ 
(Ingold, 2013a, p. 101) as the latter would infer a network of nodes that represented 
linear connections as opposed to a meshwork of lines90 that intra-acted in an entangled 
choreography through time (Transfer 16). 
                                                          
89 Ingold advanced this concept from Pickering’s (2010) ‘Dance of Agency’, which 
Ingold sees as problematic because ‘how can air possibly be regarded as an agent?’ 
(Ingold, 2013a, p. 100). ‘The very idea of agency, as we have seen, is the corollary of 
a logic of embodiment, of closing things up in themselves. But air cannot be closed. 
More than any other element, as the philosopher Luce Irigaray reminds us, air is 
‘opening itself ’ (Irigaray 1999: 8). The flow of air – the wind (anemos), the breath of 
life – is the very antithesis of embodied agency. But if the air cannot be closed upon 
itself, then no more, as we have seen, can the organism–person that lives and breathes. 
Thus even if we allow that in flying a kite, the flyer dances with the air, it cannot be a 
dance of agency. It can only be a dance of animacy.’ (Ingold, 2013b, pp. 100-101). 
Similar to Morton abandoning ‘nature’, Ingold abandons ‘agency’. Personally, I think 
agency is a useful concept, as long as we enlist materiality into the assemblages of 
agential distribution and don’t reserve it purely for linear anthropocentric 
intentionality. Jane Bennett asserts, ‘There is no agency proper to assemblages, only 
the effervescence of the agency of individuals acting alone or in concert with each 
other’ (2010, p. 29, emphasis added). Again, I disagree, as there is no alone, only the 
concert. 
90 See Ingold’s (2011) ‘When SPIDER Meets ANT’ for an in-depth critique of 
Latour’s Actor Network Theory. 
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Transfer 16: ‘Interaction and correspondence’ (Redrawn after Ingold, 2013, p. 107) 
 
‘Humanity and nonhumanity have always performed an intricate dance with 
each other. There was never a time when human agency was anything other than an 
interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity; today this mingling has become 
harder to ignore.’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 31). 
 
Assemblages of Assemblages 
 
Pre Deleuze and Guattari, Allan Kaprow’s version of assemblages ‘used found 
material from the surrounding environment […] creating Environments and 
Happenings, the latter of which were described by Michael Kirby as ‘non-matrixed 
performances’’ (Kaprow, 1956, p. 269). The trend has grown. Research utilising 
assemblages include, ‘terrorist assemblages’ (Puar, 2007), ‘global assemblages’ (Ong 
& Collier, 2005), ‘political science assemblages’ (Buchanan & Thoburn, 2008), 
‘assemblage ethnographies’ (Gale & Wyatt, 2013), ‘sociological assemblages’ (Marcus 
& Saka, 2006) and perhaps more specific to this PhD, ‘assemblages and geography’ 
(Anderson, Kearnes, McFarlane, & Swanton, 2012) ‘urban assemblages’ (Farías & 
Bender, 2010), ‘assemblages of health’ (Duff, 2014), ‘ill-health assemblages’ (Fox, 
2011) and ‘agentic assemblages’ (Bennett, 2010).  
Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) anti-essentialist notion of assemblages ‘has 
inspired a number of new approaches to social science that emphasise heterogeneity, 
fluidity, and processes of becoming’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 5) as opposed 
to ‘taxonomic essentialism’ (for example, see Mcphie & Clarke, 2015, p. 236) which 
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reifies ‘the general categories produced by their classifications’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 26). 
‘Thus, in assemblage theory, analysis based on logical differentiation is replaced by 
analysis of the historical differentiation of entities.’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 
11).  
 
Assemblage/Ethnography 
 
Assemblages are composed of other assemblages and it is only a matter of 
‘plugging in and out’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004) that distinguishes which ones91 are in 
play at any time. With an exteriority of relations92, component parts of the assemblage 
can be detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which the 
interactions are different (DeLanda, 2006; de Vega, n.d.b; Price-Robertson & Duff, 
2015). Therefore, I myself am an assemblage already and when I write or think with 
another, I plug in to a different assemblage that has the capacity to affect (and be 
affected) in myriad other ways (for example, see Gale & Wyatt, 2009; 2010).  
Sermijn, Devlieger and Loots (2008, p. 7) state that the ‘traditional story’ has 
only one entry and exit point whereas ‘selfhood as a rhizomatic story’ has multiple 
entryways, which ‘lead to a temporary rendering of selfhood’, implying that the ‘fixed 
authentic, prediscursive self that exists independent of the speaking’ is illusory. 
Therefore, Gale and Wyatt’s (2010) escape from ‘incessant nouning’ in their 
assemblage ethnography makes sense as ‘[t]he self as a noun (stable and relatively 
fixed) is moved to the self as a verb, always in process, taking its shape in and through 
the speaking (Davies et al., 2004).’ (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 7). 
Can thinking with assemblages offer potential diffractions from the striated 
space of institutional regimes? There are some openings now starting to emerge. In the 
arena of (Western) assemblages of health and wellbeing, Duff, Fox and Wyatt are 
pioneering nomads, trying to create a smooth space from the striations of enlightenment 
chunking. Of course, Foucault, Guattari and Mol had already started the ontological 
project of deterritorialising the medicalised body, paving the way for others to re-
assemble the ‘body multiple’ (Mol, 2002).  
 
                                                          
91 Never one, always 1.032 or 0.389. 
92 ‘[R]elations of exteriority imply that the properties of the component parts can 
never explain the relations which constitute the whole.’  (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 10) 
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Assemblages of Health 
 
In his assemblages of health, Cameron Duff (2014) explores ‘the prospects and 
values of a posthuman account of health and illness, advocating the need for research 
innovation to be more alert to the multiple, overlapping and endemic imbrications of 
biology and technology, the human and the nonhuman in contemporary life.’ (p. 2). 
Using Deleuze’s concept of assemblages, he argues that mental health (and health in 
general) cannot be onto-episte-methodologically ‘distinguished from particular 
experiential, social, political, economic or cultural factors, processes or ‘determinants’.’ 
(Duff, 2014, p. 4). ‘In what Deleuze (1994) calls “actual” or “real experience”, 
biological, material, affective, social, semiotic, political and economic forces 
necessarily cohere in the articulation of an assemblage of health.’ (Duff, 2014, p. 4). 
Duff (2014) advocates the need for a minor science of health and illness that is 
‘concerned to trace the affects, relations and events of a body’s becomings, rather than 
the stable identities, the substances, laws and axioms, which stand as natural objects for 
all “royal sciences” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 364-369).’ (p. 6). 
Assemblages of health, ‘ventures to explain how health may be reframed in the 
absence of conventional ontological distinctions such as human/nonhuman, 
nature/culture and body/society’ (pp. ix-x) and asks what might health look like, ‘in the 
context of a posthuman, more-than-human, assemblage of spaces, forces and bodies.’ 
(Duff, 2014, p. x). He suggests that ‘recovery may be construed as a process of learning 
to manipulate the affects, signs, territories and events of one’s ‘becoming well’’: 
 
The always unﬁnished event of recovery links diverse human and 
nonhuman signs, bodies, territories and relations in the joint expression of 
an enhanced capacity to affect (and be affected by) other bodies. One of the 
most important of these capacities in the promotion of recovery from mental 
illness is the means of reterritorialising place in the expression of belonging 
to, or feeling included in, the socius (Protevi 2009: 33–42). (Duff, 2014, p. 
93) 
 
Duff (2014) elaborates that ‘this insight may inspire novel ways of understanding the 
role of social inclusion, place and community in promoting recovery from mental 
illness.’ (p. 93). 
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Rather than regard recovery as a process or phenomenon that happens to 
individuals living with mental health problems, I wish to reframe recovery 
in terms of the broad assemblages of health which sustain recovery in 
particular territories or milieus. This more ethological perspective suggests 
that recovery occurs in and among an assemblage of human and nonhuman 
forces, as that assemblage’s capacity to affect the varied forces it encounters 
grows or expands. It is, properly speaking, the assemblage which recovers, 
rather than individual bodies or forces within it. I would stress that the 
advantage of such a formulation lies in the attention it draws to the variety 
of nonhuman entities, forces, affects and relations active in any event of 
recovery. (Duff, 2014, p. 94) 
 
This minor science of becoming well holds much potential for co-generating lines 
of flight, especially when juxtaposed with assemblages of ill-health. 
 
Ill-Health Assemblages 
 
Nick Fox’s (2011) ill-health assemblage ‘comprises the networks of biological, 
psychological and sociocultural relations that surround bodies during ill-health’ and 
‘argues for health sociology to reject an organic body-with-organs as its unit of analysis 
of health and illness, and replace it with an approach to embodiment deriving from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology.’ (p. 359).  
 
Ill-health will tend to produce ‘sickening-bodies’, in which the capacities of 
the body will reflect differing patterns of biological and social engagements 
from that of a body in ‘health’.  However these capabilities will depend 
upon the assemblages that produce them. […] Ontologically, ill-health does 
not act on a prior body.  Rather the body (or BwO) emerges and is shaped 
by the ill-health assemblage.  Bodies are not the locus at which forces act, 
they are the production of the interactions of forces. (Fox, 2011, p. 368) 
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Following Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) rejection of the body with organs93, instead 
conceiving of the body without organs (BwO)94, Fox (2011) explains that health and 
illness assemblages are not properties of an ‘organic body’, ‘but emergent features of 
relationships between bodies and other elements (Buchanan 1997, Duff 2010, Fox 2002, 
Fox and Ward 2008a).’ (Fox, 2011, p. 361):  
 
For instance, there is an ‘eating assemblage’, comprising (in no particular 
order), at least:  mouth –food – energy – appetite; there is a working 
assemblage comprising, at least: body – task –money – career; a sexuality 
assemblage comprising, at least: sex organ - arousal – object of desire, a 
health-care assemblage comprising, at least: pathology - health professional 
–therapy and so forth. (p. 363)  
 
I wholeheartedly agree with Fox’s (2011, p. 373) geological statement that ‘ill-health 
and health are located beyond the physical body of biomedicine’ but not that they are 
located in a conceptual spatial realm that is ‘any less physical’ than ‘the body’. Because 
of this the biomedical model may also benefit from ecological studies, philosophy of 
mind, physics, art, etc. in order to release the restrictive notion that psychological, 
sociological or indeed conceptual phenomena that exist ‘outside’ the body are non-
physical. Externalism can certainly fill this conceptual gap. Although versions of 
externalism, such as, enactivism, embodied cognition and situated cognition reject the 
notion of internal representations, they do not claim that ‘all phenomenal content is the 
result of the interaction with environment’ (Manzotti, 2011c, p. 29, emphasis added) 
but the more radical versions of externalism (such as Honderich, 2004a, 2004b, 2006; 
Manzotti, 2006; Rockwell, 2005; Noë, 2009), to some degree, do. As I am putting 
forward the idea that ‘interaction with environment’ must be replaced with ‘intra-
action’ (Barad, 2007) or ‘correspondence’ (Ingold, 2013), for example, then ‘all’ 
phenomenal, cognitive and neural content must be a result of intra-actions of the 
                                                          
93  ‘The body-with-organs is the focus for economic and political activity, for the 
disciplines of modernity and for the stratification of society by gender, ethnicity and 
age.’ (Fox, 2011, n. p., emphasis added) 
94 ‘The body-without-organs emerges from a sea of relations that may be physical, 
psychological or cultural.  This approach decentres the biological aspects of 
embodiment, while retaining biology and physicality as a (necessary but not 
privileged) component of the body.’ (Fox, 2011, n. p., emphasis added) 
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environment, a dance of animacy. This isn’t just ‘leaking’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) in 
and out of a body as in and out become a porous non-divide. The ingenious phrase 
‘trans-cranial’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) also becomes trans-embodied/trans-enminded 
(or ‘trans-corporeal’ as Stacy Alaimo (2010) has put it) and necessarily processual and 
physical.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) ‘schizoanalysis’ (p. 273) ‘rejected the 
territorialisation of the BwO into the organism, arguing for a line of flight into a new 
embodiment’ (Fox, 2011, p. 372), whereas ‘Nomadology’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, 
p. 25) was their response to this as a ‘political strategy for living’, both of which suggest: 
 
an ontology in which the body is no longer individual and organic; in which 
health and ill-health are marked not by aspects of an individual body but by 
connectivities and relations between bodies, objects and ideas; in which 
healthcare is re-focused upon these nexi of relations (Fox, 2011, p. 372) 
 
But how might this new position for the assemblage play out in practice? How might 
therapists or counsellors ruminate with these ineffable articulations to become nomads 
of environ(mental) health? Fortunately, there are some examples of these ruminations 
as narratives deployed in academic contexts.  
 
Becoming-(non-)counsellor Assemblage 
 
Jonathan Wyatt’s (2013) autoethnography assemblage/ethnography of 
becoming-(non-)counsellor is a search for the plural ‘I’, a wrestle with the ‘I’ of 
subjective autoethnography to produce a ‘performative I’ (Jackson & Mazzei, 2008, p. 
314), ‘as he moves through and away from NHS procedural bureaucracy towards 
becoming a non-counsellor.’ (Grant, Short & Turner, 2013, p.13). 
 
The delightful, liberating poststructural view of the fragmented, de-centred 
subject has stuck like a boiled sweet in the throat of the reflexive writer and 
therapist. I sign up to Deleuzian conceptualisations of subjectivity whilst I 
continue to write, both alone and with others, in the first person. I write 
about ‘my’ experience while I purport to disrupt the unified subject. How 
can a poststructuralist writing about personal experience be anything but 
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ironic, and how can a therapist write about their clients ironically? It is ‘my’ 
body that sits – that sat – with clients and registered their rage and pain; 
‘my’ stomach that growled indelicately. The ‘I’ that will die and be mourned 
and missed (or not) is not just some postmodern blob of subjectivity; it has 
palpable edges, a perimeter of permeable skin within which this writing 
happens. (Wyatt, 2013, p. 132) 
 
This is the permeable skin of a haecceity, an extended, embodied and distributed self, 
an assemblage that plugs in and out (storying), unconsciously following the drive of 
least resistance, to form other temporal assemblages (re-storying).  
 
Moreover, in so far as the Cogito refers to a fractured I, an I split from end 
to end by the form of time which runs through it, it must be said that Ideas 
swarm in the fracture, constantly emerging on its edges, ceaselessly coming 
out and going back, being composed in a thousand different manners. 
(Deleuze, 2014, p. 225) 
 
Perhaps this is what’s needed, a non-therapy (rather than an ‘anti-therapy’) to place it 
under erasure, diffractively, without destroying it completely and denying its 
potentiality for creating lines of flight. Could we instead attend to the fracture, the 
ecotone, the conjunction, the and…and…and…? Sermijn, Devlieger and Loots (2008) 
see this type of rhizomatic writing as tackling the problem of subjectivity in reflexive 
research and writing: 
 
By considering selfhood as a rhizomatic story, researchers and participants 
are conceived as discursive processes, taking continuously their shapes in 
and through speaking and writing narratives about the narratives they have 
just told or written, always from the continuously changing perspective of 
narrating after the just told. In rhizomatic thinking and writing, a fixed or 
meta-linguistic subject is absent. The subject—whether participant or 
researcher—is continuously (re)born in the perspective of the narrating after 
the just narrated, always turning language back on itself in a horizontally 
moving way, that is characterized by multiple entryways, multiple 
connections and asignifying ruptures. (p. 17) 
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‘When one views selfhood as a rhizomatic story, as a researcher one knows that one is 
not presenting the participant’s true self but merely one of the many possible context-
bound, co-constructed presentations of the self.’ (Sermijn, Devlieger & Loots, 2008, p. 
14). It opens up multiple possibilities, lines of flight that explore what the body can do 
as opposed to what it ought to do, following an ethics of immanence rather than 
transcendence95. I imagine that the ‘I’ that Jonathan Wyatt had trouble leaving behind 
may be characterised by a move from what Deleuze calls a ‘principle of interiority’ to 
one of ‘exteriority’: 
 
According to the principle of interiority, while a component’s interactions 
may differ as it forms new relations, these interactions are determined by 
that component’s innate properties, whereas the principle of exteriority 
maintains that such interactions are a function of a component’s encounters 
or associations. Interactions and capacities are emergent properties of 
relations and associations between component parts, rather than mere 
expressions of their properties. In this way, assemblage theory is able to 
explain emergence without sacrificing the autonomy, or uniqueness, of 
discrete objects. (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, pp. 10-11). 
 
‘Thus the component parts of an assemblage are self‐subsistent and have a certain 
autonomy to form relations that can change.’ (de Vega, n.d.b, p. 10, emphasis added), 
not ought to change. So, the subject becomes undone, travels from interiority to 
exteriority and yet remains ethical in its new autonomy as a permeable, a-subjective, 
haecceitical singularisation.  
 
[T]he subject of this ethics has nothing to do with the individualism and 
self-possession of normative moral theories: instead, it is decisively 
posthuman. Such a subject can be defined, after Braidotti, as relational, 
“constituted in and by multiplicity”; it is a subject “that works across 
                                                          
95 ‘any place in the universe I temporally occupy, and from which I build, consume, 
love and destroy, is never originally and duly mine: I am just a wayfarer through 
mater’s planetary unfoldings and thickenings. There is therefore a story-telling aspect 
to ethics.’ (Zylinska, 2014, p. 93) 
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differences and is also internally differentiated, but still grounded and 
accountable” (2013: 49). (Zylinska, 2014, p. 99) 
 
Scene seven: Ethics? 
 
I suppose the ‘norm’ is to write about ethics as if it were a transcendent subject 
that I carefully attended to during my research involving ‘participants’. Yes, I applied 
to the university’s ethics panel to confirm that I was properly attending to norms of 
research, such as participant pseudonyms, protecting the vulnerable people from 
exposure to the potentially harmful effects of academic inquiry. Yes, I followed ‘the 
rules’. Yet, ethics becomes problematic when separated in this epistemological fashion. 
It is always already bound up in whatever projects we undertake at the ontological level. 
Karen Barad (2007) said as much, coining the term, ‘ethico-onto-epistemology’ (p. 381) 
in order to denote ‘the intertwining of ethics, knowing, and being’ (not necessarily in 
that order). 
 
Being is threaded through with mattering. Epistemology, ontology, and 
ethics are inseparable. Matters of fact, matters of concern, and matters of 
care are shot through with one another. Or to put it in yet another way: 
matter and meaning cannot be severed. […] Agential separability is not 
individuation. Ethics is therefore not about right responses to a radically 
exteriorized other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively 
relationalities of becoming, of which we are a part. […] This way of 
thinking ontology, epistemology, and ethics together makes for a world that 
is always already an ethical matter.’ (Barad, 2012b, p. 69, emphasis added) 
 
Apart from the ethics of the university ethics panel, there is an underlying ethical strand 
that is already woven into the PhD’s fabric from my childhood (and before) to now. For 
example: 
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Snippet 7: ‘I’m a boy, I’m a boy, but my mamma won’t admit it’. 
 
So, with that baggage ultimately sewn into my very core, I cannot help but let it 
gently seep into the very pores of this thesis. It is woven in to its performativity. The 
words ‘oppression’ and ‘resistance’ have been with my thoughts since I can remember. 
I imagine that’s the reason they appear as underlying concepts in this play/thesis. 
However, I have thought about ethics anew during this process and that too will now 
become woven in as a weft of immanence to the warp of transcendence that keeps trying 
to gain a stranglehold on the structure.  
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A move from morality to ethics 
 
Strictly speaking, we do not disapprove the action because it is vicious; 
instead, it is vicious because we disapprove it. Since morality is grounded 
in human sentiments, the normative question cannot be whether its dictates 
are true. Instead, it is whether we have reason to be glad that we have such 
sentiments, and to allow ourselves to be governed by them. (Korsgaard, 
1996, p. 50) 
 
The concept, ethics, seems at first transcendent, a cultural construction, especially when 
thought about as morality. But there is an immanence at play when thought about under 
a Deleuzian approach, ‘where ethics is no longer concerned with the formulation of 
norms or principles preceding situations that would allow us to judge those situations’ 
(Bryant, 2011, p. 30).  
 
It is quite likely that what we conventionally refer to as moral behavior—
actions that are compliant with a given group’s customs and social codes 
and that are aimed to produce beneficial outcomes for this group, on a 
material or spiritual level—is just a set of reactions to external and internal 
stimuli, reactions that then become a form of learned behavior and that, in 
the human language, get elevated to the status of “goodness”. It is primarily 
the linguistic labelling of certain types of behavior as “good”, “noble” and 
“honorable” that differentiates human acts towards other human and 
nonhuman entities and processes as “moral”. (Zylinska, 2014, pp. 91-92) 
 
Ethics ‘cannot be reduced to, or thought in terms of, any determinate, identifiable cause 
or condition.’ (Bell, 2011, p. 9) as ‘the abstract does not explain, but must itself be 
explained’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 2007, p. vii) and so by thinking an immanent ethics with 
Deleuze, ‘the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the 
conditions under which something new is produced (creativeness).’ (Deleuze & Parnet, 
2007, p. vii). ‘Rather than rushing to answer the question of what ethics is, or how we 
distinguish right from wrong, we should first ask the strange question of when ethical 
problematics arise.’ (Bryant, 2011, pp. 25-26). This temporal inquiry is a nomadic one 
as it keeps it always on the move. 
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Ethics of immanence? 
 
Ethics, which is to say, a typology of immanent modes of existence, replaces 
Morality, which always refers existence to transcendent values. Morality is 
the judgment of God, the system of Judgment. But Ethics overthrows the 
system of judgment. The opposition of values (Good–Evil) is supplanted by 
the qualitative difference of modes of existence (good–bad). (Deleuze, 
1988, p. 23) 
 
Deleuze picked up on Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s ethics of immanence—as a form of 
empowerment, not to judge but to act (Smith, 2011)—after being omitted from 
philosophy for some time. Although Deleuze does not directly discuss the concept of 
ethics in great depth, he eluded to it throughout his work as it was always entangled in 
his writing. For example, Foucault (1983) stated, ‘Anti-Oedipus […] is a book of ethics, 
the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time’ (xiii) as ‘for Deleuze, 
problems are not a psychological or epistemological category, but rather an ontological 
category’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 36). Therefore, for Deleuze, ethics is buried in his work at 
the ontological level. Deleuze posited that ethics need not be about what ought or must 
we do (questions of morality and the implementation of socially accepted rules and 
regulations) but rather what might, can or could we do, what are we capable of doing? 
(Braidotti & Dolphijn, 2015; Jun, 2011a; Smith, 2011). This is a change from a 
normative ethics of transcendence (one that precedes ontology, for example, as in 
Levinas’ (1969) thought96) to an ethics of immanence. Instead of ‘oughts’ and ‘shoulds’ 
(ethics of transcendence) we can ask, after Spinoza, ‘what can a body do?’ (ethics of 
immanence) in order to deal with the power relations that may govern our intra-actions 
(Braidotti & Dolphijn, 2015). ‘What an ethics of immanence will criticize, then, is 
anything that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting – and what 
separates us from our power of acting is, ultimately, the illusions of transcendence.’ 
                                                          
96 ‘Levinas’ ethics also does not go all the way in recognizing the mutual 
entanglement of “us” and “the world”: the boundaries of Levinas’ “other”, even if not 
fully knowable, are nevertheless transcendentally posited, rather than seen as 
immanent, as differentiation-from-within’ (Zylinska, 2014, pp. 94-95) 
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(Smith, 2011, p. 125). In this ethics of immanence, pluralistic evaluations and immanent 
modes of existence are prioritised over transcendent judgments (Smith, 2011). 
 
All being is immanent; there is no transcendence, thus there are no self-
contained identities outside the world (gods, values, subjectivities, etc.) that 
determine or constitute it (Deleuze 1983: 147). Furthermore, substance is at 
root a difference that exists virtually in the past and is actualized in various 
modes in the present. These modes are not stable identities but 
multiplicities, differences, complicated intersections of forces. As Daniel 
Smith notes: “There is no universal or transcendental subject, which could 
function as the bearer of universal human rights, but only variable and 
historically diverse ‘processes of subjectivation’” (Smith 2003: 307). (Jun, 
2011b, p. 93) 
 
If there was such a transcendental subject that functioned as the bearer of universal 
human rights (and there are many candidates), it might just appear in the form of 
Occidental hegemony or Faciality97 (see Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, pp. 185-211). 
‘Problems are not in the mind, but rather belong to the world.’ (Deleuze, 1994, p. 280, 
cited in Bryant, 2011, p. 36). 
 
From the viewpoint of immanence, in other words, transcendence, far from 
being our salvation, represents our slavery and impotence reduced to its 
lowest point: the demand to do the impossible is nothing other than the 
concept of impotence raised to infinity. […] How can people reach a point 
where they actually desire their servitude and slavery as if it were their 
salvation – for those in power have an obvious interest in separating us from 
our capacity to act? How can we desire to be separated from our power, 
from our capacity to act? (Smith, 2011, p. 126) 
 
‘Rather than judging acts, the question will be one of exploring the generative field in 
which acts are produced. And this is a painstaking and laborious task that requires 
                                                          
97 Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) concept of faciality highlights the imposition of 
significance and subjectification that the (European) white man’s promotion of (their 
version of) the ‘face’-typically derived from the image of Jesus Christ.    
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constant engagement with the milieu.’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 41). This is the question of 
ethics that is unearthed and exposed in sporadic pockets throughout this PhD. Just as 
Dolly didn’t ask for or want the protection (oppression?) of the boxing ethic that 
prevented her from competing professionally (see Assemblage Two/Mcphie, in press), 
many participants involved in research don’t really get to make that choice, even though 
it is sold as such. The transcendent ethic that was supposed to benefit ‘people like Dolly’ 
prevented Dolly’s more healthy desire lines from becoming realised. The same was true 
for Blondie regarding the estrangement from her daughter. Blondie has been forced to 
accept her impotence in this outcome, yet we, as a society, constantly (re)enforce these 
transcendent ethics98; we are complicit. In these examples and throughout these 
assemblages, taken as an assemblage in itself (the PhD assemblage and machine), it is 
almost clear that we desire our own repression by the very separations (of capacities to 
act and powers to change) that we instil in our society-natures.  
 
As Deleuze and Guattari write, following Reich: “The astonishing thing is 
not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but 
rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and 
all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983: 29). (Smith, 2011, p. 126) 
 
These ‘unconscious drives99’ that lead us toward certain actions vie with each other and 
often the one that wins is not to our benefit, not what we might call a healthy choice. 
The ingrained transcendent ontology of the enlightenment built the foundations of a 
particularly cruel palimpsest that governs almost everything that we think we are driven 
to do. ‘Even when you get what you want, you can't have what you want’ (Berlant, 
2011, p. 266). The OCD of Liverpool ONE (and the other POPS, popping up around 
the country) is a shining example of the desire for transcendence (see mental health 
Assemblage ONE). Its spectacle is the co-driver of your bus (another co-Author), where 
                                                          
98 Although, in many cases, these transcendent ethics may prevent certain atrocities in 
the short term. 
99 ‘It is not that I have a different perspective on the world than you; it is rather that 
each of us has multiple perspectives on the world because of the multiplicity of our 
drives – drives that are often contradictory among themselves.’ (Smith, 2011, p. 127) 
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transcendent separations are acted out in full view of the coarseness of its implications: 
hyper-consumers welcome, vagrants eliminated.  
 
Nomadic theory foregrounds the force of affirmation as the empowering 
mode for both critical theory and political praxis […] Each relation is 
therefore an ethical project indexed on affirmation and mutual specification, 
not on the dialectics of recognition and lack. (Braidotti, 2011, p. 3) 
 
Non-human Ethics? 
 
Price-Robertson and Duff (2015, p. 2) state that due to the ‘emphasis on the forces 
(or “stuff”) of the material world’ by the affective and material turns, they have had 
‘some influence among contemporary psychologists (see Brown & Stenner, 2009; Duff, 
2014; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Rose, 2007)’. This is a crucial point to make, 
especially in a philosophy where the subject is undone and what a body can do is opened 
up or restricted to the materiality of the topological environment at hand. We have to 
look to the physical processes that take place from the virtual to the actual. ‘Ethical 
theory has suffered tremendously as a result of treating ethics exclusively as the domain 
of the human divorced from all relations to the nonhuman.’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 28). For 
example, Latour (2005, p. 77) asks, ‘[w]ould I have become a couch potato, switching 
endlessly from channel to channel […] if I did not have a remote?’ (cited in Bryant, 
2011, p. 28). ‘The point here is not that the remote determines me to become a couch 
potato, but rather the far more disturbing consequence that we cannot firmly draw the 
distinction between actors (humans) and mere behaviors (objects).’ (Bryant, 2011, p. 
28). 
For Deleuze, ethics aren’t a set of pre-existing morals reserved purely for human 
quiddities, they lie in wait on a virtual plane. They are to come. Ought is replaced by 
can. The actual ethic is yet to be brought forth from the virtual possibilities which are 
not pre-ordained (as that is another type of ethics), they are made in the moment of the 
event. Each event is materially contextual to itself, so ethics must become anew as the 
event unfolds. If the actual ethics are traced or represented on mass, a transcendent 
normative ethic is born and thus, problems are likely to ensue.  
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Our human responsibility can therefore be described as a form of 
experiential, corporeal and affective “worlding” in which we produce 
(knowledge about) the world, seen as a set of relations and tasks. This may 
involve relating responsibly to other humans, but also to nonhuman beings 
and processes, including some extremely tiny and extremely complex or 
even abstract ones (microbes, clouds, climate, global warming). […] 
However, an act of taking responsibility is not just a passive reaction to pre-
existing reality: it involves actively making cuts into the ongoing unfolding 
of matter in order to stabilize it. Ethical de-cisions can thus be best 
understood as material in-cisions. (Zylinska, 2014, pp. 97-98) 
 
Ethics is always already immanent. How can it not be? As a rebuttal to Dawkins’ ‘selfish 
gene’, Timothy Morton posits that it is rather altruism that is hardwired into reality as 
‘we are made of others: we’ve literally got them under our skin’ (2010, p. 119, cited in 
Zylinska, 2014, p. 95). It is the concept of a transcendent ethics that is problematic (yet 
still immanent in its corporeality). But as we have discussed in (Intra-)Act 1, concepts 
are never passive, they perform. And as it seems to have become lodged within the 
ethico-onto-epistemological framework of the Western paradigm, we must find novel 
resources for dislodging it due to the oppression and repression it unleashes. But it’s 
difficult because this transcendent ethic is the ethic that we know. This thesis/play is 
saturated with it. It makes it strange to imagine an ethics that is not based on normative 
cultural constructions. So, we might say that we are still in Plato’s cave of transcendent 
ethics and simply need to escape to think from another plane, a flatter one, a flat 
ecological ontology. Yet, it’s not simple at all. The only way I can think of to do this is 
how I’ve tackled the problems of interpretation and anthropocentrism. By placing it 
sous rature, juxtaposing it, highlighting and exposing its weaknesses, turning it into a 
Brechtian play. Ethics may not be possible, at least in its current guise of morality, but 
the ‘attempt’ to dislodge it will do something, perhaps even enough to open new 
channels for lines of flight to take off. The attempt will be diffractive and transgressive. 
And so, with my ethics section suitably chunked, put in its proper place and now 
placed sous rature (well, what did you expect?), I imagine you’re wondering what we 
actually did?  
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Scene eight: ‘Method-Assemblage’100: Walking in Circles (WiC) 
 
 
Transfer 17: Walking in Circles (WiC). (Photo courtesy of Liz Mallabon) 
 
I undertook an initial study (what some might call a ‘pilot’) from June to July in 
2012 in order to gain a deeper understanding of any therapeutic benefits to perceived 
notions of ‘nature’ before undertaking the main inquiry (see Mcphie, 2015a for a full 
account of this study). Thus, my thinking was already tainted. Then, in 2013, I put up 
posters (Transfer 17) to recruit co-participants/co-(re)researchers from two already 
established therapeutic groups (a horticultural therapy community garden and an art 
therapy group) as well as two health clinics (an NHS health clinic and an 
alternative/natural health clinic), all based in Cumbria in order to get a range of diverse 
volunteers who may have been interested in this project as well as the practicality of the 
geographical proximity for me to travel to and from in the minibus. As you can tell, 
there are already provocateurs in the poster (picture and words chosen) and regarding 
the choice of location to place the posters. I wanted volunteers who wished to explore 
                                                          
100 A ‘method assemblage’ is an “adhoc contingency of a collage” (Law, 2004, p. 41). 
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how their perceptions of a variety of environments might alter or influence their moods, 
stress levels, mental health and wellbeing. 
A few people from the art therapy group and NHS clinic responded to the posters 
but none joined the group. After an initial meeting on 02-05-13, it turned out that seven 
respondents were from the horticultural therapy community garden and two responded 
from the alternative/natural health clinic. After the first few meetings and outings, the 
core group consisted of six co-participants/co-(re)searchers, myself and a critical friend 
(the prof.) who only came to the focus group meetings and eventually left half way 
through the year. The inquiry consisted of a series of trips to a variety of environments 
(almost one every month), democratically chosen by the WiC group, followed a couple 
of weeks later by focus group meetings, giving me enough time to layer and edit the 
empirical materials (dual video feedback, photos, journals, notes) so that we could 
analyse them together. We had initial meetings in May and June, 2013, followed by a 
series of outings and meetings once a month until it officially came to rest in June, 2014. 
During that time, we visited Langdale (17-06-13), Coniston (29-07-13), Liverpool (09-
09-13), Lancaster (14-10-13), Gummers How (25-11-13), Ulverston estuary (13-01-
14), Birkrigg (22-02-14), Rydal (14/04/14), Grange-Over-Sands (26/05/14), and 
Duddon Valley (30/06/14). A risk assessment was produced for each trip and a critical 
friend notified. I gave all the co-participants/co-(re)searchers journals and cameras to 
work with to record their experiences. 
I chose psychogeography as a suitable tool to walk with due to my fascination 
with it as a fun, politically transgressive lens to explore environmental intra-relations 
with. I also regularly employ psychogeography within many of my lessons for under 
and post-graduates reading outdoor studies and so it seemed like an obvious choice as 
a mobile method. I put this to the newly formed group and all agreed to its use. 
 
Scene nine: Psychogeography as a mobile method 
 
‘if there is no method, this is also a type of method for carrying out 
psychogeography’ (Richardson, 2015a, pp. 3-4) 
 
I won’t give a history of psychogeography as that’s already been done (see 
Merlin Coverley’s Psychogeography (2010) and Tina Richardson’s Walking Inside Out 
(2015a, pp. 1-30; 2015b, pp. 241-250)). Instead, I will discuss a few important 
186 
 
events/dates that glowed and have led to the reasons why psychogeography came to me 
over time.  
 
‘Walking is the best way to explore and exploit the city.’ (Sinclair, 1997, p. 4). 
 
1968 
 
We still consider May ’68 the moment at which transversal thinking, i.e. the 
kind of thinking that refuses to accept modern dualisms such as the subject-
object divide, was given a strong voice. The focus on difference, on 
emancipatory processes, on life, liberated a new materialism that needs to 
be mapped now more than ever. After all, the problems of the “now” are 
many: ranging from environmental crises to financial crises, from privacy 
issues to social movements such as the Arab revolutions or the Occupy 
movement, and perpetual war. (van der Tuin & Dolphijn, 2015, p. 25) 
 
It is perhaps best that I begin this brief discussion on psychogeography in 1968, as that 
was a momentous and radically era defining, paradigm shifting moment in Western 
thought. If a line were to be drawn (heaven forbid) between modernity and post-
modernity, it would be at that juncture in Paris (although it’s always changing, as is the 
nature of spatio-temporality).  
In Deleuze and Guattari’s view, ‘fascism did not disappear’ after the Second 
World War,  
 
even if the gas chambers did, it simply migrated to a deeper, and more 
recessed quarter of the psychosocial matrix of Western society. The 
flashpoint that brought this into focus for Deleuze and Guattari was May 
1968 because it marked the dawning of a new era (Buchanan 2008a: 7-12)’ 
(Buchanan, Matts & Tynan, 2015, pp. 7-8). 
 
‘May 1968 gave form to new institutions, to a new university structure, to a new 
political program, a new philosophy’ (Braidotti & Dolphijn, 2015, p. 14). There were 
many events that led up to the urban revolution in Paris that year, such as ‘worldwide 
challenges to capitalism, war, racism, patriarchy, imperialism, and the alienation of 
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modern urban life’ (Smith, 2003, p. vii) and the revolutionary spirit didn’t simply stay 
put in Paris, it quickly spread in a rhizomatic fashion to many other cities around the 
globe (Tokyo, Mexico City, Detroit, for example) who held political/social empathies. 
The general consensus is that it failed, as capitalism just grew stronger from the 
attempted coup. I, however, think the revolution succeeded. Think of all the intense 
scrutiny’s, deconstructions and intellectual/creative productions it influenced, including 
Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Butler, Haraway, Verso publications, and…and…and (the 
rhizomatic palimpsest that followed). These productions have, do and will influence as 
many transgressions as any of the major revolutions that have occurred previously. The 
ontological turn is indeed a revolution and is, as we speak, growing as fungal 
mycelium’s do. Henri Lefebvre’s Urban Revolution (1970/2003) was perhaps a 
testament to 1968 as he recorded the temporal and spatial activities that flowed through 
structural decision making in the urban organism of that era. Other political discussions 
and critique about urbanisation followed in similar fashion, such as de Certeau’s essay 
‘Walking in the City’ from The Practice of Everyday Life (1984), Davis’ City of Quartz 
(1990), Augé’s Non-Places (2009), Mitchell’s The Right to the City (2003), Edensor 
and Jayne’s (eds.) Urban Theory Beyond the West (2012), Harvey’s Rebel Cities (2012) 
and Amin and Thrift’s Cities: Reimagining the Urban (2002). 
For me, 1968 and the few years that followed were also a high point in the arts, 
especially film, theatre and music. I was born in 1971 and benefitted from the swell that 
was created during that small window of time, until Spielberg produced Jaws and 
Thatcher came to power. It was then only a matter of time before Hauntology101 became 
a possibility. We are now stuck in 1984. We are living in the dystopian future of the 
past 30 years. Orwell’s 1984 has already happened but we seem to have become numb 
to it, baffled by the shiny lights of neoliberal capitalism and its henchman, globalisation. 
Marc Auge’s Non-Places, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi’s After the Future, Patrick Keiller’s 
Robinson in Ruins and Mark Fisher’s Lost Futures all point to this. Fisher (2014) states, 
‘there’s an increasing sense that culture has lost the ability to grasp and articulate the 
present. Or could it be that, in one very important sense, there is no present to grasp and 
articulate any more.’ (p. 9). Fisher (2014) uses the example of genres in music to 
highlight the extent to which we have become stuck in the 1980’s and 90’s as no new 
                                                          
101 ‘Hauntology’ is a Derridean (1994) term denoting the lost futures of modernity 
(Fisher, 2014) and an ontological spatio-temporal disjunction: a time out of joint 
(Derrida, 1994). 
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genre has been realised since that time. I believe this is due to the suppression of the 
spirit of 1968. But an underground movement kept a thread of 1968 alive. That 
rhizomatic thread ran under the pavement, many of us didn’t notice it as it secretly 
weaved its way into the present, slowly picking up momentum until a tipping point was 
declared: we have reached the ontological turn and there’s no turning back.  
 
1967 
 
Guy Debord published Society of the Spectacle in 1967. Debord’s ‘Situationist’ 
movement was partly held as the intellectual catalyst for the uprising in 1968, along 
with many artists (such as director Jean-Luc Godard), who spurred the students on to 
attempt change (Anthony & Henry, 2005, p. 22).  
 
What the situationists had added to their tactics after the 1950s was a 
grammatically conscientious and elegant prose account of their 
foundational critique of social relations, the spectacle: a re-territorializing 
of capital in which ideology, in the Marxist sense of images and ideas in the 
last instance serving and reproducing the interests of a capital-owning class, 
became itself the very substance and mechanics of the production of surplus 
value. (Smith, 2009, p. 2) 
 
It was one of the first critiques of ‘advanced capitalism’ that suggested ‘the spectacle’ 
had replaced healthful social interaction, inducing further isolation and loneliness.  ‘The 
spectacle is the nightmare of imprisoned modern society which ultimately expresses 
nothing more than its desire to sleep. The spectacle is the guardian of that sleep.’ 
(Debord, 1983, para. 21). I believe Transfers 18-21 speak for themselves. 
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Transfers 18-21. Society of the Spectacle. Pictures from top left: A teacher 
cutting a square shaped bubble (SkittleBomb, 2013); X Factor Wiki (X Factor, 
2016102); Charles Graner and Sabrina Harman, happily posing with naked and 
hooded prisoners who were forced to form a human pyramid (Abu Ghraib, 
2006103); Society of the Spectacle (Black & Red, 1983104). 
 
1958 
 
In 1958, Guy Debord published, The theory of the dérivé in ‘Internationale 
Situationniste, 2’.  
 
The Situationists feared that cities were losing their unique character and 
human dimensions, and that human life was becoming increasingly 
commodified through urbanism, mass media and the modern structure of 
working life that divided an individual’s personality into polarised 
opposites of work and play. The Situationists’ dérivé (drift) – an 
                                                          
102 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
103 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
104 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
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unorganised and aimless yet significant walk – was central to their 
philosophy of using the city, and was a key influence on the 
psychogeographers of today.’ (Anthony & Henry, 2005, p. 21)  
 
For a fuller description of the dérivé, see Plant’s (1992) account of the Situationist 
International in a Postmodern Age, Tester’s (1987) The Flaneur, Careri’s (2002) 
Walkscapes, Sadler’s (1998) The Situationist City, Solnit’s (2000) Wanderlust, 
Coverley’s (2010) Psychogeography and Richardson’s (2015c) Walking Inside Out. 
 
1905 
 
According to evidence gathered by the ‘Fife Psychogeography Association’ 
(2014) (Transfer 22), J. Walter Fewkes, from the Bureau of American Ethnology, was 
the first to coin the term ‘psychogeography’ in 1905 as: ‘The science of 
anthropogeography, or more properly speaking, psychogeography, deals with the 
influence of geographical environment on the human mind.’  
 
 
Transfer 22: ‘The science of anthropogeography’ (Fife Psychogeography 
Association, 2014) 
 
1987 
 
This year is worth mentioning so as not to confuse you with Howard Stein’s 
version of psychogeography which is very different to Debord’s socio-political stance. 
Stein’s Freudian version in Maps from the Mind: Readings in Psychogeography (Stein 
& Niederland, 1987/1989), states that, ‘Psychogeography is the study of how issues, 
experiences, and processes that result from growing up in a human body are symbolized 
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and played out in the wider social and natural worlds’ (p. xvii) and takes a signifying 
psychoanalytic (and sometimes anthropological) perspective with which to interpret the 
world. As you can tell from my italics, it’s not the kind of psychogeography that appeals 
to me under my current influence of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis. 
 
2016 
 
According to Debord, psychogeography is, ‘the study of the specific effects of the 
geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions and behavior 
of individuals’ (Andreotti & Costa, 1996, p. 69). 
There is no one psychogeography but there is a general theme that runs through 
contemporary British psychogeographic practice, underlying its (non)structure: 
transgression. Mischief-making, disorientation, anarchic wayfaring, breaking habit, 
seeing the unseeable: ‘You don’t take a walk, the walk takes you’ (Hanson, 2004, p. 6). 
‘Psychogeography investigates the intersection of time and space, and hence attacks 
science at its point of weakness - the replicability of results. Psychogeography is the 
universalism of the specific, of the particular, i.e. at its point of dissolution.’ (Why 
Psychogeography, 2013).  
I see psychogeography as a playful, diffractive protest against what Deleuze and 
Guattari (2004) would call striated space, faciality and bodies with organs. It has an 
immense potential to create lines of flight away from the taboos and clinical pathology 
of mental ill-health. 
 
Walking involves the articulation of spaces and experiences through 
movement, escapism, and (dis)attention. […] Walking can constitute a 
physical grammar that stitches places in the city together. Journeys provide 
opportunities for experiencing particular spaces differently (Hodgetts et al. 
2010 p.288) 
 
Contemporary British psychogeography writing ranges from Papadimitriou’s (2012) 
Deep Topography; Bennett’s (2015) Legal Psychogeography; Garratt’s (2013) Urban 
Exploration; to Smith’s (2015) Mythogeography (coined from ‘a misremembering’ of 
‘psychogeography’ which later proved useful as Smith and colleagues ‘sought to 
distinguish [them]selves from certain hegemonic aspects of the SI’ (p. 166)) and Zombie 
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Walking, which are useful concepts to think-walk with as a fantastical/dystopian 
critique of hyperconsumption and the capitalist production of subjectivity. 
Within the rich and growing British psychogeography movement, Alexander John 
Bridger has suggested using ‘walking as a ‘Radicalized’ critical psychological method’ 
in his ‘review of academic, artistic and activist contributions to the study of social 
environments’ (2010, p. 131).  
 
The study of how walking can confer particular types of experiences and 
how it can be a political practice is a neglected site of study not only in 
psychology, but across academic disciplines such as human geography and 
cultural studies. (Bridger, 2010, p. 131) 
 
He argues ‘that disorientating walking practices can be used as a means to reflect on 
experiences of places in order to begin to think how social environments could be 
radically changed’ (Bridger, 2010, p. 131). He goes on to assert that, ‘psychogeographic 
practice can be used to extend qualitative epistemologies and methods to argue for a 
‘turn to place’ in psychology and to open up new methods and approaches in critical 
psychology’ in response to the ‘apathetic vision of radicalism and criticality’ which he 
contends is the ‘current status of critical psychology’ (Bridger, 2010, p. 131).  
However empowering psychogeography may be, it continues to explore the 
effects of the geographical environment→on→the→human→psyche. In this way, it 
may be branded as being slightly deterministic, linear and unidirectional. Conversely, 
‘schizocartography’, Tina Richardson (2015) explains,  
 
offers a method of cartography that questions dominant power structures 
and at the same time enables subjective voices to appear from underlying 
postmodern topography. Schizocartography is the process and output of a 
psychogeography of particular spaces that have been co-opted by various 
capitalist-oriented operations, routines or procedures. It attempts to reveal 
the aesthetic and ideological contradictions that appear in urban space while 
simultaneously reclaiming the subjectivity of individuals by enabling new 
modes of creative expression. Schizocartography challenges anti-
production, the homogenizing character of overriding forms that work 
towards silencing heterogeneous voices. (p. 182) 
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In this way, schizocartography offers a more multidirectional approach to topological 
mapping that includes a subject whilst at the same time still allowing for an acentering 
of the self. Richardson’s schizocartography adds more colour to Bridger’s ‘radical’ 
suggestions by including Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘schizoanalysis’105 into the 
fray, which was based on ‘neither triadic structures (such as Oedipal relations) nor 
dyadic ones (such as hierarchical binary oppositions)’; rather ‘it is concerned with ‘the 
other’ to dominant voices and explores the heterogeneity that is often sidelined in 
arrangements of hierarchical power.’ (Richardson, 2015, p. 183)  
Morag Rose’s Anarcho-Flaneuse (2015) is also worth a mention here due to the 
lines of flight she is currently creating. Rose was a founding member of the ‘Loiterers 
Resistance Movement’ (LRM) and describes her psychogeographic self thus: 
 
I am not a flâneur in the pure sense because a working-class, queer, disabled 
woman does not have the affordances of Benjamin’s privileged subject, but 
I have adopted some of his habits, perhaps because at the birth of the LRM 
I had read very few key texts and was unaware they were not designed for 
the likes of me. (Rose, 2015, p. 149). 
 
The LRM facilitate dérives using a variety of methods such as, ‘CCTV Bingo’, 
‘algorithmic walks’, ‘throwing dice’ and ‘transposing maps’, not to solve issues, but to 
‘ask questions and provoke debate’ as ‘[c]ontrasting issues of spatial justice are raised 
as we play together’ (Rose, 2015, p. 152). Morag has also attempted to ‘subvert heritage 
walks’ to ‘make clear that history is permeable, plural and open to contestation’, such 
as her ‘Manchester Modernist Heroines project’ which rose out of ‘frustration about the 
lack of women in public narratives of Manchester’ (Rose, 2015, p. 154).  
 
                                                          
105 The concept schizoanalysis ‘does not promote mental illness; rather, it is used as a 
way of offering up the possibility of multiple voices and alternative worldviews, 
among other factors.’ (Richardson, 2015, p. 192)  
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Transfer 23: ‘Psychogeographic Venn diagram’106 (2006) (Rose, 2015, p. 148). 
 
In all of this modern psychogeographic practice (including the more literary 
practices of Ian Sinclair (2002) or Patrick Keiller (2013), for example), there is an 
obvious anthropocentric strand107 that neglects a fruitful and arguably richer exploration 
of various environments by thinking with more current paradigm shifts to the 
ontological turn, such as a non-anthropocentric (posthuman), new materialist 
psychogeographic approach. What is needed is a ‘psychogeographical turn’, to quote 
Tina Richardson (2015), but not as a ‘gentle bend in the road’ (p. 245), rather as a 
transgressive diffraction at the ontological level. Perhaps if the human-urban 
assemblage were considered as a fungal mycelium (Transfer 24) as Ingold (2011) 
suggests, we might enter this rich meshwork more successfully. Similarly, we might 
think of ourselves as a haecceity or ‘line of becoming’, rather than, as Richardson 
suggests, a quiddity, to disrupt the anthropocentric notion of linear relationality between 
points (such as intentionality), what Marcus Doel (2000) calls ‘pointillism.’ 
 
                                                          
106 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
107 I.e. By presuming ‘social’ environments to be the sole domain of humans. 
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Transfer 24: ‘Mycelium [Processing]’108 (Alexander, 2010) 
 
There is a move on the horizon towards these lines of flight, as is evident in 
Cameron Duff’s work. 
 
Duff’s Ethological City 
 
In his ‘ethology of bodies, cities, affects, relations, encounters and events’, 
Cameron Duff (2013) examines a handstand against a wall in an urban environment and 
asks ‘[h]ow should the movements implicated in these bodies be identified and 
attributed?’: 
 
A handstand. In this handstand, there is the body, there is the city and there 
is (a) life (Deleuze 2001: 27–32). Yet, there is also a call to abandon the 
convenience of a subject and its objects; the familiar taxonomy of a body 
willing its movements in the midst of passive objects, surfaces and contexts. 
Such conventions inevitably ignore most of the bodies assembled in the 
event of the handstand (Bennett 2010: 4–6). So, how might the body- 
                                                          
108 Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
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becoming- city- becoming- body instantiated in this event be observed, 
theorised, cared for? (Duff, 2013, p. 215) 
 
These are the sorts of questions that are important to support a healthy community (of 
everything) are they not? So you can see the associations I place on these varieties of 
urban exploration/psychogeography as being ‘relevant’ and a ‘good fit’ to my own 
inquiry. Duff (2013) adds to this relevance, the association of Deleuze’s ethology to 
health and wellbeing: 
 
Applied to the study of the ‘modern’ city, Deleuze’s ethology highlights the 
body- becoming- city, becoming- place, becoming- collective characteristic 
of the everyday experience of urban life. This logic applies as much to the 
body of the (post)human subject as it does to the bodies (material, relational 
and affective) of the built environment (Dovey 2010). The quality of urban 
life, its concrete richness, is enhanced in the provision of new affective 
sensitivities and new relational capacities, which extend the spatial and 
temporal range of the body- becoming- city- becoming-subject (Awan et al. 
2011). Such an ethology has important implications for the ongoing 
development of a participatory architectural theory and practice, more alert 
to questions of sustainability, health, well- being and democracy in urban 
settings (Blundell- Jones et al. 2005; Brott 2011). (Duff, 2013, p. 218) 
 
What might this look like if we apply Duff’s comments here to my notion of 
environ(mental) health? ‘Will a different democracy become necessary? A democracy 
extended to things?’ (Latour, 1993, p. 12). I think so. The online journal, Rhizomes.net, 
‘oppose the idea that knowledge must grow in a tree structure from previously accepted 
ideas. New thinking need not follow established patterns […] unlike trees or their roots, 
the rhizome connects any point to any other point’ (The Rhizomes Manifesto, n.d.). So 
that’s what I did with my research… 
A small assemblage responded to the poster I put up, with each multiplicity 
admitting to some mental health issue that they wished to explore in relation to their 
environments (see the prologue to the play, Liverpool ONE-Liverpool Too for a 
description of this labelling). We used a number of methods under the umbrella of post-
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qualitative collaborative action research to explore varied environments, one of which 
was psychogeography: a method where a line took ‘us’ for a walk. 
 
 
Transfer 25: Some of the lines that took us for walks. 
 
A bricolage of data were amassed in the form of journaling (notes, drawings, 
mind maps, collage), photography, observation, video interviews (individual and 
group), sociodemographics, and dual video feedback (an original method), which were 
then collectively analysed through group (re)flections/focus group meetings. These 
were recorded, later transcribed and then formed into a Brechtian play to both highlight 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of interpretosis as well as resolve the ethical issue of 
participant redundancy at the write up stage (voices that are usually omitted in most 
research). I waded through the rest of the empirical materials, waiting for any particular 
events to glow, and they did. 
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Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Three: 
😊 = 109?  
 
 
Snippet 8: ‘loads of physical things’ 
 
Snippet 8 highlights an example of the classic Cartesian trap that I fell into in 
that discussion. Of course at that time, I didn’t (re)cognise the mind or mental as 
physical or as co produced (rather than linear and uni→directional from 
cause→to→effect). I hadn’t yet figured out Spinoza’s point of the mind as an idea of 
the body. Of course pollution is entangled with ‘mental’ health. How can it not be?  Had 
I realised, I probably would have kept it as ‘health’, as that’s just what it is. I suppose 
this is what the process of diffractive rumination does—induces paradigm shifts—if you 
happen to follow those particular paths that lead in those multiple directions.   
                                                          
109 Picture taken from the ‘Mr. Men Wiki website’ (2016a). Creative Commons 
Attribution-Share Alike License 3.0 (Unported) (CC-BY-SA). 
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This assemblage is another attempt to stray from that linear anthropocentric path 
by playing and thinking with indiscretions from the ontological turn in order to diffract 
the modernist causal mechanisms of thought. It explores the WiC co-participants/co-
(re)searchers rumination: ‘how can we learn from/use the experiences we have to 
understand ourselves better and enhance our moods?’ This cogitation co-emerged over 
a couple of group meetings where I asked the question of what they were hoping to get 
from these outings and meetings. Every answer was different but they eventually came 
to a collective agreement on this particular musing by the third (02-09-13) and fourth 
(07-10-13) meetings. It turns out that their responses to this rumination ‘mainly’ focused 
on the material-semiotic actors we enlisted into our lines of flight and as such it also 
stepped in the realm of my own interest of how mental health and wellbeing is 
distributed. 
 
The central term in Haraway’s elaboration is the material-semiotic actor. 
This actor may be human or non-human, machine or non-machine. What is 
critical to her position is that the material-semiotic actor actively contributes 
to the production. Thus an “object of knowledge” is no longer a resource, 
ground, matrix, object, material or instrument to be used by humans as a 
means to an end. Rather an object of knowledge is an ‘active, meaning-
generating axis of the apparatus of bodily production’ (Haraway 1991: 200). 
(Bolt, 2007, p. 2) 
 
As time went on, we all began to think with stone, graffiti, photo, video and emoji and 
they revealed their roles in the production of our mental health in rather explicit ways. 
Hodgetts et al. (2010) stressed the importance of objects (such as MP3 players and 
books) in modelling recovery trajectories during their inquiry following a homeless 
man. Other research has found similar support that people come to know themselves 
and take form as ‘materially and socially located beings’ (Hodgetts et al. 2010 p. 300) 
through inter-objective relations (Cooley, 1902; Cuba & Hummon, 1993; 
Jovchelovitch, 2007). Tucker (2010) and Duff, Murray, Loo and Jacobs (2013) reasoned 
that ‘places’ hold similar value for mediating recovery (such as attachments to homes), 
as ‘a person’s sense of self both leaks into and out from the places they inhabit and the 
things they use in everyday life.’ (Hodgetts et al., 2010, p. 286). Hodgetts et al. (2010) 
state that ‘[s]uch objects extend the places [one] can go beyond [their] physical 
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environments to the imaginary’ (p. 300), yet the imaginary is also physical and so it 
becomes a topological extension that is granted by such objects. They also infer that 
‘[a]n MP3 player actually feels like part of us. It sounds as if the music is inside our 
heads.’ (Hodgetts et al. 2010 p. 300, emphasis added), yet following Noë (2009), it is 
we who experience the music ‘out of our heads’ as we ourselves are ‘patterns of active 
engagement with fluid boundaries and changing components’ (p. 183). In other words, 
we are spread.  
 
Scene one: Photos 
 
‘Ansel Adams urges that we say we “make” a picture, not “take” one.’ 
(Sontag, 1977, pp. 122-123) 
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Snippet 9: ‘so you can put yourself back into that…’ 
 
Looked, felt and heard! ‘All photographs are memento mori. To take a photograph 
is to participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, vulnerability, mutability. 
Precisely by slicing out this moment and freezing it, all photographs testify to time’s 
relentless melt.’ (Sontag, 1977, p. 15). Hodgetts et al. (2010) suggest that photographs 
‘provide insights into the practices through which’ people construct themselves as 
‘socio-geographically located and mobile human being[s] across time and space 
(Hodgetts et al., 2006, cited in Hodgetts et al., 2010, p. 290). So Blondie is able to jump 
back in time synaesthetically with the aid of a photo (traditionally thought of as a visual 
stimulation) to conjure other sensory memories, perceptual qualities such as sight and 
sound that are associated and merged with proprioceptive, haptic and affective qualities 
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such as feeling. In the film Memento, Leonard does the same (although for very different 
reasons) using annotated Polaroids as a part of his memory bank but not merely as a 
stimulus. Leonard intra-acts with them (not over-and-against them), as does Blondie. 
For example,  
 
telephone numbers stored on a mobile phone may serve as an extra-cranial 
memory, an extension of our own memory that we don’t simply ‘use’ as a 
source of memory stimulation. Rather, the phone is actually imbricated as 
part of our cognitive processing. (Mcphie, 2016, p. 49).  
 
Any sense of agency (if we want to call it that) co-emerges and is co-produced out of 
the intra-relations between what we would traditionally consider to be objects (the 
passive inanimate photos) and subjects (the organised organic human). Yet photos are 
never static, humans are never just organic and agency doesn’t necessarily require 
humans to become.  
‘[L]ike every mass art form, photography is not practiced by most people as an 
art. It is mainly a social rite, a defense against anxiety, and a tool of power.’ (Sontag, 
1977, p. 8). For example, ‘PhotoTherapy’ has been a popular technique since the late 
nineteen-seventies (see Krauss, 1979) that utilises ‘clients’ personal photos (family 
photos, personal snapshots) as a catalyst for therapeutic healing when words alone 
aren’t always sufficient, as photos ‘always contain stories’ (Weiser, 2004, p. 23). 
Referring to her photos of the WiC adventures, Blondie stated, ‘I wish I’d just looked 
at those photos before I decided to cut my hair and have a baby’. After she had her baby 
taken away, she cut her hair and attempted to change her gender from a female identity 
to a male one, adopting a masculinised name to go by. This is when I met him. His first 
pseudonym was Spike before she adopted Blondie. The photos seem powerful indeed 
if, as Blondie’s infer, they hold the capacity to (re-)story (yet never re-store) an identity. 
But rather than imagining that the photos are simple catalysts or tools to be used 
by the therapist or patient in order to promote healing (and the subtle power relations 
this (re)enforces), I imagine that the photos were an integral extension of Blondie’s 
memory, an extended spatio-temporal limb for her to physically travel with (as a 
topological and mobile corporeal apparatus) in order to ‘cheer up’ and ‘think happy 
thoughts’. ‘In other words, the mind does not inhabit the body; rather, the body inhabits 
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the mind’ (Malafouris, 2013, p. 60). The photos were like the TARDIS110, temporal co-
agents in the production of mental health. It is the haecceitical intra-relational quality 
‘between’ Blondie (including her embodied memories of the original events) and the 
photos that co-produce the feelings she discusses rather than Blondie as a discrete and 
subjective agentic entity acting upon an object as if it were a passive and inert quiddital 
non-entity, static in time and space. They have the capacity to affect and be affected. 
‘The BwO is a component of passage’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 175). A rainbow 
(a process or assemblage, not an object) wouldn’t exist as ‘a rainbow’ without a 
perceiver111 to co-produce/co-constitute it in myriad ways112. Nietzshe (1967/1887) 
stated, ‘[i]f we were to remove all the relationships and actions of a thing, the thing does 
not remain.’ (p. 302). Take away any of these processes—photons, water, human—and 
the rainbow (as we113 understand it) does not remain. In the same way, the photo is not 
a discrete object, it is an intra-relational process and as such lends itself to becoming 
plugged in (following Deleuze and Guattari) to other intra-relational processes, 
including humans. ‘To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It means 
putting oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge -- and, 
therefore, like power’ (Sontag, 1977, p. 4).  
A different way of conceiving photography is of the relationship between the 
camera, the depressor of the button and eye of the beholder. The camera itself is an 
extended or bionic eye (like a bat monitor114). It allows us to see more clearly and more 
                                                          
110 TARDIS stands for ‘Time and Relative Dimension in Space’ from the BBC series 
Doctor Who. Susan Foreman, the actor who played the Doctors granddaughter, coined 
the term in An Unearthly Child in 1963. 
111 The perceiver could just as easily be a rock as a human, as the spectrum of colours 
produce varying temperatures on the surface, creating shifting ecological diversities 
and mutable energetic intensities: perception is the conglomeration of multiple forces 
of encounter. However, to the rock, the rainbow is still not a rainbow as it is for a 
human (or even between humans).   
112 ‘[A] rainbow is a process that requires a further physical system in order to take 
place. Where is the rainbow? Where is the experience of the rainbow? Is there a 
rainbow without an observer? Is there a rainbow-observer without a rainbow in the 
cloud? […] it is impossible, from a physical perspective, to disentangle the rainbow 
from its observer […] Processes are necessarily private and yet physical. Secondarily, 
the rainbow is something that takes place. It is not a static entity. The rainbow takes 
place and it is extended in time and in space.’ (Manzotti, 2011b, para. 8). 
113 I place ‘we’ under erasure due to varied cultural conceptions of rainbows over time 
and so ‘we’ are never ‘we’ for very long (if ever we were ‘we’ to begin with).  
114 We wouldn’t be able to ‘hear’ the bat’s echo location without the extended bodily 
apparatus that is the monitor. The air is bulging with stuff, most of which we cannot 
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closely without the rest of our body moving any closer to the subject of scrutiny (like 
Bateson’s blind person with the stick). As an extension, we literally learn to become the 
camera, using it skilfully to enact our culture’s habit of framing the world. Our internal 
framing, the constantly changing lens that we carry around with us (also created in that 
moment), thus becomes externalised. We begin to think ‘with’ this tool, this extended 
self.  
Recollecting memories of salvaged photographs, Glorianna Davenport (2011) 
documents that ‘photographs led me to cameras, and over the years the camera became 
an object I could think with. I could think about light and shadow, about composing the 
frame, and about what it meant to live in a certain way, to make decisions at many 
levels, and to document the world’ (p. 219, emphasis added). Therefore, the action of 
photographing something is different from discussing the resulting photograph itself. 
Again, the photograph is not the action or event that happened at the time. Yet the 
photograph, here on the page, still does something ‘with’ us. It intra-acts with us and 
depending on our differently embodied memories and experiences, it will enact 
different intensities to co-produce different affective relations. Each of the co-
participants/co-(re)searchers took very different photos. Even the photos that looked the 
same, were taken for very different reasons. The cameras themselves played a part in 
the style of the photos and what photos were taken. The tension of the button, the weight 
of the camera, the width and texture of the camera as it’s being held all alter, no matter 
how slightly, the action of taking the photo as well as the photo itself. Then, there’s the 
fact that two of the cameras were deployed by me. They belonged to the university and 
so had associated institutional properties, yet it was I who provided them and so the 
power relations exerted from/with the camera may have had an influence on which 
particular photos were taken, as well as how they were taken. For example, Bumble 
imagined that I had wanted a particular type of photo taken along with writing down all 
the street names and so her photos all example a power relation between herself, myself, 
the University of Cumbria, Liverpool and the camera.  
 
                                                          
perceive. Space is erroneous…and tangible…at the same time. It is a necessary 
contradiction. 
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Annotated Polaroids 12-13: Street names. (Photos by Bumble). 
 
This assemblage is also articulated in Bumble’s journal.  
 
 
Note 1: ‘Whose agenda are we following?’ (Bumble). 
 
Although I hadn’t actually requested street names to be photographed or written 
down, Bumble logically imagined I had as I suggested to ‘record the textual run off’ 
from the streets (after MacFarlane’s description of psychogeography). However, 
Bumble soon ‘takes charge’ of the situation herself. 
 
 
Note 2: ‘Need to take charge’ (Bumble). 
 
So, rather than exert a determining agency of their own, the journals and cameras 
seem to be co-conspirators in what appears to be a kind of agential assemblage. This is 
not to say that humans cannot exert agency by themselves as they were/are never ‘by 
themselves’ to begin with.  
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There is not a body ‘in recovery’ passively accessing and deploying equally 
passive material objects in the instrumental service of recovery. Recovery 
is a function of the entire assemblage, human and nonhuman. Remove one 
element and the assemblage morphs again, transforming the experience of 
recovery. Material forces thus provide the immanent conditions for 
recovery. They are not the ‘tools’ of recovery, they embody recovery. (Duff, 
2014, p. 115) 
 
Karen Barad (2007) insists that objects do not precede their ‘interaction’ but emerge 
through specific intra-actions. ‘Apparatuses are not merely about us.’ (Barad, 2007, p. 
142). So they are about human-nonhuman assemblages? ‘[A]pparatuses are specific 
material reconfigurings of the world that do not merely emerge in time but iteratively 
reconfigure space-timematter as part of the ongoing dynamism of becoming.’ (Barad, 
2007, p. 142). So, a sort of dynamic, performative assemblage of becoming agential? 
Although similar to Judith Butler’s notion of performative agency, 
 
for both Butler and Foucault, agency belongs only to the human domain, 
and neither address the nature of technoscientific practices and their 
profoundly productive effects on human bodies, as well as the ways in 
which these practices are deeply implicated in what constitutes the human, 
and more generally the workings of power. That is, both accounts honor the 
nature-culture binary (to different degrees), thereby deferring a 
thoroughgoing genealogy of its production. (Barad, 2007, pp. 145-146) 
 
I think Barad is suggesting that what is needed is a ‘posthumanist performative account 
of the material-discursive practices of mattering (including those that get labelled 
“scientific” and those that get labelled “social”)’ (Barad, 2007, p. 146). Yet this 
performative account of mattering does already exist: 
 
In Indigenous ontologies, all beings and things have particular qualities and 
capabilities by virtue of their taking form always and only in a relational 
context. The identity of ‘things’ in the world is not understood as discrete 
or independent, but emerges through, and as, relations with everything else. 
207 
 
It is the relation, or connection, not the thing itself, that is ontologically 
privileged in Indigenous Maori thought. […] This ontology […] produces 
a necessarily mutually constituting relationship between all things, 
including human beings (see also Henare, et al., 2006). (Jones & Hoskins, 
2016, p. 80) 
 
This includes stones, graffiti and Emoji. 
 
Scene two: Emoji 
 
Emoji played a slightly different role in our inquiry…as tataus of the face. Yet 
even a tatau of the face can become a transfer, a mask, under the imposition of 
significance and subjectification. ‘Paintings, tattoos, or marks on the skin embrace the 
multidimensionality of bodies.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 195). So what happens if 
that abstract machine turns from alphabetised to hieroglyph or pictograph? For the WiC 
group, mental health was also spread in emoticons and emoji. BBS drew emoji 
throughout his journal (just as they drew him). They presented a variety of emotions 
(hence, emoji as a derivative of ‘emoticon’): 
 
 
Note 3: Emoji of taboo, embarrassment, shame, disempowerment? Or resistance, 
empowerment and transgression? 
 
 
 
Notes 4-7: Meteorological Emoji. Is the face the sun? 
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Notes 8-9: Emoji of signification: of speeds and rhythms, signs of negativity? 
 
 
Note 10: Emoji of anger? Paranoia, Panopticon/Oligopticon, Big Brother, 
disempowerment? 
 
Notes 11-12: Haptic emoji: contact, friendship, affective encounters? 
 
 
Notes 13-14: Empathetic emoji: sadness, anger, injustice? 
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Notes 15-17: Emoji of relief: Survival, physiological needs? 
 
 
 
Notes 18-21: Synesthetic embodied emoji: Auditory, olfactory and visual? 
 
These emoji became very popular with the WiC group. They spread rapidly, like 
a fungal mycelium or rhizome.  
 
 
Note 22: ‘Amazing feeling’ Emoji (Blondie) 
 
 
Note 23: ‘Ace. Fantastic’ Emoji (Blondie) 
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Note 24: Bumble’s mind map of Liverpool  
 
 
Note 25: Bumble’s digital mind map of Liverpool  
 
Bumble regularly used emoji in her journal. In fact, Bumble decided to produce 
some feedback sheets for the WiC group to use that utilised the popularity of the emoji.  
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Transfer 26: Bumble’s emoji feedback sheets 
 
Each of the faces (as an accompaniment to alphabetised language) on Bumble’s 
sheets could be ticked or circled depending on your choice of association with how the 
environment made you feel/you felt in that environment.  
 
 
Transfer 27: Word of the Year 2015. (Onwuemezi, 2015) 
 
This emoji, Face with Tears of Joy (Transfer 27) was the Oxford Dictionaries’ 
Word of the Year 2015 (Onwuemezi, 2015). Yet again, the data (emoji) begins to glow. 
But what do these emoji do? 
 
Intra-acting emoji 😊 
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Emoticons ;-) and emoji 😊 interrupt spaces (in place of an ellipsis) and mediate 
between people (and things) to denote a mental state. Yet they also have a history (like 
a map) that always already influences our intra-actions with them. This history gets in 
the cracks to add to our associations.  
The WiC group’s mental health was/is bound up in these small round expressional 
faces. Faces in their simplest form, recognisable and immediate in their connotations. 
They may very simply present our affective mental state yet are powerful signifiers. 
Arguably more than words, they contain traces of our mental health, externally 
preserved in the technological mediating form (iPhone, etc.) that also adds to its impact 
(depending on who it belongs to, the company who made it, etc.). The force of encounter 
with an emoji is a simple one as we get an immediate indication of what feelings are 
conveyed.  
They are generally yellow. This is important for parity and homogenisation. The 
Classic yellow face of have a nice day holds associations with nuclear power, pinned 
as badges on the lapels of protesters (I have one), also as a symbol of resistance. Yet, 
yellow is the face of Mr. Happy 115, a face we must all attempt to attain under the 
hegemonic signification/subjectification regime, made even more evident through the 
introduction of Little Miss Sunshine 116 (not too dissimilar to Sarah Ahmed’s 
description of the happy housewife), in a dystopic Misterland where clearly identifiable 
Westernised cultural stereotypes and bounded anthropocentric forms are redeployed in 
little yellow avatar bodies. Facialisation (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004) now has another 
colour, other than green. 
Of course, the associations we have with emoji are culturally mediated yet are 
powerful in their impacts. They are the (re)placement of the 1-10 scale for BBS: ‘I use 
a smiley thing on it, and I scale it, I number it. You know, one to ten about how I’m 
feeling, one meaning [inaudible] and the higher up the scale, the happier I am’, yet are 
far more nuanced than numbers. There are hundreds of emoji that supposedly signify a 
variety of emotions, but are they complex enough to ‘know’ what another person is 
really ‘feeling’ and do they really encourage empathy in this way? As is evident in 
                                                          
115 Picture taken from the ‘Mr. Men Wiki website’ (2016a)  
116 Ibid. (2016b) 
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Bumble’s journal entry, the variety of emoji not only compliment the words, they 
actually add considerable nuance (also dependent on the translator/spect-actor). 
 
 
Note 26: Bumble’s digital mind map of Liverpool  
 
Scene three: Emoji and mental health 
 
Edom (2016, n.p.) goes as far as to say that ‘Emojis might be one of the most 
effective forms of emotional communication we use today’. Evans (2015a), found that 
‘72% of 18-25 year olds in the UK believe that emoji make them better at expressing 
their feelings’ (para. 8). Various psychological programmes have now begun using 
emoji as a form of therapy, such as the Swedish Children’s Rights Society, BRIS, 
‘which helps victims of domestic abuse’ and educational therapy such as the Emotes 
project, ‘which makes use of emoji-like images to help children explore and better 
develop their ability to express emotions’  (Evans, 2015a, para. 9). Emoji ‘can convey 
ideas, and be used to influence the mental states, emotions, and even behaviours of 
others.’ (Evans, 2015b, n.p.). 
With the ‘Emergence of e-therapy in mental health care’, emoticons and emoji 
are starting to emerge as useful communicators for many people (e.g. Mood diary, 
Moodlens, Online therapy, Internet counselling). For example, ‘Emoodji’ is an app 
specifically designed to help students express their feelings in order to tackle issues of 
mental ill-health. The charity Mind devised Emoodji’s and they are now available as 
apps for iPhones and Android phones. ‘Expressing how you’re feeling can be one of 
the hardest things we do, but with Emoodji you can do it in an instant.’ (Edom, 2016, 
n.p.). It seems mental health and wellbeing is now offered in a bun. If not careful, this 
214 
 
could spiral into a time-saving strategy (a McDonaldisation117) for a cash-strapped 
mental health service. 
 
 
 
Transfer 28: ‘Are emojis the future of mental health?’ (Edom, 2016, n.p.) 
                                                          
117 See Ritzer (1993). 
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Transfer 29: Emoodji (2016) 
 
 
Transfer 30: Emoodji iTunes (2016) app for iPhones. 
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Transfer 31: ‘As validated by Sir Paul McCartney.’ (Edom, 2016, n.p.) 
(Illustration by Gazin, 2016) 
 
Is it serious too? Yep. As validated by Sir Paul McCartney himself, emojis 
are a powerful communication tool.  Making it just that bit easier to express 
how they’re feeling could be a game-changer for student mental health. 
Emoodji tracks your mood too, showing where your fluctuations are and is 
filled with little tips and info to help students along the way. (Edom, 2016, 
n.p.) 
 
So that’s it then, Sir Paul McCartney has validated it! This does seem useful as a method 
of easier, faster communication regarding that extra little information that could make 
all the difference between someone understanding what you are trying to communicate 
or getting frustrated because they’re just not on the same wavelength. After all, they are 
usually used as a supplement to the alphabetised word and not on their own (Hwang, 
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2014). ‘Users reading text messages with emoticons are significantly better at 
interpreting the precise meaning of the author than those reading messages without 
emoticons’ (Lo, 2008; Gajadhar & Green, 2005, cited in Park, Fink, Barash & Cha, 
2013). Surely, this is helpful for many people who may have difficulty with literacy, 
especially if they happen to be depressed partly due to nobody understanding them? But 
what might be lost in translation? Surely an emotion is never simply an emotion. This 
would be chunking. 
 
What do the emoji do? Chunk? 
 
The co-participants/co-(re)searchers use of emoji/emoticons comes as no 
surprise then, especially regarding the conveyance of feelings and the potential to affect 
and be affected. Their journals and text messages are bursting with other languages, 
such as emoji, mind maps, mental maps, drawings, photos, etc. Where words fail (due 
to their more abstract presentational nature (apart from onomatopoeia perhaps)), 
emoji’s communicate at a much more nuanced and basic level. They are superb 
relational communicators as a part of our mental processing and agential make-up. They 
are external and yet seemingly example a more sincere cognitive process than written 
words or speech. But is there a danger of creating more objective boundaries through 
diversification of emoji? ‘You can make any list of part-objects you want: hand, breast, 
mouth, eyes…it’s still Frankenstein. […] The question of the body is not one of part-
objects but of differential speeds.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 190).  
The emoji wrote themselves through BBS and BBS wrote himself through the 
emoji. Thus, the emoji are another form of mapping in/of the flesh, more tatau than 
transfer (unlike words and numbers). They are the graffiti of mapping rather than the 
graffiti of aesthetic representation, the transfer.  
Emoticons and emoji were another example of how the co-participants/co-
(re)searchers were generating their own ways of tackling their research question along 
with photos, journals, etc. All of these different materials were much more than external 
tools to utilise though, they were co-producing agency and intricately woven through 
their mental health, as a part of their very being (becoming). 
 
Before the appearance of the mirror, the person didn’t know his own face 
except reflected in the waters of a lake. After a certain point everyone is 
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responsible for the face he has. I’ll now look at mine. It is a naked face. And 
when I think that no other like it exists in the world, I get a happy shock. 
(Lispector, 2014, p. 29) 
 
Scene four: Reterritorialisation 
 
 
Snippet 10: ‘try and mirror it’ (Dolly) 
 
This is rather like writing over a past event. You may never delete the original 
event entirely but writing an inscription over it produces a palimpsest where the 
underlying archaeology of the embodied mind (embodied memory) is historicised by 
the new topsoil that you overlay it with. This is done with graffiti. It’s also sometimes 
done with tattoos to hide previous scarring. As a group, we attempted this positive form 
of dermabrasion with Dolly as she had particularly stressful scars in a specific place in 
her home town. The memories she associated with a previous partner were inscribed in 
a certain walk along an estuary, by the docks, now a forbidden zone to Dolly. She asked 
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the WiC group if we could walk with her along those same lines of memory, along the 
path that stretched out beside the water’s edge in her home town. So, after the project 
had supposedly come to an end, on the 21st of July, 2014, we walked with her to 
(re)inscribe over those painful memories, rather like her tatau, don’t you think?   
As Cameron Duff (2014) has inferred, studies that tease out the agential 
capacities of human-object/place relations ‘hint at the prospect of manipulating or 
affecting select nonhuman entities in an effort to promote recovery in diverse settings.’ 
(Duff, 2014, p. 94). This manipulation may not come from us but there is no reason why 
we cannot be involved in some sort of assemblage manipulation, perhaps more of an 
affective nudge than a ‘free won’t’118 (Libet, 2006), in order to promote healthy 
trajectories. Perhaps we must deterritorialise before we can attempt to (re)territorialise 
though. It took a year and the supposed finilisation of the WiC project before Dolly was 
able to trust our group enough to ask us to help her forge a new path. After a year and 
its formal closure, the WiC assemblage became a heterogeneous swarm that had the 
power to create lines of flight away from prescribed trajectories. Like the popular story 
of the protagonist dying and being reborn to become something more-than-human, 
perhaps this is what the WiC inquiry had to do. Perhaps only when the research is no 
longer under the pretence of being research can there be possibilities for 
(re)territorialisations to be born. Like the phoenix from the flames, haecceities are born 
from quiddities.  
 
‘We must die as egos and be born again in the swarm, not separate and self-
hypnotized, but individual and related.’ (Henry Miller, Sexus, cited in Seem, 
1983, p. xv). 
 
                                                          
118 ‘Free won’t’ is a concept introduced by Benjamin Libet (2006) where volition or 
agency is enacted in the form of veto. However, Libet (2006) goes on to describe his 
‘Conscious Mental Field’ theory (CMF) as ‘a non-physical phenomenon, like the 
subjective experience that it represents. The process by which the CMF arises from its 
contributing elements is not describable. It must simply be regarded as a new 
fundamental ‘‘given’’ phenomenon in nature, which is different from other 
fundamental ‘‘givens,’’ like gravity or electromagnetism.’ (p. 324). Although Libet 
denies the Cartesian dualism inherent in his statement, it is, never-the-less, obviously a 
Cartesian dualism and, like Descartes’ rationale, argued by way of ‘faith’ that it exists 
due to its invented non-physical nature. 
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Interméde: (Intra-)Act 3 is available as a complimentary play script. Read 
it now if you like! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
Environ(Mental) Health Assemblage Four: Ecology of the Oppressed 
 
Once we were happy in our own country and we were seldom hungry, for 
then the two-leggeds and the four-leggeds lived together like relatives, and 
there was plenty for them and for us. But the Wasichus [white men] came, 
and they have made little islands for us and other little islands for the four 
leggeds, and always these islands are becoming smaller (Black Elk, cited in 
Neihardt, 1991, p. 157) 
 
Space the final frontier: Physical space is temporarily occupied and appropriated by 
hegemonic power relations. During this time, it becomes controlled, ordered, 
taxonomised, gendered (sexed, even), classed, racialised, bounded, etc. Space becomes 
place and all that that encompasses. It becomes encultured. Of course, these are all 
‘natural’ processes as is evident when observing other ecological events, such as how 
spaces of fear created by wolves enact trophic cascades, changing topographies and 
topologies of physical space. These spaces have atmospheres and are felt, a physical 
process. How else do deer or elk know to stay away from a space where wolves hunt? 
Traces of chemicals permeate the senses, sound waves are numbed and/or excited to the 
presence of wolves through muted silences and/or alarm calls, and impressions in the 
snow are visually disclosed and distributed haptically around the body, all to create an 
affective register that becomes a felt atmosphere, an ecological force of encounter. 
Gregory Bateson criticised the epistemological fallacy of Western thinking,  
 
that the unit of survival in the bio-taxonomy, is “organism plus 
environment.” The choice of the wrong unit leads to an epistemological 
error that propagates itself, multiplying and mutating, as a basic 
characteristic of the thought-system of which it is a part. The hierarchy of 
taxa leads to a conception of species against species, Man against Nature—
a view that has been reinforced by various ideologies and movements, 
including Romanticism. (cited in Peters, 2003, p. 280). 
 
‘This is a destructive thesis insofar as it suggests that culture is outside nature’ (Bryant, 
2013, p. 294). Guattari was heavily influenced by Bateson’s ecology of mind, enough 
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to produce a tripartite theory of ecology that consists of ‘the environmental, the social, 
and the mental (the complex, environment-social-mental) where mental ecology 
transcends the psychology of the individual.’ (Peters, 2003, p. 280).  
 
Gregory Bateson has clearly shown that what he calls the ‘ecology of ideas’ 
cannot be contained within the domain of the psychology of the individual, 
but organizes itself into systems or ‘minds’, the boundaries of which no 
longer coincide with the participant individuals. (Guattari, 2000, p. 54). 
 
Although parting company with Bateson’s ideas due to his hierarchical ‘systemic’ view 
of ‘context’ (see Guattari, 2000, p. 54), Guattari’s ‘three ecologies’ attempts to entangle 
these concepts together, which he calls ‘ecosophy119’. Similarly, I part company with 
Guattari here as he reinforces the conceptual boundaries by the very distinguishing 
words he uses. Hence, Haraway’s ‘naturecultures’ or my ‘environ(mental) health’. It 
matters. However, I believe both Bateson’s and Guattari’s epistemological intensions 
behind their attempts are ethically sound as Guattari states, ‘only an ethico-political 
articulation […] between the three ecological registers (the environment, social 
relations, and human subjectivity) would be likely to clarify [the ecological dangers that 
confront us]’ (Guattari, 2000, p. 27). Guattari blames ‘integrated world capitalism’ for 
these ecological dangers by suggesting that it is now orientated to the production of 
signs and a passive subjectivity, which only serves to accentuate these issues (Peters, 
2003).  
Bateson (2000, p. 491) suggested that ‘[e]cology, in the widest sense, turns out 
to be the study of the interaction and survival of ideas and programs […] in circuits’, 
such as ‘complexes of differences’. Thus, there must be an ecology of the oppressed. 
This particular ecology, like weeds, often goes unnoticed, unchallenged or is simply 
accepted and appropriated into the dominant culture. Within this assemblage, I explore 
and highlight it. 
 
Scene one: Affective transmission: spaces of repression and liberation 
 
                                                          
119 This is a different ecosophy to Arne Naess’s deep ecology version.  
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‘Is there anyone who has not, at least once, walked into a room and “felt the 
atmosphere”?’ (Brennan, 2004, p. 1) 
 
‘In a preparatory note to Ulysses, Joyce wrote, ‘places remember events’, 
and in this we can recognize how deeply time has become embedded within place, 
and might be said to have become one of its dominant characteristics.’ (Dean & 
Millar, 2005, p. 14). When I was in Phnom Pen, Cambodia, I visited a former 
Khmer Rouge detention centre/security prison where the people who were kept 
inside were tortured and slaughtered in their ten’s of thousands. It was a high 
school before a prison, now called Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, a museum that 
archives the atrocities enacted during Pol Pot’s reign of terror in the 1970’s. The 
seemingly innofensive and tranquil outer skin of the school was a deception. Here, 
every darkened room in the building, every sprouting plant in the cracks of the 
concrete, every angle within the architecture of the place gave itself over, 
overwhelmingly, to the (past) events of torture and unsympathetic cruelty. I 
remember that visit as a deep cut in my affective haecceity. It got under my skin. 
As I walked around, I was emotionally overwhelmed by the atmosphere as the 
weight of the atrocities that happened there made me break down in tears. The 
affective force of the atmosphere penetrated my flesh from without (the buildings 
embodied scars) and within (my embodied memories), co-producing a saline 
solution into existence. The affects of the embodied mind (or enminded body) are 
evidently physical, processual and multi-directional.  
 
I am using the term “transmission of affect” to capture a process that is 
social in origin but biological and physical in effect. The origin of 
transmitted affects is social in that these affects do not only arise within a 
particular person but also come from without. They come via an interaction 
with other people and an environment. But they have a physiological 
impact. By the transmission of affect, I mean simply that the emotions or 
affects of one person, and the enhancing or depressing energies these affects 
entail, can enter into another. (Brennan, 2004, p. 3) 
 
But this transmission in Tuol Sleng wasn’t just a social phenomenon, tranmitted from 
human to human. The transmission of affect co-emerges from the intra-actions of 
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particular assemblages (of which some of its composition are other than human). For 
example, the building itself contains the memory that still haunts the ‘tourists’ who 
experience it. This memory is etched into the concrete walls and irradiates a disquite 
though the tourists walk in whispered awkwardness and solemnity. Affective memory 
is embodied even within the name, Tuol Sleng, which means ‘Hill of the Poisonous 
Trees’ as the shadows in the former classrooms exude brutality and shame. ‘First, affect 
references those impulses and nerve-firings that sit within bodies, just below mindful 
consciousness. Second, it hints at the relational interactions between bodies and places.’ 
(Waterton, 2014, p. 9).  
Our WiC group arrived by minibus in Lancaster and immediately walked to the 
castle, the start of our psychogeography ramble. We walked into a pub, reached for our 
map of Lancaster and drew around a pint glass. First stop, the castle. Immediately, the 
force of heritage emanated from the building and pulled us in, as tourists, to experience 
its power of historisisation and commodification. 
 
 
Transfer 32: The (sort of) circle we walked in Lancaster. (Photo by Jamie) 
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Annotated Polaroid 14: Force of heritage. (Photo by Blondie) 
 
Lancaster castle exudes an air of posterity. It is a palimpsest of many layers. It 
reads as defence, attack, protection, panopticon, community, wealth, capital, 
(in)civility, aggression, hierarchy, etc. It was once a castle (to keep them out), then a 
prison (to keep them in), now a tourist site (to bring them in). ‘The castle has been the 
scene of notable trials, scores of executions and has housed prisoners of various 
categories until as recently as 2011.’ (A Dark History, 2014, n.p.). The guided walks 
and talks sell it as a ‘macabre heritage’ that is ‘historically significant’ (A Dark History, 
2014, n.p.) as an appropriation and commodification of its ‘dark’ history.  
Whilst investigating people’s affective responses to certain heritage sites of 
atmospheric appeal (such as Pearl Harbor Visitor Center in Honolulu), Waterton (2014) 
found that: 
 
spaces of heritage are often designed to evoke affective responses. […] 
visitors I spoke to hinted at processes of encountering their surroundings 
through their bodies. These are all multi-sensual sites, alive with intense and 
often lingering sounds, smells and sights. In them, the body and its reactions 
are central, with visitors frequently remarking upon the rush of emerging 
goose-pimples, hair standing taut, jerked surprise, a hollowing stomach or 
the painful fight to hold back tears. These are examples that reflect both 
internal and external responses, ricocheting between individual bodies, 
groups and the very parameters of a heritage space. (p. 15) 
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When interviewing Blondie, she declared, ‘First time I’ve been to the castle; that is 
awesome’ (Blondie) yet her photos (Annotated Polaroids 15-18) seem to declare a very 
different narrative from typical touristic pictures, something resonant of my experience 
in the Tuol Sleng museum in Cambodia. Annotated Polaroid 18 is particularly 
disturbing, especially if you let yourself get pulled in to the darker space on the left… 
Maybe it was the university camera that exerted this force of attraction, this 
power. Did the feel of the camera in her hands add to the assumption that these were 
the kind of pictures the research required? If it was her own camera, maybe they would 
be different. 
 
 
 
Annotated Polaroids 15-18: Affective rooms. (Photos by Blondie). 
 
The desolate rooms (that Blondie’s photos present here) seemed to produce a 
synaesthetic narrative that was embodied and enstoried by Dolly as evidenced in her 
journal (Note 27). She ‘visioned’ a prisoner, ‘imagined’ how it could make you insane 
as she (mentally) ‘heard’ the communication of prisoners (‘loudly’) as well as cell doors 
slamming shut.  
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Note 27: ‘Scrubs’ (Dolly) 
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However, if we follow Manzotti’s (2010) line of thought here, the ‘images’ in 
Dolly’s ‘mind’ are not ‘images’ and are not ‘in’ her mind, especially if we take mind to 
mean brain, even though Dolly states that her ‘brain came up with what the rooms could 
have been used for’, could ‘vision a prisoner being placed in solitary’ and ‘could only 
imagine how insane it could make you’ (emphasis added). Therefore, we might ask, 
what and where are these thoughts located? Where did they originate, if at all? This is 
an ecological query. These photos give us a clue, not as representations of the rooms 
the photos are of (as that would be impossible due to the omission of an assortment of 
sensory stimulation that the rooms co-produced when actually there) but as 
presentations themselves, in their own right (as they have their own unique two-
dimesional performativity and way of intra-acting with you, the spect-actor). The 
pictures engage in a temporal ecological dialogue with us which we may co-produce an 
association that tells a story.  
 
In other words, the transmission of affect, if only for an instant, alters the 
biochemistry and neurology of the subject. The “atmosphere” or the 
environment literally gets into the individual. Physically and biologically, 
something is present that was not there before, but it did not originate sui 
generis: it was not generated solely or sometimes even in part by the 
individual organism or its genes. (Brennan, 2004, p. 1) 
 
Initially, the building itself co-produced various stories with us (the WiC group) but 
now these photos produce something similar, yet different for you, the reader. These 
other than human materials are co-producers of these narrations, something that in part 
forms what we think of as agency.  
 
As the notion of the individual gained in strength, it was assumed more and 
more that emotions and energies are naturally contained, going no farther 
than the skin. But while it is recognized freely that individualism is a 
historical and cultural product, the idea that affective self-containment is 
also a production is resisted […] But if we accept with comparatively ready 
acquiescence that our thoughts are not entirely independent, we are, 
nonetheless, peculiarly resistant to the idea that our emotions are not 
altogether our own. (Brennan, 2004, p. 2) 
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Thus, agency can be said to be co-produced by human and other than human 
assemblages (although the now blurred boundaries of separation may not even allow us 
to define the term ‘other than human’ in the first place). Waterton (2014, p. 4) explains 
that the shifts in practice from ‘static ‘site’ or ‘artefact’ to questions of engagement, 
experience and performance (see Harvey 2001; Smith 2006; Harrison 2013)’, have 
travelled through ‘phenomenological styles of thinking’ (involving embodied processes 
of meaning-making), to ‘the more recent injunction to take up an interest in the ‘more-
than-human’, through which we might recognise the spaces of heritage as agents or co-
participants/producers of a heritage experience (see Harrison 2013).’ She adds that these 
recent changes in thought and practice, ‘reset the theoretical lenses onto not only what 
heritage might mean, but what it might do, which simultaneously means foregrounding 
notions of ‘becoming’ and ‘embodiment’ (Waterton, 2014, p. 4, emphasis added). 
What might spaces/architecture of heritage ‘do’ is perhaps the most apt question 
here. For BBS the visit to Lancaster castle provided the opportunity for the event to 
become an affordance. It became a site of protest, revelation, storytelling, storymaking, 
resistance, mourning and escape. The bars of the prison seem to lurk under BBS’s skin 
and skull. He takes this place around with him yet it occasionally emerges as a tatau 
that we can all share the narrative of. He seems to be attempting a prison break by 
utilising a variety of methods (including the membership of this group). In the video 
interview in Lancaster, BBS admitted that he was vocal in persuading the group to go 
to Lancaster after the Liverpool visit, although I didn’t realise this at the time as I 
thought it was a ‘group’ decision. The castle/prison emitted a magnetic field that 
ensnared BBS’s particular mental health story. It pulled him in and in turn, he pulled us 
with him. BBS told his story with cardboard, words, a face (emoji?) and photos. 
 
 
231 
 
 
Snippet 11: Interview transcript of BBS 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 19: BBS’s tatau. (Photo by Blondie) 
 
After noticing BBS’s positioning of his cardboard sign to pose for the photo (on 
the bars, under the no-entry sign), I had a trawl through some of the other photos he’d 
taken and realised a melancholic refrain emerging.  
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Annotated Polaroids 20-28: Liverpool prisons (Photos by BBS) 
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Annotated Polaroids 29-31: ‘I’m still serving my sentence’ (BBS). Lancaster 
prisons. (Photos by BBS) 
 
 
Note 28: ‘bad signs all over’ (BBS) 
   
These photos tell a story, but not on their own. They need you to co-create it. Also, 
one of them on their own would tell a very different story than how I have compiled 
them here. Your own memories have now merged with these pictures and combine to 
(fleetingly) co-create a unique story that only your current multiplicity (a temporal 
assemblage of your memories-pictures-computer screen/page) has ‘full’120 access to. As 
well as the visual feast of associations and affordances in Lancaster that BBS could 
adopt for his mental health story (as a capacity to affect and be affected), his journal 
and the photos that BBS took on the day were also a (re)minder of serving his sentence 
(his insinuation+my interpretation). The photos from Liverpool followed a similar 
melody of re/de-pression. The environment is not a passive surface on which BBS 
inscribes his will but then BBS is not a passive surface for the environment to shape 
                                                          
120 I highlight ‘full’ due to the possibility of others having partial access to your 
haecceity via shared intra-actions with your memories that are topologically spread on 
your mobile phone, computer, address book, diary, publications, art works, etc. 
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either (as highlighted in the Brechtian play, Liverpool ONE-Liverpool Too). ‘We have 
relations which are proper to our physiology, to our environment, and to our aspirations 
to talk, to work, to love, to reason or whatever.  Humans develop broad (and highly 
individualised) capacities to affect and be affected by these myriad relations.’ (Fox, 
2011, p. 362). In this case, at this time, the Lancaster mental health assemblage 
consisted of, at least, BBS-Lancaster castle/prison-head injury. In other words, ‘the 
assemblage will vary from person to person, contingent on the precise relations that 
exist as a consequence of experience, beliefs and attitudes, or from bodily 
predispositions.’ (Fox, 2011, p. 363). 
 
a visitor’s capacity to be affected by heritage is qualified by the experiences 
inevitably and already encoded in their person, as well as their responses to 
its already circulating representations. These, in turn, will trigger a range of 
kinaesthetic senses and flows that act as entry points for the retrieval or 
(re)emergence of memories in a cycle of affective contagion. (Waterton, 
2014, p. 12) 
 
These affective contagions were contextual for each member of the WiC group. 
 
 
Note 29: ‘felt much more relaxed’ (Jim) 
 
 
Note 30: ‘Felt easier here’ (Jim) 
 
The ‘old street’ and ‘old buildings’ in Liverpool were ‘more interesting’ and 
relaxing for Jim. It ‘felt easier’ in these spaces. These ‘feelings’ may have already been 
‘encoded’ in Jim due to the palimpsest of embodied memories tataud in his flesh. As 
Ahmed (2004, p. 10) points out, ‘[t]he moods we arrive with do affect what happens: 
which is not to say we always keep our moods’ (cited in Waterton, 2014, p. 9). The 
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spaces we engage with are not separate phenomena from us, they are not blank canvases 
that we may inscribe our thoughts and feelings onto or into without the spaces pushing 
back or pushing forward. Pushing back is a re-action to what we bring with us but 
pushing forward is what the spaces may bring with them. And as we are relational 
phenomena, we cannot help but intermingle along a path of becoming as opposed to 
any linear action-reaction sequence ‘in a place’. Therefore, our mental health co-
emerges along a path of becoming and as such is never fixed in any place, including a 
place within us. These ‘places’ of heritage, often preserved in street names, protected 
buildings and fenced off landscapes are concepts as well as percepts. Yet, when 
regarded as a whole category, they are disguised as a concept.  
 
 
Note 31: ‘street’ (Bumble) 
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Snippet 12: ‘feeling of history’ 
 
Bumble’s ‘feeling of history’ appeared in her journal quite a lot in different 
contexts. But how can a building of (mostly) stone emit a ‘feeling of history’? In an 
animistic cosmology this would make sense as ‘there are no objects as such’: 
 
Things are alive and active not because they are possessed of spirit – 
whether in or of matter – but because the substances of which they are 
comprised continue to be swept up in circulations of the surrounding media 
that alternately portend their dissolution or – characteristically with animate 
beings – ensure their regeneration. (Ingold, 2011, p. 29, emphasis added) 
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Similarly, Christopher Alexander (1979) suggests that buildings themselves ‘are alive’ 
(p. 8) ‘and what strikes to the heart, they live.’ (p. 9). Alexander doesn’t mean ‘alive’ 
in the bio-logical sense. He renounces the definition of current scientific orthodoxy that 
considers ‘an organism any carbon-oxygen-hydrogen-nitrogen system capable of 
reproducing itself, healing itself, and remaining stable for some particular lifetime.’ 
(Alexander, 2002, p. 30) as it runs into boundary issues such as: ‘Is a virus alive? Is a 
forest alive (as a whole, and over and above the life of the component species taken as 
individuals)? Are carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen necessary to what we shall define 
as life?’ (Alexander, 2002, p. 30). Alexander (2002) suggests a broader conception of 
life, ‘in which each thing-regardless of what it is-has some degree of life.’ (p. 31). ‘Life 
is not something stored in biological creatures; hybrids or bastards can be more alive 
than the puriﬁed versions, naturally, because they are imperfect, wild and radically 
picturesque.’ (Spuybroek, 2011, p. 331). Organic life, firstly in reference to ‘bodily 
organs’ and then in reference to ‘living beings’, is a product of essentialist thinking. 
Therefore, ‘the organism is that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself, and 
there is a life all the more intense, all the more powerful for being inorganic.’ (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1987, p. 503). I would say that Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) concept of 
‘inorganic’ life or ‘Body without Organs’ (BwO) is perhaps more consistent with a truly 
animistic understanding of life for as ‘a haecceity, we can no longer measure ourselves 
as if objects of the same genetic species.’ (Mcphie & Clarke, 2015, p. 241).  
 
The authors of A Thousand Plateaus are proposing an ontological theory in 
which everything is inorganically alive, everything is assembled. When a 
person walks into a room, when a new fabric touches a ﬁnger, when a star 
wobbles, when a molecule falls apart, when a mayor feels threatened, when 
a recipe approaches a critical threshold: in all cases the laws of assembling 
are operating and are universally applied. If we want to know more about 
how inorganic life works, the next step is to learn more about the 
mechanisms of assembling. (Dema, 2007, para. 20) 
 
The life of a stone is not some abstract, symbolic or immaterial essence ‘in’ the stone. 
But the stone is of the flow of life itself. Opposed to the idea of ‘materiality’ (as for 
Ingold this suggests a symbolic abstraction rather than focusing on the materials 
themselves) or on things having ‘agency’ (such as stones…or even humans), Tim Ingold 
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(2011) explains that ‘things are in life rather than life in things’ (Ingold, 2011, p. 29), 
including stones with (intra-)agency: 
 
They have us pick them up, feel them, close them in our ﬁst (if particularly 
smooth and rounded) or hold them between our thumb and foreﬁnger (if 
small and edgy).They condition our walking […] we exist as a consequence 
of stones: the event of carrying stones makes us in the moment […] we 
become stone-carrying with carrying stones. (Rautio, 2013, p. 11) 
 
I have previously intimated at the life of inorganic agency (see Mcphie & Clarke, 2015, 
pp. 242-243) and in this respect mountains are no different (p. 243), nor plastic bags for 
that matter (p. 244). This ‘vital materiality’ may ‘sound’ like symbolism but this is most 
certainly not how it is meant by many new materialists such as Barad, Bennet or 
Malafouris. To them, materiality is physical matter itself and not, as Ingold implies, 
symbolic abstraction. 
 
Scene two: Inhuman agency 
 
Inhuman agency undermines our fantasies of sovereign relation to 
environment, a domination that renders nature “out there,” a resource for 
recreation, consumption, and exploitation. (Cohen, 2015, p. 9) 
 
Cohen’s (2015, p. 19) ‘ecology of the inhuman’ (Geophilia), invites the earth proper in 
to our thoughts, our philosophy (see Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) geophilosophy), and 
therefore must invade our mental health. Metal (earth-stone), stone (earth), bone 
(calcium-earth-metal-stone), plastic (sun-plant-animal-gas-carbon-earth-oil), paint 
(egg-plant-beetle-sand-soil-oil) and ‘all’ their derivatives are nature. Some formations 
of these properties may have trophic consequences for ‘organic life’ but, as Deleuze 
and Dema reminds us, ‘life can be articulated in all things’. This is radically different 
to the romanticized perception of a bio-logical (green) nature. 
Nature and heritage are ideas, you can’t touch them but you may certainly feel 
them. There is, then, a difference here between percept and affect. We can’t outwardly 
physically touch (as a percept) the concepts heritage or nature (as they are not really 
real) but we can feel (as an affect) them or at least feel the traces, effects and physical 
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impacts of them that becomes perceptual. Is the idea that we may ‘touch nature’ or ‘go 
out into it’ a semiotic category mistake then? That would assume ‘categories’ exist in 
the world in the first place. It is an abstract concept that we associate with/to percepts 
(such as the sight of a green meadow or the feel of the wind on your skin). But nature 
is not a percept in itself, at least not one that we can outwardly touch with sight, sound, 
smell or our skin. However, as soon as the word is uttered (or even thought), it becomes 
a physical property, for example as a sound wave that enters us and intertwines with our 
embodied memories and selves to (co)produce varyingly intensive feelings, feelings 
that may enhance health effects or even detract from them (depending on a variety of 
socio-cultural equities and inequities). Like nature, heritage is historicised and as such 
has political and social affiliations. In this way, it is always already taxonomised, 
gendered, racialized and enclassed. It is territorialised through its aesthetics and enacts 
a play of posterity that has physical consequences for our mental health and wellbeing. 
Our cultural conceptions of heritage are bound up with nationality and influence our 
physical perceptions through/via our affective actions. These perceptions, in turn, affect 
our mental health. Through the play of concept-affect-percept, the imaginary becomes 
really real but only through its consequences. So, like nature (or wilderness), the idea 
of heritage is rather like an embodied placebo response (Thompson, Ritenbaugh & 
Nichter, 2009; Mcphie, 2011, 2012, 2015a) and as such may have healing qualities 
depending on the socio-cultural persuasiveness on a person’s embodied memories (as 
well as their definitions of ‘healing’).  
But epistemological access is also embroiled in this mesh of enaction. This 
means that not everyone has the opportunity to benefit from the healing power of 
heritage, just as not everyone has the fortune of benefitting from the healing power of 
the concept nature because ‘narratives of heritage are mediated in affective worlds that 
shape their reception, tapping into everyday emotional resonances and circulations of 
feelings of inclusion and exclusion’ (Waterton, 2014, pp. 2-3). Heritage and nature are 
dripping in power, the materiality of which becomes phenomenal when it is felt. For 
example, the sculpted landscapes of the Lake District are viewed in many different ways 
by many different people at many different times. We could group certain people 
together (as Urry (1990) does in the ‘Collective Gaze’, ‘Romantic Gaze’ and ‘Tourist 
Gaze’) and say that the upper and middle classes of Britain have (topological) 
epistemological access to the (previously unromanticised) mountainscapes that were 
made popular during the 18th Century, whereas the ‘lower’ or working classes may not 
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(at least not the ‘same’ type of access, as exampled in Suckall, Fraser and Quinn’s 
(2009) study of the Peak District school leavers). A Study by Ayamba and Rotherham 
(2003) found ‘Ninety-nine per cent of respondents, many with rural roots, were 
interested in using the outdoors, but felt excluded. Parks advocate equal opportunities 
policies but these are often ineffective.’ (p.1) (cited in Mcphie, 2014b, n.p.). This, as 
argued previously, is also true of the accessibility to the concept of ‘nature’ but is 
perhaps more obvious, apparent and evident in the historical material structures of urban 
environments (such as the appearance of green spaces). These urban social spaces are 
divided into hierarchies of materials, from architecture and public spaces, to privately 
owned public spaces and ‘green’ spaces.  
 
The categories of “privileged” and “oppressed” are not ﬁxed categories, as 
they vary with time and place and with situational and cultural contexts, 
such that any one individual might experience different roles. In this 
privilege/oppression dialectic, each expression not only relies upon the 
other to exist, but also deﬁnes the other: There is no privilege without 
oppression, just as oppression cannot exist in any of its multiple forms 
without commensurate privilege. This dialectic affords no neutrality; one’s 
position and one’s response to any social order is never neutral. (Rose & 
Paisley, 2012, p.140). 
 
If we are to put aside the evolutionary assumptions regarding restorative landscapes 
(which I will), only a privileged group have ‘access’ to these ‘healing’ spaces where 
‘associations’ are made with impoverished or well-off environments. ‘Social capital, 
like physical capital and human capital, is a critical source for health and overall well-
being.’ (Mitchell & LaGory, 2002, p. 201). Bourdieu’s theories of Cultural and Social 
Capital exemplify this ‘accessibility’ but I would add that these are perfectly natural 
material progressions and productions. This power division is evident in landscapes. 
There is an ecology of the oppressed just as there is an ecology of the colour green as it 
‘dominates our thinking about ecology like no other, as if the color were the only 
organic hue, a blazon for nature itself’ (Cohen, 2013, p. xix). Yet green is perceived 
differently according to culture and history. For example, Berlin and Kay’s (1969) study 
into ‘basic colour terms’ suggest that many cultures (historically and presently) don’t 
make a distinction between blue and green and as such the colours brown, purple, pink, 
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orange and grey will not emerge in those cultures. Therefore, it is the natural-
sociocultural-material structures that are responsible for our reactions to green.  
 
Scene three: Green space=Striated space 
  
 
 
Snippet 13: Lancaster reflections 
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For Blondie, green is perceived as dirty. But in Liverpool ONE she ‘didn’t see 
any green, didn’t see any dirt’ (Blondie). There was green there of course and she took 
pictures of green spaces so she may ‘mean’ something different to not ‘seeing’ green. 
As a concept, green takes on many different meanings to many different people and it 
would be hard (if not impossible) to disentangle each of these anthropocentric 
understandings of the concept (which would therefore include the percepts of green as 
they too are entangled within the concept itself). Rather than look for ‘meanings’ then, 
I will try to explore what the concept green may produce, i.e. what does it do?     
 
 
Snippet 14: ‘it looked dead’ (BBS) 
 
Blondie’s actual words from the video interview were, ‘that thing down there. 
It looks a bit dead to me […] I didn’t know what it was. There’s just no life in it at all’ 
(Blondie). The heron being ‘the most natural thing’ (Prof.) now seems contextual and 
relative to the space it’s in and the human (or other than human) perceiving it. Also, the 
‘pollution’ that Blondie mentioned was, as BBS suggested, the tidal silts and muds that 
are deposited when the tide retreats. I suppose this is certainly pollution to something. 
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Annotated Polaroid 32:‘it was all polluted and everything. So it’s just all disgusting 
for all the birds that are in there’ (Blondie) 
 
 
Transfer 33: Gummer’s How 
 
For Blondie, the ‘countryside’ (as a concept) contains too much green. When on 
top of Gummer’s How, Blondie explained,  
‘For me it’s too much green round here […] I’m loving the view but it’s just too green’ 
(Blondie).  
‘Regarding your mental health, what do you make of it?’ (Jamie)  
‘Well I’m not really liking this part of it […] I’d rather see boats and houses and things 
like that’ (Blondie).  
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When explaining why she preferred Liverpool ONE to the Gummer’s How hill 
top view, Blondie said that in Liverpool she, ‘didn’t see any green, didn’t see any dirt 
[…] it was very clean, I didn’t see any rubbish on the floor’ and regarding the air quality 
in Liverpool, ‘I felt that it was clean and pure’ (Blondie). She relates and merges the 
concepts green and dirty together to co-produce (with the surrounding environments 
and embodied memories) an affective reaction. This is not difficult to associate. Grass 
is often green. Grass grows in soil and mud. Mud is dirty. Green is dirty. But that is my 
interpretation and something here is lost in translation. 
The cultural concept ‘rubbish’ is also included within this assemblage as in 
Liverpool ONE Blondie ‘didn’t see any rubbish on the floor’ (Blondie) and so it was 
clean. However, on Gummer’s How she perceived the cow dung that was scattered 
randomly over the landscape as dirty as well as (or intra-related to) the green. Of course 
the concepts litter or rubbish are problematic in their mere existence. For example, 
throwing away the newspaper that contained your chips is not too dissimilar to a bird 
discarding a snail shell (a difference being the anthropocentric concept of time 
regarding how long it takes to biodegrade). Anthropocentric aesthetics also plays a role 
in this as human litter may be considered unsightly compared to a discarded snail shell 
(a birds litter). Thinking from a flat ecological perspective, the newspaper and shell 
have equal value. Again, it depends on who or what is doing the perceiving. For 
Blondie, cow dung is not perceived as clean. Green is perceived as dirty.  
If we jump to where she lives, the environment outside her flat (Annotated 
Polaroids 33, 40, 41, 42) is not managed in the same way as Liverpool ONE or indeed 
the countryside of Gummer’s How. Environmental associations with wealth are stark 
in comparison. Outside her flat, green grass is allowed to grow between the cracks in 
the pavement, something that would never be allowed to happen in the ‘well-managed’ 
and ‘weeded’ (the weeding of plants, pigeons and certain unwanted elements) Liverpool 
ONE environment.  
In this Blondie-street-grass assemblage the grass (or rather how the grass reveals 
itself; where and when it is located) plays an important role for Blondie’s mental health. 
In trying to survive, and being left to survive, the grass reveals itself as related to an 
impoverished environment and community, topologically intra-related to Blondie’s 
mental health, not as a symbol, but as a physical, ecological association with wealth, 
poverty, social capital, etc. In a different location and perceived by a different person, 
it would be perceived differently again and so would not necessarily form part of that 
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unique assemblage. So it is contextual to who, where, when and what. As the who and 
the what are currently under erasure in this dissertation (as they are conceived as 
haecceitical multiplicities within this production), where and when become more 
weighty, especially when the photos we took are placed in relation to the comments: 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 33:  ‘didn’t see any green, didn’t see any dirt’ (Blondie). (Photo 
by Jamie) 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 34: ‘I’m loving the view but it’s just too green’ (Blondie). (Photo 
by BBS) 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 35: ‘too much green round here’ (Blondie). (Photo by BBS) 
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Annotated Polaroid 36: ‘it was all polluted and everything. So it’s just all disgusting 
for all the birds that are in there’ (Blondie). (Photo by Jamie). 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 37: ‘it was very clean’ (Blondie) (Photo by Blondie) 
 
Annotated Polaroid 38: ‘I felt that it was clean and pure’ (Blondie). (Photo by 
Bumble) 
 
Annotated Polaroid 39: ‘loving cleanliness of area and new/old buildings’ (Bumble). 
(Photo by Bumble) 
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The varied reactions to landscape were emphasised in my initial study in 2011, 
where I began to question the dominance of linear causation regarding ‘the healing 
power of nature’. ‘Gideon was recovering from drug addiction and so ‘structure’ was 
particularly important to him with statements such as, “You need to keep on weeding, 
it’s a never ending journey” and “…has kept me focused, gave me some structure to my 
week”.’ (Mcphie, 2015a, p. 560). Concepts such as, neat, tidy, structured, ordered and 
clean began to disrupt the theory I had read, from genetic theories to social 
constructivism. This is the moment in my writing when the penny dropped (see Mcphie, 
2015a, p. 564). By this time, the ecotheory that relied upon innate theories (e.g. Wilson, 
Ulrich and the Kaplan’s), deep ecological perspectives (e.g. Naess) or both (e.g. 
Ecopsychology, environmental psychology and their corresponding therapeutic allies) 
had well and truly been laid to rest.  
Yet green is not merely a colour. It is a concept, percept and affect and as such 
has many empirical permutations. As a political statement it implies a concern for the 
survival of biodiversity but also the preservation of a romanticised concept of nature for 
the cultural hegemony that would enforce it. But it also changes meaning depending on 
the situation and environment a person is in/of at the time. At a political rally on climate 
change, green has a completely different intensity than it does standing in Liverpool 
ONE. But then it would also have a completely different intensity at the same political 
rally if it were raining, at a different time of day/month/year, in a different historical 
period, in a different part of the world, for a different age group, zeitgeist, species and 
even element (for example see Mcphie, 2015a, pp. 560-561). 
During that initial study, I witnessed alternative reasons for these attractions to 
green or blue than the current explanations derived from the genetic theories suggested. 
Depending on a person’s social circumstances, each environment will be perceived 
differently ‘which emphasises the point that there cannot be a generalizable response to 
a singular idea of ‘nature’ (as with the evolutionary claims)’ (Mcphie, 2015a, p. 560).  
 
Not everyone will – or can – be open to the same affective transfers: 
different bodies, differently imagined, will have certain affective responses 
already mapped onto them, defined by social expectations and structures of 
feelings that have built up around issues of gender, class, race, and so forth 
(see Tolia-Kelly 2007, 2012). (Waterton, 2014, p. 13) 
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Scene four: The Golden Arches 
 
 
Annotated Polaroids 40-41: Repression and liberation: ‘there’s nothing. I’m always 
living in fear’ (Blondie) 
 
The CCTV cameras where Dolly and Blondie live (Annotated Polaroid 40) ‘do’ 
something very different to the ones in Liverpool ONE. The signs perform differently 
depending on the person-environment assemblage. If these signs were viewed in a 
wealthy, neat, policed environment, the atmosphere that is co-produced would be felt 
differently, just as it would if the perceiver were rich, white, male, middle class, 
mentally healthy and Western (a majoritarian perspective) compared to a poor, black, 
female, subaltern with mental ill-health. The many possible combinations of 
assemblages this insinuates creates a contextual complexity too entangled to straighten 
out in the way that the majority of current research paradigms attempt. In reality, Mr. 
Neat and Mr. Tidy would never be able to draw boundaries as they do in the children’s 
story. They would never be able to striate the smooth space of Mr. Messy, though they 
try and try and try. 
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Annotated Polaroid 42: The Golden Arches 
 
The golden arches looms over the council estate that dominates the skyline 
where Blondie and Dolly live as a sort of consumer panopticon (as it feeds you it also 
enslaves you). This was the site of our (impromptu) final visit to an environment in the 
minibus (although Blondie and Dolly met us there), after we thought that the trips had 
come to an end. I took this photo believing it to be especially significant to influencing 
the mental health of people who live in this area (due to socio-cultural associations that 
I’ve invented based on my own socio-cultural demographics, which I think from). I 
framed the photo to influence the viewer to link the golden arches to the types of houses 
foregrounded. However, in the moment I pressed the camera button, (similar to the 
words on this page) I died and you, the spec-actor have been born. As it’s not a static 
piece of ‘data’, it is itself, on the page, a very large part of the inquiry process and 
changes the findings dramatically, depending on the contexts co-created by the PhD 
assemblage (you-me-the page-the concepts-the other authors I’ve written with). 
Whether you choose to accept it as a piece of ‘evidence’ (due to being a photo that ‘I’ 
took and not one of the co-participants/co-(re)searchers) is largely based on your own 
socio-demographics (including wellbeing, current mood, area of interest, creative 
ability, transgressive intent, ethical interests and political affiliations).  
Hence, the golden arches presented here becomes something entirely different 
from both ‘my’ initial affective response to it as well as whatever the people who live 
in that environment make of it. It also lets us in to glimpsing a previously hidden world 
of ‘us’ as multiplicities of human-environment assemblages (that includes the 
imbrication of various materialisms such as paper and picture or concepts such as the 
golden arches and council estates) that produces what we generally think of as mental 
health outcomes. 
When asked the question, ‘Did you have any preconceived preferences of any 
particular environments before joining WiC?’, Blondie replied (speaking about the 
town where she lives): 
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Snippet 15: ‘its bad for your health’ (Blondie) 
 
There’s a juxtaposition between repression and liberation that seems counter 
intuitive when I compare Blondie’s comments about her home town where she lives, 
‘there’s nothing. I’m always living in fear’ with her favourable comments about 
Liverpool ONE, ‘didn’t see any green, didn’t see any dirt’ (Blondie). So, for Blondie, 
at those particular times, Liverpool ONE was clean and safe, Gummers How was green 
and dirty and her home was a place of fear.  
As emphasised in Gehlert et al.’s, (2008) research, where breast cancer in black 
women was linked to living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, ‘[m]any studies have 
found direct and indirect relationships between individual levels of mental and physical 
health and neighbourhood characteristics (Brewster, 1994; Cohen et al., 2000; LaGory 
and Fitzpatrick, 1992; Ross et al., 2000; Schulz et al., 2000)’ (cited in Mitchell & 
LaGory, 2002, p. 200). This is because mental health is a physical, ecological process 
and as such is affected by political cascades. 
 
Spaces of fear 
 
Trophic cascades are well known in ecology but less so in sociology. There are 
no studies, as far as I’m aware, that discuss mental health as a trophic cascade.  
When the wolves were (re)introduced to Yellowstone Park in the US, it altered 
the shape of the rivers. The wolves created spaces of fear, areas where the deer or Elk 
would not venture for fear of being eaten. This allowed the flora to flourish, in turn 
providing Beavers with materials for building their dams. The dams would then alter 
the rivers course, changing the shape of the land. So the physical morphogenesis of the 
landscape came about partly due to an emotional response. Thus, affect is capable of 
landscaping without prior intention or independent agency. 
Blondie goes ‘down the back streets’ because of fear; felt atmospheres and 
forces of encounter (affect). Her physical presence in one area and lack of presence in 
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another area, over time, physically changes the environment (in ways that I cannot 
possibly list here). This, in turn, will physically change Blondie. The paths that co-
emerge for us to tread take us along routes that morph our very physicality. If certain 
processes of the environment are repressed, as shown in these photos, then ‘we’ become 
repressed because ‘we’ are the environment.  For example, if your home is a 
homogenised or sanitised space (or at least you conceive-perceive it as such), isolated 
from symbiotic relationships of diversity, preventing social relations from blooming, 
you may become as homogenised as your house. 
The developers of cheap, mass produced accommodation born out of neo-liberal 
capitalist democracies may indeed promote spaces of fear, leading to mental ill-health: 
a (non-linear) trophic cascade. But this is not a unidirectional and linear cause-and-
effect trajectory. It is an assemblage and can operate in multidirectional flows. Mental 
ill-health may also feed a neo-liberal capitalist democracy. For example, if we agree 
that hyper-consumption is a disease or perhaps a sign (and symptom) of environ(mental) 
ill-health, then we can observe (and participate in) the feeding of this disorder by a neo-
liberal capitalist democracy as well as the feeding of a neo-liberal capitalist democracy 
by the disease hyper-consumption. Liverpool ONE is a mental (dis)order yet it co-
creates a symbiotic relationship with the creatures (biotic and abiotic) that feed it. 
Others who do not feed it are not allowed in it. Is this not also true of green spaces? 
National parks? Rural countryside? The homogenised spaces of many housing estates 
built for cheap accommodation also build inorganic relationships. For example, gated 
communities promote what Mike Davis (1998) calls an ‘ecology of fear’ as the physical 
barriers enact physical cascades. 
The options available exist only relative to the specific affordances when 
‘plugged in’ to particular emergent assemblages. They are contextual. For example, a 
‘romantic gaze’ upon a specific environment type (such as the romanticised nature of 
‘England’s green and pleasant land’) may only be afforded to certain socio-
demographics at certain historical junctures. Hence the reactions from some of the WiC 
group when visiting a private permaculture plot (not to mention Blondie’s reactions to 
the ‘green’ of the countryside). The general consensus from the WiC group was that it 
was a privileged (and slightly ‘hippie’) middle-class endeavour that was not particularly 
accessible to many from other groups. This was certainly understandable when 
comparing the amount of private land we were joyously shown around to the fact that 
Blondie and Dolly’s flats didn’t even have potential for a window box.  
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We do not all have access (specifically ‘epistemological’ access) to the 
restorative and healing environments espoused by ecopsychology, etc. Therefore, it is 
an ethico-political dilemma that we find ourselves in. Even if we are all allowed 
epistemological access to certain romanticized restorative environments, it doesn’t 
mean that we should, as there may be dire social and environmental consequences. Just 
look at the exportation of the romantic gaze from England to America and Australia. 
When a non-native species is quickly introduced to a new environment (and climate) 
that it did not evolve in, it tends to have consequences, some of which are harmful. As 
we can’t help but take place with us wherever we go, if forceful enough (through 
number or wealth) we will almost always end up destroying that environment (by 
disrupting the diverse heterogeneous relations that support that environment).  
 
Our engagements with heritage are thus vulnerable, changing, contested 
and, ultimately, contingent – upon our histories, memories, the nuances of 
our personalities, our social positions, cultural affiliations, ethnic 
backgrounds and the discursive realms within which we operate and to 
which we respond (see Staiff et al. 2013). But they are contingent not only 
on the human. Think for a moment about the affective capacities of a 
heritage site that pushes forward a narrative of the past that is almost entirely 
white and based on the privileged classes. If these narratives are being 
consumed by an overwhelmingly white audience who have the capacity to 
be affected, we then need to think politically. (Waterton, 2014, p. 16) 
 
Thus the concept ‘green’ becomes a tool or strategy of/for power relations and very 
much associated with social class depending on its relational context (i.e. how it is 
‘used’ and what it is used for). But what does this ‘do’? Well, in this case it allows 
epistemological access to privileged environments, just as the hegemonic middle-upper 
classes of the romantic era (re)developed/invented the concepts of wilderness, sublime 
and nature to gain a semi-spiritual sense of wellbeing whilst forbidding the working 
classes such enlightened access (e.g. the privileged protests that stopped the train from 
carrying the working classes on to Ambleside from Windermere, something that still 
exists and is quite evident today).  
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The very idea of heritage mobilized here plays a key role, differentially 
enabling some citizens to feel connected while others cannot. As Crang and 
Tolia-Kelly (2010, p. 2316) point out, this ‘privileging of one form of 
affective response as universal has been the hallmark of exclusive 
heritages.’ (Waterton, 2014, p. 17). 
 
The Lake District (as well as all the other national parks) is a boundaried site of 
privileged epistemological access (see Mcphie, 2014b, n.p.). This is evident in the 
housing situation. A report by the charity ‘Shelter’ (2013) highlighted how houses in 
the South Lake District national park cost more than nine times the average household 
income. Where Dolly and Blondie live, just outside that invented border, it costs a third 
of the average. This is highlighted in a journal extract by Jim:  
 
 
Note 32: ‘We’re from the lake district and we’ve come to gloat’ (Jim) 
 
Scene five: Abstract space … Little Arnolds…and a hill… 
 
Lefebvre (1991) understood the hegemony of ‘abstract space’ as having arisen 
with capitalism and is ‘socially produced under particular universalizing social 
relations’ (Mitchell, 2003, p. 29). It is the ‘arrangement of space that makes capitalism 
possible’ (Mitchell, 2003, p. 29) and ‘it is struggle alone which prevents abstract space 
from taking over the whole planet and papering over all differences’ in order to produce 
a more healthy ‘differentiated space’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 55, cited in Mitchell, 2003, p. 
29). 
For myself, this abstract space is not only visible in the city but perhaps even 
more visible in the countryside with the invention of nature and wilderness. The Kinder 
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trespass worked for the English middle classes but Yellowstone is still off limits to the 
Shoshone Sheep Eaters. And in some respect the English national parks are still off 
limits to many people today in the form of epistemological inaccessibility (just like this 
language!). There is also an issue of rural homogeneity in ‘England’s green and pleasant 
land’, one that is exported to colonise other lands and minds as all cultural hegemonies 
take place with them. Although Lefebvre was from the countryside, he  
 
shared with Marx a disdain for the idiocy […] the essential privacy – and 
therefore isolation and homogeneity – of rural life. In contrast, cities were 
necessarily public – and therefore places of social interaction and exchange 
with people who were necessarily different. Publicity demands 
heterogeneity and the space of the city – with its density and its constant 
attraction of new immigrants – assured a thick fabric of heterogeneity, one 
in which encounters with difference are guaranteed. But for the encounter 
with difference to really succeed, then […] the right to inhabit the city – by 
different people and different groups – had always to be struggled for. 
(Mitchell, 2003, p. 18) 
 
Our (WiC’s) attempt to walk a circle in the countryside was impeded by the fences of 
privatised land. Hence, the line that led us was forcibly pushed by the fence itself, 
pushed by the land laws governing it, pushed by the aesthetics of a Teletubby landscape, 
pushed by a historicisation of materiality. It was much easier to walk in the city centre 
than in the countryside (in terms of topographical and epistemological access), even in 
the privatised public space of Liverpool ONE. The English countryside was taken and 
privatised so long ago (mostly by the Normans) that I (among many) often forget that I 
have less freedom or control than in the city (and some cities more than others). Yet it 
is now in the city that some of us protest for more freedom and control. The countryside 
was always already the new urban and the urban is quickly becoming the new 
countryside. 
 
Little Arnolds 
 
Matthew Arnold’s (1993) response to the 1866 Hyde Park working class 
demonstrations for the right to vote was to reign in their ‘rights’ and assert ‘firmer 
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control over public space’ (Williams, 1997, paraphrased in Mitchell, 2003, p. 14). This 
next quote is Mitchell’s response to Arnold’s response: 
 
But, just as it is always necessary “to go again to Hyde Park” – for people 
to take control of public space in defiance of the order, control, and 
contempt imposed upon them in the name of vouchsafing the vested 
interests of the few – so too in response do there arise legions of little 
Matthew Arnold imitators. “Our own little Arnolds,” Williams (1997 
[1980], 8) called them, who claim they are promoting “excellence and 
humane values on the one hand; discipline and where necessary repression 
on the other.” It is not just spectacular protests, riots, or mass 
demonstrations that draw out these “little Arnolds.” In the contemporary 
United States, these “little Arnolds” have multiplied most rapidly around 
the perceived disordering of city streets that has come with the persistent 
growth of homelessness, with the growing numbers of the un- and 
underemployed, the mentally ill, and the drug-addicted who have no other 
recourse than to live their lives in full view of the urban public. For the 
homeless “to go to Hyde Park” is often a matter of survival; for their 
detractors this “occupation” of public space by homeless people is seen as 
a clear affront to the order, dignity, and the civilisation of the city. (Mitchell, 
2003, pp. 14-15, emphasis added) 
 
Order and control are part of the territorialisation of environments (including 
spaces, places and everything within their conceptual borders). This ranges from 
weeds, wolves, minority groups and topography to countries, planets and even as 
far out as concepts and topological space.  
 
Smooth and striated space 
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Transfers 34-37: Abstract, Striated green space. (Photos by Henry Shaftoe, n.d. 
Reprinted with permission). 
 
These pictures (Transfers 34-37) taken by Henry Shaftoe show the 
implementation of a policy (made somewhere other than where these photographs were 
taken) that was developed from research (performed somewhere other than where these 
photographs were taken) that stated that green spaces were necessary to reduce 
antisocial behaviour (although it could easily be argued that the anti-social behaviour 
of a ‘gang’ is actually a good example of ‘social’ behaviour!) and increase mental health 
and well-being (a generalised ‘mental health and well-being’ that was conceived by a 
group of people other than the people in these photographs). The green spaces were 
built (by a group of people other than the people in these photographs) and then left for 
the people in these photographs. Unfortunately, yet not particularly surprisingly, these 
green spaces didn’t achieve the desired effects (I’m sure I don’t have to spell out the 
obvious in these pictures). Interestingly, some of the problems I’ve just highlighted 
were brought up at a conference at Bristol University by Henry Shaftoe and yet when I 
asked the question, ‘but why aren’t the people in these photographs, who this conference 
is ultimately ‘about’ and ‘for’, here, at this conference?’ there was an embarrassed 
silence and nobody would give an answer. The economic, socio-cultural and 
epistemological capital needed to access this conference about community inclusion is 
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not on the agenda of this conference and so is simply not discussed. In fact, I don’t know 
of any conference where this has been the main (or any other) topic of the conference!  
 
For the first time a new architecture, which in all previous epochs had been 
reserved for the satisfaction of the ruling classes, is directly aimed at the 
poor […] Authoritarian decision, which abstractly organizes territory into 
territory of abstraction, is obviously at the heart of these modern conditions 
of construction. (Debord, 1983, para. 173) 
 
As exemplified in Henry Shaftoe’s photos (Transfers 50-53) many green spaces in 
places of poverty become territories of abstraction when they are abstractly organised. 
What this does is sends a clear message to those who live next to these spaces: ‘we don’t 
really care’! Those who have epistemological and social access to a sublime rural 
nature as opposed to this specific type of urban green space seem to do rather well out 
of this deal, they call it the healing power of nature. Of course, this is Nature 3, not 
Nature 4 or 5. The grass that seeps through the pavement is reserved for the poor, not 
the romanticised mountain legacy of Thomas Burnett.  
 
 
 
Agency, mind and mental health can only ever be articulated through prismatic 
intra-relations within temporal assemblages. They/it can never be articulated 
independently or in any fixed or static state. Just as agency and mind are shared and co-
produced, so is mental health. This is why such concepts are better described as 
haecceities rather than quiddities as we attempt to diffract and make a move away from 
striation.  
Striated space produces ‘the measurable’, such as longitude and latitude, and 
creates homogeneity whereas nomadic smooth space is both formless and non-formal 
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(Hubert, n.d.).  Deleuze and Guattari (2004) ask the nomad researcher to occupy and 
then hold smooth space. 
On Gummer’s How we (WiC) came up against striated AND abstract space. The 
ready formed footpaths and fences prevented us from walking our much prized circle 
either by leading us to follow a path of least resistance or by damming up the previously 
free-flowing water to lead us down a striated canal where we can be more easily 
contained.   
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 43: Striated space 
 
 
Annotated Polaroid 44: Striated space 
 
This wasn’t so different from the striated space when we visited a Buddhist 
temple: 
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Annotated Polaroids 45-49: Striated spaces with an attempt to smooth them 
out, causing further striation. (Photos by Jamie) 
 
Donaldo Macedo (2000, p. 12) asserted that Paulo Freire's view offered him: 
 
—and all of those who experience subordination through an imposed 
assimilation policy—a path through which we come to understand what it 
means to come to cultural voice. It is a process that always involves pain 
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and hope; a process through which, as forced cultural jugglers, we can come 
to subjectivity, transcending our object position in a society that hosts us 
yet is alien. 
 
Yet what can the body do to achieve this transformation? Is it a will-to-power (following 
Nietzsche), a form of psychological resilience that we must enact? Is it the responsibility 
of the ecologically oppressed to enforce their own forms of resilience and resistance to 
enable so-called subjectivities to appear? Isn’t this just another way to control or 
manage possible rebellions to hegemonic power structures that already control the 
striated green (and yellow: see assemblage three) space? Or is this transformation out-
of-our-hands as is implied by a resistance to the belief in the Cartesian soul or Freudian 
ego?  In other words, how can we come to a healthily co-produced distributed agency 
that suggests neither environmental determinism nor free will derived from an 
anthropocentrically invented subjective self? There may not be any model for a frame 
of reference to develop these healthy spaces but there may just be temporal directions 
that lines of flight are co-produced by, like moving trains that we might be able to jump 
on as they pass by, occasionally diffracting the trains course by nudging the railroad 
switches out of the carriage window as we fly past them.  
Maybe I should make use of diffraction rather than transgression then, as my 
normally reactive nature quite possibly produces a similar epistemological 
inaccessibility to (potentially) more healthy lines of flight. Maybe Deleuze and Guattari 
were right. Maybe my transgressive actions (thought) reduces the creative potential for 
positive desire. 
 
Only by exercising this positive desire could humans be creative rather than 
reactive, to meet their (real, not symbolic) needs and become free from 
capitalist oppression (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 254). (Fox & Ward, 2008, 
p. 1008) 
 
Summing up the middle… 
 
Spuybroek (2011, p. 182) notes that ‘we are not recipients but participants.’ 
‘[A]ffect is not confined to the individual body or people at all: it is transmitted, moves, 
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circulates, flows outside and between bodies, incorporating a range of things, places 
and technologies (Lorimer 2008).’ (Waterton, 2014, p. 13) … like mental health!!! 
 
All this means, indeed the transmission of affect means, that we are not self-
contained in terms of our energies. There is no secure distinction between 
the “individual” and the “environment.” (Brennan, 2004, p. 6) 
 
The concepts mind, affect, percept, cognition and memory are all material, 
physiological processes that don’t merely ‘bridge’ body-environment distinctions (as 
we have explored, there is no river dividing them) but are the very ecotones of 
embodiment, the epidermis of our true bodies that continuously flow in and out of the 
haecceity that is ‘us’. They are perhaps better thought of as different tributaries of the 
same river and have no ‘distinct’ boundaries, only confluences or confluxes (where 
rivers merge). And if these concepts partly make up what we think of as mental health, 
then mental health is also such a convergence of force, matter and energy. Also, as they 
are all concepts of some sort, we must also include concepts into the mental health 
assemblage. Therefore, mental health must be influenced (physically) by concepts such 
as, social hierarchy, territorialisation, nature, happiness, space, place and time. For 
psychotherapists, this means treating the person as an ecologically spread and a-centred 
haecceity as well as a physically distributed intra-relational assemblage. We cannot 
afford to omit the political, social, ecological, spatial, temporal, perceptual, conceptual 
and affective structures (all material) that are contextual to mental health and wellbeing. 
Also, I believe there is an imperative to begin conceiving of mental health and wellbeing 
as not merely contained within an anthropocentric dialogue. We must begin discussing 
the mental health of the environment, just as Gregory Bateson and many animists 
emphasise/d. This is not anthropomorphism, if we think immanently rather than 
transcendently. Remember Green’s (1997) words, the Celtic god Taranis was not the 
god ‘of’ thunder, it ‘was’ thunder! This is extended embodiment, a type of ecomorphism 
rather than anthropomorphism. The psychoanalysts ‘patient’ is not a self-contained 
vessel to be fixed. They are of the couch, the room, the hierarchical social divide 
between the analyst and themselves, the land, their culture, their body, the topology of 
the internet, the sun, and…and…and... 
 
262 
 
Epilogue=Prologue: From Observation to Participation  
 
‘things – and not their representations – are said to flow through the mind’ (Brinkley, 
1992, p. 247) 
 
Scene one: HAT’s and QAT’s 
 
Deleuze’s purpose in writing Difference and Repetition, was ‘not an intellectual 
search for meaning, but an affective encounter, a turning on’ (Protevi, 2010, p. 36). 
‘You don’t understand music: you hear it. So hear me with your whole body.’ 
(Lispector, 2014, p. 4). So, at this moment, I do hope we have arrived ‘at a perfect and 
unformed expression, a materially intense expression’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 
19)...like jazz! 
There is a ‘usual way’ to research mental health and wellbeing (privileging 
transcendence) and a ‘transgressive-diffractive121 way’ (privileging immanence). The 
usual way involves looking at the individual psyche (a quiddity) either in isolation 
(pointillism) as a psychological discipline or in relation to their immediate social and 
environmental topography as a striated geographical discipline. A transgressive-
diffractive way does not simplify the mental realm (a haecceity) to that of the 
brain/mind, genes or immediate Euclidean environment. The physical realm of the 
‘mental’ is spread in the environment. Therefore, a transgressive-diffractive way 
explores these physical topological intra-relations. Mental health and wellbeing is 
much more complex than traditional Western models currently suggest. A 
transgressive-diffractive way involves a much flatter ontological approach to exploring 
this area than any one discipline may reveal. Therefore, multidisciplinary transgressive-
diffractive research that explores more emergent lines/paths of topological intra-
relations may prove to be more useful (and ethical) than simply ‘sticking to the rules’ 
                                                          
121 As I found both transgression and diffraction useful concepts to think with, I 
combined them here as a useful partnership. I placed transgression before diffraction 
on purpose in order to remind myself to be transgressively diffractive (diffraction is 
ultimately rooted in transgression as a political ploy) rather than diffractively 
transgressive (diffraction dissipates or diffuses transgression). However, since writing 
this I have changed my mind and will now be attentive to my habitually reactive 
nature in order to co-produce further affirmative-critical/diffractive-creative 
becomings rather than transgressive ones. 
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of any one bounded subject area or even method of analysis that boasts representational 
outcomes or conclusions.  
A transgressive-diffractive approach to research can also make use of temporal 
Haecceitical Analysis Techniques (HAT’s) as an alternative to staid Quiddital 
Arborescent Techniques (QAT’s). When thinking with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
rhizoanalysis, for example, I was provoked into attending to the flat ecological topology 
of intensities and rhythms of spatiotemporal intra-relations as opposed to bounding, 
tracing and hierarchizing data into codes, categories or statistical significance.  
A very obvious example of this more open topological approach to analysis 
would be to map/create a new (yet flat) path when following the words of Blondie. She 
found Liverpool ONE to have a positive influence on her mental health and wellbeing 
(even when compared to the ‘dirty’, green landscape of Gummers How in the Lake 
District). A flatter path takes us into new territories (without presuming they are more 
important), it forces us to explore the palimpsest of influential phenomena such as the 
historisisation and politicisation that shapes/d the physical-mental architecture of the 
concept-percept-affect that is Liverpool ONE. It takes us there because the Euclidean 
geography and representational ideologies are simply not enough to understand not how 
the whole is other than the sum of its parts but how there are never static or fixed wholes 
or parts to begin with. So we can also explore the palimpsest of our experience in 
Liverpool. This could involve how certain streets came to be there; their shapes, 
textures, depths, lengths, proportions, styles, resemblances, etc. It could involve 
who/what owns them and their socio-demographics, revealing a political trophic 
cascade (their voting preference may relate to their reasons for co-designing a shopping 
centre in a particular style which may influence how a person feels when experiencing 
it, consciously or unconsciously, etc.). Exploring what these things do, has been perhaps 
more politically and ethically revealing than other lines of questioning. Also, exposing 
what we might usually think of as ‘cultural’ or ‘artificial’ (Annotated Polaroids 50 & 
51) using a properly ecological inquiry method (exposing ‘all’ objects of study as intra-
relations), has been most fruitful.      
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Annotated Polaroid 50: ‘The power of man-made beauty’ (BBS). (Photo by BBS). 
 
 
Note 33: ‘in shock and awe’ (BBS) 
 
 
Note 34: ‘a traffic cone 😃’ (BBS) 
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Annotated Polaroid 51: ‘The great escape from the M6 to sanctuary’ (BBS). (Photo 
by BBS). 
 
The tataus, the graffiti and the emoji are all inscriptions in the flesh of the earth, 
ways of memorialising the past and resisting the present. ‘The memory of its 
materializing effects is written into the world.’ (Barad, 2012b, p. 67). The consequences 
of the concepts become perceptually pronounced. The photos, written documents, video 
interviews and focus group meetings are all transfers, tracings of the original marks 
engraved into the flow of spacetim(ing). Yet even the tataus become transfers as soon 
as they are re-presented, interpreted, analysed, re-searched, etc. And, as they become 
transfers, their very materiality changes and morphs into something new, something of 
a Debordian spectacle. It dramatises it. This questions the very logic and possibility of 
‘doing research’. However, I believe I have exampled a way out of this conundrum 
through the play, Liverpool ONE - Liverpool Too, as it highlights, juxtaposes and places 
the ‘event assemblage’ (the focus group meetings as well as the WiC outings) under 
erasure and by doing so enables an enactment of diffraction.  
I’m not sure that I agree with Sontag (1990) that ‘all thinking is interpretation’ 
(p. 93). After this exploration I would most certainly place interpretation itself under 
erasure. By performing it in this way, it makes clear that it is an issue, which is hopefully 
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enough to counterbalance the contradictions of ‘doing research’. It does this by 
changing the very fabric of the ecological thought processes that go through the reader’s 
‘mind’ as they engage with the text. Therefore, the Brechtian play co-operates with the 
reader (you) to open up the mere possibility of productive change (lines of flight). The 
research assemblage that is this PhD is also placed sous rature through the constant 
attempts at (re)minding as well as the titled composition of a play format. It is the 
‘attempt’ that seems to do the trick. 
 
Scene two: Re-searching re-search. 
 
What did the co-participants/co-(re)searchers rumination, regarding enhancing 
their moods, ‘do’? If they had not asked this question before visiting many of the 
environments we travelled to, would the same behaviours have been produced? I think 
not. The same can be said of the rumination ‘how is mental health and wellbeing spread 
in the environment’? So what does research itself produce? 
The research process itself, became a therapeutic process as well as something 
else. Whilst undertaking research on mental health and wellbeing, all of the co-
participants/co-(re)searchers reported becoming ‘healthier’ (from at least one definition 
of the concept), as a co-emergent process. This process involved the social, ecological, 
political, etc. The emoji, the paper in the journals, the pens/pencils, the ordered lines on 
the page to keep words in their place, the words, the locations (topographical and 
topological), the people, the weather, the embodied memories, the stone, the phone, the 
tone…all played a part in this (Brechtian) play. Each player wandered in and out of 
character (Deleuze would call this ‘plugging in’ and ‘plugging out’ of the temporal 
assemblages) as they continually morphed into major and minor roles depending on the 
context of the temporal events.  
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Snippet 16: ‘I’m like weeeee’ (Dolly) 
 
Everyone’s different. This has implications for ‘where’ therapy is ‘performed’. 
It really is dependent on the temporal person-place assemblage. So, rather than having 
a set place to undertake psychotherapy or psychiatry, such as the clinical indoor 
(natural) setting or the romanticised outdoor (natural) setting, perhaps the stage for 
‘therapy’ needs to be negotiated and experimented with on a person-by-person-by-
assemblage basis, or even a person-by-group-by-assemblage basis (and if we include 
time, as people-place assemblages constantly change, then we must also be adaptable 
to these changing assemblages). Even though we (WiC) were not ‘doing’ therapy, more 
than half of our process was very physically mobile122, in a variety of settings.  
                                                          
122 I realise that even by sitting in a room one is still ‘mobile’ as time moves us 
(onward) wherever we are, yet there is a difference in speed, rhythm, tempo, energy 
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‘Leavy suggests we all could benefit from challenging our own comfort zones 
and begin to see that we can all learn from our colleagues regardless of the method 
being utilized’ (Chenail, 2008, p. 8). There are many possibilities that emerge from 
diffraction but if we attempt to co-create these lines of flight more diffractively, from a 
flatter ontology, I wager more productive paths will emerge.  
 
Healthy (re)search? 
 
I would like to introduce-depart with some evaluative comments from the WiC 
assemblage that highlight what this style of inquiry has the possibility to produce: 
 
 
Note 35: ‘in a good mood’ (BBS). 
 
 
 
Note 36: ‘Thanks’ (BBS) 
 
                                                          
and force between slower events (sat in a room) and faster events (walking through a 
city or up a hill). 
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Note 45: ‘a very positive experience’ (Bumble) 
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Note 38: ‘Been good year’ (Bumble) 
 
 
 
Note 39: ‘I’m a lot more confident’ (Jim). 
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One of the outings that the WiC assemblage took was particularly healthful for 
BBS where even ‘noise’ was not considered stressful, emphasising a certain resilience. 
 
 
Snippet 27: ‘happiness words’ (BBS) 
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Note 40: ‘I like myself’ (BBS) 
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Notes 41-43: ‘I’m so happy’ (BBS) 
 
 
Annotated Polaroids 94-95: BBS’s marks in the sand. (Photos by BBS) 
 
At first glance, these admissions might seem like lines of flight, taking off in 
various healthful rhizomatic directions. Yet the (re)search process may have been a 
victim of its own success as the second (re)search rumination that the group introduced 
may have suffered as a result of the efficacy of the (re)search process itself. The 
improved ‘mood’ and ‘happiness’ that Dolly and Blondie reported during the outings 
seemed short lived on their return to their home existence. This reported happiness 
suddenly seems rather shallow. 
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Note 44: ‘I wouldn’t be able to do it on my own without all you. I haven’t felt anxious 
all day, but when I go back to [home] I look over my shoulder, I hate it.’ (Blondie) 
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Note 45: ‘till I returned home’ (Dolly) 
 
Maybe the minibus discouraged resilience for Dolly and Blondie due to the 
reliance on its mobility to gain (physical) access to previously inaccessible varied 
environments.  
Maybe the materials we were working with, the video recorder, the cameras, the 
minibus, the journals, my laptop, the emoji, all played a part in their invitations to 
accessibility, including epistemological accessibility.  
 
This elementary principle of prosthesis and prosthetic projection animates 
the whole technological universe […] the human organic mass, the body, is 
the first manufacturer of technology in that it seeks for organic extension of 
itself first through tools, weapons, and artifacts, then through language, the 
ultimate prosthesis. (Braidotti, 1994, p. 44).  
 
Maybe the after-effects of the research events conjured up a prosthetic ghost due to the 
over reliance of technology as extended selves. Put another way, the materials that I 
(and the University of Cumbria) provided for the ‘data’ collection may have 
inadvertently produced a sense of dis-embodiment/enmindment as their extended tool-
selves (the minibus, cameras, etc.) were left behind (with me, until the next outing).  
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The agential capacities of the social assemblage that was the WiC group itself 
seemed to play a dominant role for Blondie and Dolly and as such the affective-social 
aspects of the WiC events may well have been a key component in their sense of 
relational loss and resumed anxiety.  
Maybe I, as the main facilitator, discouraged resilience by passively taking the 
lead so many times regarding organising meetings, writing up the academic verse and 
presenting it at expensive academic conferences designed to keep out those who may 
never accrue monetary, social and epistemological access to such elitist, hegemonic 
events. ‘Power resides in the affective flows between relations in assemblages, the 
aggregations and singularities these flows produce, and the capacities or constraints 
upon capacities produced in some – and not other – bodies, collectivities and non-
human formations.’ (Fox & Alldred, 2014, pp. 4-5). 
Maybe I allowed epistemological access (through my own espousing of the 
theories that I had read) as well as an epistemological restriction through my 
(sometimes) inaccessible academic language (evident in my first focus group encounter 
where I reeled off the theory on co-operative action research to a room of blank faces).  
Maybe a (re)search process that is designed to encourage such personal and 
social effectiveness as collaboration, self-efficacy, internal locus of control, etc. was 
actually the main culprit itself. Research with rather than on people sounds ethically 
responsible and yet I can’t help but wonder what the performance of ‘with’ does? I 
suppose it depends on multiple possibilities, including who is doing the facilitating and 
who is being facilitated. I imagine it would make quite a big difference if the facilitator 
were a trained therapist and/or the facilitated were a white middle-class Western male 
with no history of mental ill-health and an ample supply of self-efficacy. 
‘Marginalized people, including people diagnosed with mental health problems, 
must, despite their starting point of epistemic disadvantage, enact their own forms of 
resistance.’ (Fisher & Freshwater, 2013, p.6, emphasis added). Paulo Freire (1996, p. 
64) proposed that ‘people develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in 
the world with which and in which they find themselves’. Would it be better to remove 
the therapist? By continuing to support the professional-patient dichotomy of power 
relations to find a ‘cure’, are they complicit in the formation of striated space? I do not 
have the inclination to suggest we do this but it’s worth a look at what this role does. 
Just as a philanthropist is complicit in reifying a capitalist ideology, is the therapist also? 
If we are to enact a ‘prevention’ rather than ‘cure’ philosophy, then maybe this 
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suggestion would be logical. However, a prevention and cure philosophy does 
something different yet again. If this is indeed possible, then I imagine it may look a bit 
like the irony inherent in Jonathan’s Wyatt’s (2013) description of becoming-(non-
)councellor. Either way, we need a different sort of ethico-onto-epistemological 
engagement if we wish to become healthy haecceities (human-environments).  
This may sound cynical or even nihilistic, but maybe Blondie and Dolly are 
fighting a losing battle. It sometimes seems like a futile attempt to persevere at 
developing healthful and/or resilient becomings just to be beaten down again when you 
return home to an environment that is not only unsupportive, but is also perhaps part of 
the ‘cause’ of mental ill-health in the first place. The political infrastructure doesn’t 
seem to allow them (and many other people without an appropriate amount of social 
capital, economic prosperity or epistemological accessibility to privaledged 
environments) any sort of respite or escape. In other words, how can lines of flight be 
co-produced if you are chained to a tree (Plato’s)? Perhaps the key to healthy 
assemblages is to diffract the arborescent ideology at its roots: the modern, Western, 
humanist, neo-liberal capitalist ethico-onto-epistemology. 
 
Spatial environments are one of the primary ways by which we have 
socially extended our organs and minds. Today, we need to re-conceive of 
what we understand by nature, and what we understand as our relationship 
to it. We need to propose new formations and new metabolisms of country 
and city, we need to re-theorise alienation, health and well-being, as part of 
a bigger attempt to, as Fuller suggested, make existing models obsolete. 
(Goodbun, n.d., p. 46) 
 
Mulling over recent literature has led me to believe that a variety of diversities (e.g. bio-
, geo-, socio-, eco-, ethico-, linguistic, conceptual, artistic, etc.) are important for mental 
health and wellbeing (human and other-than-human). I suppose an ideal strategy would 
be to mix a classless, non-romanticised ecotherapy (perhaps exchanging Wordsworth’s 
poetry for Norman Nicholson’s) with art and narrative therapy…and then get rid of the 
therapists. In order to tackle the ethico-onto-epistemological structures that permeate 
the Western neo-liberal capitalist democracy we cannot continue to just keep fixing and 
curing as if mental health were a transcendent quiddity. We must rally to prevention at 
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the same time. This means attending to the mental health of the environment. It means 
attending to the haecceitical immanence of ‘environ(mental) health.’ 
 
Scene three: ‘Environ(Mental) Health’: The immanent spatio-temporal 
distribution of mental health and wellbeing 
 
I repeat: Nietzshe (1967/1887) stated, ‘[i]f we were to remove all the 
relationships and actions of a thing, the thing does not remain.’ (p. 302). ‘Thus, there 
cannot be a fixed point from which a fixed individuation can observe another fixed 
individuation at another fixed point […] everything is entangled and always already 
overlapping, dynamic, contested, multiple, antagonistic, becoming, in process.’ (St. 
Pierre, 2011, p. 619). Perhaps, then, we are simply-complexly the relations themselves? 
The mind (noosphere), and thus mental health also, is spread throughout the 
biosphere, lithosphere and hydrosphere. Indeed, some (including Tim Ingold) would go 
as far as to say that our mind is also spread in the troposphere (and perhaps beyond), 
just as the ‘weather’ or ‘climate’ can often influence our mood (Ingold, 2015). In fact, 
if we think topologically rather than topographically, there are no bound or separate 
spheres to begin with as we contain traces of all of these so called spheres, we are made 
of them. Therefore, I would also add that the mind, and thus mental health, is spread 
temporally, as evidenced by BBS in Liverpool when he encountered a momentary lapse 
in composure due to the auditory and chemical stimulation that allowed him 
(involuntarily) to travel back in time to his unfortunate accident that co-produced his 
PTSD and change it, once again (see Liverpool ONE – Liverpool Too play script 
supplement). Price-Robertson and Duff (2015) purport that ‘[a] more comprehensive 
and useful account of PTSD ought to commence with the assemblage itself as the basic 
unit of analysis’ (p. 15) ‘which move[s] beyond the “individual,” “discourse,” or 
“institutions” to enable far more comprehensive studies of the ways psychological 
problems are experienced’ (p. 14). This way of working holds many potentials for 
creating lines of flight to more healthy futures. ‘The goal must be to transform the ways 
different actors, entities, and/or forces affect one another in the event of their 
association, such that the production of PTSD may be reduced within a given social 
field (Duff, 2014).’ (Price-Robertson & Duff, 2015, p. 16).  
As Gregory Bateson (2000) put forward in his example of the blind man with a 
stick, our conscious experience is extended and spread in the environment and to chop 
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a part of that assemblage out (such as the stick or the street) in order to reduce the 
variables may produce unintended and questionable ethical consequences. These 
integrated (un)conscious experiences also involve what we think of as memory. 
‘Memory, too, requires a physical and causal continuity with past events. Thus, memory 
is another kind of postponed perception’ (Manzotti, 2008, n.p.). Postponed perception 
merges with current events and may become particularly emphasised if there are 
physical traces of association that (re)mind us of the original event that is stored in a 
constantly changing/becoming embodied memory, like that of the BBS-pneumatic drill 
assemblage. 
Commenting on Gregory Bateson’s blind man-stick-street assemblage, 
Malafouris (2013) suggests 
 
[t]his extension in the “body schema” also means that the brain treats the 
stick as part of the body. One could see in this emergent coalition between 
the blind man and the stick, which enables the making of vision out of touch, 
a powerful metaphor for what it means to be human. (p. 5) 
 
In other words, ‘what we often see as a fixed human nature is more a flexible process 
of ongoing human becoming’ (Malafouris, 2013, p. 5). Malafouris’ Material 
Engagement Theory (2004) is ‘the zone in which brains, bodies, and things conflate, 
mutually catalyzing and constituting one another’. This zone, I call the ecotone. Just as 
an ecotone bridges the inorganic skin of the human ‘internal’ environment with the 
illusory ‘external’ environment, the ‘mental world—the mind’, as Gregory Bateson 
points out, ‘is not limited by the skin’ (2000, p. 460) or, I would add, by time. Malafouris 
(2013) points out that this is why Bateson was able to recognise the blind man’s stick 
as a pathway rather than a boundary; ‘the mental characteristics of the system are 
immanent, not in some part, but in the system as a whole’ (Bateson, 2000, p. 316) and 
so ‘skillfull experience with a cane can actually extend the body beyond its strictly 
biological limits’ (Noë, 2009, p. 79). Therefore, the stick, to a human, is similar to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) wasp to an orchid in that it forms part of the ‘make-up’ 
of the (non-)organism (process/haecceity/knot). The wasp is a (detachable) mobile 
sexual organ of the orchid and the stick is a (detachable) extended sensory limb for the 
blind person, just as the orchid is an orgasm for the wasp and the human is a torso for 
the stick. Alva Noë (2009) reports that monkeys using a rake exhibit enlarged cortical 
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representations of the hand and arm and eventually treat the rake extension as a part of 
their body. The mind, ‘is a leaky organ, forever escaping its ‘natural’ confines and 
mingling shamelessly with body and with world’ (Clark, 1997, p.53). ‘Beginning in 
early childhood, we constantly think through things, actively engaging our surrounding 
material environment, but we rarely become explicitly aware of the action potential of 
this engagement in the shaping of our minds and brains.’ (Malafouris, 2013, p. 7). 
So my computerised calendar ‘is’ my memory. The plastic and metal materials, 
for example, of the computerised calender are actually of my mental processing and 
body schema. They are, literally, of ‘me’. Fortunately, unlike more vital organs that 
make up ‘me’, they are, to a large degree, expendable. But then, to a lesser degree, my 
fingers are also expendable in that I can still function without them, just in a different 
way. However, I would still find it extremely distressing if I were to lose my calendar, 
as an assemblage of my memory. The experience may not be as sharply painful as losing 
a finger, yet the stress it may invoke has just as much a physical consequence as the loss 
of a digit, just to different degrees and intensities. 
So what are the implications of this for the relationship between mental health 
and our environments? This extensive research and relatively new body of philosophy 
contests that we can latch onto what we think of as ‘external objects’ and incorporate 
them into our becoming, not just mentally (as a non-material concoction), but 
physically. In other words, the mental and the mind are just as physical and alive as the 
bio-logical. Also, the biological is not so easily determined from the lithological, 
topological, tropological, hydrological or even cosmological. If this is the case, and the 
body-mind extends beyond the confines of the organic skin, then it has many 
implications for how we think about mental health. It also has implications for how we 
treat our environments if we are of them.    
 
It should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a décor or 
backdrop that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people 
to the ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that 
is a haecceity; it is this assemblage that is defined by a longitude and a 
latitude, by speeds and affects, independently of forms and subjects, which 
belong to another plane. It is the wolf itself, and the horse, and the child, 
that cease to be subjects to become events, in assemblages that are 
inseparable from an hour, a season, an atmosphere, an air, a life. The street 
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enters into composition with the horse, just as the dying rat enters into 
composition with the air, and the beast and the full moon enter into 
composition with each other.  (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 289) 
 
 
Annotated Polaroids 54-55: Haecceities at different intensities of becoming. 
(Photos by Jamie) 
 
This should be read without a pause: the animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock. The 
becoming-evening, becoming-night of an animal, blood nuptials. Five 
o’clock is this animal! This animal is this place! “The thin dog is running in 
the road, this dog is the road,” cries Virginia Woolf. That is how we need 
to feel. Spatiotemporal relations, determinations, are not predicates of the 
thing but dimensions of multiplicities. The street is as much a part of the 
omnibus-horse assemblage as the Hand assemblage the becoming-horse of 
which it initiates. We are all five o’clock in the evening, or another hour, or 
rather two hours simultaneously, the optimal and the pessimal, noon-
midnight, but distributed in a variable fashion. The plane of consistency 
contains only haecceities, along intersecting lines. Forms and subjects are 
not of that world. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 290) 
 
Ansell-Pearson (1999) suggests that human behaviour (and I would add ‘mental health’) 
‘can no longer be localized in individuals …; but has to be treated … as a function of 
complex material systems which cut across individuals (assemblages) and which 
transverse … organismic boundaries (rhizomes)’ which requires ‘the articulation of a 
distributed conception of agency.’ (p. 171, cited in Tiessen, 2011, p. 137). This dynamic 
and specific propensity or arrangement of things (forces, materials and energy) is an 
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incipient form of agency (Hale, 2015; Bennett, 2010), one that seems apparent within 
the assemblages of this PhD and as produced from the inquiry itself. The emergent 
agencies produced as a result of the particular temporal assemblages of WiC’s inquiry 
process were/are a distinguishing phenomena of the mental health and wellbeing of the 
co-participants/co-(re)searchers. If we see ourselves, as Tiessen (2011, p. 132) 
examples,  
 
as consisting of the elements of various relationships rather than as discrete 
individuals, or as collective enunciations or expressions of environments, 
then our actions-our expressions of agency-become not so much instances 
of our own picking and choosing, but rather examples of our propensity to 
act and react in accordance with both our inherent capacities to act and be 
acted upon and our environment’s capacity to act and, more importantly, to 
act upon us. 
 
If this transversal approach to mental health and wellbeing extends the mind or the self 
into the environment, then it also extends the environment into the self. It brings the 
outdoors in. 
 
 
Snippet 18: ‘bring the outside in’ (Bumble) 
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We have explored together the idea that percepts, concepts and affects are very 
much ecological processes that are spread in a variety of ways in a variety of 
environments, both topographical (e.g. Liverpool ONE) and topological (e.g the fifth 
Duke of Westminster). Therefore, we need to conceive of mental health as an 
ecologically distributed process. We also need an accompanying pragmatics and 
practice of mental health as an ecologically distributed process. This is not of the same 
conception, pragmatics or practice as ecopsychology and ecotherapy though, as I have 
argued, due to different beliefs about immanence, nature and socio-political structure. I 
envision an ecologically distributed process as encompassing the material, energy and 
force of ‘everything’, not simply a ‘green and pleasant land’ (Nature 2/Nature 3). There 
is no generalizable topographical good or bad environment for our mental health and 
wellbeing that is set over and against us. There are only co-created temporal 
assemblages of environments that are contextualised and co-produced through 
embodied/enminded associations and material topological intra-relations. Therefore, 
mental health and wellbeing becomes ‘environ(mental) health and well-becoming’. 
Things, as haecceities, are only perceived as empirically and conceptually 
separate under the post-enlightenment paradigm but we are not ontologically separate. 
This means that I cannot provide an answer to the question of where or when mental 
health and wellbeing is as it is continuously morphing into something new. However, it 
is still perhaps one of the most apt ruminations to explore as it pulls us closer to an 
ethics of immanence.  
 
We are left then with environments, entities, and individuals that express 
and are expressions of a profound reciprocity. Taking this reciprocity 
seriously, in turn, might compel us to cling less vigorously to 
anthropocentric perspectives about what is and is not an agent, or what does 
or does not merit ethical consideration. (Tiessen, 2011, pp. 137-138). 
 
Clock time forces a fabula of all things but it’s never made up of a fabula. It’s 
constructed from a syuzhet. BBS’s embodied memory in Liverpool wasn’t a linear 
cause-and-effect fabula. It jumped through time, sequencing events sporadically 
dependent on contextual circumstances and co-emergent processes. For BBS the 
process of becoming anxious was in the form of a syuzhet. The most relevant therapy 
that might attend to this form of narrative is narrative therapy but it is currently thinking 
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with the fabula model. I suggest the inclusion of people-environment’s syuzhet’s as a 
beneficial addition. This would then include the non-linear temporal elements as well 
as the distributed material agency of the spatial elements.   
 
Relational adaptation.  
 
Environ(mental) health and well-becoming is a matter of the adaptability of 
temporal relations of assemblages. For example, the amount of energy an old growth 
forest utilises is minimal due to the adapted relations between things over (usually) long 
periods of time. Introduce a species that hasn't evolved in that space and see the energy 
levels shoot up due to the extra effort it takes to fit in. Time creates relational 
adaptations, the small things that then require less energy to affect and be affected. This 
is evident in entropy and trophic cascades. Humans may interfere with that relational 
adaptation but then so do volcanic action, tornadoes and bacteria. So it’s really not as 
simple as nature versus culture and it’s definitely not as simple as reconnecting to a 
romanticised imaginary hegemonic ideal! 
The capitalist production and appropriation of both space and subjectivity seems 
to increase the entropy levels of the relations, thereby increasing stress and tension in 
the temporality of the things themselves. Therefore, I firmly believe that the modern 
Western practice of neo-liberal capitalism is both the producer and product of 
environ(mental) ill-health.  
 
Scene four: There is no such thing as mental health 
 
Suman Fernando (1991) emphasised the point that various cultural concepts 
about mental health are contextual yet ‘Western thinking about [it] is dominated by 
psychiatry and propagated throughout the world as a ‘scientific’ approach’ (p. 69). 
Therefore, parity must be placed under erasure. A homogenised one-size-fits-all 
definition and model of mental health and wellbeing would always be oppressive as the 
dominating culture, class, gender, species, etc. would be the one that enforces it based 
on their own ethico-onto-epistemologies and agendas. Fernando (1991) suggests that a 
‘relativistic approach to (Western) conceptions about ‘mental’ illness would be the first 
step towards opening it up and improving communication with other ways of thinking,’ 
as it would ‘lead to a fluidity of thought (about illness) that is culture-sensitive and 
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flexible – and free of racist ideology.’ (pp. 70-71). I would add a class, gender, age and 
environment-sensitive to the list. 
Fernando (1991) continues, ‘[i]t is not biochemical causes but the balances of 
biochemical influences that are significant’ (p. 70, emphasis added). The underlying 
issues of mental health may be politically, socially, materially and environmentally 
relational as opposed to a pathologised ‘disorder/disability/disease/illness’ that is then 
treated with a drug-based intervention or cognitive psychoanalytic/psychotherapeutic 
cure that was primarily developed in response to the assumption that what is treatable 
is a malfunction of an isolated subject or psyche within a wider world. Utilising ideas 
from ‘the extended mind hypothesis’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) or enactivism stemming 
from ‘the embodied mind’ (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), for example, challenges 
the ‘equating of the boundaries of the physical body with those of the mind’ as they all 
tend to agree that ‘although the mind must be physically realized, it extends in 
substantive ways into the environment, its boundaries subject to constant negotiation 
and re-negotiation.’ (Parthemore & Whitby, 2013, p. 4). Parthemore and Whitby (2013) 
suggest there is an ‘increasingly vocal group’ of ‘brand new’ and ‘cutting edge’ 
scholarly work ‘within the extended-mind/enactive community’ in ‘the field of mental 
health’ (p. 4). They are referring to the conference Re-conceptualizing Mental Illness: 
The View from Enactive Philosophy and Cognitive Science at the University of Exeter 
where academics are beginning to move 
 
away from a model based on physical illness toward one that emphasizes 
each person’s history and embedding in a social context: such identified 
conditions as Asperger Syndrome and high-functioning autism may be 
better understood as instances of cognitive diversity rather than impairment: 
while conditions such as schizophrenia or manic-depressive disorder must 
be understood, and treated, as problems of the patient’s immediate 
community and not just the patient herself. Furthermore, they must be 
understood, and treated, in light of the patient’s history of interaction with 
her environment and not just the presenting symptoms. The risk of much 
contemporary treatment is that, like aspirin, it treats the symptoms and does 
not address the underlying issues. (Parthemore & Whitby, 2013, p. 4) 
 
286 
 
Perhaps a stark realisation is necessary in order to break the Cartesian mind-body 
illusion that has so dominated Western notions of mental health, one that McGann and 
Cummins (2013, p. 1) put so straightforwardly: ‘there is no coherent domain of mental 
health. There is health: the health of cells, of bodies, of families, of football teams, and 
of nations.’  McGann and Cummins ‘believe that the enactive framework that is 
emerging may be the best of the current stock of theoretical approaches to develop 
arguments that are free of the mental-physical dichotomy’ (2013, p. 1). ‘If the concept 
of “mind” does not stand in opposition to the concept of “body”, then there is little 
justification for distinguishing between “mental” and “physical” health.’ (McGann & 
Cummins, 2013, p. 2). In their concluding remarks, McGann and Cummins state ‘[t]here 
is thus no domain of mental health. There are questions of health, period.’ (2013, p. 4). 
If McGann and Cummins were to expand their reading to include the already-mentioned 
immanent process-relational philosophies of new materialisms and contemporary 
animisms in order to escape the anthropocentric humanist boundaries, I believe they 
would add these extra two ontologies of immanence to ‘develop arguments that are free 
of the mental-physical dichotomy’. Therefore, ‘the mind’ and ‘mental health’ may be 
better placed in our literature and practice as an extended body that may include an 
assortment of material processes to contribute to its agential assemblage. 
 
A Troika of Ontologies of Immanence 
 
 As de Vega clearly spells out, extended mind theories are fully compatible with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblages. 
 Deleuze and Guattari’s examples of wolfing are well-matched to many animist 
beliefs such as the Koyukon of Alaska’s notions of Owling. 
 Animist ideas of being of the world fit well with extended mind theories. 
 All three have a shared philosophy of immanence rather than transcendence and 
as such share ideas of intra-relational becoming.  
 Both animist and new materialist (especially feminist new materialist) discourse 
can add to externalist discourse by injecting a course of immanent ethics.  
 All three diffract modernist conceptions and perceptions of how mental health 
and wellbeing are understood and practiced in Western neoliberal democracies 
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in such a way that can open up lines of flight to aid more equitable ways of being 
(becoming) of the world. 
 
Mixing the troika of immanent philosophies with what I have gleaned from the WiC 
group outings, meetings, assemblages and play, one could say something like this:  
Mental health and wellbeing is an ecologically distributed physical process. It 
is spread perceptually, conceptually, affectively, politically, socially, materially, 
topologically, spatio-temporally and through the research itself (including the intra-
actions with you, the spect-actor). Mental health is an idea of the body which, in turn, 
is physically extended and topologically distributed in the environment, merging with 
a variety of other physical phenomena to co-produce a sense of agency and wellbeing 
and/or illbeing. And, as the politicised body is encultured, gendered and enclassed, 
mental health is physically influenced by any temporal material processes and 
phenomena that happen to be within the topological vicinity of the permeable body’s 
extended inorganic dermatological layer, such as newspapers, mobile phones, 
architecture, language, political decisions, concepts and space. Examples of this from 
the WiC project include POPS (producing subjectivities influenced by the capitalist 
production of space), tataus and graffiti (enacting forms of resistance, appropriation and 
LOVE), photos (co-producing topological memories to aid healing as a ‘quick fix’), 
emoji  (expressing emotion, promoting inequity but supporting social 
comprehension), video cameras and laptops (revealing multi-directional power 
relations), and concepts such as nature and green (playing on socio-economic status, 
hegemonic zeitgeists and temporal place-based contextuality). These are not 
conclusions. They are diffractive ruminations. 
I have a tendency to agree with Georges Perec. When exploring the ‘infra-
ordinary’ and the ‘endotic’, Perec (1973, cited in Highmore, 2002, p.178) insisted: 
 
What we need to question is bricks, concrete, glass, our table manners, our 
utensils, our tools, the way we spend our time, our rhythms. To question 
that which seems to have ceased forever to astonish us. […] Question your 
tea spoons.  
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So, ‘things – and not their representations – are said to flow through the mind’ 
(Brinkley, 1992, p. 247), from Lispector’s bulge of sparrows to Perec’s tea spoons, for 
they all form the DNA of your mental health and wellbeing. 
 
Scene six: A crisis of conception 
 
As discussed in (Intra-)Act 1, it has been suggested that we are undergoing a 
significant crisis of perception. After travelling along the streams and tributaries of this 
PhD thesis, I tend to disagree. It is a crisis of conception that we have administered. In 
the very same way that sexual conception brings forth other forms of life, so does mental 
conception. This has become more obvious as I have thought with philosophies of 
immanence. Mental conception, like sexual conception, co-produces (and is co-
produced by) physical phenomena. Once we accept that the Cartesian dualism of mind 
and body is simply illusory, so it becomes more evident that mental health is actually 
physical health. And if ‘mental health’ (and by association ‘the mind’) were to be 
considered ‘physical health’, what might be the repercussions? Firstly, the treatment 
would have to look more seriously at what we (in the West) think of as the external 
environment, politics, class and gender inequities, etc. as would prevention, as opposed 
to some inward looking psyche purely as a deterministic response to some innate genetic 
malfunction or innate genetic response to some environmental aesthetic. The ‘fix’ may 
be political rather than subjective. Secondly, the money distributed by the government 
would be more non-discriminatory, as currently there is a gaping mismatch in spending 
and allocation between mental and physical health prevention and cure. 
 
‘We are living in a space that is beyond the future. What strategies will the 
collective organism follow in order to escape this fabric of unhappiness?’ 
(Berardi, 2012a, p. 84) 
 
Those people who have the time or ‘leisure to develop and express’ their capacity for 
healthful notions of ‘nature’ or ‘the wilderness experience’ will be those people whose 
needs (economic, emotional, epistemological, etc.) have been more fully satisfied than 
those people who may be from a much more impoverished socio-economic background. 
In order to go for a countryside jaunt or a brisk stroll up a mountain (of one’s own 
volition) one first has to have a certain access to that type of perception and behaviour, 
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one that requires a certain privileging of one sort or another. Therefore, access issues, 
such as physiological (regarding mobility), economic, epistemological, topographical, 
racial, sexual, political, etc., may be of interest when considering any sort of therapeutic 
or mental health benefits of certain environments. However, just as a reminder, the 
impression that increasing access to countryside and mountains will benefit ones mental 
health generally, is not a/the finding of this thesis. 
 
And Back to the middle… 
 
I am a compost-ist, not a posthuman-ist: we are all compost, not posthuman 
[…] Perhaps the Dithering is a more apt name than either the Anthropocene 
or Capitalocene! The Dithering will be written into earth’s rocky strata, 
indeed already is written into earth’s mineralized layers. (Haraway, 2015, 
p. 161) 
 
The modernist world of transcendent reasoning needs to be placed sous rature. 
Anthropocentric ontologies have fallen into the Cartesian trap and have spread like a 
homogenising virus. One monocultural narrative seems to have infected the ecological 
thought and practice of such a large proportion of the world’s haecceities that we have 
entered ‘the Dithering’ (Haraway, 2015), perhaps never to emerge.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) would describe such anthropocentric 
ontologies as reflecting a commitment to “top down” reasoning that restricts 
the proliferation of emergent and “bottom up” understandings of the world; 
they would suggest that these “top down” ontologies prefer to reason 
according to constraining systems of reified abstractions and representation 
rather than according to the Spinozist understanding of the world as a field 
of forces that affect and are affected on a plane of immanence. (Tiessen, 
2007, para. 8) 
 
Yet, for me, the ‘bottom up’ ontological approach does more of the same as it is born 
out of the same arborescent lineage as the ‘top down’ approach. A rhizomatic, immanent 
conception doesn’t travel in perpendicular directions, as I have explained previously 
(see Mcphie, 2016); it’s flat.  
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No species, not even our own arrogant one pretending to be good 
individuals in so-called modern Western scripts, acts alone; assemblages of 
organic species and of abiotic actors make history, the evolutionary kind 
and the other kinds too. (Haraway, 2015, p. 159) 
 
It might be more beneficial to think with the term Capitalocene (Moore, 2014) due to 
its call to arms that the anthropocene doesn’t seem to emit in the same way. Plus, the 
Capitalocene is perhaps more easily conceived as an assemblage of forces and 
intensities that are malleable and as such may not seem so speciesist and therefore 
objectionable. In this way, finding lines of flight out of the Capitalocene might just 
stand a chance of survival. I will leave the penultimate words to Donna Haraway as she, 
among many others on this vast, vast, vast PhD journey, was an absolute challenge and 
pleasure to think with. 
 
The Anthropocene marks severe discontinuities; what comes after will not 
be like what came before. I think our job is to make the Anthropocene as 
short/thin as possible and to cultivate with each other in every way 
imaginable epochs to come that can replenish refuge. […] It matters which 
stories tell stories, which concepts think concepts. Mathematically, visually, 
and narratively, it matters which figures figure figures, which systems 
systematize systems. (Haraway, 2015, p. 160) 
 
Even nihilism matters.  
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